V.S. Gupta vs Punjab National Bank
2009 Latest Caselaw 4882 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                Crl.M.C. Nos. 923/2009 & 1654/2009
                           Reserved on:           18th November, 2009
%                          Date of Decision:      30th November, 2009
#     V.S. GUPTA                                        ..... Petitioner
!                                         Through: Mr. Sanjay Gupta,
                                          Adv.
                           Versus

      PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK                               ..... Respondent

                                 Through: Mr. U.C. Mittal & Mr.
                                 Ankur Mittal, Advs.

*     CORAM:
      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN

      1.     Whether the Reporters of local papers
             may be allowed to see the judgment?                        Yes

      2.     To be referred to the Reporter or not?                     Yes

      3.     Whether the judgment should be
             reported in the Digest?                                    Yes

: V.K. JAIN, J.

1. This is a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 for quashing criminal complaints No.1367/2008 and

1368/2008, filed by the respondent against the petitioner and others

under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act. Identical allegations

have been made in both the complaints, the only difference being the

date and amount of the cheques.

2. Complaints under Section 138 and 141 of Negotiable

Instrument Act read with Section 420 of IPC were filed by respondent

- Punjab National Bank against Padmini Technologies Ltd. and 30

others including the petitioner - V.S.Gupta. It was alleged in the

complaint that accused No.2 to 4 namely Shri Vivek Nagpal,

Managing Director, Shri Mahesh Malhotra, Commercial Manager,

Shri V.S.Gupta, Director of accused No.1 - Padmini Technologies Ltd.,

were carrying on the management and day to day affairs of Company

and were responsible for everything related to finances of the

company. It has been further alleged that accused No.1 which had

availed credit facilities from the complainant - Bank issued cheques

towards part payment of its liability. The cheques according to the

complainant were issued by accused No.3 acting for all other accused.

The aforesaid cheques when present to the Bank were returned

unpaid with remarks „funds insufficient‟. A notice demanding amount

of the cheque in question was sent to the accused persons. They

having failed to make payment, these complaints were filed.

3. Vide order dated 12.9.2008, the learned Metropolitan

Magistrate summoned all the accused only under Section 138 of

Negotiable Instrument Act.

4. The case of the petitioner is that since he had resigned as a

director of accused No.1 - Padmini Technologies Ltd., prior to issue of

cheques in question, he is not vicariously liable for the offence

committed by the Company. A certified copy of Form 32 has been

filed by the petitioner which shows that he had resigned as a Director

of Padmini Technologies Ltd. w.e.f. 30.4.2003. The petitioner has also

filed a certified copy of the order dated 24.2.2009 passed by learned

ACMM, North Delhi, whereby the petitioner was discharged in a

complaint initiated by Registrar under Section 209A(8) of Companies

Act against four persons including the petitioner V.S.Gupta. The

other persons against whom complaint was filed were Mr.Vivek

Nagpal, Managing Director and Mr.Praveen Kumar, whole Director

and Mr.Rajesh Sodhi, an officer of Padmini Technologies Ltd. During

the course of his judgment, the learned ACMM recorded that the

accused No.3 had resigned w.e.f. 30.4.2003 and since the offence was

committed on 30.5.2003, he was entitled to a discharge.

5. The petition has been opposed by the respondent. It has been

alleged in the reply the petitioner is the person who is responsible for

day to day affairs of Padmini Technologies Ltd., along with accused

No.2 and 3 was carrying on the management and day to day affairs of

Company and was responsible for everything related to finances of

the company. It has also been alleged that petitioner has been

representing the Company in O.A.No.481/1999 filed by the

respondent and in R.C.No.349/2009 arising out of the final order

passed in O.A.No.481/1999. It has been claimed that the appearance

of the petitioner as a representative of the Company has been

recorded by Debt Recovery Tribunal in various proceedings including

the proceeding dated 18.2.2005. It has been stated in the reply that

to attract liability under Section 141(1) of Negotiable Instruments Act,

the person concerned need not necessarily be a Director of the

Company and any person, who is incharge of and responsible to the

Company for conduct of its business will be deemed to be guilty of the

offence. It has also been claimed that it is the petitioner who had

been approaching the Bank for the compromise which was affected in

R.C.No.349/2009 pursuant to which cheque in question was issued by

Company. It has also been pointed out that it was the statement of

the petitioner which was recorded on behalf of the Company at the

time of compromise.

6. Section 141(1) of Negotiable Instruments Act reads as under:-

" 141. Offences by companies - (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence:

[Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.]

7. In support of his claim that he had resigned as a Director of

Padmini Technologies Ltd. w.e.f. 30.4.2003, the petitioner has placed

on record a certified copy of Form 32 issued by Registrar of

Companies. This document shows that the petitioner resigned as a

Director of Padmini Technologies Ltd.w.e.f. 30.4.2003. There is no

reason, not to accept an authentic public document such as certified

copy of Form 32. Therefore, for the purpose of this petition, I proceed

on the basis that the petitioner had actually resigned as a Director of

Padmini Technologies Ltd. w.e.f. 30.4.2003.

8. In Dr.(Mrs.) Sarla Kumar vs. Srei International Finance Ltd.,

2007 (2) NIJ 208 (Del), the petitioner sought quashing of the criminal

complaint against her on the ground that she had resigned from the

directorship of the concerned Company M/s.Sansar Braktols Pvt. Ltd.

on 20.8.1994 whereas cheques in question were issued in the year

2003 and she was not a Director of the Company at that time. In that

case, it was alleged in the complaint that the petitioner was a Director

of the Company and was incharge and responsible for day-to-day

conduct and business of the Company at the time of commission of the

offence. The petitioner placed on record the certified copy of Form 32

and claimed that she was not liable for the offence committed by the

Company. The petition was opposed by the respondent on the ground

that the question as to whether the petitioner had resigned or not was

a question of fact which should be gone into only at the stage of trial

and should not be dealt with in proceeding under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Single Judge noted that the

petitioner had filed certified copy issued by Registrar of Companies,

authenticity of which could not be disputed and such a document was

conclusive of the fact that the petitioner had resigned w.e.f. the date

mentioned in the document. Holding that the petitioner was not

incharge or responsible for day-to-day affairs of the Company and

could not be so, the petitions were allowed and the complaints were

quashed quo the petitioner. I am in full agreement with the view

taken in the above referred case as regards authenticity and

conclusive nature of certified copy of form 32. When such an

authentic and conclusive document is made available to the Court, it

would be an exercise of futility to again go into the same question to

find out as to whether the petitioner was a Director in the Company or

not at the time mentioned in the document. Such an exercise, if

undertaken, would not serve any useful purpose but would

unnecessarily drag the person concerned to a long drawn trial without

rendering any fruitful result.

9. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the

decision of this Court in O.P. Aggarwal vs. State and Anr., 2009

(108) DRJ, 494, where despite the petitioner having produced

certified copy of Form-32, the petition filed by him for quashing the

proceedings was dismissed. A perusal of the judgment would show

that in that case one of the co-accused Inder Verma had written a

letter dated 3rd August, 2006 to the complainant-bank stating that

petitioner Shri O.P. Aggarwal was, in fact, the Functional Head of the

company and that he had issued cheque in question under the

instruction and order of the petitioner Shri O.P. Aggarwal. There was

a reference to this letter in the complaint itself. Also, in his reply to

the legal notice, accused No. 7 has stated that he had signed the

letters, etc. on the orders and instructions of accused No. 2 who was

the owner/Functional Head of accused No. 1. It was, under these

circumstances, that this Court after noticing that to incur criminal

liability under Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, one need

not necessary be a Director of the company and could be any working

person of the company if he was otherwise in charge of affairs of the

company and responsible to it for the conduct of its business, held

that the question whether or not the petitioner was a person in

control of the affairs of the company, would only be proved after the

case had gone to trial

The facts of the present case being altogether different, the

above referred decision would not apply to this case.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly relied upon

recent decision of the Supreme Court in K.K. Ahuja vs. V.K. Vora and

Anr., 2009 (3) JCC (NI) 194. In the case before the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court, the appellant before the Hon‟ble Court had impleaded 9

persons as accused. They included, the company, its Chairman, four

Directors, Vice-President (Finance), General Manager and Deputy

General Manager. It was alleged in the complaint that "at the time of

the commission of offence, accused 2 to 9 were in-charge of and

responsible for the conduct of day to day business of accused No. 1"

and that therefore they were deemed to be guilty of offence under

Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and Section 420 of the

Indian Penal Code. The appellant also alleged that "respondents 2 to 9

were directly and actively involved in the financial dealings of the

company" and that the accused had failed to make payment of the

cheques which were dishonoured. In the pre- summoning evidence,

the appellant "reiterated that accused 2 to 9 were responsible for the

conduct of day to day business of first accused company at the time of

commission of offence".

11. Accused No.9, who was the first respondent before the Supreme

Court, filed two petitions for quashing the proceedings against him on

the ground that as Deputy General Manager, he was not in charge of

and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the

company. He also contended that merely stating that he was directly

and actively involved in the financial dealings of the accused or was

responsible for the conduct of day to day business would not be

sufficient to fasten criminal liability on him. He submitted that neither

the complaint nor the sworn statement gave any particulars of the

part played by him or part attributed to him in the alleged offence.

12. The High Court having quashed the summoning order of the

first respondent on the ground that he was not a signatory to the

cheque nor was the party to the decision to allow the cheques to be

dishonoured, the appellant approached the Hon‟ble Supreme Court

and contended that having regard to the specific averment in the

complaint that the accused 2 to 9 were in charge of and responsible

for the conduct of day to day business of the company, the order

summoning the first respondent could not have been quashed under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is also submitted that at the stage of

summoning the accused, when evidence was yet to be led by the

parties, the High Court committed an error in quashing the order

summoning the first respondent, on the basis of an unwarranted

assumption that the first respondent was not responsible for or

involved in the conduct of the business of the company. Reliance was

placed on the decision of this Court in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v.

Neeta Bhalla and Anr. 2005 (3) JCC (NI) 203: [2005 (8) SCC 89].

13. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, after considering its earlier

judgment in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) and

noticing that in that case, the Court had observed that only the

persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a

crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action under

Section 141 of the Act, also noticed the following observations made

in Saroj Kumar Poddar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2007 (1) JCC (NI), 60:

2007 (3) SCC 693,

"there is no averment in the complaint petitions as to how and in what manner the appellant was responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company or otherwise responsible to it in regard to its functioning.

He had not issued any cheque. How he is responsible for dishonour of the cheque has not been stated."

The Hon‟ble Court noted that in the later decisions, N.K. Wahi vs.

Shekhar Singh - 2007 (1) JCC (NI) 112:2007 (9) SCC 481, DCM

Financial Services Ltd. vs. J.N. Sareen-2008 (2) JCC (NI) 233: 20008

(8) SCC 1 and Ramraj Singh vs. State of M.P. 2009 (2) JCC (NI), 156:

2009 (5) SCALE 670, the Court had reiterated the principle laid down

in Saroj Kumar Poddar (supra).

14. After considering the above noted decisions, the Hon‟ble Court

inter alia observed as under:

"The prevailing trend appears to require the complainant to state how a Director who is sought to be made an accused, was in charge of the business of the company, as every director need not be and is not in charge of the business of the company. If that is the position in regard to a director, it is needless to emphasise that in the case of non-director officers, there is all the more the need to state what his part is with regard to conduct of business of the company and how and in what manner he is liable.

15. The Hon‟ble Court further observed as under:

"The scheme of the Act, therefore is, that a person who is responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company and who is in charge of business of the

company is vicariously liable by reason only of his fulfilling the requirements of Sub-section (1). But if the person responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company, was not in charge of the conduct of the business of the company, then he can be made liable only if the offence was committed with his consent or connivance or as a result of his negligence.

11. The criminal liability for the offence by a company under Section 138, is fastened vicariously on the persons referred to in Sub- section (1) of Section 141 by virtue of a legal fiction. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly. Penal statutes providing constructive vicarious liability should be construed much more strictly. When conditions are prescribed for extending such constructive criminal liability to others, courts will insist upon strict literal compliance. There is no question of inferential or implied compliance. Therefore, a specific averment complying with the requirements of Section 141 is imperative. As pointed out in K. Srikanth Singh v. North East Securities Ltd. 2007 (12) SCC 788, the mere fact that at some point of time, an officer of a company had played some role in the financial affairs of the company, will not be sufficient to attract the constructive liability under Section 141 of the Act."

16. On the question as to who would be persons responsible to the

company for conduct of its business, the Hon‟ble Court inter alia held

as under:

"A company though a legal entity can act only through its Board of Directors. The settled position is that a Managing Director is prima facie in charge of and responsible for the company's business and affairs and can be prosecuted for offences by the company. But insofar as other directors are concerned, they can be prosecuted only if they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business. A combined reading of Sections 5 and 291 of Companies Act, 1956 with the definitions in clauses (24), (26), (30), (31), (45) of Section 2 of that Act would show

that the following persons are considered to be the persons who are responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company :

(a) the managing director/s;

(b) the whole-time director/s;

(c) the manager;

(d) the secretary;

(e) any person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the Board of directors of the company is accustomed to act;

(f) any person charged by the Board with the responsibility of complying with that provision (and who has given his consent in that behalf to the Board); and

(g) where any company does not have any of the officers specified in clauses (a) to (c), any director or directors who may be specified by the Board in this behalf or where no director is so specified, all the directors.

It follows that other employees of the company, cannot be said to be persons who are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company.

15. Section 141 uses the words "was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company". It is evident that a person who can be made vicariously liable under Sub-section (1) of Section 141 is a person who is responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company and in addition is also in charge of the business of the company. There may be many directors and secretaries who are not in charge of the business of the company at all. The meaning of the words "person in charge of the business of the company" was considered by this Court in Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.N. Mehta [1971 (3) SCC 189] followed in State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand [1981 (2) SCC 335] and Katta Sujatha v. Fertiliser & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. [2002 (7)SCC655] . This Court held that the words refer to a person who is in

overall control of the day to day business of the company. This Court pointed out that a person may be a director and thus belongs to the group of persons making the policy followed by the company, but yet may not be in charge of the business of the company; that a person may be a Manager who is in charge of the business but may not be in overall charge of the business; and that a person may be an officer who may be in charge of only some part of the business.

16. Therefore, if a person does not meet the first requirement, that is being a person who is responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, neither the question of his meeting the second requirement (being a person in charge of the business of the company), nor the question of such person being liable under Sub-section (1) of Section 141 does not arise. To put it differently, to be vicariously liable under Sub- section (1) of Section 141, a person should fulfill the 'legal requirement' of being a person in law (under the statute governing companies) responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company and also fulfill the 'factual requirement' of being a person in charge of the business of the company.

17. Therefore, the averment in a complaint that an accused is a director and that he is in charge of and is responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, duly affirmed in the sworn statement, may be sufficient for the purpose of issuing summons to him. But if the accused is not one of the persons who falls under the category of 'persons who are responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company' (listed in para 14 above), then merely by stating that 'he was in charge of the business of the company' or by stating that 'he was in charge of the day to day management of the company' or by stating that he was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company', he cannot be made vicariously liable under Section 141(1) of the Act."

17. As regards officers of the company, the Hon‟ble Court inter alia

held as under:

"It should, however, be kept in view that even an officer who was not in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company can be made liable under Sub-section (2) of Section 141. For making a person liable under Section 141(2), the mechanical repetition of the requirements under Section 141(1) will be of no assistance, but there should be necessary averments in the complaint as to how and in what manner the accused was guilty of consent and connivance or negligence and therefore, responsible under Sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the Act."

18. The legal position under Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments

Act was summarized as under:

"(i) If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time. This is because the prefix `Managing' to the word `Director' makes it clear that they were in charge of and are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company.

(ii) In the case of a director or an officer of the company who signed the cheque on behalf of the company, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company or make any specific allegation about consent, connivance or negligence. The very fact that the dishonoured cheque was signed by him on behalf of the company, would give rise to responsibility under Sub-section (2) of Section

141.

(iii) In the case of a Director, Secretary or Manager (as defined in Section 2(24) of the Companies Act) or a person referred to in clauses (e) and (f) of Section 5 of Companies Act, an averment in the complaint that he was in charge of, and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company is necessary to bring the case under Section 141(1). No further averment would be necessary in the complaint, though some particulars will be desirable. They can also be made liable under Section 141(2) by making necessary averments relating to consent and connivance or negligence, in the complaint, to bring the matter under that Sub- section.

(iv) Other Officers of a company can not be made liable under Sub-section (1) of Section

141. Other officers of a company can be made liable only under Sub-section (2) of Section 141, be averring in the complaint their position and duties in the company and their role in regard to the issue and dishonour of the cheque, disclosing consent, connivance or negligence."

19. In respect of employees of the company, the Hon‟ble Court

further noted as under:

"If a mere reproduction of the wording of Section 141(1) in the complaint is sufficient to make a person liable to face prosecution, virtually every officer/employee of a company without exception could be impleaded as accused by merely making an averment that at the time when the offence was committed they were in charge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct and business of the company. This would mean that if a company had 100 branches and the cheque issued from one branch was dishonoured, the officers of all the 100 branches could be made accused by simply making an allegation that they were in charge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. That would be absurd and not intended under the Act. As the trauma, harassment and hardship of a criminal proceedings in such cases, may be more serious than the ultimate punishment, it is not

proper to subject all and sundry to be impleaded as accused in a complaint against a company, even when the requirements of Section 138 read and Section 141 of the Act are not fulfilled."

20. Holding that a Deputy General Manager is not a person who is

responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the

company, the Hon‟ble Court held that since he does not fall under any

of the categories (a) to (g) listed in Section 5 of the Companies Act,

the question whether he was in charge of the business of the company

or not is irrelevant and he can be made liable only under Section

141(2) for which necessary averments relating to

consent/connivance/negligence should have been made. Finding no

such averment, the appeal filed by the complainant was dismissed.

21. Coming to the present case, as noted earlier, certified copy of

Form-32 shows that petitioner was not a Director of the company on

the date cheques in question were issued. Though it was alleged in

the complaint, accused No.4, V.S. Gupta was a Director of the

company, that averment is obviously incorrect as he had already

resigned from Directorship on 30th April, 2003.

22. Though it has been alleged in para 3 of the complaint that

accused Nos. 2 to 4, which includes the petitioner, he being accused

No.4 in the complaint, were carrying on the management & day to day

affairs of the company and were responsible for everything related to

finances of the company and it is further alleged that they had every

knowledge of transaction in question and were also aware of the final

order/subsequent compromise pursuant to which cheques in question

were given to the complainant-bank, nowhere does the complaint

disclose as to, if the petitioner was not a Director of the company,

what was the status he enjoyed in the company at the time of issue of

cheques in question. In fact, the whole case of the complainant

against the petitioner is based on the averment that he was a Director

of the company, and therefore, he was carrying on management and

day to day affairs of the company and was also responsible for its

finances. This is not the case of the complainant anywhere in the

complaint that the petitioner, by virtue of a position other than a

Director in the company, was instrumental behind issue of cheques in

question to the complainant-bank. During the arguments, it was

submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that petitioner

was a consultant with the company. Though there is no such

allegation in the complaint, assuming the statement made by the

learned counsel for the respondent to be correct, a consultant cannot

be said to be a person in charge of and responsible to the company for

conduct of the business of the company. There is no averment in the

complaint that decision to issue cheques or to get them dishonoured

was taken on the directions or at the behest of the petitioner.

There is no averment in the complaint that cheques in question

were issued and dishonoured with the consent/connivance or

negligence of the petitioner.

23. In the case of K.K. Ahuja, the petitioner was Deputy General

Manager of the bank and there was a specific allegation in the

complaint that he was person in charge of and responsible for day to

day business of the company and was directly and actively involved in

its financial dealings. In the present case, the petition does not

disclose true status of the petitioner in the company and makes a false

averment that he was its Director on the date of commission of

offence. I fail to understand how a consultant could be a person in

charge of day to day affairs of the company and how he could be said

to be responsible for conduct of business of the company. It has been

alleged by the respondent that the petitioner has been appearing as

authorized representative of the company before the Recovery

Tribunal and that his presence has been recorded on a number of

hearings. Even if that be so, that does not make the petitioner a

person in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of the

business of the company. Any employee can represent the company

before a judicial forum, as its Authorized Representative. To appoint

someone as Authorized Representative of a company only a Power of

Attorney/Authorization needs to be given to him. Merely from

appearing on behalf of the company, as its Authorized Representative,

one does not become a person in-charge of and responsible to the

company for conduct of the business of the company. The position

would be much weaker in the case of a person who is not even an

employee of the company. It has also been alleged in the complaint

that the petitioner as well as accused Nos. 2 and 3 had submitted a

compromise proposal to the bank pursuant to which settlement was

arrived at and the cheques were issued. Para 8 of the complaint shows

that compromise proposal was approved on 28 th August, 2007. The

proposal must have been given earlier than that date. The cheques in

question were issued in July, 2008. Since the petitioner had ceased to

be a Director of the company more than four years before that, it is

obvious that he was acting only as a consultant and not as a Director

of the company at that time. Merely from submitting the compromise

on behalf of the company alongwith the Managing Director and

Commercial Manager of the company, the petitioner did not become

person in-charge of and responsible to the company for conduct and

its business.

24. Since the petitioner was not a Director, Secretary, Manager or

any other person falling under any of the categories a to g listed in

Section 5 of Companies Act, at the time of commission of the offence,

he could not have been a person incharge of the business of the

company, within the meaning of Section 141(1) of Negotiable

Instruments Act.

25. Since there is no allegation that cheques were issued and

dishonoured with the consent or connivance of the petitioner or that

issue and dishonour of the cheques was otherwise attributable to any

neglect on his part, the case of the complainant as regards the

petitioner is not covered even under sub-section (2) of Section 141 of

Negotiable Instruments Act. Since a Consultant is not even an officer

of the company, he having been engaged only on contractual basis, it

is doubtful whether he would be covered even under sub-section 2 of

Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act. I, however, need not go

into this aspect as there is no allegation in the complaint imputing the

requisite consent, connivance or neglect to the petitioner.

26. For the reasons given above, I am of the considered view that,

no offence under Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act read with

Section 138 thereof is made out against the petitioner on the basis of

the complaints filed by the respondent. The proceedings initiated

against the petitioner, therefore, cannot be allowed to continue. The

complaints, subject matters of these petitions, to the extent they

pertain to the petitioner are hereby quashed. It is made clear that

quashing of complaint against the petitioner would not affect

prosecution of other accused persons.

(V.K.JAIN) JUDGE NOVEMBER 30, 2009 bg