Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 2196 Del
Judgement Date : 21 May, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ FAO (OS) No. 278/2007, CM Nos.10094/2007 (for stay
by the appellant); 13082/2007 (for stay by the
respondent), 13083/2007 (cross-objections),
13084/2007 (condonation of delay in filing cross-
objections) & 15652/2007 (for directions by the
appellant)
Reserved on : 14.05.2009
% Date of decision : 21.05.2009
AJAY KUMAR JAIN ... ... ... ... ... ...APPELLANT
Through : Mr. Aman Lekhi, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Jaspreet S. Rai, Advocate.
-VERSUS-
BALJIT KAUR JAIN ... ... ... ... ... RESPONDENT
Through : Mr. Adhip Iyer & Ms. Mandira Mitra,
Advs. along with the Respondent.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in the Digest? No
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The respondent / wife filed a suit under Section 18, 23
and 28 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,
1956 against the appellant / husband seeking grant of
maintenance at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month with
the declaration to have a right of residence in her
matrimonial home on the first floor of D - 291, Defence
Colony, New Delhi ( hereinafter referred to as, 'the suit
property' ) as also for restraining the appellant from
dispossessing her from the said premises. The
respondent also filed an application for interim
maintenance of Rs.30,000/- per month as well as for
interim relief in respect of the suit property. The suit
and the interim applications were contested by the
appellant. In terms of the impugned order dated
02.07.2007 apart from the admitted rental income of
Rs.22,500/- per month of the respondent, the appellant
was directed to pay a further sum of Rs.22,500/- per
month as interim maintenance. A further direction was
issued restraining the appellant from alienating or
selling off his portion of the suit property though the
order would not stand in the way of partition of the said
property by metes and bounds in view of pendency of
the partition suit between the appellant and his brother.
2. The appellant has impugned this order by filing the
present appeal. The respondent has filed cross-
objections. In the cross-objections, the respondent has
sought to set up a case that her right of residence in the
matrimonial home had been made contingent and
subordinate to the appellant's right to affect partition of
the suit property.
3. The dispute is an unfortunate one where the parties are
well educated and have settled children, but do not
seem to be able to live together. The appellant is
stated to be 60 years of age while the respondent is 54
years old.
4. It is in view thereof that right from the inception of the
appeal in the year 2007 itself, various Benches made an
endeavour to see that an overall settlement could be
arrived at. The matter was also referred for mediation.
However, none of the proceedings for settlement proved
to be successful. We may note that even after the
mediation proceedings failed, endeavour was made for
settlement, but even the same proved to be fruitless.
On the other hand, we found on 04.05.2009 that in the
middle of the process of an endeavour for settlement,
there was a change of counsel by the respondent. We
did not appreciate such conduct of the respondent and,
therefore, found it appropriate to direct that the earlier
counsel should also remain present, as he was in the
know of what endeavour was made for settlement. On
the next date of hearing, i.e., 13.05.2009, the earlier
counsel appeared and the new counsel, who had been
engaged, sought to be recused. Since no settlement
was possible, we proceeded to hear the matter as the
earlier counsel stated he would make the submissions.
On the learned senior counsel for the appellant
concluding his submissions, learned counsel for the
respondent again sought one day's accommodation to
make his submissions with the objective of finding out if
some settlement was possible. However, on
14.05.2009, we again found that the respondent was
only vacillating and prevaricating and, thus, no
settlement was possible. We, thus, asked the counsel
for the respondent to proceed with the arguments. At
this stage, learned counsel for the respondent stated
that the respondent wanted to engage a Senior
Advocate. We declined such a request for adjournment
in the middle of the hearing as we considered the
request inappropriate and only a dilatory tactic, which
had resulted in the pendency of the appeal already for
two years and reserved the judgment.
5. We have perused the pleadings and considered the
submissions of the parties. At this interim stage, there
are only two aspects, which require consideration :
(i) the extent of maintenance, which should be paid to the respondent to maintain her lifestyle in the manner she has been used to; and
(ii) the nature of protection necessary for the matrimonial home, which was stated to be in the suit property.
6. In so far as the aspect of maintenance is concerned,
learned Single Judge has observed in para 8 of the
impugned order that the respondent admitted to having
rental income of Rs.22,500/- per month. The offer of the
appellant that he was willing to purchase another house
was declined by the respondent and, thus, considering
the residence available with the respondent and her
rental income, an additional sum of interim
maintenance of Rs.22,500/- per month was directed to
be paid.
7. We were informed that the interim maintenance was
being paid by the appellant to the respondent at the
rate of Rs.12,500/- per month. Learned senior counsel
for the appellant explained that the reason for the same
was that even on the Original Side, endeavour was
made by learned Single Judge to arrive at a settlement
and it had been pointed out that some part of the rental
income being received by the respondent appeared to
have inadvertently escaped notice in the impugned
order. In this behalf, the impugned order refers to the
rental income of Rs.22,500/- per month of the
respondent. This income relates to a shop in DLF City
Centre let out for Rs.45,000/- per month, which is owned
in equal share by the appellant and the respondent and
both were getting equal share in the rent. The
respondent actually had another 7% share in the rentals
received in respect of commercial flat at Kanchenjunga
Building of Rs.9,800/- per month (i.e., approximately
Rs.10,000/-). It is in these circumstances that
Rs.12,500/- per month was being paid by the appellant
after taking into account Rs.10,000/- per month being
received by the respondent as rent from the flat in
Kanchenjunga Building. Even the respondent has
admitted in the plaint and in the interim application to
be carrying out a tailoring business, though she claims
that the same is not yielding any profits.
8. We find that learned Single Judge has taken note of
rental income of Rs.22,500/- per month. Learned Single
Judge has found that an additional amount of
Rs.22,500/- per month should be paid by the appellant.
The rent from Kanchenjunga Building approximately
Rs.10,000/- appears to have escaped notice and the
total rent being realized is Rs.22,500/- + Rs.9,800/-,
which is equal to Rs.32,300/-. This appears to be also
the reason that on perusal of the suit file, it is found that
on 29.01.2009, a direction has been issued that the
appellant would continue to pay interim maintenance of
Rs.12,500/- per month. There is, of course, an
allegation made during the court proceedings by the
respondent that the tenant of the shop in Gurgaon is
absconding. If the complete rent is taken into account,
then the interim maintenance to be paid should be
Rs.12,500/- per month and we order accordingly.
9. The real bone of contention is the suit property. The
respondent is adamant that the same is her matrimonial
home and she is not willing to shift to another place. On
the other hand, it has been pointed out by learned
counsel for the appellant that a suit for partition in
respect of the said complete property had been filed by
the brother of the appellant as both the appellant and
his brother own 50% share each and preliminary decree
had been passed. The question of the mode of division
or sale of property was pending consideration before
the competent court and it was in view thereof that the
appellant had offered to shift the respondent to another
house.
10. Learned Single Judge in the impugned order has laid
great emphasis on the fact that both the appellant and
the respondent had been originally residing in the suit
property being the first floor. We, however, feel that a
matrimonial home is a place where both the parties
seek to reside and the object of protecting the same is
that the wife should not be left homeless by any action
of the husband. We are in agreement with the
submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the
wife cannot have a right of living in a particular property
and the same cannot become a clog on the property
denying the right of the appellant to deal with the
property when he is willing to provide an alternative
matrimonial home. It has to be appreciated that the
claim of the respondent is not to any title, but of
residence in the home. The appellant and his brother
seek separation. The brother of the appellant cannot be
denied his right to realize the best value for his share of
the property or get enjoyment of a demarcated share.
The brother of the appellant owes no obligation to the
respondent. We are, thus, unable to agree with the
conclusion of learned Single Judge that there should be
a blanket injunction against the appellant restraining
him from alienating or selling the suit property other
than partitioning it by way of metes and bounds. In
fact, there is no merit in the cross-objections in this
behalf of the respondent.
11. We feel the appropriate order to be passed is that the
rights of the appellant and his brother have to be
determined in the suit for partition and if the eventuality
arises that the complete property consisting of the plot
and the superstructure raised thereon has to be sold, so
be it so long as there is proper accommodation made
available to the respondent for her residence. The
appellant cannot be worse of than the respondent and,
thus, if both the appellant and the respondent are
unable to live together, then the proceeds from the sale
of the said property should be dealt with in such a
manner that 50% of the said proceeds should be utilized
to purchase a flat by the appellant in his name, but for
the benefit of the respondent. The appellant has 50%
share in the said property and, thus, if the plot and the
structure raised thereon are sold for 'X' price, then the
share of the appellant would be 'X/2". The appellant,
thus, must make available accommodation, i.e., a
residential flat of a value of 'X/4' for the benefit and
occupation of the respondent and the respondent
should not be dispossessed from the said property at
the first floor till such alternative arrangement is made.
The respondent cannot, however, insist on residing in
the suit property alone. It is no doubt true that a flat,
which could be purchased for the total price to be
realized by the appellant, would be a larger and better
located flat than of half the value. That is, however, an
inevitable result of the strained relationship between
the appellant and the respondent where they would like
to live in separate accommodation and, thus, our
direction will ensure that 50% of the amount realized by
the appellant in case of sale is utilized for purchase of
an immovable property by the appellant for the benefit
of the respondent, though the title would remain with
the appellant. The flat can be in any South Delhi colony.
12. We may notice at this stage that on 28.01.2009, it was
pointed out to us that there were certain other
properties including a property at Kasauli, which was
owned by other colaterals of the appellant, but the
respondent had keys of the same. Learned counsel for
the respondent on instructions from the respondent
present in Court had stated that there was no difficulty
in depositing the keys. The keys were subsequently
deposited, but it transpired that the property at Kasauli
continued to be occupied by the mother of the
respondent, though neither the respondent nor her
mother had any right to occupy it or title to the same.
This was found to be clearly in violation of the
understanding and undertaking given by the respondent
and learned counsel for the respondent had stated that
necessary corrective measures would be taken. We
expect that the corrective measures would have been
taken by now. The keys deposited should be placed in
the Original Side file for necessary directions by the
learned Single Judge.
13. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the aforesaid
extent and the impugned order stands modified and the
cross-objections, the application for condonation of
delay in filing cross-objections and the interim
application stand disposed of.
14. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
May 21, 2009 SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA, J. madan
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