V.S. Tyagi vs The Central Administrative ...
2009 Latest Caselaw 315 Del

                           Unreportable
*             IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                         W.P.(C) No. 8042/2002

                                            Decided on : January 30, 2009

% V.S.Tyagi                                 . . . Petitioner

                     Through :              Petitioner in person

              VERSUS

The Central Administrative Tribunal & Ors.         . . . Respondents

                     Through          Mr. Kumar Rajesh Singh Adv. for
                                      the Respondent.

CORAM :-

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT

      1.      Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed
              to see the Judgment?
      2.      To be referred to the Reporter or not?
      3.      Whether the Judgment should be reported in the Digest?

A.K. SIKRI, J. (ORAL)

1. The petitioner herein was placed under suspension on 29.7.1990.

Charge sheet dated 16/17.8.1982 was served upon him and after holding

the enquiry he was dismissed from service vide order dated 12.6.1989.

The petitioner challenged the aforesaid enquiry and the punishment

imposed upon him by filing O.A No.2126/1990. This was allowed by the

Tribunal vide order dated 24.1.1992 and the punishment of dismissal was

set aside. He was directed to be reinstated in service. Ultimately, he was

taken back in service on 18.12.1992. The respondents herein challenged

the order of the Tribunal by filing Special Leave Petition and after grant

of leave, the said SLP, was allowed and matter remanded back to the

tribunal for fresh consideration. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties

again allowed the O.A and set aside the dismissal order as well as order of

the appellate authority vide its judgment dated 29.5.1997. It is the

implementation of this judgment which has given rise to various

proceedings as would be noted hereafter. We first reproduce the relevant

directions contained in the said judgment while allowing the O.A of the

petitioner herein:

"(i) The impugned orders of disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority are quashed.

(ii) Since the petitioner has already been reinstated by order dated 18.12.1992, the petitioner is entitled to consequential benefits including arrears, if not paid, for the period between 12.6.1989 to 18.12.1992.

(iii) Respondents shall comply with this order within three months from today".

2. Since the petitioner was not given consequential benefits and the

arrears of salary as per directions given in para-ii (quoted above and

extracted above), the petitioner filed C.P.No.168/1998. In this contempt

petition respondent appeared and sought time to deposit the amount and

orders dated 24.12.1998 were passed granting 10 days time for this

purpose. While this contempt petition was still pending, the petitioner

filed another C.P.No.66/1999 which was dismissed vide orders dated

9.3.1999 on the ground that second contempt petition was not permissible

when earlier contempt petition No.168/1998 was still pending.

Thereafter, first contempt petition i.e. C.P.No.168/1998 came up for

hearing on 8.4.1999 and was dismissed by passing following order:

"CP 66/99 already stands rejected vide order dated 9.3.1999 and should have been deleted from the cause list.

2. In regard to CP 168/98, the respondents have filed MA 85/99, in para 3 of which, list of various payments to be made to the applicant has been mentioned.

3. If any grievance still survives in respect of payments, it will be open to applicant to agitate the same through appropriate original proceedings if so advised in accordance with law.

4. CP 168/98 is rejected, and notice issued to the alleged contemnors are discharged".

3. It is clear from the above that after taking note of the various

payments which were made by the respondents to the petitioner, the

notice in the contempt petition was discharged and while doing so, the

tribunal specifically mentioned that if any grievance still survives in

respect of payments it would be open to the petitioner to agitate the same

("through appropriate proceedings"). The petitioner did not challenge this

order. He did not even file fresh OA. Instead the petitioner filed Review

Application No.118/99 and another Contempt Petition No.90/2000. The

review application was dismissed vide orders dated 25.9.2001 along with

Contempt Petition No.90/2000. The petitioner at that stage did not

challenge orders dated 25.9.2001 instead he filed another Review

Application namely R.A.No.380/2001 which was also dismissed vide

orders dated 24.12.2001 and inter alia observing as under:-

"It is quite interesting to note that the applicant has been filing application-after-application either in the form of OAs or CPs or RAs on one pretext or another which tantamount to abuse of process of law and such a practice is highly condemnable. Applicant‟s last CP No.90/2000, along with RA NO. 118/1999, was dismissed by our order dated 25.9.2001 as we found nothing survived to initiate action for contempt against the respondents. Since we do not find any error apparent on the face of the record in our judgment dated 25.9.2001 in CP No.90/2000 we have no valid ground to entertain the present RA and the same is summarily rejected. However, we would like to warn the applicant to approach the appropriate judicial forum, if so advised, only if he has got any fresh cause of action".

4. After getting the aforesaid dismissal order, the petitioner has filed

the present writ petition in which he has challenged orders dated

25.9.2001 in CP NO.90/2000 and RA No.118/99 and orders dated

6.12.2001 in RA No.380/2001.

5. In so far as orders dated 6.12.2001 in RA No. 380/2001 are

concerned, we do not find any fault with the same. The learned Tribunal

rightly observed that it was not open to the petitioner to keep on filing one

review application after other. As far as order in CP No.90/2000 are

concerned, the same was not maintainable in view of the orders passed in

CP No.168/98. If the petitioner was aggrieved by the orders dated

8.4.1999 in CP No.168/98, the remedy for him was to challenge those

orders and not to file fresh Contempt Petition. Therefore, contempt

petition No.90/2000 was rightly dismissed.

6. In so far as orders dated 8.4.1999 in CP No.168/1998 are

concerned, no doubt the petitioner did not challenge that order by filing a

writ petition. Instead he filed Review Application No.118/1999 which

was dismissed by orders dated 25.9.2001 and that order is impugned in

the present writ petition. When vide orders dated 8.4.1999, petitioner was

granted liberty to file substantive OA if any grievance was still left,

appropriate cause of action for the petitioner was to file a fresh OA.

However, since orders dated 25.9.2001 passed in review application are

on merits whereby the grievance of the petitioner for non-implementation

of judgment dated 29.5.1997 is considered and rejected and the said order

is under challenge before us, we would like to deal with the question on

merits.

7. With this background we revert back to the directions which were

issued while allowing the OA of the petitioner and setting aside the

dismissal orders vide judgment dated 29.5.1997. The controversy raised

and the interpretation on the direction No.2, we may recapitulate that the

petitioner was initially suspended on 29.7.1980. He was dismissed from

service w.e.f 12.6.1989 and was reinstated on 18.12.1992. The petitioner

claims that when the order of dismissal is set aside he could be entitled to

salary for the entire period from 29.7.1980 to 18.12.1992. On the other

hand the case of the respondent is that as per the directions given by the

tribunal in its judgment dated 29.5.1997, the respondent would be entitled

to arrears of salary only w.e.f. 12.6.1989 to 18.12.1992 as pointed above,

both the parties are making their respective arguments on the basis of

direction No.2 given in the said order and the outcome of the case would

depend upon the interpretation thereafter. We are, therefore, reproduced

that directions once again for ready reference and findings:

"Since the petitioner has already been reinstated by order dated 18.12.1992, the petitioner is entitled to consequential benefits including arrears, if not paid, for the period between 12.6.1989 to 18.12.1992".

8. It is clear that the tribunal directed that the petitioner would be

entitled to "consequential benefits including arrears, if not paid, for the

period between 12.6.1989 to 18.12.1992", whereas the petitioner contends

that the expression „consequential benefits‟ would include all the benefits

and therefore when the order of dismissal is set aside, the petitioner

should be held entitled to the salary w.e.f. 29.7.1980. On the other hand

counsel for the respondent submits that no doubt petitioner would be

entitled to all other consequential benefits which were even given to him

but so far as arrears of salary are concerned, the tribunal specifically

limited the period from 12.6.1989 to 18.12.1992 and therefore, the

petitioner shall not be entitled to arrears of salary for the period prior to

12.6.1989.

9. The aforesaid directions shall have to be read keeping in view the

context in which they were made. As noted above, OA filed by the

petitioner was allowed for the first time vide orders dated 24.1.1992 and

implementing those orders, the petitioner had filed contempt petition,

petitioner was reinstated in service on 18.12.1992 though in the

meantime, the respondents had filed Special Leave Petition challenging

the orders dated 24.1.1992. Thus, the petitioner was taken back in service

in pursuance to the first judgment dated 24.1.1992 though it was set aside

by the Supreme Court and matter was remanded back to the tribunal for

fresh consideration. It is in this backdrop when the OA was decided and

allowed vide judgment dated 25.9.2001, with the aforesaid directions

came to be passed. Since the petitioner was already reinstated in service

we.f.18.12.1992 and was not thrown out from service even after Supreme

Court had allowed the appeal of the respondent against the first judgment,

the tribunal had not mentioned the period between 12.6.1989 to

18.12.1992 i.e., from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement. It

appears that only because of this reason and by way of abundant caution

in the order dated 29.5.1997 the period of 12.6.1989 to 18.12.1992 was

also specifically mentioned otherwise the order is clear while setting aside

the dismissal, the tribunal has held that the petitioner shall be entitled to

"consequential benefits." If the said expression is to be given its fullest

meaning, the petitioner would be entitled to full salary for the period from

29.7.1980 to 12.6.1989 as well otherwise a period when the petitioner

remained under suspension on the setting aside of the dismissal. Even the

normal consequence is to allow full salary for the intervening period.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that merely because the period from

12.6.1989 to 18.12.1992 is mentioned, the intention was not to limit the

arrears of pay only of that period are confirmed as fortified by the

expression "include the use" would not mean that the arrears would be

only for the period mentioned thereafter and the expression „consequential

benefits‟ is to be interpreted to mean all benefits to which the petitioner

would be entitled to. According to us, this can be the only intention of the

directions given in the impugned judgment dated 25.9.2001, the tribunal

has considered the directions without keeping in mind the expression of

words „consequential benefits‟. We are, therefore, set aside order dated

25.9.2001 and hold that the petitioner shall be entitled to full salary for the

period from 29.7.1980 to 12.6.1989. Arrears of salary shall be computed

and given to the petitioner within two months from the date of the receipt

of copy of this judgment.

No costs.

A.K.SIKRI (JUDGE)

SURESH KAIT (JUDGE)

JANUARY 30, 2009 ib