Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 117 Del
Judgement Date : 16 January, 2009
"REPORTABLE"
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL. L.P. No. 54/2004
Date of decision : January 16, 2009
# STATE ..... Petitioner
! Through : Mr. Lovkesh Sawhney, APP
SI Krishan Kumar
Versus
$ ASHU BANSAL & ANR. ..... Respondents
^ Through : Mr. Arvind Nigam, Adv. with
Mr. Manoj Taneja, Adv.
%
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ARUNA SURESH
(1) Whether reporters of local paper may be
allowed to see the judgment?
(2) To be referred to the reporter or not? Yes
(3) Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? Yes
JUDGMENT
ARUNA SURESH, J.
1. This is a petition under Section 378 (1) Code of
Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as
'Cr.P.C.') for leave to appeal against the
judgment/order dated 12.2.2004 passed by the
learned ASJ whereby the accused persons were
acquitted of the offences under Section 306 IPC.
2. Leave granted. Let the petition be registered as an
appeal.
3. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties
I proceed further to decide the appeal.
Crl. Appeal No. 47/2009
4. Sh. C.D. Bansal sent a written complaint dated
21.4.1998 to Chowki Incharge, Police Station Saket
alleging that his son Sanjeev was being constantly
tortured and harassed by his wife Ashu Bansal and
his in-laws since after his marriage in February,
1991 soon after marriage, they started living as
husband and wife at Mumbai. They were blessed
with a son in the year 1992. Accused Jagdish Chand
Gupta had asked Sanjeev Bansal to make payment
for the jewellery and other gift items given in
marriage and on his default to do so jewellery and
other valuables were taken away by Jagdish Chand
Gupta. Accused Ashu Bansal, Sanjeev's wife, used
to torture him by hurling abuses and getting
physically violent. On various occasions (as detailed
in the complaint), she insisted Sanjeev to
purchase everything in her name irrespective of
the source of money. Though both of them
invested money jointly for one flat, but the said flat
was forcibly got registered by Ashu Bansal in her
name. In December, 1997, both the accused
persons allegedly came to the house of deceased
Sanjeev along with other persons and forcibly took
away household articles and other valuables and
accused Ashu Bansal allegedly instigated Sanjeev
to commit suicide under threat of killing him, in the
presence of Duty Officer, D.N. Nagar Police
Station, Bombay. Sanjeev left Bombay and came to
Delhi on 8.3.1998 and since then was residing with
his parents at E-43, Saket, New Delhi when on
12.3.1998 he committed suicide by hanging
himself.
5. On the fateful day, a telephone call was allegedly
received from Ashu Bansal at about 1.30 PM which
was firstly attended by the wife of the complainant
and then by deceased Sanjeev. Accused Ashu
Bansal is stated to have abused the complainant's
wife and told her that either Sanjeev should kill
himself or they would kill him. After talking on
telephone, Sanjeev appeared terrified and he
informed his mother that his wife used abusive
language and insisted that he should kill himself or
otherwise they would kill him. After receipt of the
telephone Sanjeev remained in the company of his
mother till 2.30 PM. It was at 3.00 PM when
complainant heard a shriek from his wife, he went
inside the room and was shocked to see that
Sanjeev was hanging. Doctor Sharma was called
and Sanjeev was taken to the hospital where he
was declared brought dead. Accordingly FIR was
registered on 22.5.1998 against the accused
persons for having committed offence under
Section 306/34 Indian Penal Code (hereinafter
referred to as 'IPC').
6. Prosecution examined as many as 18 witnesses in
support of its case. The Statement of the accused
persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded
and after hearing the parties on merits, the trial
court opined that prosecution had failed to prove
its case against the accused persons beyond
reasonable doubt and therefore, was pleased to
acquit the accused persons of the offences charged
with.
7. Aggrieved by the said judgment of the trial court,
the State has filed the present appeal.
8. Learned APP for the State has argued that PW3
Raman Bansal, who happened to be the brother of
deceased Sanjeev, has categorically proved by way
of his testimony the letter Ex. P-1 purportedly
written by Sanjeev which was seized by the Police
vide Memo Ex. PW3/A and therefore, the trial court
committed an error in not accepting in evidence
document Ex. P-1 which was a suicide note left
behind by the deceased.
9. I do not find much force in the submission of the
learned APP for the State. The trial court did not
accept Ex. P-1 as sufficient evidence against the
accused persons for two reasons; firstly the
prosecution failed to produce any corroborative
evidence to prove that letter Ex. P-1 was written by
deceased Sanjeev and secondly this letter was not
recovered by the family members on the date of the
incident from the spot but on the next following
day. This letter was produced by PW3 Raman
Bansal and handed over to the Investigating Officer
on 13.3.2008. Bare perusal of document Ex. P-1
makes it clear that this letter is purported to have
been signed by Sanjeev Bansal and was not written
at the time when the signatures were apportioned
on it. There is a considerable space between the
written contents of the note and the signature
appearing at the bottom of the same. There is
enough space wherein something more could be
incorporated. Admittedly no complaint was made
to the Police even after the recovery of this letter,
though Police was informed when deceased was
removed to the hospital by the complainant and
other family members. Admittedly, the
Investigating Officer did not collect any other letter
written by the deceased or admitted handwriting or
signatures of the deceased on any document during
the investigation of the case, though it has come in
evidence that deceased used to write letters to his
brother Raman Bansal as well as to his parents.
The Investigating Officer did not send Ex. P-1 along
with admitted handwriting and signatures of the
deceased for handwriting expert opinion. Even if
Ex. P-1 was written by the deceased soon before
his death, there was no evidence available on the
record for the trial court to assess and reach to a
conclusion that this letter was written by deceased
Sanjeev Bansal. Intriguingly, this letter was
addressed to the Magistrate, Bombay High Court.
If that was so, why this letter was not dispatched
goes unexplained. This casts a cloud on the
prosecution case and possibility is that this letter
probably was never written at Delhi nor was
recovered as alleged. Besides this letter is not
indicative of the fact that deceased was abetted to
and driven by accused Ashu, his wife, to commit
suicide.
10. Under Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, if a
document is alleged to be signed or to have been
written wholly or in part by any person, the
signature or the handwriting of so much of the
document must be proved to be in that person's
handwriting. Opinion of handwriting expert is
relevant so as to enable the Court to form an
opinion as to the person by whom questioned
document was written or signed. Letter Ex. P-1
was not written by the deceased in the presence of
Raman Bansal. Prosecution did not take any expert
opinion to establish that letter Ex. P1 was written
by the deceased.
11. Learned APP for the State has submitted that the
requirement of Section 67 of the Indian Evidence
Act is only that the handwriting must be proved to
be that of the person concerned and in order to
prove the identity of the handwriting, any mode
accepted by law can be resorted to. He has
referred to Gulzar Ali v. State of H.P. - (1998) 2
SCC 192.
12. Proposition of law as laid down in the said case is
not in dispute.
13. Two modes accepted by law are indicated in
Sections 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Section 45 permits expert opinion to be regarded
as relevant evidence and Section 47 permits
opinion of any person acquainted with such
handwriting to be regarded as relevant evidence.
14. In this case as discussed above, prosecution has
not been able to bring on record convincing
corroborative evidence to prove that Ex. P-1 was
written by the deceased. Why the letter could not
be traced out on the date of the incident when
Investigating Officer had gone to the residence of
the complainant and searches were made; why this
letter could be recovered only on the next following
day and why no complaint was lodged with the
police despite recovery of the letter, are all
unexplained factors which create a reasonable
grave doubt in the mind of the court if at all this
letter was written and signed by the deceased,
specially when no other document written or
signed by the deceased was handed over to the
Police during the investigation of the case. In the
absence of any corroborative evidence, even the
Court could not exercise its power under Section
73 of the Evidence Act and compare the disputed
handwriting and signatures with the admitted
handwriting and signatures in order to ascertain
whether the signature or the handwriting on Ex. P-
1 was that of the deceased.
15. Deceased was not having cordial relationship with
his wife since after his marriage. He had left
Bombay on 8.3.1998. He committed suicide on
12.3.1998 i.e. after four days of his coming to
Delhi.
16. The trial court observed that PW4 Kaushalya Devi,
mother of the deceased, who had narrated the
alleged threat extended by Ashu Bansal on
telephone on the fateful day could not be believed
because there was no mention of any such phone
call made by accused Ashu Bansal in the FIR. PW3
Raman Bansal in his statement Ex. PW18/C had
stated that he was told by his brother that he had
come to Delhi to his parents from Bombay for
reconciliation with Ashu. He had also stated that
nobody was to be blamed for the said incident.
The complaint was made thereafter about one
month and ten days of the incident i.e. on
21.4.1998 and FIR was registered after about more
than two months of the incident on 22.5.1998.
17. As regards jewellery etc. accused Ashu Bansal
being wife had full right to take her jewellery and
other valuables being her istridhan from the
deceased even when she was residing with him.
Accused Jagdish Chand Gupta had taken away the
jewellery and other valuables from the deceased on
18.11.1997. Therefore, this could not have been a
cause for Sanjeev to commit suicide.
18. Learned APP for the State has submitted that it is
not material that complaint was not made initially
on the date of the occurrence keeping in mind that
the family was in mental shock and therefore, the
delay in lodging of the FIR is not fatal to the case.
These submissions are devoid of any merits.
19. Police was informed of the incident on the same
day and the Investigating Officer had gone to the
hospital and found the dead body of Sanjeev lying
in the hospital, post-mortem was got conducted on
the dead body, the family was indeed in its frame of
mind to lodge an FIR alleging that Sanjeev was
abetted by his wife to commit suicide. The Police
could have been informed of the alleged telephone
call received from Ashu Bansal and threats
extended by her on telephone to Kaushalya Devi as
well as to the deceased.
20. It also weighed in the mind of the trial court that
deceased was in the protective company of his
parents. After receipt of threats from his wife on
telephone, he sat with his mother for quite some
time before retiring to his room and he had
sufficient time with him to share his grief with his
mother. Rightly so, because a person is prone to
commit suicide on spur of a moment when he is
unable to fight with his depression or emotional
turmoil or acute sense of insecurity or alleged
instigation which might drive him to commit
suicide. If the crucial moment is fought and won
over or passes away mental and emotional
capabilities as well as rationality in thought retreat
and a person thinks twice before taking drastic
step to commit suicide. Deceased had enough time
to overcome his shaken and upheavaled feelings
and rippled emotions because of threats allegedly
received from his wife on telephone. He was not
apprehending immediate danger to his life at the
hands of any of the accused persons who were at
Bombay at the relevant time. The mere fact that
deceased was maltreated by his wife would not
create such circumstance which would have made
deceased to end his life and any such maltreatment
or ill-treatment at the hands of the wife at Bombay
under no circumstances would amount to abetment
within the meaning of Section 107 of IPC.
21. The trial court referred to all the circumstances
including letter Ex. P-1 highlighting the
deficiencies in the prosecution evidence while
directing acquittal of the accused persons.
22. The appellate court generally should not interfere
with an order of acquittal keeping in mind the fact
that presumption of innocence of the accused is
further strengthened by acquittal. The golden
thread which runs through the web of
administration of justice in criminal cases is that if
two views are possible on the evidence adduced in
the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused
and the other to his innocence, the view favouring
the accused is to be adopted. It is the duty of the
Court to keep in mind that miscarriage of justice is
prevented. The Court should only interfere in the
order of acquittal when it is of the view that there
are compelling and substantial reasons for doing
so. If the impugned judgment is apparently
unreasonable and relevant and convincing evidence
has been unjustifiably eliminated in the process,
the Court has compelling reason to interfere
therein.
23. In this case neither the judgment shows any
unreasonability in assessment of the evidence and
other material available on record, nor the Court
has ignored any convincing material on record
which could raise a finger towards the guilt of the
accused persons.
24. The trial court has précised its opinion in para 7 of
the judgment in detail to reach to a conclusion that
prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond any
shadow of reasonable doubt i.e. Sanjeev had
committed suicide on the instigation of the accused
persons.
25. Admittedly there is no specific immediate incident
which could directly relate to commission of suicide
by the deceased as the earlier incidents could at
best be the case of cruelty but not of abetment. I
find no illegality or infirmity in the order of the trial
court. Hence, the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
26. The trial court record be sent back.
27. Attested copy of the order be sent to the trial court.
(ARUNA SURESH) JUDGE January 16, 2009 jk
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