Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 472 Del
Judgement Date : 10 February, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ AA No.6/2008
% Date of Decision: 10.02.2009
M/s.Rapti Contractors ....... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Raman Kapur, Advocate.
Versus
Reliance Energy Ltd & Ors ........ Respondents
Through : Mr.Rishi Aggarwal, Advocate.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may be YES
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in NO
the Digest?
ANIL KUMAR, J.
*
1. This is a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996 by the petitioner for appointment of an arbitrator
in terms of the arbitration agreement between the parties.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner on instructions seeks to
delete respondents No.3 to 7 as parties to the present petition. The
learned counsel for the respondents also has no objection for deletion of
the respondents No.3 to 7 as parties to the present petition.
3. The petitioner contends that it is a partnership firm doing
business of construction and maintenance on contract basis and the
firm is registered with the Registrar of Firms at Lucknow.
4. It is contended that in 2004 respondent No. 2, Reliance Energy
Ltd, invited offers for construction of 33 KVA sub-station building at
Balaji-Kalkaji, New Delhi (Remaining Civil and electrical works). The
offer submitted by the petitioner was accepted at Delhi by respondent
No.2.
5. After the acceptance of the offer of the petitioner a letter of intent
was issued. In accordance with the work order dated 28th September,
2004, issued in accordance with the letter of intent, the date of
commencement of work was 28th March, 2004 and the total work was
required to be completed by 17th December, 2004, i.e. within a period of
80 days only.
6. The petitioner contended that his working was dependant mainly
on the respondent permitting the petitioner to proceed with the work,
without causing any hindrance in any manner and by resolving the
problems at site in time and by faithfully discharging his obligation
under the contract. According to the assertions of the petitioner, the
respondents failed to discharge their obligations under the contract. It
is asserted that the respondents took an exceptionally long time in
giving constructional drawings and failed in finalizing the logistics of the
work. The no-objection certificate which was required from the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi was not obtained nor had the plans
been got sanctioned from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, entailing
delay in start of the work. During this period according to the plea of
the petitioner his labour, plant and tools remained idle. Disputes arose
between the parties and in terms of the arbitration clause contained in
the detailed work order No.CPG/7302/BLJ dated 28th September, 2004
the petitioner invoked the arbitration agreement between the parties,
first for adjudication of disputes by the respondents. The arbitration
agreement in terms of the clauses in the agreement between the parties
is as below:-
"Arbitration:- All disputes arising out of and in connection with this contract, which cannot be settled by mutual negotiations within 30 days of reference, by either party shall be considered a dispute within the meaning of this Clause. Such dispute shall be referred to Arbitration in accordance with the rules of Indian Arbitration.
18.0 Arbitration:- If any disputes or differences arise between the owner and the contractor in relation to or out of this contract, the same shall be referred to the Arbitration of two arbitrators, one each to be appointed by the owner and the contractor. The provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 shall apply for such Arbitration. The decision so given shall be final and binding upon the parties hereto. "
7. The petitioner contended that on account of breaches committed
by the respondents disputes arose which were referred to the
respondents with the request to settle the same mutually and amicably.
The petitioner communicated the disputes by letter dated 29th
September, 2007. Along with the letter the details of the disputes were
also sent. The disputes, however, could not be settled even after more
than 50 days and, therefore, the petitioner invoked the arbitration
clause No.18 of General Conditions of Contract which is the arbitration
agreement and nominated its nominee for the arbitral Tribunal with the
request to the respondents to nominate their arbitrator.
8. According to the petitioners even after 30 days of invoking the
arbitration agreement the respondents did not appoint an arbitrator.
The petitioner thereafter, filed the present petition on 20th January,
2008 and till the filing of the petition the respondents have not
appointed any arbitrator.
9. The petition is contested by the respondents contending that the
petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 is
not maintainable. It was contended that the arbitration agreement
contemplates adjudication of disputes under the Indian Arbitration Act,
1940 which stands repealed by virtue of Section 85 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996 and consequently there is no agreement between
the parties to have the disputes adjudicated by arbitration and the
arbitration agreement is void in law and, therefore, no arbitrators can
be appointed nor arbitration proceedings can commence.
10. The respondents also contended that the arbitration agreement is
violative of Section 10 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as
there cannot be an even number of arbitrators after the enactment of
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
11. The petition is also contested on the ground that the Court does
not have territorial jurisdiction since the respondents is a company
registered at Mumbai and by virtue of Clause 19 the jurisdiction of the
Court other than Mumbai was excluded. Clause 19 regarding
jurisdiction is as under:-
"19. Jurisdiction
The contract shall be governed by and constructed according to the laws in force in India. The contractor hereby submits to the jurisdiction of the Courts situated at Mumbai for the purposes of actions and proceedings arising out of the contract and the courts in Mumbai only will have the jurisdiction to hear and decide such actions and proceedings."
12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Regarding the
non-maintainability of the petition as respondents No.3 to 7 were also
impleaded, it is contended that since respondents No.3 to 7 have been
deleted as parties, therefore, it cannot be held that there is no valid
arbitration agreement between the petitioner and all the parties. The
respondent no.1 & 2 are the same entity and therefore, the dispute that
there is no arbitration agreement with respondents no. 3 to 7 does not
survive in the facts and circumstances.
13. The learned counsel for the respondents, after some arguments,
has given up his objection regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction of
this Court to adjudicate Section 11 petition under the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996 in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Patel Roadways Ltd, Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company,
(1991) 4 SCC 270. In any case the cause of action has arisen at Delhi
as the work was executed at Delhi and the payments were also made at
Delhi and the offer of the petitioner was also given in Delhi and merely
on account of registered office of the respondents being at Mumbai,
there was no cause of action at Mumbai. The Supreme Court in Patel
Roadways Ltd (Supra) had held that the choice of forum can be limited
by incorporating inclusion Clause under the agreement but by
agreement jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a place where it does not
lie. Relying on the explanation to Section 20 of the Code of Civil
Procedure it was held that if the cause of action had not arisen at the
place where the defendant has its principal office, then merely on
account of the principal office of the defendant being at that particular
place, the cause of action cannot be said to have arisen there and
consequently the defendant cannot, by incorporating an inclusion
clause, confer jurisdiction on the Court having jurisdiction over the
place where only the principal office is situated.
14. The next contention of the respondents is that the arbitration
agreement is void as it contemplates appointment of even number of
arbitrators contrary to Section 10 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act,
1996. It is also contended that the arbitration agreement contemplates
adjudication of disputes in accordance with the Indian Arbitration Act,
1940 which stood repealed on the day the arbitration agreement was
entered into between the parties and, therefore, the arbitration
agreement is void.
15. Regarding the appointment of even number of arbitrators, the
learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on Dr.Deepashree v. Sultan
Chand & Sons, 2008 (4) Arb.LR 94 (Delhi). In Deepashree (Supra) the
arbitration agreement contemplated appointment of two arbitrators, one
each to be appointed by the parties. On disputes having arisen, an
arbitrator was appointed by one of the parties and the other party was
asked to give consent to the appointment of that arbitrator as the sole
arbitrator. The opposite party had declined to concur with the
appointment of the nominated arbitrator as the sole arbitrator and had
nominated another arbitrator as per the terms of the agreement.
Thereafter, an application under Section 11 was filed by one of the
parties. The learned Single Judge relying on a judgment of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Sri Venkateswara Construction Company v.
Union of India, AIR 2001 A.P 284 where an agreement for arbitration by
two arbitrators was construed as an agreement for reference to a sole
arbitrator, and relying on two judgments of this Court, Wipro Finance
Ltd v. Sandplast India Ltd, 2006(3) Raj. 524 (Delhi) and Marine
Container Services (South) Pvt Ltd v. Atma Steels Ltd, 2001(1)
Arb.L.R.341 (Delhi) where sole arbitrators were appointed even though
the arbitration agreements were for the appointment of two arbitrators,
had held that an agreement for appointment of two arbitrators is not an
agreement within the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Act and
consequently Section 10(2) comes into play and the Arbitral Tribunal is
to consist of a sole arbitrator.
16. Section 10 (1) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 provides
that the parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators provided
that such number shall not be an even number. Section 10(2) of the
said Act, however, provides that failing the determination referred to in
sub-Section (1) the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator.
The precedents referred to hereinabove had also held that an arbitration
agreement which provides for an even number of arbitrators will not be
invalid on that count only and it was held that in those circumstances
the arbitration agreement is to be deemed to be for reference to a sole
arbitrator. A similar view was also taken in North East Securities Ltd v.
Sri Nageshwara Chemicals and Drugs Pvt Ltd, 2001(1) Arb.L.R.70 (A.P).
In view of the precedents discussed above it cannot be held that the
arbitration agreement is void solely for the reason that it contemplated
arbitration by even number of arbitrators. Section 10(2) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall be applicable in the
circumstances and the arbitral tribunal is to consist of a sole arbitrator.
The petitioner had appointed an arbitrator and asked the respondents
to appoint his arbitrator which the respondents failed to appoint within
30 days or before filing of the present petition. Since even numbers of
arbitrators are not to be appointed, therefore, it will be just and
appropriate to appoint a sole arbitrator. The learned counsel for the
petitioner also has no objection in case a sole arbitrator is appointed in
place of the arbitrator nominated by the petitioner.
17. The next contention of the respondents is that the arbitration
agreement stipulates that the arbitration shall be governed by the
provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 and since the Act of 1940
had been repealed by virtue of Section 85(1) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 and as the arbitral proceedings had not
commenced before the coming into force of the Act of 1996 as
contemplated in Section 85(2) of the Act of 1996 and as there was no
agreement between the parties to subject themselves to arbitration
under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any modification of
the Arbitration Act, 1940, the arbitration agreement in its entirety is
void in law. Section 85 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 is as
under:-
"85. Repeal and saving:- 1) The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (6 of 1937), the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 are hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal,-
a) the provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before this Act came into force unless otherwise agreed by the parties but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after this Act comes into force.
b) all rules made and notifications published, under the said enactments shall, to the extent to which they are not repugnant to this Act, be deemed respectively to have been made or issued under this Act."
18. Section 85 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996
contemplates that the Act shall apply in relation to the arbitral
proceedings which commenced on or after this act comes into force.
Since the arbitration was invoked by the petitioner vide letter dated 23rd
November, 2007 after coming into force of Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996, so the arbitration between the parties cannot commence
under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. Since the agreement
contemplates adjudication of disputes between the parties under the
Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, therefore, whether the agreement will
become void or the arbitration can proceed in accordance with the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
19. It is well-settled that if the contract is in several parts, some of
which are legal and enforceable and some are unenforceable, lawful
parts can be enforced provided they are severable. Partial invalidity in
contract will not ipso facto make the whole contract void or
unenforceable. Wherever a contract contains legal as well as illegal
parts and objectionable parts can be severed, effect has to be given to
legal and valid parts striking out the offending parts.
20. In Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. v. Jain Studios Ltd., AIR 2006 SC
963 the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held -
"The proper test for deciding validity or otherwise of an agreement or order is 'substantial severability' and not 'textual divisibility'. It is the duty of the court to severe and separate trivial or technical part by retaining the main or substantial part and by giving effect to the latter if it is legal, lawful and otherwise enforceable. In such cases, the Court must consider the question whether the parties could have agreed on the valid terms of the agreement had they known that the other terms were invalid or unlawful. If the answer to the said question is in the affirmative, the doctrine of severability would apply and the valid terms of the agreement could be enforced, ignoring invalid terms. To hold otherwise would be "to expose the covenanter to the almost inevitable risk of litigation which in nine cases out of ten he is very ill able to afford, should he venture to act upon his own opinion as to how far the restraint upon him would be held by the court to be reasonable, while it may give the covenantee the full benefit of
unreasonable provisions if the covenanter is unable to face litigation."
Applying the doctrine of severability in Shin Satellite (supra) the
Court had held -
"In the present case, Clause 23 relates to arbitration. It is in various parts. The first part mandates that, if there is a dispute between the parties, it shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration. It clarifies that the rules of UNCITRAL would apply to such arbitration. It then directs that the arbitration shall be held in Delhi and will be in English language. It stipulates that the costs of arbitration shall be shared by the parties equally. The offending and objectionable part, no doubt, expressly makes the arbitrator's determination "final and binding between the parties" and declares that the parties have waived the rights of appeal or objection "in any jurisdiction". The said objectionable part, in my opinion, however, is clearly severable as it is independent of the dispute being referred to and resolved by an arbitrator. Hence, even in the absence of any other clause, the part as to referring the dispute to arbitrator can be given effect to and enforced. By implementing that part, it cannot be said that the Court is doing something which is not contemplated by the parties or by 'interpretative process', the Court is re-writing the contract which is in the nature of 'novatio'. The intention of the parties is explicitly clear and they have agreed that the dispute, if any, would be referred to an arbitrator. To that extent, therefore, the agreement is legal, lawful and the offending part as to the finality and restraint in approaching a Court of law can be separated and severed by using a 'blue pencil'.
21. Applying the ratio of the above said case to the case at hand I am
of the opinion that the offending clause, i.e. the clause stipulating that
the arbitration shall be governed by the provisions of the Indian
Arbitration Act, 1940, is clearly severable from the rest of the
agreement. Consequently the part of the agreement which clearly
expresses the intention of the parties to refer their disputes to
arbitration is valid and enforceable. A fortiori in case the agreement
contemplates adjudication of disputes under the Indian Arbitration Act,
1940 which had been repealed on the day the arbitration agreement
was invoked or even on the date when the agreement was executed, the
disputes between the parties are to be adjudicated by the arbitration
Act which is applicable on the day the arbitration agreement was
entered between the parties. The learned counsel for the respondents is
unable to show any provision or precedent that in case the agreement is
for adjudication of disputes under an Act which had already been
repealed when the agreement was executed, then the entire agreement,
the intention of the parties to get the disputes resolved through
arbitration, shall be negated completely and the Arbitration Agreement
shall be void.
22. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed and Mr.Justice
Vijender Jain (Retd), House No.136, Sector 15A, Noida-201301, (Phone
Nos.9711009541, 95120-2511535/2511536) is appointed as a sole
arbitrator for adjudicating all the disputes between the parties under
the contract in question. The learned arbitrator shall fix his own fees
which shall be borne equally by the parties. The learned arbitrator shall
also decide his own procedure. The parties are directed to appear before
the arbitrator on 20th February, 2009 at 5 PM. A copy of this order be
sent to the Learned Arbitrator forthwith. Copies of this order be also
given to the learned counsel for the parties dasti. Considering the facts
and circumstances parties are also left to bear their own cost. With
these directions the petition is disposed of.
FEBRUARY 10, 2009 ANIL KUMAR, J. 'K'
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