Delhi High Court
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr. vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 2009
Author: V. K. Jain
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P. (C) no. 1426/2001
Reserved on: 18th August, 2009
Pronounced on: 27th August, 2009.
# Mrs. MADHULIKA SRIVASTAVA & ANR. ..... Petitioners
! Through :Mr.Jayant Bhushan, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.S.K.Rout and Mr.M.K. Pradhan and
Mr.P. Verma, Advocates for the petitioner
VERSUS
$ UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondents
^ Through Mr.Sanjay Poddar, Advocate for Respondent/LAC.
Ms.Shobhana Takiar, Advocate for Respondent/DDA.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAMAJIT SEN
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed
to see the Judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the
Digest? Yes.
W.P.(C) No. 1426/2001 Page 1 of 43
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
V.K.Jain, J.
This is a Petition seeking quashing of Award No.6-
B/Suppl./81-82, whereby land of the Petitioners, measuring 1bigha
and 4 biswas, comprised in Khasra No.288 Min. of Village Jasola,
was acquired.
2. It has been alleged in the Petition that the Petitioners
purchased land in question from Ram Prasad, Mahesh Chand,
Mehar Chand, Sat Pal and Satvir vide Registered Sale Deed, on
the basis of a „No Objection Certificate‟ issued by Additional
District Magistrate (LA) Delhi. It was stated in No Objection
Certificate that Notification No.F-4(9)64/L&H dated 7.12.1966
issued under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, had lapsed. The
Notification under Section 4 of the Act, in respect of land in
question was issued on 6.4.1964 followed by the notification under
Section 6 of the Act on 7.12.1966. It has been claimed in the
Petition that since notifications under Section 4 and 6 had lapsed,
it was not within the power of the respondents to acquire land in
question and the award whereby his land was acquired is against
the provisions of Section 11A of Land Acquisition Act, which
provides a limitation for making the award. It has also been
pleaded that the award is null, void and illegal in view of the
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
admission of the Respondents that the notification under Sections
4 and 6 had already lapsed.
3. In its counter affidavit respondent DDA has stated that Hari
Ram and Ram Prasad, owners of land in question, filed Civil Writ
Petition No. 812 of 1984, challenging acquisition of various pieces
of land including the land in question. Vide an interim order dated
15th March, 1984, this court restrained the respondents from
making award. In WP (C) No. 4677 of 1985, titled as M.C. Mehta
v. Union of India and Ors., the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was
concerned with the construction of sewage treatment plants in
various colonies of Delhi. Various stay orders passed in respect of
land in village Jasola, which was required for construction of Okhla
Sewage Treatment Plant were brought to the notice of Hon‟ble
Supreme Court. DDA, with the permission of Hon‟ble Supreme
Court, published an advertisement, requiring the petitioners, in
the petitions, in which the stay orders pertaining to land required
for construction of Okhla Sewage Treatment Plant were passed, to
appear before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. Out of large tracts of
land subject matter of CWP 812 of 1984, only land measuring 2
bighas and 14 biswa, in khasra No. 158 of village Jasola, was
subject matter of the application of DDA before the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court. Khasra No. as well as area of the land required in
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
village Jasola, for construction of Okhla Sewage Treatment Plant
was specifically mentioned in the notice. The petition were
transferred by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court to itself and the stay
orders granted by the High Court were vacated, and Delhi
Administration was directed to take over possession of land and
handover the same to Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal
Undertaking. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court made it clear that
possession of only those khasra number was to be taken which
were mentioned in public notice. Consequently, stay granted by
this court continued to operate in respect of remaining land
subject matter of WP(C) No. 812 of 1984. WP (C) No. 812 of 1984
was decided by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on 01.11.1996. Since
there was stay operating till 01.11.1996, the award having been
made on 31.10.1998 was well within the statutory period.
4. It has also been alleged in the counter affidavit that No
Objection Certificate relied upon by the petitioner does not
amount to requisite certificate under the provisions of Delhi Lands
(Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972, the Rules framed under the
Act prescribe a format for this purpose, and Competent Authority
has not issued any No Objection Certificate for registration of Sale
Deed in favour of the petitioner. It has also been stated in the
counter affidavit that the sale deed executed in favour of the
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
petitioner contains false averments to the effect that the land had
not been notified under Section 4 or 6 of Land Acquisition Act and
the possession of the land had been handed over to the petitioner.
5. A perusal of the writ petition would show that the acquisition
has been challenged only on the grounds that (i) the award was
not made within the period of limitation prescribed in Section 11A
of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 and (ii) „No Objection
Certificate‟ was issued by the office of Additional District
Magistrate (LA) on 10.10.1997, stating therein that notification
under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act had lapsed.
6. The first ground was not pressed before us during
arguments in view of the decision dated 11.3.2008 in WP (C) No.
1830 of 1999; Gopi Chand and Ors v. Union of India, whereby this
court held that in CWP No. 4677/85; M.C. Mehta and Ors. v. Union
of India, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had vacated the stay orders
only in respect of those pieces of land which were required for
construction of Okhla Sewage Treatment Plant. The same view
was taken in W.P.(C) 13618-22/04, decided on 20.10.2008. Since,
admittedly, the land subject matter of this petition was not
included in the land required for construction of Okhla Sewage
Treatment Plant, and the Writ Petition in which stay was granted
by this court in respect of land in question was ultimately
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
dismissed only on 1.11.96, the award made on 31.10.1998 was will
within the period prescribed for this purpose.
7. Coming to the second ground, though the case set up in the
Writ Petition is that a „No Objection Certificate‟ was issued by
Additional District Magistrate (LA) on 10.10.97, stating therein
that the notification issued under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act
had lapsed and therefore the acquisition is liable to be quashed,
the arguments advanced before us at the time of hearing was that
the documents dated 10.10.97 was, in fact, a Status Report in
respect of land in question and since this Status Report contained
a statement to the effect that the notification issued under Section
6 of Land Acquisition Act had lapsed, and the petitioner had relied
upon the representation made in the status report, by purchasing
land in question, the respondents are now estopped from claiming
that the declaration under Section 6 had not lapsed and therefore
the acquisition is liable to be quashed on account of lapse of the
declaration issued under Sec. 6 of the Act. The submission before
us was that but for the representation made in the status report
dated 10.10.97, to the effect that the declaration under Section 6
of the Act had lapsed, the petitioners would not have purchased
the land in question and, in fact, would have purchased some other
land utilising the money which they spent on the purchase of land
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
in question. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents
contended that the plea of estoppel having not been set out in the
petition, is not available to the petitioners. The contention is that
unless pleaded, the plea of estoppel cannot be set up during
arguments. According to learned counsel for the respondents, the
plea of stoppel has been set up during arguments only when the
petitioner found, on production of record relating to issue of
documents dated 10.10.97, that this document was not issued with
the approval of Additional District Magistrate (LA) who is the
competent authority under Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer)
Act, 1972.
8. It would be appropriate, at this stage, to note that during the
course of hearing of this case on February 19, 2004, it was urged
on behalf of the petitioner that they had purchased the land after
verifying that it was not the subject matter of acquisition and
CERTIFICATE dated 10.10.97 has also been issued by Tehsildar
(notification) from the office of Additional District Magistrate (LA)
certifying that notification under Section 4 issued on 7.12.1967
had since lapsed. The learned counsel representing DDA at that
time contended that Tehsildar issuing the certificate was not
competent to issue such a No Objection Certificate under Delhi
Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 and the said
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
notification under Section 4 had been, in fact, not lapsed. This
court thereupon directed the Tehsildar to appear in person along
with relevant record. The record was ultimately produced before
us at commencement of hearing and it transpired from the perusal
of original record that on 9th April, 1997, Tehsildar (HQ) had
passed the following order:
"the report of the L.A. and revenue staff is in detail. Issue
N.O.C."
Thus, no approval from the Additional District Magistrate
(LA), who is the Competent Authority under Delhi Lands
(Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972, was obtained before issuing
the documents dated 10th October, 1997 and even the Tehsildar
had referred to this document has „No Objection Certificate‟. The
points sought to be made by learned counsel for the respondents
was that when the petitioner found, on production of record in the
court, that in fact document dated 10.10.97 had been issued by
Tehsildar without obtaining approval of Additional District
Magistrte (LA), the plea of stoppel was thereafter set up post-
lunch during arguments, without its having been pleaded in the
writ petition.
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
9. Before we examine the plea of estoppel, we deem it
appropriate to consider the decisions of Supreme Court in Meera
Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors.
A perusal of the decision would show that in that case also
the petitioners had relied upon documents identical to the
documents relied upon by the petitioners in this case. Document
identical to document dated 10th Oct., 1997 in this case was set up
in that case as „permission‟ granted u/s 5 of Delhi Lands
(Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972. In para 31 of the judgment,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"What was placed by the appellants before us
in support of their claim were two non-
statutory formats. One of the formats was
under the caption "Statement to be furnished
to the Registering Officer for ensuring non-
contravention of Section 8 of the Delhi Lands
(Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972" and the
other format, allegedly an order to be passed
by the Tahsildar or an Additional District
Magistrate. In order to properly appreciate,
one of the letters/permissions is extracted
hereinbelow:
"OFFICE OF THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT
MAGISTRATE (LAND ACQUISITION), DELHI
No. 4173 (The Notification) Dated 27-5-1992
To,
The Sub-Registrar, Sub-District No.III
Delhi/New Delhi.
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
Warning
The report is being sent from
acquisition point of view and
this office has got no
responsibility for any
defective title of the
land/ownership, etc. in the
(sic).
(i) As per records available in the office the
property/land, the details of which are
given in the statement, has been acquired
under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894.
OR
(ii) The property/land, the details of which are
given in the statement stands notified
under Section 6 of the Land Acquision Act,
1894 vide Notification No.........................
and .........
OR
(iii) The property/land bearing Mpl No..............
Khasra No......... (sic) ............ the details of
which are given in the statement has not
been notified so far under Section (sic) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This
information is valid for a period of 30 days
from the date of issue.
Sd/-
27-5-1992
For Tahsildar (Notification)
For Additional District Magistrate (LA), Delhi."
(Clauses not applicable should be deleted.)"
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
The first document filed by the petitioner before us also
purports to be a statement to be furnished to the Registering
Officer for ensuring non-contravention of Section 8 of Delhi Lands
(Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972. This is the same document
which is referred in para 13 of the judgment in Meera Sahni‟s case
(supra). The format of the second document filed by the
petitioners i.e. the document dated 10.10.97 issued by Tehsildar,
(Notification) is identical to the document reproduced in para 31 of
the judgment in Meera Sahni‟s case. In fact, a perusal of the
original file in the case before us would show that the document
dated 10.10.97 is printed on the back of the document which
purports to be a statement to be furnished to the Registering
Officer for ensuring non-contravention of Section 8 of Delhi Lands
(Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972.
10. In para 34 of the judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
noted that neither the application as envisaged u/s 5(1) of Delhi
Lands (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972 was filed, nor was any
documentary proof placed on record to indicate that any enquiry
was made as was required u/s 5(2) of the Act. The Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held that such applications were not the
applications required to be filed u/s 5 of Delhi Lands (Restriction
on Transfer) Act, 1972 since they were not submitted in prescribed
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
form and there was nothing to show that they were produced and
presented before the Competent Authority. In para 33 of the
Judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court noted that Tehsildar was
also not authorised to act as a Competent Authority as envisaged
u/s 5, 6 and 8 of Delhi Lands Act, since Additional District
Magistrate was the competent authority as envisaged u/s 2 (b) of
the Act. It was specifically held that no other Authority or anyone
else subordinate to him was ever authorised to exercise the
aforesaid power. Dismissing the appeal filed by Meera Sahni &
Ors., the Hon‟ble Supreme Court stated as under:-
"38. It is, thus, established from the
record placed before us that neither any
proper application was made either by
the predecessors-in-interest of the
appellants or by the appellants
themselves, as envisaged under Sections
4 and 5 of the Delhi Lands Act, nor was
any valid and legal permission granted to
the appellants by the competent authority
under the provisions of the aforesaid Act.
The transfers made in favour of the
appellants by the original landholders by
execution of the sale deed, therefore, are
illegal and without jurisdiction. We have
no hesitation in our mind in holding that
no title could be conveyed or could pass
to the appellants on the basis of such
transfer and also that consequential
mutation in favour of the appellants for
the above reasons is found and held to be
without jurisdiction."
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
11. Emphasising that if the law requires an action to be taken in
a particular manner, it has to be taken in that very manner, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
"It is by now a certain law that an action
to be taken in a particular manner as
provided by a statute, must be taken,
done or performed in the manner
prescribed and in no other manner. In
this connection we may appropriately
refer to the decision of this Court in Babu
Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala
wherein it was held as under(SCC pp
432-33, paras 31-32)
31. It is the basic principle of law long
settled that if the manner of doing a
particular act is prescribed under any
statute, the act must be done in that
manner or not at all. The origin of this
rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor
v. Taylor which was followed by Lord
Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor
who stated as under:
„where a power is given to do a certain
thing in a certain way, the thing must be
done in that way or not at all.‟
32. This rule has since been approved by
this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v.
State of Vindh Pradesh and again in Deep
Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases
were considered by a three-Judge Bench
of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara
Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir
Ahmad Case was again upheld. This rule
has since been applied to the exercise of
jurisdiction by courts and has also been
recognised as a salutary principle of
administrative law."
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
12. Since no relief against acquisition of land was granted by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Meera Sahni‟s case (Supra) on the basis
of documents identical to the documents filed by the petitioner in
this case, it would not be appropriate for us to take a contrary
view and grant relief to the petitioner. Since it was contended
before us that no document like the document dated 10.10.97 was
filed in the cases of Meera Sahni & Others, we have called for and
perused the files of LPA 332/2002, LPA 302/2002 and LPA
263/2002 against which CA 6493/02, CA 6494/02 and CA 6496/02
were filed before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and were dismissed
along with the Appeal filed by Meera Sahni. The order passed by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was common to a number of appeals
including the above referred three appeals. We find that in all
these matters the documents relied upon by the Petitioner were
absolutely identical to the documents filed before us and in fact, in
these three cases, the document purporting to have been issued
for Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) contained a
positive statement that land in question had not been notified so
far u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. This statement was false as
the declaration u/s 6 of Land Acquisition Act had actually been
issued in respect of the land which was subject matter of these
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
writ petitions. In the case before us, the statement contained in
the document dated 10.10.97 does not contain a positive statement
that no declaration u/s 6 of Land Acquisition Act had been issued
in respect of land in question. The statement is that the
declaration issued u/s 6 of Land Acquisition Act lapsed. Therefore,
the statement made in the document relied upon by the petitioners
in CA 6493/02, CA 6494/02 and CA 6496/02, which were dismissed
by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, was much more damaging to the
respondents, as compared to the statement made in the document
dated 10.10.97 in the case before us. In fact, the claim of
petitioners in the above referred Appeals before the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court was much stronger than that of the petitioners
before us, as it was represented to them that the land had not
been notified at all. Despite that, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
declined to grant relief on the basis of documents relied upon in
those appeals.
13. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that the order of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Meera Sahni‟s
case is based upon the findings that the documents relied upon by
the appellants before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court did not
constitute the permission u/s 5 of of Delhi Lands (Restriction on
Transfer) Act, 1972 and the question whether such a document
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
would constitute estoppel or not was not at all examined by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court and therefore it is open to this court to
take a view that these documents constitute estoppel to the effect
that the declaration made by the respondents u/s 6 of Land
Acquisition Act had lapsed and consequently set aside the
acquisition as being violative of Section 11A of Land Acquisition
Act. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the
petitioners. It would not be correct for us to take the view that
had the appellants before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court set up a plea
of estoppel, the decision of the Court would have been otherwise.
The presumption is that while deciding a case the court takes into
consideration all arguments which were or could have been
advanced before it. Therefore, we cannot say that had estoppel
been set up before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, it would have
taken a different view.
14. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that in the present case, the document dated 10.10.97 contains a
statement that the notification issued u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act had lapsed whereas there is no such statement in the
documents issued to the appellants before the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court. Since we have found, from record, that the documents
relied upon by the appellants before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
contained a much more positive statement, and despite that no
relief was granted in these cases, we will not be justified in
granting relief on the basis of document dated 10.10.97.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to R.C.
Sood & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1971 Delhi 170. In
that case, the land of the petitioners was acquired under Land
Acquisition Act by issuing notification in the year 1959 and 1962
but the acquisition was later on set aside by the court. A fresh
notification was issued by Delhi Administration u/s 4 of Land
Acquisition Act, in respect of the land of the petitioner on
November 21, 1966. On January 20, 1967, Land Acquisition
(Amendment and Validation) Ordinance Number 1/1967 was
issued and on April 12, 1967, Land Acquisition (Amendment and
Validation) Act was enacted, repealing the Ordinance. Thereafter
a fresh notification u/s 6 & 7 of the Act was issued on September
28, 1967. The notifications issued on November 21, 1966 and
September 28, 1967 were cancelled on March 24, 1968. On issue
of the Ordinance and Amendment Act, the notifications issued in
1959 and 1962 stood revived. It was held by this court that the
action of the government in issuing a fresh notification on
November 21, 1966 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
before promulgation of Ordinance and enactment of Amendment
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
Act, was a representation that they proposed to commence the
fresh acquisition proceedings. As a result of promulgation of
Ordinance and enactment of Amendment Act, the earlier
acquisition became valid retrospectively. At that stage, two
courses were open to the Government; one was to proceed with
the acquisition proceedings and pay compensation on the basis of
market value as of November 21, 1966; the other course was to
cancel or withdraw or obtain fresh acquisition proceedings in view
of the revival of the earlier acquisition and since the respondents
chose the former course by issuing a notice to the petitioners on
June 6, 1967 for hearing of the objections filed by them, this was a
representation that they would not rely upon the earlier
acquisitions but proceed with the fresh acquisitions. It was held
that since, relying upon representation of the Government, the
petitioners did not file an application for revival of their reference
u/s 18(2) of Land Acquisition Act and did not challenge the validity
of the Ordinance and the Act nor did they challenge the validity of
earlier acquisition proceedings on the grounds which were not
considered in the earlier decisions, the petitioners had suffered a
detriment by reason of their acting upon the representation of the
respondents and therefore, the respondents were stopped from
contending that they had not abandoned the earlier acquisition or
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
that they had no power to do so or that they were not bound to
continue the fresh acquisition proceedings. This judgment does
not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, as we
find that the petitioners have failed to establish that they had
acted to their detriment, on the representation made by the
respondents.
15. Now, we proceed to deal with plea of estoppel. In our
country, estoppel has been treated as a rule of evidence and given
statutory recognition in Section 115 of Indian Evidence Act. The
essence of the principle is that a person will not be allowed to
plead the contrary of a fact or state of things, which he has
formally asserted by words or conduct. In other words, the person
is not allowed to say one thing at one time and opposite of it at
another time. It means that a man is estopped from denying or
withdrawing his previous assertion or from going back from his
own act, even if it be to tell the truth. The principle is based on
the premise that it would be inequitable and unjust to a person, if
another person, who has made a mis-representation to him and
induced him to act in a manner he would otherwise not have done,
is allowed to deny or repudiate the fact of his former statement, to
the loss and injury of the person who acted upon the mis-
representation. The essential ingredients of estoppel as defined in
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
Section 115 of Indian Evidence Act are (a) there must be a
representation by a person or his authorised agent to another in
the form of a declaration, act or omission; (b) the representation
must have been of existence of a fact; (c) the representation must
have been made to be relied upon i.e. it must have been made
under circumstances which amounted to an intention to cause or
permit belief. (d) there must have been belief on the part of the
other party, in its truth; (e) there must have been action on the
face of such declaration, act or omission. In other words, the
declaration, act or omission must have actually caused another to
act on the face of it and it alter his position to his prejudice or
detriment.
16. No doubt, the plea of estoppel is available against the
Government, as much as against an individual, and in appropriate
case it open to the court to grant relief on the citizens setting up
and proving estoppel, as envisaged under Section 115 of Indian
Evidence Act, against the Government or a public body. Normally,
Public Institutions as well as the Government are as much bound
to carry out representation of the facts relying upon which other
persons have altered their position to their prejudice.
17. It is settled proposition of law that a plea of estoppel
whether by record or by deed has to be specifically pleaded by the
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
party setting it up and such a plea cannot be raised during
arguments, until it has been pleaded. In fact failure to plead
stoppel may be construed as its waiver. The purpose behind
insisting upon pleading is that the opposite party may show that
there is no scope for its applicability, in the facts of the case.
18. This doctrine also stands incorporated in Order VI Rule 4
and Order VIII Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure. The plea of
estoppel being a mixed question of fact and law, a party cannot be
allowed to resort to such a plea without definite allegation in the
pleading.
19. In Kasinka Trading And Another Vs. Union Of India &
Another (1995) 1 SCC 274, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, inter alia,
observed as under:
"There is preponderance of judicial opinion that to
invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound
and positive foundation must be laid in the petition
itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald
expressions, without any supporting material, to the
effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party
invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on
the assurance of the Government would not be
sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion,
the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked
in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
aspects including the results sought to be achieved and
the public good at large, because while considering the
applicability of the doctrine, the courts have to do
equity and the fundamental principles of equity must
for ever be present to the mind of the court, while
considering the applicability of the doctrine. The
doctrine must yield when the equity so demands if it
can be shown having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case that it would be inequitable
to hold the Government or the public authority to its
promise, assurance ore representation "
20. It is true that the case before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
one of invoking Promissory Estoppel and not estoppel as codified
in Section 115 of Indian Evidence Act, but, the underlying
principle being the same, it would equally apply to a plea of
estoppel under Section 115 of Indian Evidence Act. In Juggilal
Kamlapat vs. Pratapmal Rameshwar, AIR 1978 SC 389, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that:
"As the High court has pointed out, no case of
estoppel was pleaded by the plaintiff and
therefore, it was the plaintiff who should be
precluded from raising the question of estoppel"
21. On a perusal of the writ petition, we find that the petitioner
has no where set up the plea of estoppel. It has not been stated,
anywhere in the petition that land in question was purchased by
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
the petitioner relying upon the statement made in the document
dated 10.10.1997 to the effect that the declaration issued under
Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act had lapsed. It has not been
pleaded that had the respondents not stated, in the document
dated 10.10.97, that the notification issued under Section 6 of
Land Acquisition Act had lapsed, the petitioners would not have
purchased land in question and would have purchased some other
land utilising the money paid for purchase of the land subject
matter of the writ petition. It has also not been pleaded in the
petition that the petitioners were not at all aware of the writ
petition filed by Ram Prasad and his nephews and the outcome of
that petition. Rather, in their rejoinder dated 28.1.2004, to the
counter affidavit of respondent DDA, the petitioners took the stand
that writ petition No. 812 of 1994 (filed by Ram Prasad etc.) was
transferred to Hon‟ble Supreme Court and the stay was vacated
with respect to the entire matter on 14.12.94 and therefore the
limitation period started running from 14.12.94 as per the
provisions of Section 11A of Land Acquisition Act. The stand taken
in the rejoinder is a clear indicator of the fact that the writ petition
No. 812 / 94 filed by Ram Prasad etc. as well as the orders passed
in that writ petition were very much in their knowledge and in fact
their case is based upon the stand that limitation period for the
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
purpose of making an award started running from 14.12.94 and
not from 1.11.96. In fact, document dated 10.10.97 has repeatedly
been referred as a NOC in the rejoinder filed by the petitioners.
This is also their case inthe rejoinder that they are in possession of
1 bigha 4 biswa of undivided interest in the entire property along
with other legal heirs of Shri Hari Ram.
Mere one sentence in one para in the writ petition that the
awards is null and void in view of admission of the respondents
that notification under Sections 4 and 6 had already lapsed, does
not amount to pleading stoppel, as envisaged in Section 115 of
Evidence Act. In fact, the very basis of this petition is that a No
Objection Certificate having been issued by the office of Additional
District Magistrate (LA) and the NOC containing a statement that
the declaration under Section 6 had lapsed, it was not permissible
for the respondents to acquire the land. This petition was earlier
dismissed on 18.11.2002. On dismissal of this writ petition, the
petitioner filed a Review Petition dated 16.12.2002 and the review
was sought on the sole ground that since the stay order was
vacated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on 14.12.94 and not on
31.10.96, there was an error in the judgment dated 18.11.2002.
The petitioners did not seek review on the ground that their case
was based upon estoppel in view of the statement made in the
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
document dated 10.10.97 and therefore even if the stay order was
vacated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on 1.11.96, as was claimed
by the respondents, they were still entitled to relief on the basis of
principle of estoppel.
22. Even if we proceed on the assumption that the petition
contains facts necessary to lay down foundation of estoppel and
therefore the plea of estoppel is open to the petitioners, we find
that they have not been able to make out estoppel as envisaged
under Sec. 115 of Indian Evidence Act.
Admittedly, Shri Ram Prasad and his brother Hari Ram, who
sold the land in question to the petitioners, had filed writ petition
No. 812 of 1994 challenging acquisition of land comprised in
Khasra No. 288 of Village Jasola. Admittedly, the writ petition,
filed by them was dismissed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on
1.11.1996. Therefore, it cannot be denied that Shri Ram Prasad
etc. predecessor in interest of the petitioners, were very much
aware of the orders passed by this court as well as by the Supreme
Court in the writ petition filed by them. They knew it very well
that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had vacated the stay order passed
by this court, only in respect of those lands of Village Jasola which
were required for construction of Okhla Sewage Treatment Plant
and since the land subject matter of this writ petition was not
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
amongst the lands required for construction of Okhla Sewage
Treatment Plant, they also knew that the stay order passed by this
court in the writ petition filed by them was operative till 1.11.96
when their writ petition was finally disposed of. Ram Prasad etc.
also knew that notification under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act
issued in respect of land subject matter of this writ petition had
not lapsed, as the award could be made within two years of
vacation of stay. Once it is shown that true state of affairs, as
regards the date on which the stay granted by this court was
vacated, was in the knowledge of the predecessor in interest of the
petitioners, it would be difficult to accept that the same was not
known to the petitioners. We are, therefore, unable to accept
that the factual position as regards the date of vacation of stay
order passed by this court in respect of the land subject matter of
this writ petition was not in the knowledge of the petitioners, at
the time of purchasing land in question from Ram Prasad and his
nephews.
23. The representation contained in the document dated
10.10.97 to the effect that the notification issued under Sec. 6 of
Land Acquisition Act had lapsed, was made primarily to the
vendors namely Ram Prasad and his nephews. It would be for the
seller to ensure, before transferring an agricultural land, that it
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
was not subject matter of acquisition and therefore he was
competent to transfer it by way of sale. This is more so, when the
seller, having already filed a writ petition, knows it full well that
the land had already been notified under Sections 4 and 6 of Land
Acquisition Act and therefore in view of the provisions of Delhi
Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972, he cannot transfer the
same without obtaining permission from the „Competent
Authority‟. Permission under Section 5 of „The Delhi Land
(Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 has to be granted to the
transferor and not to the transferee of the land. In fact, the Act
does not envisage either any NOC or Status Report to be given by
the Competent Authority or any other officer. It only refers to
permission to transfer land.
We have noted earlier that neither in the writ petition nor in
the rejoinder filed by them, the petitioners have claimed that they
were not aware of notifications issued under L.A. Act, and the Writ
Petition filed by Ram Prasad etc, challenging the notifications. We
have also noted that in fact the petitioners have taken the stand
that acquisition was time barred as the stay order was vacated on
14.12.94, not on 01.11.96. Assuming however that the petitioner
were not aware of the writ petition filed by the sellers Ram Prasad
etc., once, it came to their knowledge, from the document dated
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
10.10.97, that a declaration under Section 6 of Land Acquisition
Act had been issued in respect of the land which they proposed to
purchase, the first question that would come to their mind would
be to know how and why the declaration had lapsed with exercise
of due diligence, they could have found that a writ petition
challenging acquisition of that land, was filed by Ram Prasad etc.,
the stay granted in that writ petition was vacated only on 1.11.96
and therefore it was equally permissible for the Land Acquisition
Collector to pass award up to 31.3.1998 and the declaration would
not lapse before 31.10.98.
Even otherwise we find it difficult to accept that the
petitioner did not have knowledge of the acquisition proceedings
and the writ petition filed by Ram Prasad etc. Had that been so,
there was no need for either the vendor or the purchaser to seek
any status report, clearance or NOC from the office of Additional
District Magistrate (LA) because a person having no knowledge of
the acquisition and litigation would entertain no doubt about the
right of the vendors to transfer their land. The very fact that a
document of the nature of documents dated 10.10.97 was sought
from the office of Additional District Magistrate (LA) indicates that
in fact, the parties knew that there was a cloud on the right of the
sellers to transfer land in question and that is why they wanted to
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
have a document of this nature. The Delhi Lands (Restrictions on
Transfer) Act, 1972 does not require any clearance/NOC to be
obtained from the competent authority before transfer of a land
which was not subjected to notification under Sections 4/6 of Land
Acquisition Act.
24. Since the petitioners and their predecessor in interest knew
that the award had been made well within the period of limitation
prescribed for this purpose, and therefore the notification issued
under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act had in fact not lapsed, it
cannot be said that the petitioners believed the statement made in
the document dated 10.10.97 and acted upon it, by purchasing the
land in question, relying upon that statement. If true facts were
known to the petitioners, there can be no estoppels, if the
statement made in the document dated 10.10.97 was not factually
correct. In Kishan Lal v. Mst. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"Whatever the acts of the respondent Chaltibai, whatever
her admissions and whatever the course of conduct she
pursued qua the appellant Kishorilal they could not amount
to estoppel as both parties were equally conversant with the
true facts."
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
In R.S. Maddanappa Vs. Chandrama and Ors. AIR 1965 SC
1812, „P‟ was the owner of the property which was held in
possession of her husband „M‟. „C‟ was the daughter of „P‟. After
demise of „P‟, „C‟ wrote a letter to her step mother stating therein
that "everything belongs to her father and he has the sole
authority to do anything." A will was executed by „M‟ in respect of
„C‟s property which was attested by „C‟ and her husband. In a suit
for possession, brought against „M‟, he claimed estoppel against
the "C" in view of the letter sent by her. The Hon‟ble Supreme
Court held that since „M‟ knew the true position that these
property belonged to „P‟ and therefore he had no authority to deal
with them, there was no possibility of erroneous belief about his
title being created in the mind of „M‟ because of what „C‟ has said
in her letter to her step mother. During the course of the
judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court quoted the following
observations from an English judgment:
"The object of estoppel is to prevent fraud and secure
justice between the parties by promotion of honesty
and good faith. Therefore, where one person makes a
misrepresentation to the other about a fact he would
not be shut out by the rule of estoppel, if that other
person knew the true state of facts and must
consequently not have been misled by the
misrepresentation."
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
It was held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that mere
representation of matters of legal inference from facts known to
both the parties, is not a ground of estoppel - Knowledge may be
of fact or of law, the only difference being that on question of fact,
knowledge will have to be proved whereas in case of law, it will
have to be presumed, on the principle that no one can claim
excuse of ignorance of law. Therefore, if true facts as regards date
of vacation of stay in CWP 812/84 was known to the petitioners,
they cannot claim that they had relied upon the statement
contained in the document dated 10.10.97, to the effect that the
declaration under Section 6 had lapsed. Once knowledge of
essential facts is shown, then whether the declaration stands
lapsed or not, is a question of legal inference and everyone,
including the petitioners is supposed to know law of the land.
The petitioner cannot claim estoppel against the
respondents if despite knowing true state of facts they chose to
purchase the land in question, thereby taking a calculated risk of
purchasing land which had already been acquired by the
Government.
25. Another reason why no relief can be granted to the
petitioner on the basis of the document dated 10.10.97 is that
Tehsildar, who issued this document did not have either actual or
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
ostensible authority to issue such a document. As is evident from a
bare perusal of document dated 10.10.97, Tehsildar purported to
act on behalf of Additional District Magistrate (LA), meaning
thereby that the officer authorised to issue such a document was
Additional District Magistrate (LA) and Tehsildar could have
issued it only with the approval of Additional District Magistrate
(LA). As noted earlier, Tehsildar did not seek an approval of
Additional District Magistrate (LA) before issuing the document
dated 10.10.97. The Government cannot be made liable for an act
committed by an employee who did not have either actual or
ostensible authority to do such an act. The Competent Authority
under The Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 is
Additional District Magistrate (LA) as noted by this court in Meera
Sahni and Anr. Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi 89 (2001) DLT 484 and
then again by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Meera Sahni Vs. Lt.
Governor of Delhi 2008 (9) SCC 177.
26. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that a
citizen is not expected to know whether the person issuing a
document on behalf of the Competent Authority had actually taken
approval of the Competent Authority or not and the citizens would
be justified in presuming that before issuing such a document, the
public servant concerned must have taken approval of the
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
Competent Authority. We are unable to agree with the learned
counsel for the petitioner, since accepting his argument would
result in a situation where any official of the Government may, by
his unauthorised act, cause irretrievable loss to the Government
and the exchequer, despite having no authority from the
Government to do so.
In Public Law, the most obvious limitation on the Doctrine of
Estoppel is that it cannot be invoked so as to give an authority,
power which it does not in law possess. If the representation
made by an official who has no legal power to do so is enforced
against the government, ultra vires acts will gain legitimacy, which
is a negation of the fundamental cannons of administrative law.
The proposition that a citizen is not expected to know the limits of
an officer tends to legitimise unauthorised actions and to hold that
a citizen acting on an unauthorised act, without enquiring into the
limits of the authority of the present committing such an act can
bind the Government, would be to create a power which does not
exist. It has to be appreciated that in government, numerous
officers work in a limited sphere, within their limited authority,
imposed by the very nature of their work. To hold that the Govt. is
bound by every act of its officers, irrespective of the field in which
they are required to operate and the scope of their functions and
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
authority, may result in catastrophic results. In the present case,
we cannot miss the fact in the matters of acquisition of land by the
court, under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, Tehsildar has
no role to play. It is Land Acquisition Collector, or Additional
District Magistrate or Secretary (L & B), who are concerned with
acquisition of land by the Govt. Therefore, if a person believes and
acts upon the representative made to him by a Tehsildar, in the
matter of land acquisition, he does so at his own peril.
27. The power to acquire land is a statutory power of the Govt.
given to by Land Acquisition Act. Since, there can, as a general
rule, be no estoppel, against a statue, the Govt. cannot be denied
right to exercise this statutory power, irrespective of the
representation, if any, made by one of its employees to a citizen, if
the same was incorrect and contrary to law. This is more so, when
such a representation is made by a person who does not have
either actual or ostensible authority to act on behalf of the Govt.
The statement, contained in the document dated 10.10.97 that the
declaration under Section 6 had lapsed, was incorrect and
contrary to the provisions of Section 11A of Land Acquisition Act,
which permitted the LAC to make award, within 2 years, after
excluding the period of stay order. That being the position if such
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
a document is held to be binding on the Govt., that will be contrary
to the statute i.e. Section 11A of Land Acquisition Act.
In Ravinder Sharma & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR
1995 SC 277, a person who did not possess requisite qualification
at the time of appointment as a clerk was further promoted as
Assistant. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that since he did not
possess the requisite qualification, the appointment was against
Punjab Public Service Commission (State Service Class III)
Regulations and that being so no question of estoppel would ever
arise.
In Plamac Machine Manufacturing Company Vs. Collector of
Central Excise, AIR 1991 SC 999, it was found that the department
had approved classification of the product under a wrong item. It
was held that since there could be no estoppel against a Statute,
department was not estopped from revising the classification.
In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Sh. R.C. D‟souza, AIR 1987 SC
1172, the respondent was appointed as Assistant Commandant in
C.R.P.F on temporary basis and was continued on re-employment.
He was promoted as a Dy. Commandant, on temporary basis. He
was asked to opt for absorption. It was found that in view of Rule
107 of CRPF Rules, he was not entitled for absorption in the Force.
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that calling for option for
absorption being contrary to the statutory rule, would not operate
as an estoppel nor confer any right to absorption. It was observed
by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad & Sons Vs. State
of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 745 that there can be no estoppels
against a Statute. It was noted by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State
of U.P. and Anr. V. U.P. Rajaya Khanij Vikas Nigam SS and Others;
JT 2008 (6) SC 489 , that "it is settled law that there can be no
estoppel against a statute."
28. One more reason why the petitioners cannot challenge the
acquisition is that they have purchased the land in question after
issue of notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section
6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Being subsequent purchasers, they
are not entitled, in law, to challenge the acquisition. In Meera
Sahni‟s case (Supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, inter alia noted
as under:
"17. When a piece of land is sought to be
acquired, a notification under Section 4 of Land
Acquisition Act is required to be issued by the State
Government strictly in accordance with law. The said
notification is also required to be followed by a
declaration to be made under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act and with the issuance of such a
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
notification any encumbrance created by the owner,
or any transfer made after the issuance of such a
notification would be deemed to be void and would
not be binding on the government. A number of
decisions of this Court have recognized the aforesaid
proposition of law wherein it was held that
subsequent purchaser cannot challenge acquisition
proceedings and also the validity of the notification
or the irregularity in taking possession of the land
after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
18. In U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its
Chairman and Anr. v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., it
was stated by this Court that:
3. ...Having regard to the facts of this case, we were
not inclined to further adjourn the case nor to remit
the case for fresh consideration by the High Court. It
is well settled law that after the notification under
Section 4(1) is published in the Gazette any
encumbrance created by the owner does not bind
the Government and the purchaser does not acquire
any title to the property....
19. In Sneh Prabha (Smt) and Ors. v. State of U.P.
and Anr. it is stated as under:
5. ...It is settled law that any person who purchases
land after publication of the notification under
Section 4(1), does so at his/her own peril. The object
of publication of the notification under Section 4(1)
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is
likely to be needed for public purpose and the
acquisition proceedings point out and an implement
to anyone to encumber the land acquired
thereunder. It authorizes the designated officer to
enter upon the land to do preliminaries etc.
Therefore, any alienation of the land after the
publication of the notification under Section 4(1)
does not bind the government or the beneficiary
under the acquisition. On taking possession of the
land, all rights, title and interests in land stand
vested in the State, under Section 16 of the Act, free
from all encumbrances and thereby absolute title in
the land is acquired thereunder....
20. The said proposition of law was also reiterated in
the cases of Ajay Kishan Shinghal and Ors. v. Union
of India and Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of
Haryana and Ors..
21. In view of the aforesaid decisions it is by now
well settled law that under the Land Acquisition Act
the subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the
acquisition proceedings and that he would be only
entitled to get the compensation."
29. The award in this case was made on 31.10.98. The writ
petition, has however been filed only on 28th February, 2001.
There is no explanation for not challenging the acquisition for
more than two years. During arguments it was contended by
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners came to the
court when they found that the land purchased by them was not
being mutated. In this regard he relied upon a letter dated
11.11.2000 sent by the petitioner to Additional District Magistrate
(LA). We have perused the letter referred to by learned counsel
for the petitioner. It appears from the letter that the grievance of
the petitioners was that the land purchased by them was not being
mutated in their name despite NOC dated 10.10.97 and registered
sale deed dated 17.10.1997, though under Suwidha Scheme, the
mutation was to be completed by 1.10.1998. Since the land in
question was purchased by the petitioner on 17.10.97 and they
applied for mutation prior to 1.10.98, it cannot be accepted that
they did not come to know of the cloud on their title, prior to the
year 2001. Obviously the mutation in favour of the petitioner was
not being granted because acquisition proceedings were still
pending. Therefore, it cannot be said that before November, 2000,
the petitioner had no reason to challenge the acquisition. Also, we
find that the petition does not disclose as to when the petitioners
came to know of the award dated 31.10.1998, though knowledge
of the award and its number is admitted in para 4 of the petition.
It is not their case in the writ petition that they had no knowledge
of the award for more than two years. Therefore in our view the
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
petitioner have not explained the inordinate delay in coming to the
court by way of this writ petition. This is yet another reason why
we would not like to grant any relief to the petitioners.
30. We would also like to add that land in question, after taking
possession by the Govt, was placed at the disposal of respondent
DDA and was sold by it in the shape of plots, after developing the
area. During pendency of this petition, an application was filed by
the petitioners for staying the auction of those plots by the DDA.
The relief sought by the petitioner was not granted to them. As a
result, land, subject matter of the writ petition is no more available
even with respondent/DDA. Faced with the situation, it was
contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that DDA can
be directed to allot some other suitable land to the petitioner
either in this very or in a nearby locality. We do not know whether
any vacant land is available with DDA in this locality or in an
adjoining locality or not and if available where the land is, what is
its area and what is the land use prescribed for such land.
31. The land in question was agricultural land when it was
purchased by the petitioners. Had there been no acquisition, they
could not have used it for any other purpose other than
agricultural purposes. Delhi Development Act does not permit
DDA to sell or transfer agricultural land to anyone. Therefore, it is
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
not possible to direct DDA to provide alternative agricultural land
to the petitioners. As regards allotment of developed plot of land
to the petitioners, we do not have any material before us to find
out what would have been present market value of land in
question if it were to be used as agricultural land and therefore
how much is the loss to the petitioners on account of its
acquisition. Consequently, we cannot know how much developed
land would compensate the petitioners for the loss on account of
acquisition of their land. Unless the court knows the extent of loss
caused to the petitioners on account of acquisition of their land
and also knows what land is available with DDA which can be
allotted to the petitioners by way of compensation and what is the
present market value of that land, it is not possible for the court to
take an appropriate view in this regard. In the facts and
circumstances of the case and keeping in view the fact that no
alternative relief has been claimed by amending the petition,
despite the fact that after taking possession of the land in question
it has already been developed and sold by way of auction, we see
no justification to embark on such an exercise.
32. We also note that the sale deed contains an indemnity clause
whereby the vendors have assured the petitioners that if the whole
or any portion of the land is ever taken away or goes out of the
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
possession of the vendees on account of any legal defect in the
ownership and title of the vendors, then the vendors will be liable
and responsible to make good the loss suffered by the vendees.
This is not a usual clause in a sale deed and in fact incorporating
such a clause in the sale deed reflects the doubt of the petitioners
on the right of the sellers to sell the land to them. Therefore, if the
petitioners were not aware of the writ petition filed by the
vendors, challenging acquisition of this land, and therefore they
did not know that the declaration issued u/s 6 of Land Acquisition
Act had actually not lapsed on account of that petition having been
dismissed and stay having been vacated only on 1.11.96, and
consequently the vendors did not have a legal right to sell this land
to them, they can sue them for appropriate remedy, including
suitable damages. In fact during the course of arguments, we are
informed by Sh. Sanjay Poddar, learned counsel for the
petitioners, that some land in this very locality is still available
with the vendors. We say nothing on this. It is for the petitioners
to decide what course of action if any they should adopt for their
remedy against the vendors. But as far as the respondents are
concerned, we are of the view that no relief can be granted to the
petitioners against them.
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
For the reasons given above, we find no merit in the writ
petition. The same is hereby dismissed.
V.K.JAIN, J.
VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.
AUGUST 27, 2009
acm/sk
Mrs. Madhulika Srivastava & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.
