Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 3247 Del
Judgement Date : 19 August, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 19th August, 2009.
+ CRL.A.82/2007
MOHAN SINGH ...Appellant
Through: Ms. Purnima Sethi, Adv.
Versus
STATE ...Respondent
Through: Mr. Pawan Sharma, APP.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the
Digest? Yes
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. (ORAL)
1. The appellant has been convicted for the offence of
murder. The impugned judgment is dated 12.12.2005.
2. Before we note the facts of the case, we wish to
pen down a prelude, for the reason we are noting an
unfortunate trend of convicting each and every accused,
whose act has resulted in the death of a person.
3. In a case of homicide, the distinction between
homicide simplicitor and a homicide amounting to murder is
well re-cognised by law and has to be kept in view while
evaluating evidence. Further, the distinction between Part I
and Part II of Section 304 IPC has also to be kept in view. That
apart, there may be cases where the intention of the accused
may be to cause an injury simplicitor but death may result. In
such cases, it has to be considered whether the act constitutes
an offence punishable under Section 322, 323, 325 or 326 IPC.
4. The reason is obvious. Unlike in statutory offences
or offences of strict liability, mens rea plays a very important
role in criminal matters. An act actuated by mens rea comes
within the four corners of a penal offence.
5. The appellant has been convicted on the testimony
of Const.Shiv Kumar PW-1 who claimed to be an eye-witness.
6. Shiv Kumar deposed that he was posted as a
Constable in police station Kalyanpuri and at 9.45 PM on
22.9.2003 was proceeding towards Khichripur. He reached
near a wine shop and saw people running here and there. He
entered the market place and saw the accused hitting a boy
with a broken bottle. On seeing him, the accused fled with the
broken bottle. He chased the accused and apprehended him.
He brought him back to the spot and met HC Jaiveer. The SHO
arrived soon. His statement Ex.PW-1/A was recorded by the
SHO. He handed over the accused whom he had apprehended
i.e. the appellant to the SHO.
7. We may note that the apprehension of the
appellant and the recovery of a broken glass bottle from him
stands recorded in the rukka prepared at the site and
dispatched from the spot in the midnight at 00.15 hours. The
same is evidenced from the endorsement Ex.PW-2/A on the
statement Ex.PW-1/A i.e. the rukka.
8. Another fact of importance qua the involvement of
the appellant may be noted. The shirt and the pant which he
was wearing when he was apprehended and were seized
immediately after his apprehension have been detected with
the presence of human blood of group A i.e. the blood group of
the deceased as per the report Ex.PW-19/L of the serologist.
9. The post-mortem report of the deceased Ex.PW-
15/A notes only two injuries on the person of the deceased
being:
"(i) Incised injury 1.5cm x .5cm x 1cm deep just below left eye semicircular. Margins (illegible);
(ii) Abrasion 2x.5 cm just below injury above."
10. Opinion regarding cause of death was kept pending till
chemical analysis report of the viscera was made available.
11. It is apparent that the doctor who conducted the post
mortem report could not give a definite opinion as to what
caused the death. We may note that as per the post-mortem
report, one liter blood was detected in the abdomen due to
heamorrhage.
12. For record we may note that there is no evidence of
the deceased being poisoned to death.
13. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem,
namely, Dr.V.K.Singh deposed that as per the post-mortem
report the cause of death of the deceased was heamorrhagic
shock consequent upon blunt force impact on the abdomen.
14. The learned Trial Judge has, without analyzing the
post-mortem report or the testimony of the doctor who
conducted the post-mortem, simply on the basis of the fact
that the deceased died, held that it is a case of murder.
15. We totally disagree.
16. The post-mortem report of the deceased shows that due
to a blow given on the stomach of the deceased a resultant
injury inside the stomach of blood vessels being ruptured
resulted. Due to blood loss the deceased suffered a
heamorrhagic shock. No external injury on the stomach could
be detected. Not even a contusion injury. It is apparent that
the blow on the stomach was sans a material object. In all
probability the blow on the stomach was a fist blow. The two
incised injuries near the eye are superficial. In any case, the
doctor has not opined the same to be dangerous.
17. Dead bodies speak for themselves. The dead body
of the deceased speaks and tells us that an unfortunate fist
blow on the stomach of the deceased resulted in internal
arteries getting ruptured and blood loss being the result
thereof. The end was heamorrhagic shock.
18. We need not discuss the theory of culpable
homicide amounting to murder and culpable homicide not
amounting to murder for the reason the theory is well-known.
19. The act of the appellant does not evidence any
intention to cause death of the deceased. It even does not
evidence an intention to cause an injury which the appellant
knew likely to cause the death of the deceased. There is no
intention to cause the injury which has resulted from the act
i.e. the rupturing of the internal arteries, which has resulted in
the death. Even knowledge contemplated by the third limb of
Section 299 IPC i.e. that the act of the appellant is likely to
cause death of the deceased is ruled out.
20. It is obvious that the appellant simply intended to
cause an injury on the person of the deceased by giving him a
fist blow on the stomach. At best, the offence committed by
the appellant is of voluntarily causing grievous hurt punishable
under Section 325 IPC with imprisonment for a term which
may extent up to seven years.
21. The appellant, as per his nominal role, has already
undergone an actual sentence of five years, ten months and
nineteen days. He has earned remissions which would entitle
him to immediate release even if we sentence him to undergo
imprisonment for seven years.
22. We dispose of appeal setting aside the impugned
judgment and order dated 12.12.2005. We acquit the
appellant from the charge of having murdered the deceased.
We convict the appellant for the offence punishable under
Section 325 IPC and sentence him to undergo imprisonment
for the period already undergone.
23. Copy of this judgment be sent to the
Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar for immediate compliance
since the appellant has to be set free pursuant to our decision,
save and accept, his being in custody in some other case.
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) JUDGE
(INDERMEET KAUR) JUDGE August 19, 2009 rb
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