Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 3122 Del
Judgement Date : 12 August, 2009
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RSA 32/2009
Judgment pronounced on: 12th August, 2009
DHRUV KUMAR GUPTA ..... Appellant
Through : Mr. S.P. Pandey, Advocate
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through : Ms. Charul Sarin, Advocate for
DDA.
%
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ARUNA SURESH
(1) Whether reporters of local paper may be
allowed to see the judgment?
(2) To be referred to the reporter or not? Yes
(3) Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? Yes
JUDGMENT
ARUNA SURESH, J.
1. This is a second appeal preferred by the appellant
assailing the judgment and decree dated
24.11.2008 in RCA No.25/2004 passed by the
Additional District Judge, Delhi whereby the first
appeal of the appellant challenging the order of the
trial court was dismissed.
2. Appellant claimed himself to be owner and in
possession of land measuring 6 Bigha 1 Biswa in
khasra No.748, 9 Bigha 19 biswa in khasra No.753,
Bigha 12 biswa in Village Mehrauli. He sought a
relief of injunction against the respondents from
dispossessing him from the suit land on the plea
that he is still in possession of the suit land and his
possession cannot be disturbed and DDA has no
right to demolish the structure which has been
raised by the appellant in the suit land.
3. On 13.11.1959 a notification was issued under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter
referred to as „Act‟) for the acquisition of the suit
land followed by another declaration dated
7.12.1966 issued under Section 6 of the Act. On
25.3.1983 award pertaining to the said acquisition
being award No.83/82-83 was published. Appellant
challenged the acquisition of the land and filed a
Writ Petition (Civil) No.3615/1982 in this court. The
said Writ Petition was dismissed. Against the said
dismissal order, appellant filed SLP No.7906 of
1996. The said SLP was also dismissed.
Accordingly, the acquisition of the suit land by the
respondent/Union of India was upheld to be in
accordance with law. With the acquisition of land
having attained finality, the possession of the land
vested with the Govt. On 14.3.1997, Land and
Building Department of the Govt. handed over the
possession of the suit land to respondent/DDA.
4. After the DDA came in possession of the said land,
the appellant filed suit No.576/1997 seeking
permanent injunction against the respondents from
raising boundary wall on the suit land and also from
dispossessing the appellant from the suit land.
After the pleadings were complete on 23.7.2001,
the trial court framed following preliminary issue:-
"Whether this Court has the jurisdiction to try and
entertain the present suit?"
5. Vide its detailed judgment and decree dated
19.1.2004, the trial court dismissed the suit of the
appellant, firstly on the ground that once the land
was acquired and possession taken, the property
vested with the Govt. free from all encumbrances
and therefore no notice was required to be served
upon the appellant before carrying out demolition
and secondly that since the plaintiff/appellant was
not in possession of the suit land, the suit for
permanent injunction simplicitor was not
maintainable.
6. The judgment and decree of the trial court was
challenged by the appellant in RCA No.25/2004
which was filed by him in June, 2004. The First
Appellate Court dismissed the appeal vide its
judgment dated 24.11.2008 with the observation
that the trial court was within its right to frame
preliminary issue regarding the jurisdiction to
entertain the suit and treat it as preliminary issue.
Hence, this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the
CPC.
7. I have heard Mr. S.P. Pandey, Advocate appearing
for the appellant, Ms. Charul Sarin Advocate for
respondent/DDA and have also perused the
judgment of the trial court as well as of the First
Appellant Court and other documents placed on the
record.
8. Order 14 Rule 2 CPC empowers the court to
pronounce judgment on all issues. However, where
issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit
and the court is of the opinion that the case or any
part thereof can be disposed of on an issue of law
only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to
the jurisdiction of the court or a bar to the suit
created by any law for the time being in force, and
for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the
settlement of the other issue until after that issue
has been determined.
9. Preliminary issue framed in this case by the trial
court pertains to the jurisdiction of the civil court to
entertain the suit filed by the appellant. Hence, the
trial court was within its right to frame preliminary
issue regarding its jurisdiction to entertain the suit
and decide it first before adjudicating upon the
merits of the case. Therefore, the appeal
challenging the courts power to frame a preliminary
issue and decide the same does not raise any
substantial question of law.
10. The other grievance of the appellant in this appeal
is that an issue was framed on 20/5/1999 before
framing the preliminary issue regarding the
jurisdiction as to whether plaintiff has any existing
cause of action in his favour. But this issue could
not have been treated as preliminary issue by the
court as it does not relate to any question of law, as
it is a mix question of law and facts and should have
been decided by the court after affording parties an
opportunity to lead their respective evidence.
Again, I find no substance in these submissions.
11. Civil court has no jurisdiction to try a case which by
necessary implication arises out of Land Acquisition
Act. Section 9 of CPC vests jurisdiction in a Civil
Court to try all the civil suits, unless barred. The
cognizance of a suit of civil nature may either
expressly or impliedly be barred. The procedure
laid down under the Act is a special procedure with
a view to envisage to effectuate public purpose,
compulsorily acquiring the land for use of public
purpose. The dissatisfied claimant after the
notification issued under Section 4 and 6 and
pronouncement of the Award, has been specifically
provided with remedy of reference under Section 18
and a further appeal under Section 54 of the Act.
Once possession is taken, it stands vested under
Section 16 of the act, in the State with absolute title
free from all encumbrances.
12. In „Laxmi Chand & Ors. vs. Gram Panchayat,
Kararia & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 218' the Supreme
Court observed:-
"3. It would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred. The civil court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the constitutional courts, viz., the High Court and the Supreme Court under their plenary power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively with self- imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary power. Barring thereof, there is no power to the civil court."
13. The trial court dealt with this aspect of the
submission in para 8 of its judgment in the following
manner:-
"8. The provisions of Land Acquisition Act clearly bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to try and entertain any Civil Suit even if owner and any other person of the acquired land remains in possession of the acquired land, as the status of the said owner or any other person after the Acquisition of said land under Land Acquisition would be deemed to be unauthorized for the plaintiff under Section 5 of P.P. Act."
14. The trial court relied upon AIR 1955 SC 1955 to
come to the conclusion that jurisdiction of the civil
court was barred to entertain the suit filed by the
plaintiff. In the cited case it was observed that by
necessary implication, power of civil court to take
cognizance of case under Section 9 of CPC stands
excluded and civil court has no jurisdiction to go
into the question of validity or legality of notification
under Section 4 and declaration issued under
Section 6 of the Act, except the High Court.
15. As discussed above, the appellant exhausted its
remedy by filing writ petition challenging the
acquisition of the land, which was dismissed and
finally when SLP against the said order of the High
Court was also dismissed by the Supreme Court.
16. Therefore, I find that the observations of the trial
court as upheld by the First Appellate Court, as
regards its jurisdiction are in accordance with law
and no substantial question of law is raised from the
said findings.
17. Another substantial question of law as formulated in
the appeal is "Whether the order dated 28.01.1980
passed by Executive Officer (DA), DDA bearing DA
No.125(1) 79 to the effect that under the
instructions of Govt. of India and the present policy
of the DDA as contained in Govt. of India's letter
No.J.3037/113/74/UDI/IIB dated 16.02.1977, no
structure constructed prior to June 1977, is to be
demolished and therefore DDA withdrew the notice
dated 5-11-79 issued to Shri Tilak Raj (father of the
appellant) in respect of this land u/s. 30(1) of the
Delhi Development Act, 1957, does not amount to
vindicating the case of the appellant?"
18. It is argued that the suit land was notified in 1973 in
Govt. Gazette as "Development Area" but later on
the same was de-notified from Development Area in
Govt. Gazette in the year 1987 and therefore, in
view of this de-notification of the suit land from
development area, civil court has the jurisdiction to
entertain the suit.
19. These submissions do not raise any substantial
question of law. Once proceedings under Section 4
and 6 of the Act were complete and award was
pronounced, any de-notification of the suit land
from development area does not nullify notification
under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of
the Act. No notification under Section 48 of the Act
withdrawing acquisition of land was ever issued by
the Govt.
20. The possession of the suit land was taken by the
Land and Building Department which was handed
over to the DDA after the award was passed.
Therefore, the acquisition became final when the
possession was taken by the Land and Building
Department. On taking over possession of the land,
the land vested in the Govt. free from all
encumbrances.
21. Order dated 28.1.1980 was passed by the Executive
Officer (DA) after declaration under Section 6 of the
Act on 7.12.1966. This order therefore is non-est
against the acquired suit land.
22. Therefore, under the facts of the case no substantial
question of law is to be formulated. Appellant
cannot be allowed to challenge acquisition of the
land again by way of this suit which, under the
circumstances of this case has been rightly rejected
by the trial court and the Appellate court for want of
jurisdiction. Reference is made to Laxmi Chand's
case (supra)and „Nagin Chand Godha vs. Union
of India & Ors., 2003 (70) DRJ 721 (DB.).
23. As regards withdrawal of the notice dated 5.11.1979
which was issued to Tilak Raj, predecessor interest
of the appellant, at the outset it can be safely said
that withdrawal of this notice did not in any manner
de-notified the acquisition proceedings of the Land
& Building Department pertaining to the land in
question. It is argued that the possession, if any,
taken by the respondents was symbolic and
appellant is still in physical possession of the house
built on the said land. This argument is also not
sustainable as the possession of the land was taken
by Land & Building Department in accordance with
the law and procedure. After taking over the
possession the Govt. becomes its absolute owner,
free from all encumbrances.
24. Therefore physical possession of the appellant, if
any can be considered as possession of a trustee on
behalf of public at large or a tress-passer and,
therefore, this itself cannot be a ground to contend
that the Govt. has not taken the possession of the
suit land. Appellant has no right to claim the relief
sought alleging that actual possession was not
taken and therefore he should be protected.
25. In „Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D. Bhagwat
& Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1767', in similar
circumstances it was observed:-
"26. In a proceeding under the Act for acquisition of land all
interests are wiped out. Actual possession of the land becomes necessary for its use for the public purpose for which it has been acquired. Therefore, the taking of possession under the Act cannot be "symbolical" in the sense as generally understood in Civil Law. Surely it cannot be a possession merely on paper. What is required under the Act is the taking of actual possession on the spot. In the eyes of law the taking of possession will have the effect of transferring possession from the owner or the occupant of the land to the Government."
It was further observed:-
"28................It is, therefore, clear that taking of possession within the meaning of S.16 or 17(1) means taking of possession on the spot. It is neither a possession on paper nor a "symbolical" possession as generally understood in Civil Law. But the question is what is the mode of taking possession? The Act is silent on the point.
Unless possession is taken by the written agreement of the party concerned the mode of taking possession obviously would be for the authority to go upon the land and to do some act which would indicate that the authority has taken possession of the land. It may be in the form of a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise or by hanging a written declaration on the spot
that the authority has taken possession of the land. The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate the taking of possession is not necessary. No further notice beyond that under Section 9 (1) of the Act is required. When possession has been taken, the owner or the occupant of the land is dispossessed. Once possession has been taken the land vests in the Government."
26. Thus, it is clear that taking of possession under the
Act means taking of possession on the spot. It is
neither a possession on paper nor a symbolic
possession as is generally understood in Civil Law.
27. In Nagin Chand Godha's case (supra) while
referring to Balwant Narayan Bhagde's case
(supra) this court observed in para 10 as under:-
"10............... If a person is enjoying the possession after the possession has been taken, the person is enjoying the possession as a trustee on behalf of the public at large and that by itself cannot be a ground to contend that the possession has not been taken. It is the duty of the person who is occupying the property to look after the property and to see that the property is not defaced or devalued by himself or by others. He cannot subsequently
come to the Court to say that actual possession is not taken and therefore he should be protected and land be denotified."
28. The first Appellate Court while dealing with the
question of appellant being in physical possession
and also whether possession of the suit land was
taken by the Govt. within the meaning of Section 17
of the Act observed:-
".......... I have gone through the Khasra Girdawri which shows that the possession of the land had been taken in the year 2004 and the building existing over the land had been demolished. It is not disputed that the first Kabza Karwahi under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the land took place on 3.4.1996; Second Kabza Karwahi took place on 14.3.1997; Third Kabza Karwahi on 31.3.1997 and Last Kabza Karwahi on 1.7.2004........"
29. In the light of discussion as above, I conclude that
no substantial question of law can be formulated
under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed in limini.
30. CM APPL.3047/2009 for stay also stands dismissed.
(ARUNA SURESH) JUDGE AUGUST 12, 2009 vk
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