Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 2995 Del
Judgement Date : 4 August, 2009
* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 31.07.2009
Judgment delivered on: 04.08.2009
Crl. L.P. 201/2006
EICHER MOTORS LTD. ..... Appellant
versus
MRS PUSHPA CHAND ..... Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant : Mr. Apporve Karal, Advocate
For the Respondent :None
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment ?
2. To be referred to Reporters or not ? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? Yes
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J
1. Leave granted.
2. Briefly by this petition the order dated 20.04.2006 passed
by the learned Magistrate in complaint no. 1559/1/2003 is sought
to be assailed. By the said order the learned Magistrate has
dismissed the complaint for non-prosecution and consequently,
acquitted the accused. The appellant being aggrieved has
preferred the present petition to this Court.
3. The facts and circumstances in the background of which
the present appeal has been instituted is briefly set out
hereinafter:
3.1 The respondent being desirous of purchasing a vehicle,
approached the Centurian Bank Ltd. (in short the 'Bank'),
through the appellant. The appellant at the relevant time was the
constituted attorney for granting such like loans. For the said
purpose a tripartite agreement bearing No. NE1386/03/2001
dated 27.03.2001 (in short 'tripartite agreement') was executed
amongst the appellant, the Bank and the respondent. It is not
disputed that the loan was disbursed to the respondent, who
purchased a vehicle bearing model no. 10.70HSD. For the
purposes of repaying of the said loan, the respondent had issued
cheques. One such cheque drawn on the Nainital Bank Ltd., Br.
Raninbagh, Distt, Nainital (UA) bearing No. 434471, dated
05.06.2003, in the sum of Rs 3,40,269/-, was presented by the
appellant for encashment to its banker. The cheque was
returned by the respondent's banker vide memo dated
18.06.2003. Consequently, the appellant triggered the provisions
of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short
the 'N.I. Act') by issuing a statutory notice of demand dated
18.06.2003. This was followed by institution of criminal
complaint on 27.08.2003. In the criminal complaint along with
the respondent two other persons, who stood as guarantors, have
been arrayed as accused Nos. 2 & 3. Alongwith the criminal
complaint an affidavit by way of evidence was also filed by the
appellant.
3.2 On 28.08.2003, the learned Magistrate after perusing the
documents on record, the affidavit of evidence and upon hearing
submissions on behalf of the complainant directed registration of
the complaint and issuance of summons to the three (3) accused.
The matter was posted for further proceedings on 06.04.2004.
3.3 On 06.04.2004, fresh summons were issued to the accused,
as the earlier summons had not been returned.
3.4 The matter was posted on 19.04.2005. On 19.04.2005, the
complainant was not present, however, the accused no. 1 i.e.,
Mrs Pushpa Chand was present alongwith her counsel. She was
admitted to bail on furnishing a personal bond of Rs 10,000/- and
the surety of a like amount. Fresh summons were issued, in
respect of, accused no. 2 and 3 as they were 'absent'.
3.5 The matter was posted to 28.08.2005. The matter was,
however, taken up on 29.08.2005, as 28.08.2005 was declared a
holiday on account of 'Janmashtmi'. On 29.08.2005, there was
once again no appearance on behalf of the complainant. Accused
no. 1, Mrs Pushpa Chand was also absent, however, an
application for exemption from personal appearance was moved
by her counsel on the ground that she was suffering from a viral
fever. The learned Magistrate was pleased to grant her
exemption from appearance for that day. In the bail application
filed by accused no. 3, the bail was granted on his furnishing a
personal bond of Rs 10,000/- with the local surety of a like
amount. Fresh summons were issued in respect of accused no. 2.
The matter was posted to 20.04.2006.
3.6 On 20.04.2006, the case in the first instance was called out
in the morning session, at that time there was no appearance on
behalf of the complainant, while accused no. 1 and 3 were
present with their counsel. Accused no. 2 was still unserved.
The learned Magistrate noted that process fee had not been filed.
The matter was, however, kept back for 1 p.m. There was no
appearance even at 1 p.m. The matter was called out once again
post-lunch at 2:35 p.m., however, the same position obtained.
Consequently, the learned Magistrate, on account of the fact that
no process fee had been filed despite orders dated 29.08.2005,
dismissed the complaint for non-prosecution and proceeded to
acquit the accused.
4. It is important to note that a perusal of the order sheets of
this court would show that the counsel for the respondent, in a
sense is guilty of the same lackadaisical approach which the
appellant adopted in the trial court in prosecuting the case.
There was no appearance on behalf of the respondent on the
following dates, i.e., on 29.05.2008, 24.09.2008, 05.03.2009,
29.07.2009 & 31.07.2009. On 31.07.2009 even after a pass over
there was no appearance on behalf of respondent.
5. I have, however, perused the reply filed by the respondent
in this Court. A perusal of the reply would show that while the
respondent has admitted that a tripartite agreement dated
27.03.2001 was entered into between appellant, Centurian Bank
and the respondent, the said agreement was terminated and
pursuant thereto vehicle had been seized on 10.07.2002. The
respondent has in the reply admitted that she was required to
pay monthly instalment of Rs 13,593/- in cash and for the
purposes of 'security' she had issued six blank cheques. It is also
contended that the legal notice dated 18.07.2003 issued by the
appellant was replied by the respondent vide her advocate's
response dated 24.07.2003. The respondent has averred that
despite the order of the learned Magistrate dated 29.08.2005
directing issuance of fresh notice to accused No.2 upon filing
fresh process fee, since process fee was not deposited by the
appellant, the learned Magistrate had rightly dismissed the
complaint on 20.04.2006, as the appellant was not interested in
prosecuting the case.
6. Before me the learned counsel for the appellant has
submitted that on 19.04.2005 the authorized representative of
the appellant alongwith the counsel reached the court late as
they were to attend to other matters in court and by the time
they reached the court, orders had already been passed granting
bail to accused no. 1 and issuance of fresh summons to accused
no. 3. As regards non-appearance on 29.08.2005, the learned
counsel submitted that the counsel for the appellant in the court
below, due to a personal difficulty, was unable to attend the court
which, however, could be conveyed to the authorized
representative at a point in time which was close to the time for
court proceedings, resulting in the authorized representative
reaching late, by which time once again orders had been passed.
It is submitted that at the time of noting the next date, the
authorized representative had inadvertently recorded a wrong
date, i.e., 12.07.2006 as against 20.04.2006, which was the
correct date. The incorrect date was communicated to the
counsel for the appellant. He submitted that it is this inadvertent
mistake which resulted in the appellant-complainant's non
appearance on 20.04.2006, and the delay in filing the process fee
for summoning the accused no. 2.
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and
after perusing the record it is quite evident that the complainant
undoubtedly has been lackadaisical in prosecuting the complaint.
However, taking into account the fact that the complaint was still
at a preliminary stage of effecting service on accused No.2, the
learned Magistrate while exercising his power under Section 256
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.')
could have avoided the extreme option of dismissing the
complaint for non-prosecution. The reason given by the appellant
that the date fixed for further proceedings in court had been
wrongly recorded and hence, primary cause of absence of the
authorised representative and default in filing the process fee,
appears to be genuine or at least cannot be outrightly
disbelieved. The power available to the Magistrate under Section
256 of the Cr.P.C. to dismiss a complaint and acquit the accused,
is to be exercised keeping in mind the purpose for which it is
conferred. The width and scope of the power is explained by the
Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd vs
keshvanand (1998) 1 SCC 687. Justice K.T. Thomas (as he then
was) speaking for the court has observed that the purpose of
conferring power on the Magistrate under Section 256 of the
Cr.P.C. is to deter dilatory tactics on the part of the complainant
once he sets in motion criminal proceeding by instituting a
complaint. The purpose being that accused is perforce required
to attend court proceedings on dates fixed by the court and is
thus, put to harassment if the complainant does not turn up in
the court on dates when his presence is necessary. This
provision affords protection to the accused against such tactics
being adopted by the complainant. This, however, does not mean
that if the complainant is absent the court is duty bound to acquit
the accused. If the situation mandates the Magistrate has the
power to adjourn the hearing. On the other hand, if the
Magistrate considers that the personal appearance of the
complainant is not necessary it has the power to dispense with
his attendance and proceed with the case. It is for the court to
consider whether the presence of the complainant is necessary
for the progress of the case on the day when the complainant is
absent or the situation is such that the case be adjourned to
another date. If the situation mandates that there is no reason to
adjourn the case, the Magistrate is free to dismiss the complaint
and acquit the accused. The ratio of Associated Cement (supra)
has been followed in a later judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case entitled S. Anand Vs. Vasumathi Chandrasekar
(2008) 4 SCC 67.
8. Applying the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Associated Cement and S. Anand (supra) in my view since
service had not been effected on accused no. 2 the learned
Magistrate could have adjourned the case for effecting the
service on accused no. 2 especially in the circumstance that on
the previous date there was no default on the part of the
complainant, in depositing the necessary process fee for effecting
service on the accused in the case. In my view it is quite possible
that the authorized representative of the appellant wrongly noted
the date as 12.07.2006, as against the correct date, that is,
20.04.2006 and hence, delayed the deposit of process fee for
issuing of summons to accused no. 2.
9. Taking into account the aforesaid facts and circumstances
and the submissions made before me, the appeal is allowed and
the impugned order dated 20.04.2006 is set aside. The complaint
is restored to its original number. The learned Magistrate shall
commence further proceedings from the stage at which the case
was prior to the date when the impugned order was passed.
Given the fact that the complaint is of 2003, the learned
Magistrate shall take steps to expedite the proceedings. Parties
shall appear before the Magistrate for appropriate orders on
17.08.2009.
10. Accordingly, the petition is disposed of.
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J
August 04, 2009 kk
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