Citation : 2008 Latest Caselaw 1704 Del
Judgement Date : 22 September, 2008
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Arb. AP.8/2008
%22.09.2008
Date of decision : 22.9.2008
M/s. Nelson Health Spa Pvt. Ltd. ....... Appellant
Through: Ms. Sujata Kashyap, Advocate
Versus
I.T.D.C. Ltd. ....... Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajiv Nayar, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Sushant Kumar Advocate
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? Not Necessary
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. This appeal u/s. 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 is preferred against the order of the Arbitral Tribunal (Sole
Arbitrator) in exercise of powers u/s. 17 of the Act. The appellant
had entered into an agreement with the respondent for running the
health club in hotel Samrat of the respondent. The said agreement is
stated to have been renewed from time to time. Disputes and
differences having arisen between the parties relating to further
renewal of the agreement, the appellant invoked the arbitration
clause and filed petitions in this court for interim relief. The
respondent made a statement in the said proceedings that the
appellant shall not be dispossessed save by due process of law.
Arbitrator was also appointed and arbitration proceedings are
underway.
2. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 27.5.2008 of
the Arbitral Tribunal. The appellant applied before the Arbitral
Tribunal u/s. 17 of the Act stating that the appellant had learnt that
the respondent had initiated the process of inviting tenders for
running the health club in hotel Samrat and sought order from the
Arbitral Tribunal to restrain the respondent from doing so. The
respondent resisted the said prayer of the appellant.
3. The Arbitral Tribunal has by the order impugned in this appeal
inter alia held that the jurisdiction u/s. 17 of the Act is only to protect
the interest of both the parties; that the agreement of the respondent
with the appellant had admittedly expired; that allowing the prayer
of the appellant would mean binding the respondent with the
appellant perpetually and as such no case was made out for
restraining the respondent from inviting tenders. The Arbitral
Tribunal, however, further ordered that the appellant will not be
dispossessed from the premises without following the due process of
law, as already undertaken by the respondent and that by the
respondent so inviting tenders, no prejudice shall be caused to the
appellant and to the arbitration proceedings. With these directions,
the application of the appellant u/s. 17 was dismissed.
4. Though, numerous grounds have been taken by the appellant
in the memorandum of appeal, but upon inquiry from the counsel for
the appellant as to what prejudice the appellant will suffer, if the
respondent so invites the tender or processes or finalizes the same,
the counsel fairly stated that if that was to be permitted, immediately
upon the award of the Arbitrator, if against the appellant, the
respondent shall award the contract to the new party, even before
the appellant has had a chance to prefer the objections against the
said award.
5. In my view, the aforesaid reasoning of the appellant cannot
stand in law. The appellant has remedies available to it for the fears
expressed. However, the appellant as a litigant has no right to delay.
The appellant cannot be permitted to take advantage of the inherent
delays in the functioning of the respondent which is a public sector
undertaking. It is common knowledge that the process of inviting
tenders, selection and finalization of the agreement is fraught with
sanctions of different authorities and takes several months. Unless
such process is allowed to be initiated now itself, the respondent
even in the event of succeeding in the arbitral proceedings will have
to necessarily either be compelled to allow the appellant to function
or be forced to shut down the health club, till the time the new
contract is finalized, if the process thereof is to take only after the
conclusion of the arbitral proceedings. This would amount to giving
the appellant an undue advantage over the respondent.
6. On the contrary, the appellant shall not suffer in any manner, if
the tender process is permitted to commence. In the event of the
appellant succeeding in the arbitral proceedings, the only
consequence would be that the time, money and effort put by the
respondent in the tender process would be wasted and the
respondent may also become liable, if finalizes the contract with
another party to such party. The Arbitral Tribunal has protected the
appellant by providing that the tender process initiated by the
respondent shall not affect the appellant or arbitral proceedings.
7. I do not find any merit in other submission also of the counsel
for the appellant that the respondent having on an earlier occasion
stated before the Arbitrator that it had no intention of initiating the
tender process, was not entitled to change its stand. The
respondent, if finding arbitral proceedings to be nearing close,
decides to now commence the tender process, it cannot be prevented
from doing so for the reason of having not earlier shown an
inclination for the same.
8. The grant/non-grant of interim measures u/s. 17 necessarily
involves the exercise of discretion and such exercise of discretion by
the Arbitral Tribunal is not to be lightly interfered in appeal unless
the exercise of such discretion is shown to be wholely unjust or
arbitrary. In my view, the same principle as in appeals against the
orders of courts with respect to orders of interim relief are to apply
to orders of the Arbitrator with respect to the interim relief. The
Arbitral Tribunal is but a court/Judge of the choice of the parties.
9. In the present case, I do not find the refusal of the Arbitrator to
grant interim relief claimed by the appellant to be unjust or
arbitrary. The appeal has no merit and is dismissed.
10. This court vide order dated 11.6.2008 while issuing notice of
the appeal had directed the respondent to hold back the issuance of
tender. The appeal having failed, the said interim order stands
vacated. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are
left to bear their own costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW (JUDGE) September 22, 2008 k
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