M/S Jagannath Dudadhar vs The Sale Tax Officer & Others
2008 Latest Caselaw 1836 Del

*                  HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+    WP(C) 18434/2006, WP(C)18435/2006, WP(C) 18436/2006,
     WP(C) 18475/2006 and WP(C) 18476/2006


%                               Reserved on     : 25th September, 2008
                                Date of Decision: 20th October, 2008

1.               WP(C) 18434/2006
M/S JAGANNATH DUDADHAR               .....PETITIONER
                     Through: Mr. Rajesh Jain, Advocate.

                           Versus

THE SALE TAX OFFICER & OTHERS         .....RESPONDENTS

Through: Mr. M.K. Arora, Advocate

2. WP(C) 18435/2006 M/S JAGANNATH DUDADHAR .....PETITIONER Through: Mr. Rajesh Jain, Advocate.

                           Versus

THE SALE TAX OFFICER & OTHERS         .....RESPONDENTS
                        Through: Mr. M.K. Arora, Advocate

3.               WP(C) 18436/2006
M/S JAGANNATH DUDADHAR               .....PETITIONER
                     Through: Mr. Rajesh Jain, Advocate.

                           Versus

THE SALE TAX OFFICER & OTHERS         .....RESPONDENTS
                        Through: Mr. M.K. Arora, Advocate

4.               WP(C) 18475/2006
M/S JAGANNATH DUDADHAR               .....PETITIONER
                     Through: Mr. Rajesh Jain, Advocate.

                           Versus

THE SALE TAX OFFICER & OTHERS         .....RESPONDENTS
                        Through: Mr. M.K. Arora, Advocate

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters]                         1 of 19
 5.               WP(C) 18476/2006
M/S JAGANNATH DUDADHAR               .....PETITIONER
                     Through: Mr. Rajesh Jain, Advocate.

                           Versus

THE SALE TAX OFFICER & OTHERS         .....RESPONDENTS
                        Through: Mr. M.K. Arora, Advocate



CORAM:

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA SHARMA
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR

1.Whether reporters of the local newspapers be allowed to see the judgment? No

2.To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes

AJIT PRAKASH SHAH, CJ

Revision Petitions were filed by the petitioner firm under Section

47 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 (for short "the Act") against the

assessment orders made on 16th December, 2002 pertaining to

assessment years 1889-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92. Applications were

also filed praying for condonation of delay in filing the revision

petitions. The Additional Commissioner-III following the decision of the

Division Bench of this Court in M/s.Foremost Industries India

Limited v. Lt.Governor and Others (WP(C) 221/2002) decided on

18th July, 2005, held that the Revisional Authority under the Act does

not have the power to condone delay in filing revision petitions and

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 2 of 19 Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to such revision

petitions. Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Commissioner, the

petitioner has preferred these writ petitions. The petitions were listed

before a Division Bench of this Court which was of the opinion that

there are conflicting views by this Court with regard to applicability of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act and consequently the matter deserved

to be decided by a larger Bench. The two Division Bench decisions of

this Court, which according to the learned Judges, contain conflicting

views, were M/s. Foremost Industries India Limited v.

Lt.Governor & Others (supra) and Walia Electronics v.

Government of NCT of Delhi & Others (2004) 111 DLT 778. The

learned Judges therefore referred the following question to a larger

Bench :

"Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for the condonation of delay in filing revision application under Section 47 of the Delhi Sales Act ?"

2.The question which came up for consideration in the case of M/s

Foremost Industries India Ltd was whether the Additional

Commissioner was correct in holding that the delay in filing the

revision petition could not be condoned. The Bench held that the

question is concluded by the Division Bench in Pranam Enterprises

v. Commissioner, Sales Tax and Others (2004) 111 DLT 743

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 3 of 19 wherein it has been held that the Revisional Authority under the Delhi

Sales Act does not have the power to condone the delay in filing of the

revision petition and Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application

to such revision petition. It was noted that in coming to that

conclusion, the Bench has relied upon Section 62 (2) of the Act which

excludes the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to revisions

filed under Section 47 of the Act.

3.It was argued before the Division Bench that in the case of Pranam

Enterprises (supra) the Court was concerned with the interpretation

of Section 45(1) of the Act. The language employed in Section 47 of

the Act is different from Section 45(1) of the Act. The distinction is that

Section 45(1) stipulates the maximum period in which discretion to

condone delay can be exercised whereas the provisions of Section 47

merely state that application for revision shall have to be filed within

two years from the date on which the order in question has been

communicated to the parties or the date on which the party otherwise

gains knowledge of it. In support of this argument reliance was placed

on the observations of the Division Bench in Walia Electronics

(supra) that "The provisions of Section 45(1) and Section 47 of the

Delhi Sales Tax Act are apparently different and therefore the same

principles may not be applicable in the case of a revision petition under

Section 47 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act." We hasten to add that the

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 4 of 19 Bench, however, expressly made it clear that it is not touching upon

that aspect of the matter as it is not required to do so in that case.

4.In the instant case, we are not concerned with the application under

Section 45 of the Act. On the other hand, we are concerned with the

provisions of Section 47 of the Act. We shall, therefore, confine our

discussion to the question referred to us, i.e., whether Section 5 of the

Limitation Act applies to a revision petition under Section 47 of the

Delhi Sales Tax Act.

5.In order to answer the issue, we may refer to some of the provisions

of the Delhi Sales Tax Act which read as follows:

47. Revision of other orders

(1) In the case of any order other than an order referred to in section 44 or to which section 46 applies, passed by a person appointed under sub-section (2) of section 9 to assist him, the Commissioner may, either on his own motion or on an application filed in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed, call for the record of any proceeding under this Act in which any such order has been passed and may make such inquiry or cause such inquiry to be made and, subject to the provisions of this Act, may pass such orders thereon, not being an order prejudicial to the dealer, as he thinks fit :

PROVIDED that the Commissioner shall not revise any order under this subsection,-

(a) where an appeal against the order is pending before the appellate authority under section 43 ; or

(b) where, if such appeal lies, the time within which it may be filed has not expired ; or

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 5 of 19

(c) where in the case of the second appeal, the dealer has not waived his right of appeal.

(2) The Commissioner shall not on his own motion revise any order under this section after the expiry of two years from the date of the order sought to be revised.

(3) In the case of an application for revision under this section by the dealer, the application shall be made within two years from the date on which the order in question was communicated to him or the date on which he otherwise comes to know of it, whichever is earlier.

62. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases

(1) An appellate authority may admit an appeal under section 43 after the period of limitation laid down in that section, if the appellant satisfies the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.

(2) In computing the period laid down under sections 43,45,46 and 47, the provisions of sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, so far as may be, apply.

(3) In computing the period of limitation prescribed by or under any provision of this Act, or the rules made thereunder, other than sections 43,45,46 and 47, any period during which any proceeding is stayed by an order or injunction of any court shall be excluded.

6.The other relevant provision which has to be answered is Section

29(2) of the Limitation Act which reads as under:

29. Savings - (1) ......

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 6 of 19 determining any period of limitation prescribed for any sit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 5 to 24 (inclusive shall apply only in so far, as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

7.On behalf of the petitioner, it is argued that in respect of a reference

under Section 45(1) of the Act, the applicability of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act has specifically been excluded in view of the proviso to

Section 45(1) of the Act. However, such a proviso being absent in

Section 47, the Revisional Authority would be clothed with the power

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 47 of the Act, it is

submitted, does not lay down any restriction on the Revisional

Authority not to extend the time for fling a revision beyond the

prescribed period, if there was sufficient cause. A revision under

Section 47 has to be filed in accordance with the Delhi Sales Tax Rules,

1975 (for short "the Rules") and as per Rule 39, the provisions of Rules

36 to 38 relating to appeals have been applied mutatis mutandis to

revisions under Section 47. Therefore when a revision is filed after the

expiry of the prescribed period under Section 47(3), and is supported

by an application, duly verified, setting forth the facts, showing

sufficient cause for not preferring the revision within the said period,

then the officer adjudicating the revision has to decide that application

and, thus, the principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act have been

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 7 of 19 incorporated in the scheme of the Act and the Rules. To hold

otherwise will have the effect of rendering the provisions of Rule 36(4)

redundant which could never be the intention of the Legislature when

it consciously applied the said provisions for the purpose of revisions

under Rule 39 of the Rules.

8.On the other hand, on behalf of the Revenue it is submitted that the Sales

Tax authorities are not courts even though they have certain duties assigned

to them for imposition and collection of tax and in the process they have to

perform duties which are quasi judicial. Section 5 can be relied upon for

extension of time in respect of the proceedings in court and not before a

tribunal or authority under any local or special law. In the absence of any

statutory provision no power exists in the authority to condone delay.

Section 62 of the Act provides that in computing the period of limitation for

filing a revision under Section 47, the provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the

Limitation Act shall, so far as may be, apply. A plain reading of Section 62

can only lead to the conclusion that for a proceeding under Section 47 only

the provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act could apply.

Therefore in such a proceeding the application of Section 5 of Limitation Act

is expressly excluded. Considering the language of the Section 62 and the

object behind enacting it, it is clear that Section 62 was enacted to exclude

application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is submitted that Rule 36(4)

merely prescribes procedure for filing of petition for condonation of delay in

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 8 of 19 filing an appeal and the same cannot be at any stretch of imagination be

construed to confer power on the Revisional Authority to condone delay in

filing revision petition beyond the prescribed period of two years.

9.The basic question to be answered is that whether the Revisional Authority

exercising power under Section 47 of the Act is a court within the meaning of

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and provisions of Sections 4 and 24 of the

Limitation Act would apply in spite of the specific applicability of only the

provisions of Section 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act to a petition under

Section 47 of the Act.

10.In Commissioner of Sale Tax U.P., Lucknow v. Parson Tools and

Plants, Kanpur reported in (1975) 35 STC 413(SC) the issue being

considered was whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would apply in

proceedings under UP Sales Tax Act, 1948. The Court held that proceedings

before the authorities under Sales Tax Act were before administrative

tribunals and not courts as contemplated under Section 14 of the Limitation

Act and hence Section 14 does not apply. The scheme of the Act would

disclose that the Legislature has deliberately excluded the application of the

principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. Delay in

disposal of revenue matters adversely affect the steady inflow of revenues

and the financial status of the State. Section 10 was therefore designed to

ensure the speedy and final determination fiscal matters within a reasonably

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 9 of 19 certain time schedule. The Court quoted with approval the following

observations in Smt.Ujjam Bai v. State of UP (1963) 1 SCR 778 :

"The taxing authorities are instrumentalities of the State. They are not a part of the legislature; not are they part of the judiciary. Their functions are the assessment and collection of taxes and in the process of assessing taxes, they follow a pattern of action which is considered judicial. They are not thereby converted into courts of civil judicature. They still remain the instrumentalities of the State and are within the definition of 'State' in Article 12."

While considering provisions of the UP Sales Tax Act the Court held

that they are merely 'administrative tribunals' and not 'courts' and

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, therefore, does not in terms apply to

proceedings before such tribunals. The Court considering Section 10 of

the UP Act noted the following scheme:

"Three features of the scheme of the provisions of above provision are noteworthy. The first is that no limitation has been prescribed for the suo motu exercise of its jurisdiction by the revising authority. The second is that the period of one year prescribed as limitation for filing an application for revision by the aggrieved party is unusually long. The third is that the revising authority has not discretion to extend this period beyond a further period of six months, even on sufficient cause shown."

The Court observed that the three stark features of the scheme and

language of the above provision unmistakably show that the

Legislature has deliberately excluded application of the principles

underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act except to the extent

and in the truncated form embodied in Sub-section (3B) of Section 10

of the Sale Tax Act. The Court then proceeded to hold as under: [WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 10 of 19 "...If the Legislature willfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation, by a analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. To do so, "would be entrenching upon the preserves of legislature", the primary function of a court of law being jus dicere and not jus dare.

Where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the law-giver; ore so if the statute is a taxing statute.''

11.In Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India AIR

1970 SC 209 the Court held that in view of Section 4 & 5 of the Limitation

Act, it would be clear that the scheme of the Act is that it only deals with

applications to courts and the Labour Court is not a court within the meaning

of the Limitation Act, and, therefore, an application under Section 33C(2)

cannot be held to be barred under Article 137 insofar as the claim was for a

period beyond three years. In CIT v. Western India Engineering Co. Ltd.

77 ITR 165 the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court has held that the

Appellate Tribunal under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is not a

court but is merely a tribunal exercising the judicial power of the State. As

the provisions of the Limitation Act are not intended to be made applicable to

proceedings before authorities other than courts governed by the Code of

Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 5 of the Limitation

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 11 of 19 Act, will not apply to applications made to the Appellate Tribunal and,

therefore, the Tribunal has no power to condone delay in filing reference

applications under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. In Comm. of

Agrl. I.T. v Thalayar Rubber Industries 131 ITR 162 a Full Bench of

Kerala High Court has held that Section 69 of the Kerala Agricultural Income

Tax Act, 1950, indicates that provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation

Act are not attracted to proceedings under the Act and the Tribunal has no

jurisdiction to condone delay in filing an application for reference under

Section 60(1) of the said Act. In Insp. Asst CIT v. Kedar Nath

Jhunjhunwalla 133 ITR 746 a Division Bench of Patna High Court has held

that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act will apply to appeals and applications

filed under a special law only where the scheme of the special law does not

exclude its application. Neither the provision of Section 5 nor that of Section

12(2) of the Limitation Act will apply to appeals filed under Section 269H of

the Income Tax Act, 1961.

12.On the conspectus of the decisions referred to above and their ratio it

would be clear that the authorities constituted under the Delhi Sales Tax Act

for deciding tax dues are not courts but tribunals and unless there is express

power conferred by the said Act to condone delay or exclude any period of

limitation, the tribunals would not be clothed with the power to condone

delay. Insofar as Section 62 of the Act is concerned it would be clear that

only provisions of Section 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act will apply to

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 12 of 19 proceedings under Section 47 of the Act. The Delhi Sales Tax Act being a

special law and having regard to provisions of Section 62 of the said Act it is

obvious that the Revisional Authority has no jurisdiction to condone delay

except to the extent provided by Section 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act. The

Revisional Authority under the Act exercising quasi judicial power is not

being a court, the Legislature by virtue of Section 62 has conferred power to

condone delay only to the extent mentioned in in Section 4 and 12 of the

Limitation Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act thus clearly has been

excluded to the proceedings under Section 47 of the Act.

13.It has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that the applicability of

the provisions of Section 2 to 24 of the Limitation Act has to be judged not

from the terms of the Limitation Act but the provisions of the special law to

ascertain whether it is a complete code in itself which does not admit the

application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act mentioned in

Section 29(2) of the said Act. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain

Mishra reported in AIR 1974 SC 480 the issue before the Supreme Court

was whether the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would

be applicable to election petitions, considering Section 29(2) of the Limitation

Act. The Court observed that under Section29(2) where a special or local

law provides for any suit, appeal or application a period different from the

period prescribed therefore by the Schedule, the provisions specified therein

will apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are expressly not

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 13 of 19 excluded by such special or local law. Under Section 29(2) of the Limitation

Act, 1908, as amended in 1922, only Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section

22 of that Act applied ordinarily unless excluded by a special or local law.

The Court then noted the amendment made in the Act of 1963 to Section

29(2) whereby the amended section incorporates two changes namely (i) a

uniform rule-making it applicable to all applications except those mentioned

therein, and (ii) to all special and local enactments unless excluded by any

of them. After considering various judgments the Court held that the

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern the filing of

election petitions or their trial , though in an appellate forum from an order

of the High Court to the Supreme Court the provisions would apply

considering that an appeal is a creature of statute.

14.In Fairgrowth Investments v. Custodian reported in (2004) 11 SCC

472, the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of the Special

Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities ) Act, 1992 and

considering Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act examined whether the

provisions of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. The powers of

a Special court are exercised by a judge of a High Court. The Court posed

itself a question whether the Act expressly or necessarily excludes the

provisions of Limitation Act and answered the issue as under:

"...We think it does. The fact that it has provided for a power to condone delay under section 10(3) of the Act, shows that Parliament had consciously excluded the power of the court in relation to section 4(2). This view also finds support in the decision of this Court in Gopal

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 14 of 19 Sardar v. Karuna Sardar (2004) 4 SCC 252. The statutory provision under consideration in that case was section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 . It was held;

"When the same statute in respect of various other provisions relating to filing of appeals and revisions, specific provisions are made so as to give benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act and such provision is not made to an application to be made under Section 8 of the Act, it obviously and necessarily follows that the Legislature consciously excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."

The Court then observed that in Union of India v. Popular

Construction Company (2001) 8 SCC 470 the Court had held that the

expression "exclusion" also includes "exclusion by necessary

implication". Proceeding to answer the issue the Court held that

considering the power to condone the delay under Section 10(3) of

the Act, the Parliament had consciously excluded power of the Court in

relation to Section 4(2).

15.In Union of India v. Popular Construction Company(supra) the issue

was whether the provisions of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would

apply to a petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996. The challenge to an arbitration award under Section 34 is before

a Civil Court. The Supreme Court observed as under:

"Had the proviso to section 34 merely provided for a period within which the Court could exercise its discretion, that would not have been sufficient to exclude sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act because 'mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of section 5'."

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 15 of 19 The Court then observed as under:

"As far as the language of section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that he court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter; wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result."

16.In L.S.Synthetics Ltd v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd &

another AIR 2005 SC 1209 the Court held that the provisions of the

Limitation Act have no application so far as the directions required to be

issued by the Special Court(Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in

Securities) Act 1992 and in that regard made the following observations :

"The Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable only in relation to certain applications and not all application despite the fact that the words "other proceedings" were added in the long title of the Act in 1963. The provisions of the said Act are not applicable to the proceedings before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial tribunal or even an executive authority. The Act primarily applies to the civil proceedings or some special criminal proceedings. Even in a Tribunal, where the Code of Civil Procedure or Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable; the Limitation Act , 1963 per se may not be applied to the proceedings before it. Even in relation to certain civil proceedings, the Limitation Act may not have any application. As for example, there is no bar of limitation for initiation of a final decree proceedings or to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure or for correction of accidental slip or omission in judgments, orders or decrees; the reason being that these powers an be exercised even

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 16 of 19 suo motu by the Court and, thus, no question of any limitation arises."

17.In Damodaran Pillai v. South Indian Bank Ltd. reported in (2005) 7

SCC 300, the Supreme Court was considering whether the provisions of

Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the proceedings under

Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court observed as under :

"It is also trite that the civil court in the absence of any express power cannot condone the delay. For the purpose of condonation of delay in the absence of applicability of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court cannot invoke its inherent power."

18.Section 62 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act clearly indicates that only two

provisions of Section 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act are attracted in

proceedings under Section 47 of the Act and is intended to be a self-

contained code in the matter for prescribing the period of limitation under

the Act. Therefore the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act have no

application to proceedings under Section 47 of the Act. We find absolutely

no merit in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner based on Rule

36(4) of the Delhi Sales Tax Rules. Rule 36(4) provides that for filing an

appeal which is made after the expiry of the period specified in sub-Section 3

of Section 43 shall be accompanied by a petition setting out the facts

showing sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the said period.

Section 43(1) of the Act confers power on the Appellate Authority to condone

delay in case sufficient cause is shown and Rule 36(4) merely prescribes the

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 17 of 19 procedure for filing an application for condonation of delay in preferring the

appeal. By virtue of Rule 39 of the Rules the provisions of Rule 36 to 38 have

been made applicable mutatis mutandis for revisions under Section 47 of the

Act. Rule 36(4) will have no application in respect of proceedings under

Section 47 in as much as Revisional Authority is not conferred any power to

condone delay. By enacting Section 62(2) the legislature has clearly

indicated that the provisions of the Limitation Act except Sections 4 and 12

are excluded insofar as proceedings under Section 47 are concerned. Rule

36(4) cannot by any stretch of imagination said to be conferring power for

condonation of delay on the Revisional Authority exercising power under

Section 47 of the Act.

19.In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that Section 5 of

the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under Section 47 of the

Delhi Sales Tax Act. Reference is answered accordingly.

The Registry is directed to place the petitions before the

appropriate Bench for further proceedings.

CHIEF JUSTICE

REKHA SHARMA JUDGE

S.MURALIDHAR

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 18 of 19 October 20, 2008 JUDGE "v"

[WP(C) No.18434/06 & Connected matters] 19 of 19