Citation : 2008 Latest Caselaw 1969 Del
Judgement Date : 6 November, 2008
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ FAO (OS) No.48/2004
Reserved on: 31.10.2008
% Date of decision: 06.11.2008
Mr.Kiran Jogani & Anr. ...APPELLANTS
Through: Mr.Amarjit Singh and Ms.Sheetal
Dang, Advocates.
Versus
George V.Records, SARL ...RESPONDENT
Through: Mr. Pravin Anand and Mr.Dhruv
Anand, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOOL CHAND GARG
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in the Digest? Yes
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The claim of the respondent-plaintiff to a trans-border
reputation in the mark BUDDHA-BAR for music albums and
the allegation of an infringement thereof by the
appellants/defendants gave rise to legal proceedings inter-
se the parties.
2. The respondent-plaintiff filed a civil suit on the Original Side
of this Court. An interlocutory application for injunction
under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ('the said Code' for short) was filed along
with the plaint. The respondent-plaintiff was granted an ad
interim ex parte injunction and thus the appellants-
defendants moved an application under Order 39 Rule 4 of
the said Code for vacation of the interim injunction. The
learned Single Judge in terms of the impugned order dated
11.03.2004 has confirmed the interim injunction.
3. It is the case of the respondent-plaintiff that the trademark
BUDDHA-BAR was first adopted and used in the year 1996
as the name of a restaurant in Paris by the respondent's
affiliate company George V Restauration. The name is
stated to have acquired immense reputation. The music
albums played at the restaurant by the well-known Disco
Jockeys were compiled into CDs as they became extremely
popular. These CDs were sold under the name BUDDHA-
BAR from the year 1999 onwards by the respondent-
plaintiff. It is thus the plea of the respondent-plaintiff that
the mark BUDDHA-BAR is connected with the respondent-
plaintiff inasmuch as its affiliate ran the restaurant business
under the said trademark while the respondent-plaintiff on
its own has been using the said mark in relation to music
albums after three years. It is also the case of the
respondent-plaintiff that this trademark has been registered
by the respondent-plaintiff in many countries such as the
European Community, USA, Canada, Japan, New Zealand,
France, Hong Kong etc. in Classes 9 and 41 and that the
reputation generated by the respondent-plaintiff has spread
across the world and has spilled over to India prior to the
adoption of the mark BUDDHA-BAR by the appellants-
defendants in February, 2002. The respondent-plaintiff
pleaded that the adoption of the mark BUDDHA-BAR by the
appellants-defendants is dishonest. The mark BUDDHA-
BAR has been constituted by a unique combination of two
words which would otherwise have no correlation with each
other and the adoption of an identical mark in relation to
identical goods being music albums without any
explanation by the appellants-defendants as to why and
how they came to have adopted the mark BUUDHA-BAR
itself shows the dishonest intent on the part of the
appellants-defendants. The plea raised is that the only
object was to play on the goodwill of the mark of the
respondent-plaintiff.
4. The respondent-plaintiff has filed material in the form of
paper cuttings of magazines and other publications to
establish that not only is the mark BUDDHA-BAR well known
all over the world, but it has been so known even in India
through circulation of its material. The appellants-
defendants have relied upon a single advertisement dated
14.02.2002 to demonstrate their adoption of this mark prior
to the respondent-plaintiff's adoption of the mark. It has
been stated that there has been blatant copying of the
artistic features of the inlay card of the music album
BUDDHA-BEATS of the respondent-plaintiff released in 2001
by the appellants-defendants when the release was under a
licence of the respondent-plaintiff.
5. The impugned Order shows that the following defence
raised by the appellants-defendants has been considered:
i)The respondent-plaintiff has failed to establish proprietary rights in the mark BUDDHA-BAR as the
restaurant business was owned by its affiliate company which is not a party in the suit;
ii) The respondent-plaintiff failed to prove the user for the year 1999-2000 since such user is of Claude Challe of Chall'O Music;
iii)The respondent-plaintiff had failed to establish user rights in India and the first invoice is of 21.02.2002 after the release of the album by the appellants-defendants in January, 2002;
iv)The material relied upon by the respondent- plaintiff in the form of newspaper reports and magazines is hearsay evidence and thus is not admissible;
v)The mark BUDDHA-BAR is being used by third parties both in relation to restaurant and music business;
vi)The delay in filing the suit for injunction disentitles the respondent-plaintiff to any injunction.
vii)The CDs of the respondent-plaintiff do not bear its name for the earlier albums BUDDHA-BAR and BUDDHA-BAR II and thus the consumers are unable to associate the product with the respondent- plaintiff. The mark thus cannot be said to be distinct of the respondent-plaintiff and
viii) The trading activity of the restaurant business is completely different from the music album.
6. It would naturally be presumed that these were the pleas
advanced on behalf of the appellants-defendants as there
was no review application filed by the appellants-
defendants seeking to contend that there were other pleas
raised which had not been dealt with by the learned Single
Judge.
7. The pleas raised by the appellants-defendants, as
mentioned aforesaid, have been comprehensively dealt
with by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order.
The learned Single Judge has emphasized that passing off is
an action of deceit and thus prior adoption and use of the
mark as also it having acquired reputation and goodwill
distinctive of the goods of the plaintiff in the country of
origin is a necessity. There should be connection in the
course of trade between the goods of the two parties by
use of identical or a deceptively similar mark.
8. Learned Single Judge has relied upon large amount of
published material placed on record by the respondent-
plaintiff in the form of newspaper reports and magazines
which would show that there was even television coverage
beamed to India on satellite television of a fashion show
held by Indian designer Ritu Beri in the BUDDHA-BAR
restaurant which had brought awareness of the mark in
India in relation to its music albums. Learned Single Judge
has also found that there was sufficient evidence on record
of the user of the mark BUDDHA-BAR in relation to the
music albums by the respondent-plaintiff and the music
album business is owned by the affiliate of the sister
companies of the respondent-plaintiff who constitute single
company entity. At the stage of interlocutory injunction,
the learned Single Judge has taken a prima facie view on
the material brought on record.
9. The defence of the appellants-defendants in respect of
failure of the part of the respondent-plaintiff to produce
sufficient evidence regarding any agreement with Chall'O
Music has been rejected on account of the translated copy
of an agreement being brought on record and the original
document having been shown in the Court. It is recorded
that the agreement shows that the licence was earlier
granted to the Chall'O Music by George V Records for
production of the first double compilation of the music
under the trademark BUDDHA-BAR free of cost. Article 7 of
the agreement specifically stipulates that any proceedings
pertaining to infringement of trademark against any third
party would be instituted by the licensor-respondent in its
name and at its own expense with the technical help of the
licensee and the proprietary rights have been
acknowledged by the licensee. The music album was first
released in the year 1999 and thereafter in the year 2000
by Claude Challe/Chall'O Music as per the trademark
licence agreement. The plea raised by the appellants-
defendants of respondent-plaintiff having infringed certain
provisions of The Copyright Act, 1957 ('the said Act' for
short) has been rejected only by observing that the same
shall be considered at the stage of trial. It has also been
further observed that though the respondent-plaintiff may
have filed the first invoice dated 21.02.2002, it is always
open to the respondent-plaintiff to produce documents at a
later stage during the trial. The factum of the failure of the
appellants-defendants to give any satisfactory explanation
in relation to adoption of the mark BUDDHA-BAR has been
emphasized. It has been held not to be honest.
10. It may be noticed at this stage that after the casting of
issues, the trial in the suit proceedings and part of the
evidence of the respondent-plaintiff has been recorded. It
was suggested to learned counsel for the parties that in
view of the lapse of time of almost four years since the
stage of the interlocutory injunction, the more advisable
course of action would be to expedite the hearing of the
suit. Learned counsel for the appellants-defendants,
however, was of the view that recording of evidence would
take some time and thus he would like to invite a judgment
on the appeal against the decision on the interlocutory
application.
11. The first aspect to be considered, rightly emphasized by
learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, is the scope of
scrutiny by the appellate Court in matters of grant or
refusal of such interim injunction. The position has been
succinctly set out by the Apex Court in Wander Ltd. & Anr.
v.Antox India P.Ltd; 1990 Supp (1) SCC 727. The aforesaid
legal position crystallized and relevant for the present
appeal is that it is not the function of this Court as an
appellate Court to substitute its own discretion with the
exercise of discretion by the Trial Court except where the
discretion has been shown to be exercised arbitrarily,
capriciously and perversely or where the Court has ignored
the settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal
of interlocutory injunctions. It is not for this Court to re-
assess the material and seek to reach conclusion different
from one reached by the courts below as long as the
conclusion already reached by the courts below is a
reasonably plausible one. It is not for this Court to put itself
in the shoes of the Trial Judge to decipher as to what
conclusion it would have reached if it was the Trial Judge.
Thus, so long as the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court
is reasonable and in a judicial manner, no interference is
called for. It is within this limited scope that the scrutiny in
an appeal has to be made. Interestingly it is the aforesaid
judgment which has also been relied upon by the learned
counsel for the appellants-defendants to plead that the
exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge was
arbitrary, capricious and perverse. One such example
given is of a finding reached that the respondent-plaintiff
could file additional documents of prior use at the time of
framing of issues and thus it cannot be said that the
absence of documents is fatal to the respondent-plaintiff.
12. We have noted the aforesaid submission for the reason
that we are unable to agree with this line of reasoning of
the learned Single Judge. The grant or refusal of injunction
has to be on the triple criteria of a prima facie case,
balance of convenience and irretrievable loss and injury.
The prima facie case is established on the basis of the
material placed on record by both the parties. The material
documents relied upon by the respondent-plaintiff have to
be filed along with the suit. Thus, the mere fact that the
parties may have opportunity to file additional documents
subsequently is not a relevant ground to form a prima facie
opinion.
13. The result of the aforesaid is that it would have to be
considered whether the prima facie view formed by the
learned Single Judge on the basis of the evidence placed on
record by the respective parties can be said to be arbitrary,
capricious or perverse. The learned Single Judge has, in
fact, dealt with the evidence brought on record in depth. It
cannot be disputed that the trademark BUUDHA-BAR has a
uniqueness to it as it is a combination of two words which
otherwise would have no connection with each other. The
material on record shows that the trademark BUDDHA-BAR
was adopted for use in the restaurant business. The
success of the music played by the Disco Jockeys in the
restaurant gave another business opportunity of making
CDs of the music and selling the same. Learned Single
Judge has discussed the agreements filed on record as also
the original documents produced before it to come to the
conclusion that the respondent-plaintiff had established a
link and a commonality of interest between the two
businesses as also the right in the respondent-plaintiff to
carry on the business. To that extent, the findings of the
learned Single Judge cannot be faulted.
14. We are unable to accept the plea of the learned counsel for
the appellants-defendants that the material in the form of
newspaper reports, magazines and other publications has
to be ignored because it is in the nature of secondary
evidence. No doubt, the plaintiff would have the duty to
prove the evidence on record by leading appropriate
evidence, but that stage had not arisen. The reference by
the learned counsel for the appellants-defendants to the
judgments of the Supreme Court are in relation to a final
trial of a matter where hearsay or secondary evidence
cannot be considered. However, at the interlocutory stage,
where the parties are yet to have the opportunity to
produce witnesses to prove the documents, such material
cannot be shut out especially taking into consideration the
nature of controversy in the present matter.
15. What would be the best material which the respondent-
plaintiff could have produced to establish its trans-border
reputation? In our considered view, it would be material
akin to the one produced by the plaintiff which would be
relevant. It is not as if there is a motivated article in one
newspaper or magazine, but the vast coverage given to the
restaurant and the music in international press and the
magazines including transmission of programs through
television channels to show even the participation of Indian
designers. It is this which seems to have awakened the
appellants-defendants to think of utilizing the trademark
BUDDHA-BAR as it has failed to give any other justification
as to how it deciphered the mark BUDDHA-BAR.
16. It is not necessary that only an invoice of sale would be the
relevant evidence and thus merely because the invoice is
just after the alleged propagation of the CD album by the
appellants-defendants cannot by itself defeat the rights of
the respondent-plaintiff on the face of other voluminous
prima facie material in support of its trans-border
reputation. Similarly, the findings about there being a
single economic entity is in the context of agreements
referred to aforesaid and relationship would be between the
lincesor and licensee giving rights to the respondent-
plaintiff.
17. There is yet another aspect urged by learned counsel for
the appellants-defendants arising from the allegation of
violation of the provisions of Section 52A of the said Act by
the respondent-plaintiff and the consequent punishment
which may follow under Section 68A of the said Act. This
plea has been brushed aside by the learned Single Judge to
be considered at the time of trial and one can have some
reservation about such a conclusion. The prima facie
finding on the effect of the same is liable to be given and
thereafter one can observe that the parties would have the
rights to produce the evidence in that behalf.
18. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has sought to
explain in respect of the aforesaid plea that the same was
not the focus of the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the appellants-defendants before the learned
Single Judge as the focus was only on the issue of trans-
border reputation. It is also the plea of the respondent-
plaintiff that there has, in fact, been no lack of compliance
with the said provision. The provisions of Section 52A of
the said Act read as under:
"52A. Particulars to be included in sound recordings and video films - (1)No person shall publish a sound recording in respect of any work unless the following particulars are displayed on the sound recording and on any container thereof, namely :-
(a) The name and address of the person who has made the sound recording;
(b) The name and address of the owner of the copyright is such work; and
(c) The year of its first publication
(2) No person shall publish a video film in respect of any work unless the following particulars are
displayed in the video film, when exhibited, and on the video cassette or other container thereof, namely:-
(a) If such work is cinematograph film required to be certified for exhibition under the provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952), a copy of the certificate granted by the Board of Film Certification under Section 5-A of that Act in respect of such work.
(b) The name and address of the person who has made the video film and a declaration by him that he has obtained the necessary licence or consent from the owner of the copyright in such work for making such video film, and
(c) The name and address of the owner of the copyright in such work."
19. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff pleads that the
BUDDHA-BAR albums may have been sold in India, but they
are not published in India and thus Section 52A of the said
Act would not be attracted. In support of this plea, learned
counsel has sought to draw distinction between the
provisions of Section 52A of the said Act and Section
51(b)(i) of the said Act. The relevant portion is re-produced
as under:
"51. When copyright infringed - Copyright in a work shall be deemed to be infringed - ...............
(b) When any person -
....................
(i) Make for sale on hire, or sells or lets for hire, or by way of trade displays or offers for sale or hire any infringing copies of the work."
20. The attention of this Court has also been drawn to Section 5
of the said Act which specifies when a work is first deemed
to be published in India. The work is deemed to be
simultaneously published in India and other country if the
time between the publication in India and publication in
such country does not exceed 30 days. Since this has not
happened factually, it is submitted that there is no
publication in India so as to infringe the provisions of
Section 52A of the said Act.
21. The most material aspect is that the penalty for
contravention of Section 52A of the said Act is provided
under Section 68A of the said Act of imprisonment
extending up to 3 years and fine. It is nobody's case that
there has been any prosecution of the respondent-plaintiff
for infringement of the provision of Section 52A of the said
Act. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has rightly
emphasized that if there was such an infringement, the
appellants-defendants would have taken steps in respect of
the same. In any case, this fact is sufficient to prima facie
come to the conclusion that even the appellants-defendants
do not appear to have thought that there was any such
infringement by the respondent-plaintiff. The object of
Section 52A of the said Act also appears to be clear i.e.to
prevent piracy and counterfeiting. That is not so in the
present case and the dispute is one relating to passing off.
The focus of the appellants-defendants before the learned
Single Judge and before this Court has largely been on the
claim of a prior user by the appellants-defendants coupled
with the failure of the respondent-plaintiff to produce
appropriate evidence in support of its prima facie case.
22. We thus are unable to agree with the learned counsel for
the appellants-defendants that this plea in any way has any
effect in grant of injunction in favour of the respondent-
plaintiff.
23. We having clarified the aforesaid two aspects in respect of
the impugned order of the learned Single Judge, feel that
the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge for grant
of injunction and dismissing the application for vacation of
injunction cannot be doubted. The material has been
rightly appreciated by the learned Single Judge to come to
a prima facie view. In fact, even if we were to weigh this
material again, there would be no different prima facie
conclusion. We must also emphasize that the object of
grant or refusal of interim injunction is to protect the inter
se rights of the parties till the Trial Court is able to reach a
final conclusion post-trial. The trial in the matter has
already commenced and is regularly in progress. The
injunction has operated for four years. In view of our
aforesaid observations, we see no reason to vary the
impugned order.
24. We find the appeal is without merit and dismiss the same
with costs of Rs.25,000/-.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
NOVEMBER 06, 2008 MOOL CHAND GARG, J. dm
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