Citation : 2008 Latest Caselaw 2167 Del
Judgement Date : 5 December, 2008
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RFA No.263/2006 & RFA No.488/2006
Reserved on : 4th November, 2008
% Date of decision: December 05, 2008
RFA No.263/2006
TAMIL NADU HANDLOOM WEAVERS‟
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY ...Appellant
Through: Mr. Pawan Mathur, Adv.
Versus
HARBANS LAL GUPTA ...Respondent
Through: Mr. Anupam Srivastava, Adv.
RFA No.488/2006
HARBANS LAL GUPTA ... Appellant
Through: Mr. Pawan Mathur, Adv.
Versus
TAMIL NADU HANDLOOM WEAVERS‟
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY ...Respondent
Through: Mr. Anupam Srivastava, Adv.
CORAM :-
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA
1. Whether Reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the Judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in the Digest? Yes
J.R. MIDHA, J.
1. M/s. Tamil Nadu Handloom Weavers‟ Cooperative
Society was a tenant under Mr. Harbans Lal Gupta in respect
of basement, ground and mezzanine floor in property No.F-6,
Kalkaji, New Delhi. M/s. Tamil Nadu Handloom Weavers‟
Cooperative Society filed a suit for mandatory injunction and
recovery of Rs.4,76,149.93 against Mr. Harbans Lal Gupta who
filed a counter claim for Rs.5,74,000/-.
2. Claim in the suit by the society was that it had
deposited Rs.12,62,000/- with Harbans Lal Gupta as security
when agreement of lease was entered into in the year 1995
and that 50% of the security deposit was appropriated
towards rent by adjusting Rs.10,000/- per month. That
maintenance charges which were payable by it to Harbans Lal
Gupta were also adjusted till March 1997. Stating that in all
Rs.7,90,996/- were adjusted and thus Rs.4,71,004/- were
refundable. It was pleaded that the society had removed all
its goods and belongings from the tenanted premises save
and except a few racks which were not permitted to be
removed by Harbans Lal Gupta on 26.3.1997. It was asserted
that the society had consumed electricity in sum of
Rs.20,705.89 and water charges payable by it was Rs.1,100/-.
Effecting further deductions it was stated that adjusting said
sums from the security deposit Rs.4,49,198.11 became due
and payable. Claiming pre suit interest on said amount @24%
per annum amounting to Rs.26,951.52, sum of Rs.4,76,149.63
was claimed.
3. In the written statement-cum-counter claim Harbans
Lal Gupta sought a decree of Rs.5,74,000/- by alleging that
possession of the tenanted premises was not returned to him
and that he was entitled to rent in sum of Rs.16,68,891/-. He
alleged that an estimated sum of Rs.3,40,000/- would be
required to restore the tenanted property due to damage
caused thereto; further seeking adjustment of Rs.20,705.89
towards outstanding electricity bill he stated that
appropriating the security deposit by him he was entitled to a
decree in sum of Rs.5,74,000/-.
4. Vide judgment and decree dated 17th January, 2006,
the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit in sum of
Rs.1,33,701/- and has dismissed the counter claim. Both the
parties have challenged the impugned judgment and decree.
5. For the sake of convenience, M/s. Tamil Nadu
Handloom Weavers‟ Cooperative Society, the appellant in RFA
No.263/2006, is hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff" and
Mr. Harbans Lal Gupta, the appellant in RFA No.488/2006, is
referred to as "the defendant".
6. The defendant let out the suit property to the plaintiff
vide registered Lease Deed dated 14th August, 1995 - Ex.PW-
1/2 at a monthly rent of Rs.70,000/-. The period of lease was
fixed for six years w.e.f. 1st June, 1995. The lease was
terminable by three months notice in writing by the plaintiff
(clause 11). The lease agreement empowered the plaintiff to
carry out the temporary additions and alterations and install
fixtures and fittings without the consent of the defendant.
However, the modifications/alterations of permanent nature
required written consent of the defendant (clause 6). At the
expiry of the lease the plaintiff was obliged to surrender the
vacant possession of the suit premises in good repairs
together with final payment of receipt for electricity and water
charges to the defendant and the damages to the fittings and
the property have to be made good (clause 18).
7. The parties executed a Security Deposit Agreement
dated 14th August, 1995 - Ex.PW-1/4 in pursuance to which,
the plaintiff paid the security deposit of Rs.12,62,000/- to the
defendant on 14th August, 1995, out of which Rs.10,000/- per
month was adjustable towards the rent and the remaining
amount was refundable at the time of surrender of the vacant
possession after adjusting the dues of rent, maintenance, bills
of electricity, water, sewerage and cost of repairs. The
agreement provided that the delay in refund of the security
deposit would carry interest at the rate of 24% per annum.
8. The parties also executed Maintenance Agreement
dated 14th August, 1995 - Ex.PW-1/3 which provided for
payment of maintenance charges of Rs.35,166/- per month for
maintenance and upkeep of the services viz. continuous water
supply, electricity, firefighting equipments etc.
9. Vide notice dated 21st December, 1996 - Ex.PW1/6
the plaintiff terminated the lease w.e.f. 31st March, 1997. The
plaintiff demanded the balance security deposit from the
defendant by the said notice.
10. Vide reply dated 30th January, 1997 - Ex.PW-1/7, the
defendant acknowledged receipt of the notice - Ex.PW.1/6
and conveyed his no objection to the termination. However,
the defendant advised the plaintiff to settle the account in
terms of the provisions of the security agreement at the time
of handing over the possession.
11. According to the plaintiff, all the goods were removed
from the suit premises except few racks and electrical fittings.
The plaintiff alleged to have visited to the suit premises to
remove the few racks and electrical fittings on 26th March,
1997 but the defendant did not allow the staff of the plaintiff
to remove the same and threatened them with serious
consequences. The plaintiff further alleged to have contacted
the defendant number of times to settle the account but the
defendant refused to settle the account with the malafide
intention. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant did
not provide electrical and water bills to the plaintiff to avoid
settlement of account and refund of security deposit. The
plaintiff alleged to have approached the defendant on 31st
March, 1997 for handing over the possession and settlement
of account and receipt of balance security deposit but the
defendant refused. The plaintiff issued a telegram dated 31 st
March, 1997 - Ex.PW-1/9 to the defendant.
12. On 1st April, 1997, the plaintiff received a registered
letter dated 26th March, 1997 - Ex.PW-1/10 from the
defendant in which the defendant raised various issues
including the payment of electricity and water charges and
non-restoration of the suit premises.
13. On 2nd April, 1997, the plaintiff instituted suit for
mandatory injunction for direction to the defendant to take
back the possession of the suit property and for recovery of
Rs.4,76,149.63.
14. Vide order dated 30th April, 1997, the learned Trial Court
appointed a Local Commissioner to visit the suit property and
to take the photographs of the suit property. The learned
Trial Court further directed that the fixtures and fittings
installed by the plaintiff to be removed and taken out by the
plaintiff after the preparation of list by the Local
Commissioner. It was further recorded that the plaintiff was
ready to hand over and the defendant was ready to take the
possession of the suit premises.
15. In pursuance to the aforesaid order, the learned Local
Commissioner visited the suit property on 30 th April, 1997 and
prepared the list of the fittings and fixtures of the plaintiff
installed in the suit premises and also took the photographs.
The keys of the suit premises were thereafter handed over to
the defendant. The fixtures and fittings of the plaintiff in the
suit premises as per the Local Commissioner were as under:-
"List of fittings and fixtures installed in premises under the tenancy of Tamil Nadu Handloom Weavers, plaintiff prepared at site:- GROUND FLOOR :
1. 3 (Three) Racks .
2. 1 (One) Wall cabinet.
3. 1 (One) counter.
4. 1 (One) counter with mirror and side racks.
5. 32 (Thirty two) lights.
6. 14 (Fourteen) Mini Hylogene lights.
7. 21 (Twenty one) spot lights.
8. 1 (One) tube light in Hall.
9. 1 (One) tube light in stairs case.
10. 1 (One) tube light in Bath room.
11. 1 (One) show mirror 8‟ x 3‟ approx.
BASEMENT :
1. 10 (Ten) steel pipes.
2. 01 (One) rack steel pipe, set.
3. 136 (One hundred and thirty six) lights including, spot and Mini Hylogene.
4. 3 (Three) racks (steel pipe).
5. 2 (Two) counters.
6. 1 (one) rack partition (2 pieces).
MAZANINE FLOOR
1. 6 (Six) window glasses in Mazanine.
2. 9 (Nine) lights in Mazanine floor."
16. The plaintiff‟s claim for mandatory injunction became
infructuous with the handing over of the possession to the
defendant on 30th April, 1997 and the claim remained with
respect to the recovery of the outstanding security amount.
17. The defendant contested the suit on various grounds,
inter alia, that the plaintiff failed to deliver the possession on
31st March, 1997 thereby rendering the notice - Ex.PW-1/6
infructuous. The defendant alleged to have waited at the suit
premises along with an engineer and others on 31st March,
1997 to receive back the possession and the plaintiff did not
show up. The respondent denied having caused any
obstruction in the removal of the fixtures and fittings by the
plaintiff. The defendant alleged that on 26th March, 1997, the
employees of the plaintiff were dismantling certain fixtures
embedded in the beams of the building and the defendant
advised the plaintiff to get the work done under the
supervision of an engineer/architect so that the safety of the
building was not endangered. The defendant admitted the
receipt of possession on 30th April, 1997 but alleged that the
suit premises were neither restored to its original condition
nor the fixtures and fittings were removed by the plaintiff.
The defendant hired a Civil engineer and a retired Chief
Engineer to estimate the cost of restoration and supplied the
estimate to the plaintiff on 8th May, 1997. However, the
plaintiff refused to carry out the restoration on the plea that it
had carried out the modernization of the property with the
consent of the defendant. The defendant referred to plaintiff‟s
internal letter dated 12th May, 1997-Ex.DW1/64 in which the
defendant had agreed to pay the reasonable cost of repair.
The defendant awarded the restoration work to M/s. Krishna
Construction for Rs.3,40,000/- out of which advance payment
of Rs.1,00,000/- was made vide cheque No.320856 dated 1 st
June, 1997. The plaintiff did not remove the fixtures and
fittings from the suit premises which were finally removed by
the defendant. The defendant adjusted balance security
amount of Rs.4,01,392/- against various heads including cost
of restoration of the suit premises, the outstanding rent upto
30th June, 1997, the outstanding electricity and water dues
and made a counter claim of Rs.5,74,000/- against the
appellant. The defendant‟s counter claim included rent and
maintenance charges upto 30th June, 2007 and interest
thereon, rent and maintenance charges for additional
accommodation of 253 sq.ft. and interest thereon, restoration
and repair charges of Rs.3,40,000/-
18. At the trial, the plaintiff produced only one witness,
namely, Mr. M.A. Lahori, its Regional Manager as PW-1, who
reiterated the case set up in the plaint. Mr. Lahori also
appeared in rebuttal evidence. In the cross examination, PW-
1 admitted that he was not present when the suit premises
were taken on rent by the plaintiff. PW-1 was also not present
when the possession of the suit premises was handed over
back to the defendant. The PW-1 admitted the photographs -
Ex.PW/1/1 to PW-1/75 to be of 31st March, 1997.
19. The defendant examined ten witnesses in his defence.
The defendant himself appeared as DW-1 and reiterated the
defence set up in the written statement. We shall refer to the
statement of the relevant witnesses. DW-4 had prepared the
estimate of restoration of the premises to be Rs.4,00,000/. He
also stated to have shortlisted the contractor, M/s. Krishna
Construction and negotiated the amount at Rs.3,43,700/-.
DW-6, Laxmi Narayan Garg, son-in-law of defendant reiterated
the case of the defendant and stated that plaintiff did not turn
up to hand over the possession on 31st March, 1997 whereas
the defendant was waiting for them along with other persons
to take the same. He stated that the estimated cost of
restoration as given by Mr. K. C. Sharma was Rs. 3,50,000 and
the work was got done from M/s. Krishna Construction co. for
Rs. 3,40,000. DW-7, K. C. Verma, Retired Chief Engineer
proved the estimate of Rs. 3,40,451, Ex. DW1/59. DW-10 is
the partner of the Contractor, M/s.Krishna Construction who
completed the restoration work. DW-10 proved the final bill
Ex.DW-1/67. DW-10 also proved receipt - Ex.DW-1/69 for
Rs.25,000/- vide cheque No.630697.
20. The first question which arises for consideration, in this
case is, whether the plaintiff has validly terminated the lease
of the subject premises.
21. The law with respect to the termination of lease by the
tenant is well settled. Where the tenant vacates the tenancy
premises and notifies the landlord to take the delivery of
possession, the lease comes to an end. The refusal of the
landlord to accept the possession will amount to delivery of
possession and the possession shall be deemed to have been
delivered to the landlord though the landlord may not accept
the same. This issue arose for consideration in the decision
reported as Raja Laksman Singh Vs. State AIR 1988 Rajasthan
44. In said case, the tenant terminated the tenancy and
offered the vacant possession to the landlord who, however,
refused to take possession and put conditions to it. It was
held by the Court that the possession shall be deemed to have
been delivered as soon as the property was vacated. The
Court held as under: -
"23.... Tenant wants to deliver the possession and landlord does not accept the possession. In such circumstances, it will have to be presumed that the possession has been delivered as soon as the property has been vacated. Vacation of the property together with a notice to the landlord to take the delivery of the possession is submission for the purpose of restoration of the possession and, any impediment put up by the landlord in the matter of redelivery of the possession and not accepting the possession on the ground that some terms and conditions will have to be fulfilled will amount to the delivery of possession and it shall be deemed for all purposes that as soon as the property has been vacated the possession has been delivered though the landlord may not accept the possession."
"24..... There is nothing in the section to compel to defendant who has terminated the tenancy and who has offered to deliver vacant possession and whose offer has been refused by the landlord on the ground that the possession
shall be taken back only on the payment of Rs.5,000/- by way of damages. If the tenant fails to comply with the demand for damages, however, legitimate it might be the Plaintiff will have a right to sue for damages for the negligence, default or other acts or the defendant. The remedy which the plaintiff has chosen in this case that he shall take possession only when the conditions are fulfilled i.e. when the damages are paid absolutely without any basis."
22. In the decision reported as P.C.C. Co-op. Society v. Baba
Haji AIR 1953 Madras 996, the tenant gave the notice dated
6th December, 1948 to the landlord that the godown was no
longer required and therefore, the landlord should take the
possession of the same on 15th December, 1948. The tenant
also offered to give the keys of the premises to the landlord.
This notice was promptly replied by the landlord on 14 th
December, 1948 whereby the landlord refused to accept the
premises on the ground that there was an understanding that
the lease will not be surrendered. The tenant sent another
notice dated 27th December, 1948 reiterating that the
premises shall be surrendered by the end of 31 st January,
1949 and the tenant will not be liable to pay the rent
subsequent thereof. This was again objected to by the
landlord who filed a suit for recovery of the rent against the
tenant. It was held by the Court as under:-
"5.... When the lease has been terminated by a valid notice as provided for under Section 111, Transfer of Property Act and when possession has been offered and the Plaintiff had refused to take possession, it cannot be held that the lease would still continue in favour of the
Plaintiff. No authority has been cited by the learned counsel for the Respondent to substantiate this extraordinary position he has taken up. The authorities which have been cited by him seem to the completely without any bearing on the point at issue."
"In the present case it is not a case of any failure on the part of the Defendant to deliver up vacant possession of the premises. On the other hand, it is quite patent that after terminating the tenancy the Defendant went to the extent of offering the key of the premises and it was refused. And the refusal is only ground that the building should be in complete repair and then only the landlord would take possession. Such a position taken up by the landlord is wholly untenable."
"If the premises have been damaged and damaged to a considerable extent as it transpires from the evidence and the judgment of the learned District Munisf, the Plaintiff has got his remedies by proceeding against the Defendant society for damages and he will be entitled to get every pie of damage which he will prove against the society. But that would entitle the plaintiff to refuse to take possession of the premises and then act as if the defendant is continuing as a tenant under him or that the tenant is in occupation and use of the premises and therefore liable to pay damages for such use and occupation. The issues have been confused and the remedy has been misconceived."
"There is nothing in this section to compel the defendant, who has terminated the tenancy and who has offered to deliver vacant possession and whose offer has been refused more than once, to remain in the premises until the premises, which a recalcitrant tenant might have purposely or otherwise damaged, is put in a state of proper repair. If he fails to comply with any demand, however legitimate it might be, from the plaintiff, the remedy of the plaintiff would be to sue for damages for the neglect or default or other deliberate acts of the defendants. The remedy that the plaintiff has chosen in this case seems to be absolutely without any basis."
"Even so in „AIR 1937 Lah 121 (E)‟ it has been held that the remedy of the landlord is to sue the tenant for damages, the measure of which is the rental value of the premises for the time he is kept out of possession and the costs of the legal proceedings to oust the under tenant from wrongful possession if the tenant fails to deliver vacant possession after termination of notice. But in the present case the facts are on a much stronger footing. Here the tenant has not merely terminated the tenancy but also offered to deliver vacant possession by giving the key."
"I do not think it is necessary for me in the view I have taken to multiply the authorities or to refer to those that have been further cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I am of the opinion that the decision of the learned District Munsif is wholly wrong and untenable and he ought to have held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover any rent or any damages for the period for which he laid this suit. On the other hand, the Plaintiff should have been directed to seek the proper remedy by taking possession of the property and then to sue the defendant for the recovery of damages that have been caused to the property of the plaintiff. Instead of doing so, the plaintiff has misconceived his remedy and the learned District Munsif has fallen into the error of accepting that was the proper remedy for the plaintiff."
23. In the present case, the plaintiff issued a valid notice of
termination Ex.PW1/6 to the defendant who received,
acknowledged and accepted the same vide reply Ex.PW1/7.
We, therefore, hold that the plaintiff has validly terminated
the lease of the subject premises with effect from 31 st March,
1997. We do not find any merit in the contention of the
defendant that the notice Ex.PW1/6 had become infructuous
or had been waived.
24. The next question is up to what date, the plaintiff is
liable to pay the rent to the defendant. The plaintiff‟s
contention is that it is liable to pay the rent up to 30th March,
1997 whereas the defendant is claiming the rent up to 30th
June, 1997. The learned Trial Court has held that the plaintiff
is liable to pay the rent upto 30 th April, 1997 because the
possession of the suit premises was delivered to the
defendant through the Local Commissioner on 30th April,
1997. We agree with the finding of the learned Trial Court.
Though the plaintiff had terminated the tenancy w.e.f. 31 st
March, 1997 but the possession was delivered on 30th April,
1997. We do not agree with the contention of the plaintiff that
it offered the possession to the defendant on 31st March, 1997
and the defendant refused to take it back. On careful
consideration of the evidence of both the parties, it is clear
that the plaintiff was insisting on refund of security deposit
but was not ready to deliver the possession without taking
back the security deposit. From the report of the Local
Commissioner, it is clear that the plaintiff had not even
removed all the fixtures and fittings from the suit premises.
The plaintiff also did not offer the inspection of the suit
premises to the defendant. The account was also admittedly
not settled at that time. Therefore, the learned Trial Court has
rightly held the liability of the plaintiff to pay the rent upto
30th April, 1997.
25. The defendant has set up a counter claim of
Rs.3,40,000/- towards the cost of restoration of the suit
premises. DW-1 proved the estimate of expenditure of
Rs.3,40,451/- as Ex.DW-1/59, out of which the cost of marble
stone flooring including cost of rubbing and polishing is
Rs.2,99,096/-. The cost of remaining items namely
dismantling of stones, slabs/flooring, dismantling of old
plaster, demolishing brick work, tile work, removal of ceiling,
distempering, PF paneling, cement plastering of ceiling, brick
work, removal of malba and other repairs is Rs.41,355/-
(Rs.3,40,451 - Rs.2,99,096). Vide letter dated 8th May, 1997 -
Ex.DW-1/60, the defendant sent the copy of Ex.DW-1/59 to
the plaintiff requesting him to get the work done, failing which
the defendant was to get the work done on its own. The
plaintiff replied vide letter dated 12th May, 1997 - Ex.DW-
1/63 in which it stated that the plaintiff had carried out
moderanisation with the consent of the defendant. However,
it was stated that the cost of repair was highly exaggerated.
In an internal letter dated 12th May, 1997 - DW-1/64, the
plaintiff recorded that they were prepared for reasonable
repair charges and the defendant was requested to deduct
reasonable charges from the security deposit account. The
plaintiff removed all the fittings, fixtures, racks and iron
stands on 2nd May, 1997 except three racks and some iron
stands which were subsequently dismantled and removed by
the defendant which is recorded in defendant‟s letter -
Ex.DW-1/65A. Vide letter 25th September, 1997 - Ex.DW-
1/67, M/s. Krishna Construction intimated the defendant of
completion of the restoration and repair work and further that
they have received Rs.3,18,700/- and final bill was being sent.
The final bill attached thereto for Rs.3,48,703 shows that the
cost of laying the marble stone flooring was Rs.3,12,173/- and
the cost of the remaining repairs was Rs.36,530/-
(Rs.3,48,703/- - Rs.3,12,173/-).
26. The learned Trial Court rejected the entire claim of the
cost of restoration. We have examined the evidence on
record. We agree with the learned Trial Court that the
defendant has not proved that the modifications/alterations
were of permanent nature. The defendant has also not
produced the evidence or the photographs of the condition of
the premises after the renovation. We are of the view that
notwithstanding the discrepancies referred to by the learned
Trial Court, entire cost of Rs.3,48,703/- mentioned in the final
bill Ex.DW-1/67 is not recoverable from the plaintiff as Clause
18 of the lease deed refers to the surrender of the vacant
possession in good repairs. Section 108 (m) of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 is subject to the contract to the contrary
and therefore, the parties shall be governed by Clause 18 of
the lease deed. The claim of Rs.3,12,173/- towards laying of
marbles stone flooring is not for repair but renovation and
reconstruction which does not fall within the purview of Clause
18 of the lease deed. We, therefore, reject the claim of
Rs.3,12,173/- of the defendant towards the cost of marble
stone flooring. The defendant is entitled to the remaining cost
of Rs.36,530/- towards the repairs which the plaintiff is liable
to bear by virtue of clause 18 of the lease deed.
27. The learned Trial Court has awarded the rent as well as
maintenance charges for two months to the plaintiff on the
ground that it would have taken two months to restore the
premises to its original shape. The maintenance charges were
Rs.35,166/- per month. The grant of maintenance charges for
two months by the learned Trial Court is not justified because
there was no maintenance during the period of repairs. In
fact, there could not have been any maintenance during the
period of repairs. The claim of maintenance charges for two
months awarded by the learned Trial Court to the defendant is
therefore rejected. However, we agree with the learned Trial
Court and uphold grant of rent for two months to the
defendant as the repair work allowed by us would have
certainly taken two month‟s time.
28. The defendant has claimed Rs.1,60,860/- towards the
rent/maintenance charges for additional accommodation of
253 sq.ft. provided to the plaintiff. The defendant has also
claimed interest @ 24% per month on the said amount. The
defendant has also claimed expenses for electricity load,
charges for putting hoarding, expenditure on anti-termite
treatment and interest on Income Tax. All the aforesaid
claims have been rejected by the learned Trial Court as being
hit by Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act. We agree with
the learned Trial Court and uphold the reasons given by the
learned Trial Court.
29. The plaintiff is claiming interest at the rate of 24% per
annum on the balance security deposit. The learned Trial
Court has rejected the claim of interest on the ground that the
plaintiff did not restore the suit premises to its original
condition. We agree with the learned trial court. The
plaintiff‟s conduct, detailed in para 29 below, does not entitle
it to any interest.
30. In view of the above, we uphold the finding of the
learned Trial Court that the plaintiff is liable to pay the rent of
the suit premises to the defendant upto 30th April, 1997. We
also uphold the finding that the plaintiff is liable to pay the
rent of two months to the defendant for carrying out the
repairs. However, we set aside the maintenance charges for
two months awarded by the learned Trial Court to the
defendant for carrying out the repairs. We further allow a
sum of Rs.36,530/- to the defendant towards the cost of
repairs. A net effect is out of Rs.1,33,701/- awarded to the
plaintiff, Rs.70,332/- towards the maintenance charges for two
months have to be added and Rs.36,530/- towards the cost of
repairs have to be subtracted. A refundable security deposit
amount comes to Rs.1,67,503/-.
31. In view of the above, we hereby allow RFA No.263/2006
and partially modify the judgment and decree passed by the
learned Trial Court to the extent stated above. We pass a
decree in sum of Rs.1,67,503/- in favour of the plaintiff and
against the defendant. We award interest to the plaintiff on
said sum @9% per annum from the date of the suit till
realization. We dismiss RFA No.488/2006.
32. Noting that both parties have acted fairly unreasonably
with each other and both parties took fairly incorrect and
unjustified stand we hold that neither party shall be entitled to
costs against each other either in the suit or in the appeals.
(J.R. MIDHA) JUDGE
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) JUDGE December 05, 2008 s.pal
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