Arun Kumar vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.
2007 Latest Caselaw 574 Del

JUDGMENT

Kailash Gambhir, J.

1. Rule. The matter is taken up for final hearing.

2. The grievance of the petitioner as set out in the present petition is that the petitioner was appointed as a Research Assistant in Indian Institute of Mass Communication, Department of Communication, Government of India/respondent No. 2 in September 1995 and worked therein up to January 1998. The petitioner has contended that the petitioner fulfillled the minimum qualification for the said post as laid down in the advertisement. The petitioner requested the respondent No. 2 to regularise his services on the post of Research Assistant as he had already completed 240 days of continuous service. The petitioner had also approached the respondent Nos. 3, i.e., National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the redressal of his grievance. The petitioner has further contended that after termination of his service on 19.06.1998 he had been persuading the respondents for his regular appointment on the said post of Research Assistant and when he failed in all his efforts, then, he approached the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee for assistance and thereafter in the year 2005 preferred the present writ petition. Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, on the other hand, has contended that the petitioner was a temporary employee and as per the certificate placed by the petitioner himself the petitioner had worked as Research Assistant with respondent No. 2 from September, 1995 to January 1998 on purely temporary basis and on consolidated salary. Counsel for respondent No. 2, therefore, has stated that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi (3) and Ors. as the employment of the petitioner with respondent No. 2 was contractual in nature and the same came to an end on 19.06.1998. Counsel for respondent further contends that the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition on 09.09.2005 that is after long gap of seven years from the date of his contract coming into an end and, therefore, the present petition is also bad due to delay and laches. The petitioner has not given any reason for such delay in filing the petition. No appointment letter has been placed on record. However, the certificate issued by respondent No. 2 dated 19.06.1998 shows that the services of the petitioner were purely on temporary basis and on consolidated salary w.e.f. September, 1995 to January, 1998. This position is not disputed by the petitioner himself as in the petition the petitioner has stated that his service was terminated w.e.f. 19.06.1998. This assertion on the part of the petitioner itself indicates that the petitioner had worked with respondent No. 2 only for a limited period and after 19.06.1998 the services of petitioner were not engaged by respondent No. 2. The employment of the petitioner being contractual in nature, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (Supra) is fully attracted in the present case. It would be relevant to refer the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (Supra) which reads as under:

45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arm's length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not (sic) one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.

3. Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the said judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (Supra) is fully applicable as the petitioner was employed on contractual basis for a limited period w.e.f. September, 1995 to January, 1998 thereafter the services of the petitioner were not engaged by respondent No. 2. The petitioner has also failed to advance any reason or offer any explanation for not preferring the petition for such a long gap of about seven years after the date of his alleged termination on 19.06.1998 and, therefore, also the present petition is not maintainable on the ground of unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. I do not find any merit in the petition and the same is hereby dismissed.

4. Rule discharged.