Delhi High Court

Rajesh Kumar vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 7 December, 2007

Equivalent citations: 146 (2008) DLT 588

Author: M Mudgal

Bench: M Mudgal, A Suresh

JUDGMENT

Mukul Mudgal, J.

1. The writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the Order dated 1st August 2003 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'CAT'), Principal Bench, New Delhi, CP 135/2003 in O.A. No. 1197/2001.

2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

(a) The petitioner herein was engaged as Badli/Daily Paid Worker in Delhi Milk Scheme with effect from 1st January 1999 onwards. The petitioner had completed 240 days in a period of 12 months. The said period of 240 days was calculated by counting the days of actual duty rendered by him plus the intervening weekly offs and other holidays.

(b) Even after completion of 240 days in accordance with the provisions of the Para 4 (iii) of the Certified Standing Orders, the petitioner was not transferred to regular establishment of Delhi Milk Scheme.

(c) Aggrieved by the failure of the respondent to transfer the services of the petitioner to the regular establishment of Mates in spite of completing the requisite number of 240 days including weekly offs and holidays the petitioner along with 15 others approached the CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi, by filing O.A.1197/2001.

(d) The learned Member , CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi, by its order dated 20th November, 2001 disposed of the O.A. No. 1197/2001 filed by the petitioner with the following findings:

Having regard to the aforestated legal position based on the provisions made in the certified Standing Orders and the judgments rendered by this Tribunal, there is no manner of doubt that each one of the applicants has completed the requisite number of days so as to be transferred on to the regular establishment of Mates.

While disposing of the O.A. Of the petitioner, the learned Member , CAT, had issued the following directions to the respondents:

For all the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the present OA is allowed and the respondents are directed to transfer the services of the applicants to the regular establishment of Mates wholly in terms of the Standing Orders and to grant them all the consequential benefits in accordance with the said orders and the applicable instructions. Needless to add that after being regularized, the applicants will also find place in the relevant seniority list prepared according to the rules on the subject.

(e) Aggrieved by the order of the learned Member of the CAT, dated 28th November, 2001, the respondents filed Civil Writ Petition No. 6211/2002 before this Court, which was dismissed by the order of this Court dated 30th September, 2002.

(f) On non-compliance of the order of the learned Member , CAT dated 20th November, 2001, by the respondents, the petitioner along with 15 other applicants filed the Contempt Petition No. 135/2003 before the Division Bench of the CAT. By its order dated 1st January 2003, the Division Bench of CAT had dismissed the petitioner's Contempt Petition. (g) Hence this writ petition.

3. In the present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 1st August 2003 passed by the CAT, Principal, New Delhi in C.P. No. 135/2003 in O.A. 1197/2001 whereby the contempt petition filed by the petitioner and 28 others was dismissed by the CAT holding that para 5 of the Tribunal's order dated 20th November, 2001 in O.A. 1197/2001 does not contain a conclusion that 'there is no manner of doubt that each one of the applicants has completed the requisite number of days so as to be transferred to the regular establishment of Mate.'

4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Sandeep Jain in support of his case submitted as follows:

(a) The Division Bench of the CAT has completely misread the order of the learned Member, CAT, dated 20th November, 2001 in O.A. No. 1197/2001 and the scheme thereof. The Tribunal made its impugned order dated 1st August 2003 dismissed the petitioner's contempt petition wholly misreading the order dated 20th November, 2001 of the learned Member of the CAT and held that there was no clear finding in para 5 of the said judgment that each one of the petitioners had completed the requisite number of days so as to be transferred on to the regular establishments of Mates. The Tribunal had erroneously held that para 5 does not contain the findings of the Tribunal but only the submissions of the Counsel for the petitioners.

(b) The Tribunal failed to appreciate the terms of the said order of the learned Member, CAT. There were following three issues before the learned Member:

(i) Whether the case of the petitioner was covered by earlier orders of the Tribunal dated 21st October, 1997 in O.A. No. 1059/87, order dated 28th May 2001 in O.A. No. 1155/2000, 1396/2000 and O.A. No. 1910/2000 and order dated 17.10.2001 in O.A. No. 2518/2000 and the petitioners had completed 240 days including intervening weekly offs and other holidays. The Tribunal failed to appreciate that the learned Member of the CAT in his order dated 28.11.2001 passed in O.A. No. 1197/2001 dealt with the first issue in paras 3 to 5 and recorded his findings in para 5 thereof. Para 5 does not contain the submissions of the counsel as regards first issue but the same are the findings of learned Member of the CAT as regards the said issue.

(ii) Whether the original application of the petitioner was barred by the constructive res-judicata' The learned Member took up the second issue and the same was discussed in para 6 of the order and the finding was also recorded in the same para.

(iii) Whether the original application was time barred' The third issue was discussed in para 7 and the findings of the learned Member was also given in the same para.

(c) The Tribunal failed to appreciate that, as far as the first issue is concerned, except para 3 to 5 there is neither any discussion nor any findings in any other para of the order dated 20th November, 2001 and the only findings of the learned Member as regard issue No. 1 are contained only in para 5. Thus there is a categorical findings of the learned Member that each of the Applicants had completed the requisite number of days so as to be transferred on to the regular findings by the learned Member anywhere in his order dated 20th November, 2001.

(d) The Tribunal failed to appreciate that if para 5 of the order dated 29th November, 2001 did not contain the findings of the learned Member , and there being no other findings recorded in order dated 20th November, 2001 regarding the first issue about the case of the applicants on merit, the direction of the learned Member in para 8 would have been that 'the respondents should include intervening weekly offs and other holidays while calculating the period of 240 days and only those applicants who had completed 240 days in a period of 12 months, their services be transferred to regular establishment of Mates in terms of the Standing orders and to grant them all the consequent benefits'. In that case, there would not have been any positive direction by the learned Member, CAT, directing the respondents to transfer the services of the applicants to the regular establishment of Mates. Thus, the Tribunal has wholly misread the order dated 20th November, 2001 of the learned Member of the CAT.

5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of the learned Member of the CAT dated 20th November, 2001, as understood by the respondents, only meant that only those applicants who had completed as per the calculation to be made by the respondents are to be regularized as prescribed in the Standing Orders. However, if the directions of the learned Member were such as claimed to have been as understood by the respondents there was no need for the respondents to file a Civil Writ Petition No. 6211/2002 before this Court challenging the said order dated 20th November, 2001 of the learned Member of the CAT. Respondent had filed a Civil Writ Petition before this Court only because they were aggrieved by the clear finding of the Tribunal in para 5 of its order dated 20th November, 2001, holding that each of the applicants had completed the requisite number of days so as to be transferred on to the regular establishment of Mates.

6. During the course of the arguments the question arose regarding the maintainability of the present writ petition.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner in order to support the maintainability of the writ petition, relied upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

(i) In L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. 1997 (3) SCC 281, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:

The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of three Tribunals rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts.

(b) In T.Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P. 2001 (1) SCC 516, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

While holding the proceedings under Section 17 of the amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well established rules of self-restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of the Tribunals. However, any order or decision of the tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against in view of the specific provision contained in the section 19 of th Contempt of Court Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Thus, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 to entertain a writ against an order of the Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 17 of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 is barred only in the case of an order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for Contempt, which order is held appealable only before the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. Otherwise all others orders passed by the Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 have to be challenged before the concerned High Court alone.

7. The learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the present writ petition preferred by the petitioner against the order of the CAT passed by it in exercise of its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act is not maintainable. In order to strengthen his arguments, the learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon the following judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

(i) T. Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. (2001)1 SCC 516, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided as follows:

However any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against in view of the specific provision contained in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of legislation by reference. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are not as if lifted and incorporated in the text of the Administrative Tribunals Act (as is in the case of legislation by incorporation); they remain there where they are, yet while reading the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act in the context of Tribunals, the same will be so read as to read the word 'Tribunal' in place of the word 'High Court' wherever it occurs, subject to the modifications set out in Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for appeals. In its text also by virtue of Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the word 'High Court' shall be read as 'Tribunal'. Here, by way of abundant caution, we make it clear that the concept of intra-Tribunal appeals i.e. appeal from an order or decision of a Member of a Tribunal sitting singly to a Bench of not less than two Members of the Tribunal is alien to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The question of any order made under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Member of the Tribunal sitting singly, if the rules of business framed by the Tribunal or the appropriate Government permit such hearing, being subjected to an appeal before a Bench of two or more Members of the Tribunal therefore does not arise. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt is appealable under Section 19 of the Act to the Supreme Court only. The Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar 1 has nowhere said that orders of the Tribunal holding the contemner guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution in spite of remedy of statutory appeal provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act being available. The distinction between orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by Section 14(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and orders punishing for contempt under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, is this: as against the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the latter statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act itself

Following the aforementioned order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court this Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 5889-91/2005 by its order dated 25th April 2005, viewed that the order passed by the Tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction under Contempt of Courts Act is not subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court.

(ii) In the case of Bradakanta Msihra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra , Hon'ble Supreme Court viewed that no appeal lie against the refusal of High Court to take action on the motion made by the appellant The relevant portion of the order of Hon'ble Supreme Court reads as under:

Now, while considering this question, we must bear in mind the true nature of the contempt jurisdiction exercised by the High Court and the law in regard to right of appeal which obtained immediately prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It has always been regarded as well-settled law that as far as criminal contempt is concerned, it is a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner. No one has a statutory or common law right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because the alleged contemner is guilty of contempt. All that he can do is to move the Court and draw its attention to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it will then be for the Court, if it so thinks fit, to take action to vindicate its authority and commit the alleged contemner for contempt. It is for the Court in the exercise of its discretion to decide whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. Even if the Court is prima facie satisfied that a contempt has been committed, the Court may yet choose to ignore it and decline to take action. There is no right in any one to compel the Court to initiate a proceeding for contempt even where a prima facie case appears to have been made out. The same position obtains even after a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court on a motion made to it for the purpose. The Court may in the exercise of its discretion accept an unconditional apology from the alleged contemner and drop the proceeding for contempt, or, even after the alleged contemner is found guilty, the Court may, having regard to the circumstances, decline to punish him. So far as the contempt jurisdiction is concerned, the only actors in the drama are the Court and the alleged contemner. An outside party comes in only by way of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt which has been committed: he does not become a part to the proceeding for contempt which may be initiated by the Court. It was for this reason that a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held in Narendrabhai Sarabhai Hatheesing v. Chinubhai Manibhai Seth that an order made by the High Court refusing to commit a man for breach of an undertaking given to the Court is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the letters patent as it does not affect the merits of any question between the parties to the suit. Beaumont, C.J., pointed out: The undertaking is given to the Court; if it is broken, and that fact is brought to the Courts notice, the Court may take such action as it thinks fit. If it comes to the conclusion that the order has been deliberately broken, it will probably commit the defaulter to jail, but the Court is free to adopt such course as it thinks fit.

Rangnekar, J., also spoke in the same strain when he said:

Proceedings for contempt are matters entirely between the Court and the person alleged to have been guilty of contempt. No party has any statutory right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because his opponent is guilty of contempt. All that he can do is to come to the Court and complain that the authority of the Court has been flouted, and if the Court thinks that it was so, then the Court in its discretion takes action to vindicate its authority. It is, therefore, difficult to see how an application for contempt raises any question between the parties, so that any order made on such an application by which the Court in its discretion refuses to take any action against the party alleged to be in the wrong can be said to raise any question between the parties.

It is, therefore, clear that under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 no appeal lay at the instance of a party moving the High Court for taking action for contempt, if the High Court in the exercise of its discretion refused to take action on the motion of such party. Even if the High Court took action and initiated a proceeding for contempt and in such proceeding, the alleged contemner, being found guilty, was punished for contempt, the order being one made by the High Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, was not appealable under Clause 15 of the letters patent, and therefore, no appeal lay against it from a Member to a Division Bench and equally, there was no appeal as of right from a Division Bench to this Court. The result was that in cases of criminal contempt, even a person punished for contempt had no right of appeal and he could impugn the order committing him for contempt only if the High Court granted the appropriate certificate under Article 134 in fit cases or on the refusal of the High Court to do so, this Court intervened by granting special leave under Article 136.

This was a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs and it was largely responsible for the criticism against the large powers of the Court to punish for contempt. This unsatisfactory feature of the law of contempt was adversely commented upon by Sanyal Committee in its report dated February 28, 1963 submitted to the Government of India. The Sanyal Committee pointed out in para 2.1 in Chapter XI of its Report:

The present state of the law relating to appeal in cases of criminal contempt appears to be more the result of accidents of legal history than a matter of policy. That this is so is clearly evident from the fact that in those cases of contempt for which specific provision is made in the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure a right of appeal is provided for under Section 486 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of contempt falling within the purview of inherent powers of the Hi gh Courts, no specific provision has been made in the letters patent of the High Courts and the only explanation for this seems to be that no such provision was made in England in regard to the English superior courts. Further, under the provisions of the letters patent, no appeal is ordinarily permissible where the order of the Court is made in the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction. It has also been held that Section 411A of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not afford any remedy by way of appea l in contempt cases. The result has been that before the Constitution came into force, an appeal in contempt cases from the decision of a High Court could lie only in special cases to the Judicial Committee. The Constitution did not alter this position very much for the effect of Articles 134 and 136 of the Constitution is merely to substitute the Supreme Court for the Privy Council. In short, there is only a discretionary right of appeal available at present in cases of criminal contempt.

Then in para 3.1 in Chapter XI of its Report the Sanyal Committee proceeded to state:

...we accordingly recommend that against an order of a Member , punishing for contempt, the appeal should lie, in the High Court, to a Bench of Judges and against a similar order of a Bench of Judges of a High Court, the appeal should lie as of right to the Supreme Court.

Chapter XII of the Report contained the recommendations of the Sanyal Committee and Clause 25 of the recommendations was in the following terms: Provision may be made for an appeal as of right from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The appeal should lie to a Bench of Judges of the High Court where the order or decision is of a Member. Where the order or decision is of a Bench the appeal should lie to the Supreme Court.

It was in pursuance of this recommendation made by the Sanyal Committee that the Parliament, while enacting the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, introduced Section 19 Sub-section (1) in that Act conferring an appeal as of right from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt

Before we examine the language of Section 19 Sub-section (1) in order to arrive at its true interpretation, we may first look at Sections 15, 17 and 20. Sub- section (1) of Section 15 provides that in a case of criminal contempt other than contempt in the face of the Court, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General and Sub-section (2) of that section says that in case of criminal contempt of any subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or in relation to Union Territories, by such law officer as the Central Government may specify in this behalf. Section 17 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Court when it decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt under Section 15. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that notice of every proceeding under Section 15 shall be served personally on the person charged and according to Sub-section (2), such notice shall be accompanied, in case of a proceeding commenced on a motion, by a copy of the motion as also copies of the affidavits, if any, on which such motion is founded, and in case of a proceeding commenced on a reference by a subordinate court, by a copy of the reference. Section 20 prescribes a period of limitation by saying that no court shall initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. It will be seen from these provisions that the scheme adopted by the legislature is that the Court may initiate a proceeding for contempt suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General or on a reference made by a subordinate court. Where the Court initiates a proceeding for contempt suo motu, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and takes the first step in exercise of it. But what happens when a motion is made by the Advocate-General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General or a reference is made by a subordinate court. Does the Court enter upon the jurisdiction to punish for contempt and act in exercise of it when it considers such motion or reference for the purpose of deciding whether it should initiate a proceeding for contempt' We do not think so. The motion or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it is for the Court, on a consideration of such motion or reference, to decide, in exercise of its discretion, whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. The Court may decline to take cognizance and to initiate a proceeding for contempt either because in its opinion no contempt prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contemner. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminous a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. Where the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not. therefore, fall within the opening words of Section 19 Sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision. This of course does not mean that there is no remedy available where the High Court on an erroneous view of the law or unreasonably and perversely refuses to take action for contempt on a motion or a reference. Though no appeal lies under Section 19 Sub-section (1) as of right against such order or decision of the High Court, the Advocate-General or any other person who has with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General moved the High Court can always come to this Court by a petition for special leave to appeal and the power of this Court to interfere with such order or decision in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 is unfettered. This Court can always in suitable cases set right any order or decision of the High Court refusing to take action for contempt against the alleged contemner, if the larger interests of administration of justice so require.

8. The learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the Tribunal had directed the respondents to transfer the services of the applicants/ petitioners to the regular establishment of the Mates only in terms of the Standing Orders and to grant the all consequential benefit in accordance with the said order and the applicable instructions. The completion of 240 days service as Badli worker was one of the terms of the Standing Order and the petitioners did not complete 240 days as Badli workers, hence they are not entitled to be transferred to the regular establishment. The respondents also passed appropriate order in this regard on 27th February 2003. It has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of JS Parihar v. Ganpath Duggar , once in terms of the direction of the learned Tribunal, the petitioners have taken appropriate action, the question of contempt was not there and the learned Tribunal rightly dismissed the contempt petition.

9. In our view, the order dated 1st August 2003 passed by the CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi in the Contempt Petition being C.P. No. 135/2003 which was filed against the order dated 20th November, 2001 passed by the learned Member, CAT, in O.A. 1197/2001, cannot be upheld. The learned Member, CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi, had disposed of the OA No. 1197/2001 with the following findings:

While disposing of the O.A. Of the petitioner, the learned Member , CAT, had issued the following consequential and operative directions to the respondents:

Thus, there was a categorical finding by the learned Member of the CAT, by the order 20th November, 2001 that the petitioner had completed the requisite number of 240 days so as to be transferred onto the regular establishment of Mates.

10. The respondents had filed Writ Petition(C) No. 6211/2002 before this Court challenging the above judgment of the CAT in OA No. 1197/2001 taking the ground therein that the Tribunal by its order dated 20th November, 2001 had failed to appreciate that only those Badli workers were entitled to be transferred to regular establishment who had actually worked for not less then 240 days in any period of 12 months and the term actually could only mean physical working for 240 days in which neither any weekly holiday nor any gazetted holiday could be added. The relevant ground in WP(C) 6211/2002 reads as follows:

It is submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the word 'actually' in the proviso Clause 4(iii) and thus has committed mistake of law. It is submitted that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that only those badli workers are entitled to be transferred to regular establishment who had actually worked for not less than 240 days in any period of 12 months. The term actually could only mean physical working for 240 days in which neither any weekly holiday nor any gazetted holiday etc. Could be added to reach the period of 240 days. Any other interpretation of the term 'actually' will render the term 'actually' redundant.

Thus, the plea now sought to be raised in defending the averment of contempt had been squarely raised in WP(C) 6211/2002 which was dismissed by a Division Bench. This Court in the above said WP(C) 6211/2002 by its Judgment dated 30th September, 2002 while rejecting the above plea had observed that: 'there cannot be any doubt or dispute that if a person works for six days a week continuously, he would be entitled to a week's salary holidays. Similarly, taking work from a workman on the national holidays can only be permitted in exceptional situation in essential services where he gets a compensatory leave and / or compensation on monetary terms.'

11. In H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India and Ors. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

Sundays/weekly offs and 17 holidays are to be added to the number of working days for the purpose of completing 240 days. In that case also, the concerned employees had actually worked for less than 240 days but was held that Sundays/weekly offs and 17 days are to be reckoned for the purpose. For the purpose of computation of working days under Sections 25B and 25F, Sundays and holidays are thus also required to be taken into account.

This Court while dismissing the abovementioned writ petition had observed that an interpretation of similar provision fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in H.D. Singh's case (supra) and thus, there is no merit in the writ petition.

12. In our view, the contention of the respondents that the present writ petition by the petitioner against the order of the CAT dated 1st August 2003 passed in exercise of its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act being not maintainable, cannot be upheld. In the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI and Ors. and T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

The jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226/227 to entertain a writ against an order of the Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 17 of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 is barred only in the case of an order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for Contempt, which order is held appealable only before the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. Otherwise all others orders passed by the Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 have to be appealed before the concerned High Court alone.

The present writ petition cannot be barred as the order of the Tribunal dated 1st August 2003 does not punish for contempt but only gives the direction that the respondents had not committed any willful disobedience of the Tribunal's order dated 20th November, 2001 to justify further proceedings against the respondents.

13. Paragraph 2 of the impugned order of the Tribunal reads as follows:

2. We have read and re-read the aforesaid order or the Tribunal dated 20.11.2001. We find no good grounds to differ from the findings in the Tribunal's order dated 28.4.2003 in CP 151/2003. We are unable to persuade ourselves to come to the conclusion that para 5 of Tribunal's order dated 20.11.2001 is the conclusion or direction of the Tribunal that there is no manner of doubt that each one of the applicants has completed the requisite number of days so as to be transferred to the regular establishment of Mates. It is also relevant to note that only from para 6 onwards the contentions of the learned Counsel for the respondents have been noted by the Tribunal followed by the directions contained in para 8 to given all consequential benefits to the applicants in accordance with the applicable standing order and instructions. We are, therefore, unable to agree that in the context of the order of the Tribunal dated 29.4.2003, the respondents have committed any willful or contumacious disobedience of the Tribunal's order to justify further proceedings against them under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 red with the provisions of Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

The above conclusion of the Tribunal, particularly the finding that paragraph 5 of the Tribunal's order dated 20th November, 2001 is the conclusion or the directions of the Tribunal that each one of the applicants who had completed requisite number of days so as to be transferred to the regular establishment of Mates. The Tribunal's order dated 20th November, 2001 could have never been granted without the Tribunal being satisfied that the requisite number of days have been completed. Paragraph 5 of the said order dated 20th November 2001 reads as follows:

Furthermore, the respondent's own stand before this Court in the Writ Petition (C) No. 6211/2002 was that:

Thus, in any event and quite apart from the fact that the Tribunal's order is in direct contradiction to the findings by this Court in WP(C) 6211/2002 and the findings recorded in paragraph 5 by the Tribunal in its order dated 20th November, 2001 in O.A. 1197/2001. In any event, the Contempt Petition bearing No. 135/2003 in OA No. 1197/2001 had been dismissed only with the direction that since there was no conclusive finding by the Tribunal that the petitioner had completed the requisite number of days so as to be transferred to the regular establishment of Mates, therefore, there was no contempt in OA. Thus, the Contempt Petition in OA No. 1197/2001 had been dismissed only on the lack of findings that the petitioner had worked for more than 240 days in the OA No. 1197/2001 and not on the plea of the contempt power of the CAT. In our view, the contempt petition in OA No. 1197/2001 had been wrongly dismissed.

Accordingly, there is no merit in the impugned order dated 1st August 2003 and the same is set aside. The writ petition is allowed.

14. The present writ petition also relies on the plea that no order or judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been produced by the respondents against the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition (C) 6211/2002. Thus, in this view of the matter, the findings of the Division Bench of this Court in the aforementioned writ petition (C) No. 6211/2002 became final and cannot be frustrated and made ineffectual by the CAT.

15. In light of the categorical findings of the learned Member of the CAT, dated 20th November, 2001 affirmed by the judgment of this Court dated 30th September, 2002 while rejecting the plea of the Respondent that only those Badli workers are entitled to be transferred to regular establishment who had actually worked for not less then 240 days in any period of 12 months, the order of the CAT dated 1st August 2003 is wholly unsustainable. It is a clear case of contempt on behalf of the respondents and they have failed to appreciate the correct position of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and reiterated by this Court. The Principal Bench, CAT while dismissing the contempt petition, also failed to appreciate the correct position of law. In any case, whatever be the view on the plea of the contempt power of the CAT, in any event, this Court can in exercise of its writ jurisdiction pass orders to ensure that the binding and final judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 30th September, 2002 is made effective. The respondents are therefore, directed to transfer the services of the petitioner to the regular establishment of Mates and grant him all the consequential benefits or or before 31st December, 2007.

16. Report for compliance on 8th January 2008.