Delhi High Court
C.B. Sharma vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr. on 15 May, 2006
Author: S R Bhat
Bench: S R Bhat
ORDER
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. Issue notice. Mr. Jayank Kumar Thakur, Advocate accepts notice on behalf of respondent No. 1.
2. The petitioner has sought appropriate directions to the respondent to treat him as having been appointed as PGT in the respondent school with effect from 4.2.1979. The facts necessary for disposing off this petition are that in the second respondent, a new post of PGT history was created on 7.12.1978. The petitioner was an existing employee working as TGT since 1968.
3. A departmental promotional committee comprising of nominees of Managing Committee of the School as also representative of the first respondent, Directorate, apparently recommended petitioner's promotion since he was the only eligible candidate on 4.2.1979. Mr. Gulshan Chawla Advocate appearding in these proceedings submitted that by virtue of Rules 96 and 98 of Delhi School Education Rules particularly, proviso to Rule 98(4), the recommendations were deemed to have been approved by the Directorate since no response was forthcoming after 15 days.
4. Learned counsel submitted that during the period between 1979 and 1989, there was complete silence on the part of the directorate. This inaction was unsupported by law. He sought to invoke the fiction enacted under Rule 98(4) to say that in spite of late approval the promotion was effected on 4.2.1979. It was also contended by placing reliance upon various recommendations of the School, and subsequently since no fresh recruitment process was held for the same post; that the recommendation of 1979 had been kept in cold storage and acted upon in 1990.
5. It is undisputed that after December 1990 the petitioner was issued with appointment/promotion order and he continued to draw salary as PGT. He worked on that position. Learned counsel submitted that denial of benefits for the period 4.2.1979 to 3.12.1990 is arbitrary and does not have sanction of law. He has placed reliance upon number of representations made by the petitioner and supported by the resolution of the second respondent school recommending that the promotion ought to be ante dated. Learned counsel relied upon a judgment of this Court in Surender Singh v. Manager Haryana Shakti Senior Secondary School 1995 (2002) DLT 135, J.K. Tiwari v. Delhi Administration 1996 Lab. 2157, as well as Harvinder Kaur v. Delhi Administration 1992 (2001) DLT 294.
6. He submitted that a Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has wide jurisdiction and can issue orders to secure ends of justice. It is claimed that by virtue of Rule 98(4), the respondent's not withholding approval and in subsequent absence of any fresh DPC strengthens the petitioner's claim that he should be given benefits with effect from 4.2.79. Counsel claimed that being unlettered in the law, the petitioners could have faulted for not approaching the Court and that in fact cause of action continued once belated to released the amounts payable as salary and allowances.
7. Learned counsel appearing for respondent resisted addition and submitted that the relief pertained to a cause of action which arose in the 1979; the petitioner's grievance could have arisen in 1990. It was submitted that the jurisdiction under Article 226 is circumscribed by the doctrine of delay and laches and the Court should not entertain stale claims.
8. It is well settled that no period of limitation has been prescribed in respect of Article 226 of the Constitution (and advisedly so), yet there are certain grounds/rules which have been laid down by the Courts to ensure that the interests of all group are adequately addressed. One of these is the doctrine or Principle of laches namely, that litigants are expected to approach the Court within a reasonable time of the grievance complained against. The Court of course is final Arbitrator as to what is reasonable time, which may vary in exercising discretion having regard to the circumstances. There is no doubt that the petitioner was promoted to PGT in 1990. Perhaps he might have justifiably (and successfully approached) this Court claiming benefits for a period prior to 1990 earlier. His approaching the Court now in the year 2006, cannot be considered as within reasonable time. At best the claim in these proceedings is one for release of monetary benefits, i.e., a claim for money.
9. The Limitation Act prescribes the time limit to seek such reliefs. Even as per its provisions the last date for filing a suit has long since lapsed. In these circumstances, the mere logic of repeated representations and drawing attention of the authorities to such grievances, does not constitute a reasonable explanation and enable the Courts to exercise its discretionary power and jurisdiction under Article 226. It has been held by the Supreme Court by a Constitution Bench of seven Judges in S.S. Rathore v. Union of India that where an employee approaches the Court in a service dispute and seeks to rely upon repeated representations as explanation for approaching the Court in a belated manner, the Court ought not to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. Apart from the admitted facts, I am also of the opinion that the petitioner accepted benefits, which were available to him in 1990 and did not avail his normal remedies or even approach this Court any time between 1990 and 2006. Therefore, it would not be a sound exercise of discretion to entertain the writ petition. The writ petition is, therefore dismissed for delay and laches.
