Dharampal vs Delhi Administration Thr. Secy.
2006 Latest Caselaw 100 Del

JUDGMENT

T.S. Thakur, J.

Page 345

1. This writ petition is destined to dismissal not only because the same has been filed after an unexplained and inordinate delay of nearly 100 years but also because the petition is deficient in terms of material facts and particulars. The petitioner claims to be the grandson of one Jai Mal who owned certain property, the details whereof have not been set out in the petition but which has, according to the petitioner, devolved upon him by succession after the death of his father and grandfather. From a reading of the applications which the petitioner appears to have filed before the Collector, Land Acquisition, Delhi between 4th September, 1996 to 30th September, 2005, it appears that the petitioner claims to be owner of land situate in khasra numbers 76, 77, 26, 27, 64, 70, 277, 279, 71, 297, 298 and 69 in village Pillanji previously known as Arbpur Bagh Mochi, New Delhi. From the applications, it is further evident that the said land was acquired from the owner in terms of Awards No.25, 26 & 27, dated 30th October, 1912.

2. The prayer made in the applications aforementioned was for release of the payment of compensation determined for the said land in terms of Awards No.25, 26 and 27. The petition also alleges that the awards in question are widely rumoured to have been set aside but despite efforts made by the petitioner, no information is made available to the petitioner on that account. The petition goes on to state that in the year 2005, after the petitioner's son joined the bar as an advocate, he learnt through him about the decision of Page 346 the Supreme Court in Parsottam Bhai Magan Bhai Patel v. State of Gujarat JT 2005 8 SC 146 that the period of limitation prescribed for seeking a reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act started from the date the land owners came to know about the making of the award. The present writ petition was, thereafter, filed with the prayer that awards No. 25, 26 and 27 should be quashed and the respondents directed to hand over the possession of the land back to the petitioner with cost.

3. We have heard Mr. Bindra, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. As noticed earlier, the writ petition does not state the complete facts necessary for a proper adjudication of the matter. The petition does not disclose the dates and particulars of the preliminary notification or the declaration under Section 6 issued pursuant thereto. It does not disclose the dates on which the awards were made by the Collector pursuant to the said notifications or the amount which was determined under the said awards towards compensation payable to Jai Mal through whom the petitioner claims his right. It also does not state the date on which Jai Mal was dispossessed and whether Jai Mal had or had not received the compensation under the awards. Even certified copies of the awards in question have not been produced. What is enclosed with the petition is a xerox copy of what purports to be a statement showing the compensation awarded on acquisition made under Punjab Government Notification dated 1st December, 1911 and the Government of India endorsement dated 10th October, 1912. An illegible xerox copy of award No. 2725 is placed along with record a typed copy in which the illegible portions have been left out. Suffice it to say that document marked Annexure P-2 purports to determine the compensation for the land acquired from the owners including that for wells, other wells, buildings and trees found on the same. There is, however, nothing to show that the amount of compensation so determined was not tendered to the owners held entitled to the same before or after taking possession of the acquired lands. The writ petition is thus a half baked and clumsy effort to agitate the matter after nearly 100 years since the acquisition had taken place without so much as making a specific assertion to the effect that compensation determined under the awards made by the Collector was never disbursed to the owners. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act requires the Collector to pay to the owners the compensation before taking possession. The petitioner has, in ground 'C' of the petition, admitted that the owners stood dispossessed from the land in question. In ground 'C', the petitioner has made the following assertion :

BECAUSE the action of the respondents in entering upon the land of the recorded owners/petitioner and dispossessing the petitioner is bad in law being in gross violation of principles of natural justice and Articles 14, 21 & 300A of the constitution of India.

4. The above clearly implies that the possession of the land acquired from Jai Mal and others was taken over by the Collector. That is evident even from the prayer made in the writ petition which seeks restoration of possession to the petitioner. It follows that the amount of compensation payable to the Page 347 owners was upon making of the award tendered to the owners as required under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 31(1) reads thus :

31(1). On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.

5. There is, in the light of the above and the provisions of Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act a presumption that the Collector had performed the obligation enjoyed upon him and tendered the compensation. That presumption may indeed be rebuttable but the burden to show that no such payment was tendered would lie heavily on the party who alleges such non-payment especially when such challenge comes after a period of 100 years after the official act was performed. This burden has not been discharged by the petitioner in the instant case. All that the petitioner has, in ground 'E' of the petition alleged in this regard is that the act of taking possession of the property was without jurisdiction in as much as the Government had not paid any compensation or consideration to the recorded owner, namely, the petitioner or his ancestors. The affidavit enclosed with the petition does not and could not possibly verify that averment on the basis of the petitioner's personal knowledge. That is because the petitioner was not even born on the date the award was made or the possession of the land taken from its owners. Challenge to the awards is in that view of the matter wholly untenable especially when the issue of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act has not been assailed nor even copies thereof produced by the petitioner.

6. That apart, the petition is hopelessly barred by the inordinate delay and laches. Acquisition in question, as noticed earlier, was made as early as in the year 1911. Jai Mal, the alleged owner of the land, never challenged the acquisition proceedings nor did his son Risal do so during his life time. Even after the death of Risal in the year 1978, the petitioner kept quite and did not assail the acquisition proceedings till over two and a half decades and till this petition was filed in the year 2005. The petitioner's explanation appears to be that he took legal advice in the year 1997 for the redressal of his grievance but what he is told is that nothing could be done as the matter had become hopelessly time barred. He therefore accepted the things as shut and closed till his son joined the bar and noticed the decision of the Supreme Court in Parsottam Bhai Magan Bhai Patel's case (supra). That decision dealt with the question of limitation reckoned for making application under Section 18(2)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act. It reiterated the legal proposition well settled by an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Anr. AIR 1961 SC 1500 that in cases where no notice under Section 12 had been given to the claimants, the limitation for making an application or a reference to the Civil Court would start running from the date the claimants came to know about the declaration of the award. Page 348 That principle of law has no application to the petitioner's case. The question here is not one of reference to a Civil Court for enhancement of compensation. The question is whether the petitioner could, having known about what according to him was an illegal award and acquisition, slept over the matter for years and challenged it belatedly on grounds which were available to his grandfather, the original owner and his father during their life times but which grounds were never taken or urged by them. If the original owner through whom the petitioner claims had accepted the award and the legality of the proceedings or if the challenge to the proceedings had become time barred by acquiescence of the owners or their silence, the successor owner could not do so. The legal position regarding interference with acquisition proceedings after years of delay and inaction is well settled by a long line of decisions delivered by the Supreme Court. These decisions have repeatedly emphasised caution on the part of the court exercising writ jurisdiction and held that belated and stale claims need not be investigated by a writ court especially where the acquisition proceedings have vested the land in the state upon taking possession of the same. A delay of even two years has been held by the Court to be fatal to such petitions. A reference may, in this regard, be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt.Governor of Delhi and Ors. 1974 SC 2077; State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. B.R. Laxmi and Anr., ; Market Committee, Hodal v. Krishan Murati and Ors. ; Senjeevanagar Medical & Health Employees Cooperative Housing Society v. Mohd. Abdul Wahab and Ors.; , Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors.; , & Northern India Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors., ,

7. In the result, this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.