Deep Chand vs Delhi Transport Corporation
2006 Latest Caselaw 2244 Del

JUDGMENT

J.M. Malik, J.

1. Adumbrated in brief, the case of the petitioner is this. The petitioner joined Delhi Transport Corporation and was posted as Assistant Fitter in August, 1981. In November 1988, the petitioner received injuries. On 05.04.1989, he received a show cause notice as to why he was not attending his duty w.e.f. 19.12.1988. He was also apprised of the facts that his absence up to 18.03.1989 was regularized as extraordinary leave without pay and beyond 18.03.1989 his leave could not be regularized under Clause 14(10)(b) of DRTA (Conditions of Appointment and Services) Regulations, 1952 and after that he would deemed to have resigned w.e.f. 10.05.1989 under Clause 14(10)(c) of the Regulations. The petitioner submitted his reply, wherein he requested that further extension of extraordinary leave be granted as per Regulation 14(10)(b) which makes a provision that extraordinary leave can be extended up to 18 months. The respondent refused to extend the extraordinary leave beyond 18.03.1989.

2. Vide order dated 19.04.1989, respondent declared that the petitioner was deemed to have resigned his post with Delhi Transport Corporation w.e.f. 19.03.1989 under Clause 14(10)(c) of the Regulations. The representation made by the petitioner on 19.04.1989 was turned down by the respondent.

3. It is pointed out that subsequently on 06.02.1991, the respondent Delhi Transport Corporation passed the following order:

It has been decided not to invoke Clause 14(10)(c) of the DRTA (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952 in the cases where the employee remain/are found absent without permission or prior sanction of leave and instead the Unit concerned are advised to take disciplinary action against such employees in accordance with the standing Orders governing the conduct of D.T.C. Employees.

The above decision has been taken with the approval of Chairman-cum-MD in consultation with Legal Deptt. It will remain in force till further orders.

4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. The petitioner has contended that he could not approach the Court early because of his family circumstances and disease in the family. The petitioner has not placed on record the medical evidence of his own sickness and the sickness of any other family member. The contentions raised by him are vague, evasive and lead the Court nowhere. At the time of arguments, learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that petitioner is willing to forgo his consequential benefits if the respondent is going to take him back, but the learned Counsel for the respondent did not agree to his proposal.

5. The present case is clearly barred by the principles of delay and latches. The petitioner is approaching the Court after the expiry of 17 years. The following authorities go to embolden this view. In J.N. Maltiar v. State of Bihar , it was held that where the petitioner, a dismissed Government servant, after being informed that his services were terminated for misconduct, spent about three years in sending memorials to the Government, a remedy not provided by law, the High Court was justified in rejecting the petition on the ground of delay. This pronouncement of law applies to this case to a hair.

6. In India Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. v. Ponam Rai 2006 DRJ 540 (DB), it was held, Moreover in this case the writ petition suffered from laches as the petitioner's service was terminated in 1995 and she filed a writ petition in 2001. In view of the averments in the counter affidavit to the writ petition, we are not satisified that she filed any appeal in the year 1995. At any event the petition is highly belated and is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches apart from on merits.

7. Similarly in C.B.S.E. v. B.R. Uppal and Ors. , it was observed, It may be mentioned that when a final seniority list is published, then certain rights accrue to the persons whose names are contained in that seniority list. If anybody has any grievance against that seniority list, he should challenge it within a reasonable time. In the present case, the writ petition was filed after six years of the publication of the final seniority list. In our opinion, such a stale claim should not have been entertained by this Court at all.

8. In Rajalakshmiah v. State of Mysore AIR 1967 SC 993 : (1967) 2 SCJ 464 (vide para 13) the Supreme Court held that the appellants were guilty of laches because after the impugned order was passed in 1950, they should have filed a writ petition within a reasonable time thereafter. Merely because the Chief Engineer had espoused their cause and was writing letters from time to time to the State Government to do something for them did not mean that they could rest upon their oars if they really had a grievance. The petition in this case was filed in the year 1964.

9. Thus, it is well settled that writ jurisdiction being discretionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked by a party who approaches the High Court after unreasonable delay. See S.A. Rasheed v. Director of Mines and Geology ; Mohd. Siddiq Ali v. High Court of A.P. and Ors. ; Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig ; State of Maharashtra v. Digambar and Karnataka Power Corporation Limited through its Chairman and Managing Director and Anr. v. K. Thangappan and Anr. .

10. The Supreme Court in Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. 2003 V AD (S.C.) 548 : 2003 (6) SCC 20 held that issuance of a writ of Certiorari is a discretionary remedy. see Champalal Binani v. CIT, West Bengal . The High Court and consequently this Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India may not strike down an illegal order although it would be lawful to do so. In a given case, the High Court or this Court may refuse to extend the benefit of a discretionary relief to the applicant.

11. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai 1964 SCR 261, it was held that if there has been unreasonable delay, the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by extraordinary remedy of mandamus. It was further held that maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard with which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. It was further held that the Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper to hold that it is unreasonable. Similar view was taken in M.K. Krishnaswamy v. Union of India .

12. In the light of above said discussion, I find that the present writ petition is hopelessly time barred. The same is, therefore, dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.