Ram Mehar And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors./Anr.
2005 Latest Caselaw 712 Del

JUDGMENT

B.C. Patel, C.J.

1. The explanation submitted by the Registry is accepted.

2. At the oral request of learned counsel for the respondent, Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking, is substituted by the new entity, North Delhi Power Limited. Amended memo of parties be filed within a week.

3. There are two sets of appeals, which will form subject matter of adjudication by the present judgment. The first set of appeals is filed by the claimants for enhancement of compensation determined in terms of the impugned judgment of learned Additional District Judge on a reference being made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( hereinafter to be referred to as, 'the said Act' ). The second set of appeals is filed by the Union of India through Land Acquisition Collector justifying determination of the value of land made by him and seeking to set aside enhancement of compensation granted by the Reference Court.

4. The land in question is situated at Village Bawana, which was acquired for a public purpose of setting up an electric sub-station.

5. A notification was issued under Section 4 of the said Act on 03.06.1987 and the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was made on 09.06.1987. The Land Acquisition Collector made the Award No. 30/87-88 on 21.03.1988 determining the market value of land at Rs. 8,390/- per bigha. The claimants aggrieved by the same sought a reference under Section 18 of the said Act and learned Additional District Judge in terms of the impugned order in respect of LAC Cases No. 3-8/2000 vide judgment dated 04.02.2000 determined the market value of land at Rs. 20,820/- per bigha.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants / claimants submitted that in respect of the same very public purpose, land was acquired under a notification issued under Section 4 of the said Act of the same date in Naya Bans. This plea is based on the fact that a Division Bench of this Court in RFA No. 859/1995 titled 'Sh. Ram Kishan (Deceased) Thru LRs v. Union of India' decided on 04.03.2004 determined the market value of land at Naya Bans at Rs. 32,951/-.

7. An important aspect to be taken note of is that the Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) itself had determined three different rates of value of the land for three villages. The value determined for Naya Bans was Rs. 8,790/- per bigha and for Holambi Khurd was Rs. 8,620/- per bigha, while in the case of Bawana, it was Rs. 8,390/- per bigha. The Reference Court also granted different values of land " in respect of Bawana as already stated above, it was determined at Rs. 20,820/- per bigha, while in respect of Naya Bans and Holambi Khurd, it was determined at Rs. 27,000/- per bigha.

8. There is no doubt that in respect of Naya Bans, this Court enhanced the amount to Rs. 32,951/- per bigha. On the basis of the said judgment, a plea was made in respect to the acquisition in respect of Holambi Khurd to enhance it to the same value. In RFA No. 1020/1995 titled 'Shri Lok Chand & Ors. v. Union of India' decided on 07.04.2005, this plea was negated by this Court while discussing the special circumstances under which the enhanced value was granted in the case of land situated at Naya Bans. It would be relevant to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment:

"3. The claimants relied upon a judgment Exhibit C-1 in LAC No. 296/90 titled Raj Pal v. Union of India decided on 4-4-1995 for the acquisition of land situated in village Holambi Khurd. The court in that case considered the Apex Court decision reported in AIR 1988 SC 943 as also the award made by the reference court in LAC 413/93 titled Ramkala v. Union of India decided on 1.2.1995 for the land situated at village Naya Bans which came to be acquired vide notification issued of the same date and the market price was determined @ Rs. 27000/-.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that as the Division Bench hearing the appeal enhanced the amount of compensation of the land situated at village Naya Bans, hence in the instant case also the compensation should be awarded accordingly. In the case of the land situated in village Naya Bans in Kanwal Singh v. Union of India RFA No. 978/95, the court has pointed out that the sale deed which was relied upon formed the basis of the judgment and that was a developed piece of land or was in any other way in an advantageous position than the acquired land. It is also required to be noted that the land of the claimants was undeveloped but it was in the area adjoining to his land which was a developed area and claimed the price of his land at par with the developed land. In that village there was sale deed at an average price of Rs. 32,400/- per bigha which was duly established. Therefore it is very clear from the tenor of the judgment that the land situated at village Naya Bans on account of development had higher value. It is also required to be noted that peculiarity of land persuaded the Bench to make a lesser deduction in the value of the land on account of large scale acquisition. So far as village Holambi Khurd is concerned there is nothing on the record about development that had taken place in village Holambi Khurd. There is nothing to indicate that there is similar peculiarity which existed in the case of Kanwal Singh v. Union of India.

5. Learned counsel also contends that the Land Acquisition Collector has recorded that the land is same. It is required to be noted that the agricultural land in the village and nearby villages would be the same. However it does not mean that the potentiality is the same as that of nearby villages. In the absence of any material on account of so called peculiarity it cannot be said that the same amount of compensation should be granted."

9. A specific question was posed to learned counsel for the appellants / claimants as to whether any special material has been placed on record or evidence led to establish the peculiarities of the land in question so as to seek equation with the land at Naya Bans. The only plea raised is that the sale deed in respect of Naya Bans was produced and was exhibited as Exhibit PW-1/A. It is submitted that the witness PW-1 proved the said document and had stated that the land was only a couple of kilas away from the land of the appellant. Interestingly, while perusing the testimony of PW-1, we find that a photocopy of the document was Exhibit PW-1/A and it was stated in the brickets "subject to proof". Thus, the document was not treated as having been proved. It is not disputed that no other witness proved the said document. Despite this fact, learned Additional District Judge in the impugned order has considered this document as if it was exhibited in accordance with law.

10. Be that as it may, it is relevant to note that nothing has been shown as to why the land of the appellants should be equated with the land at Naya Bans or that it had some peculiarities as the land at Naya Bans. The mere fact that the land is not far away from the land forming subject matter of sale deed in Exhibit PW - 1/A would not suffice. Maybe the land is away a couple of kilas and not couple of kilometers as recorded in the impugned order, but it has to be borne in mind that when sale deeds of a particular village are available and there is large-scale acquisition of land, it is best to rely on the said documents, rather than the sale deeds of an adjacent village until and unless it is shown that the land has certain peculiarities which make the land similar to the land of the adjacent village. No such material has been placed on record.

11. A site plan of the area has also been produced before us, which would show that there are three different villages and there is a large acquisition of land. The appellant in RFA No. 293/2000, who entered the witness box, did not deny the fact that there may be other sale deeds executed in respect of Village Bawana, but professed ignorance of the same. However, the said sale deeds were proved and were available on record in respect of Village Bawana.

12. The aforesaid has, in fact, been the basis of the impugned judgment as would be apparent from the reading of paras 23 and 24 where a reference has been made to judgments of the Supreme Court on the same proposition of law including in P. Ramreddy & Ors. v. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad & Ors., 1995 (2) SCC 305.

13. In our considered view, the Reference Court rightly came to the conclusion that when sale deeds are available in respect of the very village for which the land has been acquired, there is no reason to look to the sale deeds of adjacent village in the absence of any special reasons to equate the land in question with the land of the adjacent village. Mere proximity cannot be a proof of equating with the adjacent village and even that proximity is not conclusively established in evidence in the present case.

14. In so far as the appeals filed by LAC are concerned, learned counsel for the appellants / LAC has not been able to substantiate any merits in the same, especially in view of the principles relied upon by the Reference Court as referred to above and the finding arrived at in para 27 of the impugned judgment.

15. The result of the aforesaid is that both sets of appeals are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

16. In the end, it may be noted that some of the appeals being RFA Nos. 424, 425, 429, 430 & 431/2000 filed by UOI / LAC were not in the cause list for today, but were taken up at the request of learned counsel for the parties.