Mukut Behari Lal Kanodia, S/O Shri ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) Through ...
2005 Latest Caselaw 710 Del

JUDGMENT

Madan B. Lokur, J.

1. The Petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging a Notification dated 4th June, 1984 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) as well as the consequent declaration dated 21st September, 1984 issued under Section 6 of the Act. As follow up, the Petitioner has also challenged notices issued under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act for filing claims and objections in respect of land bearing khasra No.485/277 min measuring 12 bighas 10 biswas in the revenue estate of Villaie Ladha Sarai, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi. In other words, the challenge is to the acquisition proceedings in respect of the aforesaid land.

2. Although the writ petition was filed in 1984, the Petitioner moved an application only in November, 1997 being CM No.10273/1997 for an amendment of the writ petition. The purpose of the amendment was to bring in additional facts to the effect that the land was sought to be acquired for allotment to Bhagwan Mahavir Ahinsa Kendra for the installation of a statue/ sculpture of Bhagwan Mahavir. It was stated in the amendment application that an alternative site has since been allotted to the aforesaid Kendra for the installation of a statue/sculpture of Bhagwan Mahavir and as such the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired has ceased to exist. The amendment application was directed to be taken up along with the writ petition at the stage of final hearing.

3. At the outset, it must be mentioned that the Petitioner did not file any objections under Section 5A of the Act. As such, in view of the decision rendered in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 296, the Petitioner can challenge only the Notification under Section 6 of the Act and that too on a limited ground that the purpose for which the land is being acquired is not a public purpose. (Paragraphs 53 to 55 of the Report). But, this ground has not been urged by the Petitioner in the writ petition. The contention taken in the amendment application (though not in the writ petition) is that the public purpose ceased to exist by the allotment of an alternative site to the said Kendra, tacitly accepting that there was in fact a public purpose for acquisition of the land. Therefore, even in the amendment application filed by the Petitioner, there is no effective challenge to the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

4. In so far as the contention that the public purpose has ceased to exist, it must be noted here that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act mentioned that the land was being acquired for a public purpose, namely, the Planned Development of Delhi.

The declaration under Section 6 of the Act also indicated the same public purpose. After acquisition, the specific utilization of the land may have been for the installation of a statue of Bhagwan Mahavir but that is not of much consequence. The public purpose, namely, the Planned Development of Delhi continued to exist. The Planned Development of Delhi is admittedly an extremely broad concept and so the land could have been used for any public purpose as long as it came within the definition of the Planned Development of Delhi. It is in this context that the precise utilization of the land, whether it was for the installation of a statue of Bhagwan Mahavir or for some other public purpose is immaterial.

5. In any case, the Respondents have now filed an additional affidavit stating that the land is required to be maintained as a green area to maintain cological balance and the land forms a part of the Southern Ridge. It is not even the case of the Petitioner that this requirement does not relate to the Planned Development of Delhi. This being so, the public purpose for which the land was acquired continues to subsist, although the specific utilization thereof may have undergone a change.

6. It is also not the case of the Petitioner that the entire land was required for installation of a statue of Bhagwan Mahavir. Quite obviously, the statue could cover only a small part of the acquired land inasmuch as the entire land is roughly one acre. Clearly the statue could only be installed in a very small portion thereof, the rest of the land being utilized for tourists, visitors and a park.

7. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that these submissions of learned counsel for the Petitioner are required to be rejected.

8. It was also submitted by learned counsel for the Petitioner that the public purpose for which the land is acquired cannot be changed midstream. When land is acquired for a particular purpose, it must be utilized for that particular purpose. Reliance was placed on Tulsi Cooperative Housing Society, Hyderabad and Ors. v. State of A.P. and Ors., (2000) 1 SCC 533, The Industrial Development and Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 1989 Bom 156 and Municipal Corporation of Grater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., (1996) 11 SCC 501. Without commenting one way or the other on the submission of learned counsel, we have already noted that the land was acquired for the Planned Development of Delhi and there is nothing on the record to suggest, nor has any averment been made by the Petitioner that the land was not to be utilized for the Planned Development of Delhi but for some other purpose. Consequently, this argument of learned counsel also deserves to be rejected.

9. It was finally submitted that prior approval of the appropriate Government was not taken by the Land Acquisition Collector while making the Award under Section 11 of the Act. It was submitted that this makes the acquisition illegal. Reliance has been placed on State of U.P. and Ors. v. Rajiv Gupta and Anr., 1994 (3) SCALE 552, Nusli N. Wadia and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra, (1991) 1 Bom.CR 442 and N. Boman Behram (Dead) by LRs. and Anr. v. State of Mysore and Anr., AIR 1974 SC 1717. Such a ground has not been urged either in the writ petition in its original form or even in the amended writ petition. We, therefore, cannot permit learned counsel for the Petitioner to agitate this ground, coming as it is for the first time during the course of oral submissions and after the lapse of almost two decades.

10. Since there is no merit in the writ petition, the same is dismissed.

11. The Respondent Delhi Development Authority has filed an additional affidavit alleging that the Petitioner is using the land for commercial activities inasmuch as huge building materials and "badarpur" have been stacked at the site causing ecological degradation. Moreover badarpur and building material is being sold from the land in question. The Petitioner has admitted to using the land for stacking building material which, it was submitted, is not prohibited by law. There is no denial of the act that "badarpur" and building material are being sold from the site in question. This being the factual position, while dismissing the writ petition, we impose costs of Rs.10,000/- the Petitioner which will be paid to Respondent No.5 within four weeks from today.