Smt. Inderjit Kaur vs The State (N.C.T. Of Delhi)
2005 Latest Caselaw 525 Del

JUDGMENT

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. These two applications for anticipatory bail are on behalf of the mother-in-law (Inderjit Kaur) and father-in-law (Charanjit Singh) of the deceased. The petitioners are seeking anticipatory bail in respect of the FIR registered under Section 498A, 304B and 34 IPC. Under the same FIR there are three accused persons the petitioners herein and their son Baljit Singh, who is the husband of the deceased. The said Baljit Singh is in judicial custody since 3rd September, 2003. He has moved a separate bail application under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the same shall be dealt with separately.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that although the offence has been registered, inter alia, under Section 304B, the ingredients of the said offence are not made out even if the contents of the FIR, which has been recorded on the basis of the statement of the deceased (Harvinder Kaur's) father, are taken to be true. According to him, the two essential aspects of Section 304B are that "there must have been a demand for dowry" and that "the same must have been made soon before the death of the wife." In this case, he submitted that the petitioner's son Baljit Singh and the deceased Harvinder Kaur were married on 19th January, 2000. She committed suicide on 3rd September, 2003. The postmortem report, according to the learned counsel Mr Sethi, who appeared for the petitioner, discloses that the deceased Harvinder Kaur, in the opinion of the doctor who conducted the postmortem report, died possibly due to organo phosphorous insectide poisoning. He also mentioned that the postmortem report clearly indicates that there were no external injuries found on the body of the deceased. This factum of the postmortem report giving this cause of death and that no external injuries were found on the body is confirmed by the learned counsel for the State after having examined the postmortem report.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that on the fateful day when the deceased committed suicide, she had gone to her parents' home in the morning and within fifteen minutes of her return from the parental home in the evening, she consumed the poison as a result of which ultimately she lost her life. The learned counsel for the petitioners took me through the entire FIR and a reading of which disclosed that the matrimonial home and the parental home of the deceased were nearby: only about half a Km. apart. The FIR also disclosed that the deceased, on occasions when she visited her parental home used to cry and narrate the incidents of beating at the hands of her husband and of taunting and trouble making at the instances of the present petitioneRs. The FIR, however, does not disclose that the petitioners ever made any demand for dowry. On the contrary, there are indications that the marriage took place without demand for dowry and whatever the parents of the deceased gave at the time of marriage was of their free will. The FIR, however, discloses certain allegations of cruelty and beating at the hands of the husband. The learned counsel for the petitioner also took me through the statement of the deceased's mother (Prabhjit Kaur) which is virtually identical to the statement of the deceased's father which forms the basis of the FIR. Ultimately, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even if the entire contents of the FIR as well as the statement of the deceased's mother are taking at face value and are taken to be true and correct, no offence under Section 304B is made out, at least, insofar as the present petitioners are concerned. The only allegation against them is that they taunted her and teased her and troubled her. There is no allegation of beating or of demand of dowry on the part of the present petitioneRs.

4. The learned counsel for the State as well as the complainant were heard. They both opposed the grant of anticipatory bail. However, they were unable to point out any specific demand for dowry having been made on the part of the present petitioneRs. The learned counsel for the complainant, however, stated that there are some notes/letters written by the complainant which would go to show that demand for dowry was made. Those notes/letters, have not been sent for verification by the prosecution as yet as to whether they are in the handwriting of the deceased or not. So, at this stage, it would not be safe to rely upon the same. However, one such note/letter was read out in the Court by the learned counsel for the complainant and in my view, that did not disclose a demand for dowry. In any event, these are matters which are to be considered at the stage of trial. At the present stage, it has to be seen whether the facts, as narrated in the FIR, reveal the commission of an offence under Section 304B IPC or not. It is well settled that the cruelty and harassment that is meted out has to be coupled with a demand for dowry and there must be a proximate and live link between such cruelty and harassment for, or in connection with, dowry and the resultant death of the wife. Unfortunately, in this case this link is missing. On the facts as narrated in the FIR, my prima facie view is that ingredients of Section 304B have not been made out.

5. In the alternative, the learned counsel for the State submitted that even if Section 304B is not there, it is quite possible that at the time of charge, the offence would be altered to Section 306 (abetment for committing suicide). In this context, provisions of Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was pressed into service to show that a presumption is to be raised in the case of abetment of suicide by a married woman. However, it is to be noted that the presumption under Section 113A and 113B (the latter of which relates to dowry death) are of a different and distinct nature. Whereas the presumption in the case of a dowry death is mandatory, the presumption in the case of abetment to suicide is at the discretion of the Court having regard to all the other circumstances of the case. As indicated above, since my prima facie view is that Section 304B has not been made out insofar as the present petitioners are concerned, the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act does not arise. Insofar as the question of abetment of suicide is concerned, looking at the surrounding circumstances, in my view, at this stage, the presumption under Section 113A also does not arise.

6. In view of the aforesaid, I direct that the petitioners be released on bail, in the event of their arrest, on their furnishing personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- each with one surety each of the like amount to the satisfaction of the arresting officer.

7. It goes without saying that observations made in this order are only with regard to the consideration of anticipatory bail and will have no bearing on the trial of the case.