Raheja Hospital And Psychiatric ... vs Lt. Governor Of Delhi And Ors.
2005 Latest Caselaw 400 Del

JUDGMENT

Madan B. Lokur, J.

1. The Petitioner was earlier aggrieved by the acquisition of its land through a Notification dated 13th December, 2000 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short the Act) and a declaration dated 7th September, 2001 under Section 6 of the Act.

2. Since there was some urgency in the acquisition, the provisions of Section 17 of the Act were invoked on 15th March, 2002 and possession of almost the entire area covered by the declaration was taken on 14th August, 2002.

3. However, the land of the Petitioner was not taken possession of since, in the writ petition filed by it, an order was passed on 16th April, 2002 restraining the Respondents from dispossessing the Petitioner. Although that order was subsequently vacated, the Petitioner continues to be in possession of the acquired land till today.

4. The aforesaid writ petition filed by the Petitioner was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 4th September, 2003. The decision rendered is reported as Raheja Hospital and Psychiatric Research Centre vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Ors., . It was noted by the Division Bench that the Petitioner had filed objections under Section 5A of the Act in which it was stated that the land of the Petitioner is being used as a rehabilitation centre since 1995 for psychiatric research. The Petitioner had also stated in its objections that it has constructed a farm house on the land and, therefore, it should be left out of acquisition. On these broad facts, the Land Acquisition Collector gave his report and the Lt. Governor examined the plea of the Petitioner and thereafter issued a declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

5. The Division Bench noted that from the report of the Land Acquisition Collector, it is clear that the Petitioner had not constructed a farm house, and there was no doubt that the land is required for a public purpose. The Division Bench was of the vie w that it was not possible to make a comparative assessment of the purpose for which the land of the Petitioner is being used against the overall public purpose. Consequent upon these findings, the writ petition was dismissed and the interim stay vacated on 4th September, 2003.

6. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for special leave to appeal being SLP (Civil) No. 1080/2003, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 9th October, 2003.

7. Some time in December, 2003, the Respondents sought to take possession of the acquired land, but on the oral request of the Petitioner, the matter was re-considered by the Vice-Chairman, Delhi Development Authority (DDA) who agreed, on humanitarian grounds, to grant some time to the Petitioner to vacate the acquired land. Thereafter, on 6th January, 2004 the Petitioner submitted a formal written representation to the DDA seeking six months time to decide on its immediate future and take steps to rehabilitate its patients.

8. Based on the above representation, the Respondents apparently decided to stay their hands till the end of March, 2004 and it was proposed to take possession on or about 24th March, 2004

9. On 19th March, 2004, the Petitioner sent another representation to the Vice-Chairman, DDA seeking twelve months time to vacate the acquired land and make alternative arrangements for its centre. The request of the Petitioner was looked into and it was decided that the Petitioner be given six months time from 24th December, 2003 to vacate the acquired land.

10. It appears that the Petitioner had earlier, on 28th March, 2002, filed an application under Section 48 of the Act requesting the Lt. Governor to denitrify its land. Since this application was not being considered, the Petitioner renewed its request more than once and eventually on 26th May, 2004 However, since no positive response was forthcoming, the Petitioner filed the present writ petition praying for a direction to the Respondents to allot an alternative, appropriate and adequate piece of land the Petitioner to run and manage its institute or in the alternative to direct the Respondents to decide the representation made by the Petitioner under Section 48 of the Act.

11. When we heard the matter on 10th February, 2005 it was brought to our notice by learned counsel for the Respondents that in so far as the second prayer is concerned, the Lt. Governor has since rejected the request of the Petitioner by an order dated 8th January, 2005. The original files of the case were also handed over to us for our perusal. We are of the view that on the basis of the facts disclosed from the record, it is apparent that the second prayer made by the Petitioner does not survive.

12. It was contended by learned counsel for the Petitioner when the case was listed on 3rd February, 2005 it was pointed out that there are some plots adjacent to the land of the Petitioner, which have either been denitrified or are being used to carry on business and other activities of the landowners. It was submitted that the Petitioner is being discriminated against. On 10th February,2005 learned counsel for the Petitioner cited some judgments to contend that the Petitioner cannot be treated arbitrarily.

13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondents have brought to our notice through the affidavit filed by the DDA that there is no policy of making an alternative allotment against acquisition of land. Moreover, in so far as allotment of a plot for a hospital is concerned, the policy of the DDA since 2000 has been to auction hospital plots as per the amended Nazul Rules. Under the circumstances, it was submitted that the Petitioner could not be allotted any alternative plot in lieu of its acquired land. Learned counsel for the Respondents also submitted that apart from the above, the request of the Petitioner for denitrifying the land in its possession has been turned down and the Respondents have been put to inconvenience because of the staling tactics adopted by the Petitioner to vacate the land, particularly since possession of the surrounding area has been taken way back in August, 2002.

14. We are of the view that the only issue that survives in this case is with regard to the allotment of an alternative plot to the Petitioner.

15. The Petitioner does not have any right to an alternative allotment. Indeed, no such claim has been put forward by learned counsel. An alternative allotment can be made only on the basis of a statutory right or on the basis of a consistent policy. Neither of these attributes exist in the present case. It has clearly been stated by the Respondents on affidavit that the Nazul Rules require them to auction hospital plots - at least since the year 2000. As far as a policy is concerned, it has been stated on affidavit that the Respondents have no policy for making alternative allotments against acquisition of land. None of these averments have been controverter by learned counsel for the Petitioner.

16. The thrust of the contention of learned counsel, however, was that it was being discriminated against vis a vis some other land owners in the neighborhood. Reliance in this regard was placed on some averments made in this respect in the rejoinder affidavit. We are of the view that even this contention must be rejected.

17. The acquisition proceedings have become final and whether somebody else in the neighborhood is being allowed to carry on its activities or not is beside the point. In any case, this can hardly give a cause of action to the Petitioner to demand an alternative allotment. Moreover, the plea of the Petitioner for grant of an alternative allotment pre-supposes that it will vacate the land in question. Therefore, it is of no consequence if others in the neighborhood have been asked to vacate their land or not - the Petitioner has to stand on its own and must unconditionally agree to vacate the acquired land before its request for an alternative plot can even be entertained by the Court. The Petitioner has clearly declined to vacate the acquired land an so its plea to the Court for an alternative allotment requires to be rejected.

18. In view of allegations of discrimination made by the Petitioner in its rejoinder affidavit, learned counsel for the Respondents handed over in Court a brief status report to accept the fact that there are three properties in the neighborhood, of which possession has not been taken. These properties are: New Era Public School (CWP No. 2583/2002), Delhi English Academy/Kamla Devi Memorial Education Welfare (CWP No. 4847/2002) and Radha Swami Satsang (CWP No. 2909/2002). It s explained that the Respondent have not taken possession of these properties because of an interim stay granted by this Court. In respect of another property contiguous to that of the Petitioner, that is, Meena Memorial Hospital (CWP No. 4466/2002), the writ petition filed has since been dismissed by this Court and possession of that property is expected to be taken on 8th February, 2005.

19. We are mentioning these facts only to show that even though the case of discrimination made out by the Petitioner is not at all relevant to the issue of alternative allotment of a plot of land (since none of these above four persons have been given an alternative allotment) even then that question does not survive because of the facts disclosed by learned counsel for the Respondents.

20. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has not shown us anything to suggest that his client has a legally enforceable right to an alternative allotment of a plot for constructing a hospital, merely because its land has been acquired. Under the provisions of the Act, the Petitioner would be entitled to compensation, but it cannot be that in addition to monetary compensation, the Petitioner should also be given an alternative plot for constructing a hospital.

21. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has also not been able to dispute the contention of learned counsel for the Respondents that as per DDA policy, there is no question of allotting any alternative site to a person whose land has been acquired, particularly in a case such as that of the Petitioner, which concerns a plot of land for a hospital. On the contrary, the policy of the DDA is to auction hospital plots, and this has not been refuted.

22. We are of the view that on the basis of all the facts of the case, the Petitioner has not been able to show any legal right to an alternative allotment. Consequently, we do not find any merit in the petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed.

23. We are left with the impression that the Petitioner has taken undue advantage of the sympathy shown to it by the Respondents. It has declined to vacate the acquired land for such a long period of time, in spite of a solemn undertaking given by it to the Respondents on an earlier occasion. Under the circumstances, while dismissing this petition, we impose costs of Rs.10,000/- on the Petitioner payable to the Delhi Development Authority.

24. We make it clear that we have not commented one way or the other on the rejection of the request of the Petitioner for identification of its land under Section 48 of the Act. That issue is left open and leave is granted to the Petitioner to challenge that rejection in accordance with law.