The Radha Soami Satsang Beas And ... vs The Delhi Administration And Anr.
2004 Latest Caselaw 1130 Del

JUDGMENT

S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

1. The petitioners here, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, are challenging a notification issued in the year 1959, by which certain lands were sought to be acquired.

2. The following important issues arise for consideration of the court, in the present proceedings:

(a) the true meaning and scope of the expression religious institutions occurring in the impugned notification;

(b) whether the sect known as Radha Saomi Satsang are a religious institution, who can claim benefit of exemption from acquisition in terms of the notification;

(c) Whether the acquisition impugned in the present proceedings is void and liable to be quashed.

FACTS

3. On 13.11.1959 a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter, the Act). Vast tracts of land were notified. The notification, however exempted four categories of lands from acquisition. Relevant portions of that notification read as follows:

It is hereby notified that the land, measuring 34070 acres and marked with blocks Nos. A to T and x in the enclosed map (annexure-I) and the description of which has been given in the annexure II, excepting the following land in the blocks referred heren.

(a) Government land and evacuee land;

(b) The land already notified, either under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for any Government scheme;

(c) The land already notified either under section 4 or under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for House Building Cooperative Societies mentioned in annexure III;

(d) The land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and the land attached to religious institutions and waqf property;

is likely to be acquired for the above purpose.

4. The petitioners aver that one Nand Kumar, resident of Rewari, Distt. Gurgaon through registered Gift Deed, dated January 11, 1947, donated 3 kanals, 19 marlas of agricultural land bearing file Nos. 105/2 and 526/417/2 as per Jamabandi, 1948-' 49, equivalent to Nos. 572/105 and 576/526 as per Jamabandi 1966-' 67 (hereafter referred to as the petition lands),to Gaddi Nashin and his Sant Satguru Maharaj Baba Sawan Singh Ji for spiritual purposes for construction of a Satsang Ghar. The lands are located in village Dhirpur, Radio Colony of Kingsway Camp, Delhi. It is averred that the petition land has always been used and even today is being used for spiritual purposes only; i.e. holding of satsangs (religious congregations).

5. After the demise of Maharaj Baba Sawan Singh Ji, the petition lands, being his Parmarthi property, was mutated in the revenue records in the name of his successor Gaddi Nashin Sardar Bahadur Baba Jagat Singh Ji Maharaj and not in the name of his male lineal descendants. Similarly, it is alleged that on the passing away of Sardar Bahadur Jagat Singh Ji Maharaj in 1951, the said land was mutated in the name of his successor Gaddi Nashin petitioner No.2. During course of the proceedings, the second petitioner passed away, and his successor Gaddi Nashin was brought on record as the legal representative.

6. In 24th October 1957, Petitioner No.2, by a Trust deed, constituted himself the Sole Trustee of all his Parmarthi property and on 25th October 1957 by a Deed of Transfer transferred/ donated all his Parmarthi property to Petitioner No.1 Society. All the Parmarthi properties including the petition land in dispute were inherited by Petitioner No.2 as the Gaddi Nashin of Dera Baba Jaimal Singh. However, the petition avers that the land in dispute was inadvertently not mentioned in the list annexed to the Deeds of Trust and Transfer executed in October 1957. Furthermore, the petition land was not mutated in the Revenue Records in the name of Petitioner Nos. 1 society and Petitioner No.2 continued to be shown as its owner. Amongst other records the annual reports of the Petitioner No. 1 Society for the years 1965, 1968 and 1973 mention the fact that the land in dispute belongs to Petitioner No.1 Society. In any case, the petition lands are attached to it, a religious institution is and has always been held for a religious and charitable purpose and is, in fact, used purely for holding spiritual Satsangs (discourses).

7. The petitioners claim that the first petitioner is a religious sect. They state that the petition lands, by virtue of exemption (d) extracted above, fell outside the acquisition proceedings. The petitioners aver that in the year 1959 itself, a representation was made to the appropriate authorities, putting forth their claim about the lands being exempted from acquisition, and not being subject matter of proceedings under the Act. In support of their plea, the Memorandum of Association and the Objects of the first petitioner society, incorporated sometime in 1957-58, have been relied upon. The petitioners also rely upon a booklet which summarizes the tenets of the Radha Saomis, to establish that it is a religious institution.

8. The respondents have contested the petition. According to their pleadings, no objection or representation, [as averred by the petitioners] was ever received in 1959, from the petitioners, or the owner of the land at that point of time. The respondents have alleged that no attempt was made by the petitioners to establish before the authorities, that the petition lands belonged to the first petitioner society, and that it was attached to a religious institution. The averment that the first petitioner is a religious institution is denied. Additionally, the respondents have relied upon certain documents filed along with the petition and alleged that the second petitioner made claims seeking compensation, which suggest that the value of the land was consid erable, sometime in 1969, in response to the notice issued by the Land Acquisition Collector ( LAC) under the Act. The respondents' plea, therefore, is that the petitioners, not having made any attempt at the stage of the preliminary notification, or the declaration and to the effect that the land was excluded, but in fact, having participated in proceedings for determination of compensation, made claims, (after which the award was made) cannot now be heard to contend that the petition lands were covered by exemption (b). The respondents have also pleaded that the petition is barred by laches.

9. The pleadings were amended by leave of court, and the petitioners placed on record additional documents, which include Jamabandi records [ revenue and record of rights] for various years, and income tax assessments. These documents have been relied upon to support the case that the first petitioner is a religious institution, recognized as such by other statutory authorities, and that the use of the land has been shown to be for religious purposes.

CONTENTIONS

10. Shri V. P. Singh, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioners, contended that the first petitioner is a religious institution, and was exempted from acquisition as per clause (d) of the preliminary notification. He has relied upon the gift deed dated 11.1.1947, the Memorandum of association of the first petitioner society and the brief description of the teachings, tenets and practices of the petitioners, to contend that the first petitioner is a religious institution. Reliance has also bee placed upon the income tax proceedings/ documents to contend that the status of petitioner No. 1 society as a religious institution has been accepted all through by different authorities. Importantly, the copy of the Khasra Girdawari of Village Dhirpur, pertaining to the petition land, has been relied upon. As per that document, the recorded owner is said to be the then Gaddi Nashin Sardar Bahadur Jagat Singh, and the description of the use of the land is as a place of satsang.

11. Shri Singh has placed reliance upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, reported as Jathedar Sadhu Singh and Others vs- Charan Singh and other1s to contend that the issue of whether the first petitioner society/ sect is a religious institution or not has been judicially settled. That decision, according to him, stood affirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Charan Singh and others-vs- Darshan Singh and others2.

12. Learned counsel urged that the issue of status of the first petitioner as religious institution cannot be gone into; the decision of the Supreme Court amounts to a judgment in rem, and a declaration of law, in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution. To support this submission, he has relied upon the judgment reported as Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao3.

13. On the issue of delay and laches, learned counsel stated that such an objection could not be raised, since the State action, to wit, the acquisition had no authority in law, if it is found that the petition lands were covered by exemption (d). In such an event, the subsequent declaration as well as the award could not constitute impediments to relief, since they were based on the assumption of existence of a valid preliminary notification. Once it was established that the petition lands were not incuded in the Section 4 notification- by virtue of the exemption relied upon- all subsequent steps were void, and non-est. Heavy reliance has been placed on decisions of this court, reported as Smt. Angira Devi Gupta vs- Land Acquisition Collector4;Ram Kisan vs- Union of India5; Romesh Chand Chopra vs- Union of India6 for the contention that the lack of an initial notification would vitiate the entire acquisition proceedings, and render it a nullity.

14. Learned counsel has lastly urged that even otherwise, if possession is not taken, the question of delay or laches would not hinder the court from granting the relief, if it found that the lands were exempt, or not included in the preliminary notification. In support of this submission, the decision of this court rendered by a Full Bench, in Roshanara Begum vs- Union of India7; and Division Bench judgments rendered in Matwal Chand vs-Union of India8 and Gajendra Kumar-vs- Union of India9 have been reled upon. It has been submitted that in these cases, the notification in issue, dated 13.11.1959 was considered. There too, the issue was the grant of exemption to another category, i.e evacuee lands.

15. Ms. Geeta Luthra and Ms Jhum Jhum Sarkar, appearing for the respondents, justified the acquisition. They contested the stand that petitioner No1 was a religious institution. According to them, the petitioners have taken false and contradictory stands They contend that the pleadings and documents placed on the record do not justify a finding that the petition lands were attached to a religious institution, to qualify for exemption from the acquisition. It is also submitted that the first petitioners not a religious institution. In that regard, it has been submitted that the first petitioner cannot be described as a religious body or institution. Learned counsel submits that the first petitioner is not affiliated to any established or acknowledgereligion or religious order; therefore it would not, in any sense of the term, be involved in the practice of any religion.

16. Learned counsel for the respondent have submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Charan Singh's case, supra is, not an authority on whether the first petitioner is a religious institution. It has been contended by them that the judgment of the Supreme Court did not decide such an issue. According to them, the judgment in that respect is sub-silentio. In support of this argument, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Municipal Corporation of Delhi -vs Gurnam Kaur10. They further submit that in view of this position, the judgment of the Supreme Court does not amount to a declaration of law. It has therefore, been submitted that the question about whether the first petitioner is a religious institutionor whether it is engaged in the practice of religion requires independent consideration in these proceedings, since a claim for exemption from acquisition has been made. They further submit that the issue is covered by the decision in S.PMittal's case, were, after discussing all previous judgments, the Supreme Court concluded that the sect or order propagated by Sri Aurobindo did not constitute religion. Drawing inspiration from that decision, the respondents contend that like in that case, the firstetitioner is a society. Its tenets and the belief of its adherents do not fall within any known or accepted meaning of the term religion.

17. Learned counsel for the respondent further submit that the Petitioners are guilty of delay and laches. The preliminary notification was issued in 1959; the declaration ( under Section 6) was made on 6.9.1969. The petitioners made no attempt at establishing at either of these stages that the petition lands were attached to a religious institution. The allegation about the first petitioner having made a representation in 1959, denied in the counter affidavit, has been reiterated before the court. It is further submitted that even after receiving notice of making award in September, 1969, no contention was taken that the land stood exempted; on the contrary, a claim for substantial amounts was made towards compensation, on the plea that the lands were valuable. Counsel for respondents also urge that the lands always stood in the name of the second petitioner, and at material times, was not in the control of the first respondent. They point out that though the society was established in 1957, lands were not transferred at the material time, by the second petitioner; in fact, he even personally claimed compensation. All these circumstances, they contend, belie the claim that the lands were attached to a religious institution. Had such been the case, it was necessary for the petitioners to have challenged the acquisition, and not waited for 19 years, before approaching the Courts. In support of this argument, the respondent rely upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ramjass Foundation vs- Union of Innia 11 Municipal Council vs-Shah Hyder Baig12; Urban Improvement Trust vs- Behrulal13. In all these cases, challenge to acquisition proceedings was repelled on the ground of delay in approaching the courts under Article 226; the periods in question varied between 2 and 7 years. It is also submitted, on the basis of these decisions, that once an award is made (as is the case in these proceedings) the court should decline relief.

18. It has lastly been submitted on behalf of the respondents that now it is well established that if State action, even in land acquisition proceedings, is illegal or ultra vires, there is no question of it being non-est or void from inception. The argument is that the action continues to have legal and binding force till it is declared void, or inoperative in competently established proceedings. It has been submitted that the expression void does not have any absolute meaning, and every void order ought not to and cannot be set at naught; in each case, the court has to examine a host of factors, including the reasonable time within which the person aggrieved approaches the court for the purpose. The respondents have relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan vs- D.R. Laxmi14; Anand Lal Berry vs- Collector of Central Excise15 Rafique Biwi vs- Syed Waliuddin 16 and Sultan Sadik vs- Sanjay Raj Subba17 in support of this limb of their arguments. They submit that in the case of DR. Laxmi, the precise issue was the validity of land acquisition proceedings. The High Court had quashed the acquisition, whereas the Supreme Court, after noticing that a void order need not automatically lead to invalidation of the proceedings, reverse the High Court judgment on the ground that the petitioners were guilty of delay and laches.

19. The petitioners have placed heavy reliance upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the Jathedar Sadhu Singh case ( supra). The High Court was called upon to decide an objection whether Petitioner No. 1 was a religious trust. An issue which specifically arose was relating to certain provisions of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, and whether the lands there were excluded from the definition of Shamilat Dehas the institution was a place of worship. The Court held that such a place of worship would be:

A place where a select few dedicated to a particular faith congregate to pay homage to their leader or head or to discourse their views and beliefs or to sing hymns would be a shrine or place of worship whether we choose to call it a Dera or a Dharamsal or a Gurudwara.

The Court went on to record a finding that the institution of Radhasoami was a place of worship and therefore exempted. The court returned findings to the effect that the institution was religious, and that there was no need to comply with provisions of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, before instituting the suit. On appeal, curiously, objection to locus standi of the plaintiffs, was raised, on the plea that the lands vested under the 1961 Act. That point, it may be stated, covered the findin rendered by the High Court as to the religious use of the properties, and was Point No 2 before the Supreme Court. In para 5 of the judgment, in Charan Singh's case ( supra) the Supreme Court held as follows: The last two points may be shortly disposed off as they have to be stated merely to be rejected. Point No (2) was eventually given up as it was completely devoid of substance.

Point No.2, as noted above was intrinsically linked with the nature and character of the institution being religious. The question, therefore, is whether the judgment of affirmance ( of the findings by the Punjab and Haryana High Court) was law and whether it was a declaration in rem as to the religious nature of the first petitioner institution.

20. In the decision of the Supreme Court, in M.R. Apparao's case (supra) the correctness of a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, was in question. The High Court had held that previous observations in the course of an order of the Supreme Court, was based upon a concession, and did not amount to a binding declaration of law. The Supreme Court, in its subsequent judgment, held that the interpretation of its order, by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, (in the subsequent judgment) was not tenable, in the following terms:

It is no doubt true that the counsel for respondent Venkatagiri had indicated that the respondent will have no objection to the judgments and orders of the High Court under appeal, being set aside. But that by itself would not tantamount to hold that th judgment is a judgment on concession. Even after recording the stand of the counsel appearing for Venkatagiri when the Court observed we are also of the view that the two amendments referred to above, are constitutionally valid., The same is unequivoca determination of the constitutional validity of the amended Act, it cannot be dubbed as a conclusion on concession, nor can it be held to be a conclusion without application of mind?

Here too, the Supreme Court, in Charan Singh's case recorded the stand of counsel, who gave up his contention, and further held that such a stand was completely devised of substance. Such expression of opinion, in our view, is one touching upon the merits of the issue, in the course of an appeal. We therefore, cannot accept the submission of the respondent that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Charan Singh's case requires to be regarded as sub-silentio on the issue of whether the institution is a religious trust.

21. Apart from our above finding, we proceed to examine the issue independently, since the question is whether the petition land was attached to a religious institution when the preliminary notification was issued.

22. Considerable arguments were addressed from both sides of the Bar as to the meaning of religion in the context of the expression religious institutions. We have to preface the discussion with a note of caution. We cannot, in these proceedings, enter into a theological debate. Nor can we allow the vastness of the topic engulf the controversy at hand requiring resolution. The paradigm of discourse has to commence and, if one may say so, end, with the understanding of the term religious institutio for the purpose of the notification in question. History has shown that religion defies definition; conceptually, it is elusive. Many faiths predicate the centrality of divinity or God. To several, its existence is not of great concern. In her History of God: From Abraham to the Present : the 4000 year Quest for God18, Karen Armstrong says:

The human idea of God has a history, since it has always meant something slightly different to each group of people who have used it at various points of time. The idea of God formed in one generation by one set of human beings could be meaning less in another. Indeed, the statement 'I believe in God' has no objective meaning, as such, but like another statement, it only means something in context, when proclaimed by a particular community. Consequently there is not one unchanging idea contained in the word 'God' but the word contains a whole spectrum of meanings, some of which are contradictory or even mutually exclusive.

Therefore, any attempt at stereotyping the term religion through a definition would undermine its diversity and inherent catholicity.

Authorities abound on the subject. Robert Jackson in his Full Faith and Credit The Lawyers' Clause of the Constitution,19 aptly remarks :

While Judge Cardozo pointed out with great accuracy that the power of the precedent is only the path of the beaten track still the mere fact that a path is a beaten one is a persuasive reason for following it.

Therefore, examination of authorities at once reassures, and serves as a guide in the quest as to the correct meaning of the expression religion.

23. A Seven Judge Constitution Bench, of the Supreme Court, in the decision reported as The Commissioner for Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur 20 held:

The word religion has not been defined in the Constitution and it is a term which is hardly susceptible of any rigid definition. In an American case -'Vide Davis Vs. Beason', (1888) 133 US 333 , it has been said:

that the term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relation to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and character and of obedience of His will. It is often confounded with 'cultus' of form or worship of a articular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter.

We do not think that the above definition can be regarded as either precise or adequate. Article 25 and 26 of our Constitution are based for the most part upon Art. 44(2), Constitution of Eire and we have great doubt whether a definition of 'religion' a given above could have been in the minds of our Constitution-makers when they framed the Constitution. Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well-being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress.

24. This view of religion has been consistently followed, and applied in subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court (Ref. Durgah Committee, Ajmer Vs. Syed Hussain Ali21; S.P. Mittal Vs. Union of India22; and Bramchari Sidheswhar Shai Vs. State of West Bengal23 ).

25. In S.P.Mittal's case (supra), the Court exhaustedly considered various judgments and dictionaries for construing the expression 'religion'. The Court prefaced its discussion with the observation that it is a term that is hardly susceptible of any rigrid definition. After considering various authorities, the Court endorsed the following propositions of law :

(1) Religion means a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well-being;

(2) Religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression in acts as well;

(3) Religion need not be theistic (i.e. dependent on the existence of God or a Divine being).

26. The expression institution occurring in the notification in question is undefined in the Act as well as the notification. It is, therefore, essential to consider the general meaning of that term. Black's Law Dictionary24 states that an institution means :

.....an established organisation, especially one of a public character.......

The Oxford Dictionary25 defines an institution as:

.....an organisation established for social, educational, religious, etc. purposes........

Wharton's Law Lexican26 lists, among others the following meaning for institution :

..........a society for promoting any public object, as a charitable or benevolent institution or literary and scientific institutions......

The dominant theme, in the case of an institution appears to be the existence of an organization created to achieve stated objectives. Some aid can also be taken, in this context from the expression denomination occurring in Article 26 of the Constitution ( in conjunction with the term religious). That term too, was interpreted in Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar's case (supra). The Supreme Court held, in that context as follows:

The word 'denomination' has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean 'a collection of individuals classed together under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name'. It is wel known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres of theological teaching was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was followed by various teachers since then. After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu religion that we find in India at the present day. Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name, - in many cases it is the name of the f under, - and has a common faith and common spiritual organisation.

The formulation enunciated by the Supreme Court has been subsequently applied in several other cases. Thus sects/ denominations such the Ramakrishna Mission (Bramchari Sidheswhar Shai's case, supra); Ananda Marg27 Arya Samaj28 etc have been held to fall within the expression religious denomination.

27. For the purposes of the present case, therefore, the following elements, if present, may be held to constitute a religious institution:

(1) a collection of religious faith, a system of belief which is conducive to the spiritual well-being, i.e., a common faith;

(2) common organisation;

(3) a designation by a distinctive name

28. The Memorandum of Association of the first petitioner society discloses the following objects:

1. Dissemination of knowledge useful for spiritual and moral advancement according to the traditions and tenents of Radha Soami Path as propounded by Sant Satgurus of Radha Soami Colony Beas ( Dera Baba Jaimal Singh).

2. To provide and make arrangements for holding satsangs (spiritual discourses) and bhandaras at the colony and other places?

The documents further reveal that the society is managed by an executive committee. The first patron of the society was the second petitioner. Nomination to that office has been provided; it also lays down the mechanism for succession to the position of Patron. Property of the society vests in the Executive Committee; it is chosen by election, on periodical basis, by members. The document also obligates the holding of Annual General Meetings. Of some interest, for the purposes of the present proceeding, is Clause 10 (iv), which reads as follows:

(iv) The Society, through the Secretary or any other person authorized by the Executive Committee, shall have the right to accept all property as may be dedicated to it by the Patron and contributions made to it by any person by way of gifts, donations, etc.

29. The monograph Teachings and Brief History produced by the petitioners, with leave of the court, describes the teachings, beliefs and history of the faith. According to the document, the Radha Soami Satsang is the name of the faith; Radha Soami is the name of the Supreme Being. It has no rituals, no dogmas, no ceremonies. The faith is a name given to the age old philosophy of Saints, which is timeless and eternal; not cribbed by narrow bonds of caste, creed or nationality. All these are stated to be irrelevant for spiritual realization. The simile taken about the human soul is that it is akin to a drop in the Ocean; the soul, through constant endeavor seeks to reach that Ocean. In that quest, the guidance of a Master is essential. The next importan belief is that God is to be found within each human being. Rituals, external worship, austerities, penances, even study of Scriptures do not lead to God. The seat of the soul, is the beginning of the journey toward realization of God. The faith stresses upon concentration of attention to the melody within each human being. Satsang is the recommended mode or devotion which helps in realization of this objective.

30. On an analysis of the above material, it is apparent that the first petitioner disseminates a a system of belief which is conducive to the spiritual well-being of a body of individuals. It has an organization, which is engaged in the orderly management of its affairs, in the form of an incorporated society, with a defined administrative structure, a corporate personality, entitled to acquire and hold all manner of properties, etc. It also has a distinctive name. The petitioners have thus been able o establish, in these proceedings, that they are a religious institution.

31. The above finding in favor of the petitioners however, does not conclude all issues. The further question for determination is whether the petition lands were at the relevant time attached to a religious institution. This has to be answered in the light of the facts, not as presented to the court in these proceedings at the time of their institution in 1978 or subsequently, but as they existed when the notification dated 13.11.1959 was issued. This further inquiry is necessary because the petitioner claim exemption of those lands in terms of the exemption in clause (d) of the notification. The issue, in no small measure is inseparably linked with the time taken in, and the conduct of the petitioners before, approaching this court for relief.

32. As noticed in the earlier part of the judgment, the argument of the petitioners is that the petition lands fell within the description of clause [d]; therefore, they were not the subject of the preliminary notification. Hence, all subsequent steps have been characterized as void ab-initio and non-est.

33. In a celebrated passage in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council29 Lord Radcliffe made what may now be justifiably termed as an aphorism i.eAn order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead.

The above principle has been quoted with approval in several cases by the Supreme Court. In State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh30 it was further held as follows:

9. Apropos to this principle, Prof. Wade states: the principle must be equally true even where the 'brand' of invalidity is plainly visible; for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. Prof. Wade sums up these principles:

The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the 'void' order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another.

34. This principle of the when, i.e the time taken by a suitor or litigant in approaching the court for relief, against a void order, [in the context of land acquisition proceedings] was considered by the Supreme Court in D. R. Laxmi's case (supra). The Court held as follows at page 453 of the Report:

10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonabl time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances. It is seen that the acquisition has become final and not only possession had already been taken but reference was also sought for; the award of the Court under Section 26 enhancing the compensation was also accepted. The order of the appellate court had also become final. Under those circumstances, the acquisition proceedings having become final and the compensation determined also having become final, the High Court was highly unjustified in interfering with and in quashing the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6.

Recently, in another decision, reported as Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin31 the Supreme Court held as follows:

7. Two things must be clearly borne in mind. Firstly, the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be 'a nullity' and 'void' but these terms have no obsolute sense: their meaning is relative, depending upon the court's willingness to grant relief in any particular situation. If this principle of illegal relativity is borne in mind, the law can be made to operate justly and reasonably in cases where the doctrine of ultra vires, rigidly applied, would produce unacceptable results. (Administrative Law, Wade and Forsyth, 8th Edn., 2000, p. 308.)

In an application for judicial review, impugning an order of compulsory purchase, ( as compulsory acquisition is now known in the United Kingdom) relief was declined for the same reasons, in O'Reilly vs- Mackman32 in the following terms:

The public interest in good administration requires the public authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority has reached in purported exercise of decision-making powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary?

Thus, the circumstances and time taken by the litigant, complaining that an order is void, are critical factors requiring evaluation as to whether the court ought to interdict the offending measure.

35. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Aflatoon vs- Lt. Governor33 when dealing with a challenge to the notification dated 13.11.1959 (i.e impugned in this case) held as follows:

There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under Section 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners..

Likewise, other, subsequent, three judge Benches of the Supreme Court refused to quash the same notification ( Ref Vishwas Nagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers Assn. v. Under Secy., Delhi Admn,34 Ram Chand vs- Union of India 35and Ramjass Foundation- para 16 supra). In two cases i.e Vishwas Nagar and Ramjass Foundation, laches and delay were the primary ground for denying relief.

36. The petitioners have sought to meet these with the submission that in several cases, this court has granted relief, in respect of void land acquisition proceedings, provided possession is not taken. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the decisions in Ramesh Chand Chopra; Ram Chand and Matwal Chand's case (supra). The further argument of the petitioners is that till an attempt is made to secure possession, there is no occasion for a person to feel aggrieved, particularly against an order hich is a nullity and non-est since inception.

37. At first blush, these arguments are persuasive. What however, emerges upon a deeper analysis is that it is premised upon the void order having no force of law at all- something that is not tenable. All the authorities, right from Smith vs- East Eloe onwards, have emphasized that no order carries a brand of invalidity upon its forehead; it continues to have validity and efficacy till challenged in competent proceedings. In the present case, the proceedings were instituted 19 long years after the reliminary notification; nine years after the award was issued. Delay in taking possession of lands does not render the acquisition proceedings invalid or illegal. Furthermore, if the argument were to be taken to its logical conclusion, even though possession is not sought to be taken 20 years after the award is made, a petition under Article 226 could yet be maintained successfully, since the initial order is non-est. It is precisely this kind of contention that the Supreme Court had in mind when it remarked, while quoting Wade, ( in Rafique Bibi's case, supra) that:

the doctrine of ultra vires, rigidly applied, would produce unacceptable results.

38. At this juncture, it would be necessary to consider the rationale behind the judgments in Ramesh Chand Chopra; Ram Chand and Matwal Chand's case. All of them dealt with challenges to acquisition where the petitioners claimed that the lands were evacue e lands, falling within exemption (a) in the notification dated 13.11.1959. Exemption (a) dealt with two categories, namely Government and evacuee lands. Both classes of land were owned by the Government. The dispute relating to evacuee lands was aimed at discovering whether any private interest had passed or arisen, as on the date of issuance of the notification, viz 13.11.1959. If it had not, and such interest accrued subsequently, there was no question of the Government acquiring its own lands. This feature is important to notice, in that it distinguishes the challenge to the acquisition from persons claiming to fall in exemption (d).

39. If one examines the structure of the 1959 notification, it would be apparent that the four exempted classes (of lands) had certain distinctive characteristics. The first category, (a) covered lands owned by the Government. The second category covered exemptions (b) and (c). In both cases, of the second category, the precondition was the issuance of notification under Section 4 or Section 6, for specific and distinct purposes, namely, Government scheme, and for house building co-operative societies me tioned in Annexure III. In this category, viz (b) and (c) the lands stood already notified under the Act; hence the logic of excluding them from the purview of the 1959 notification. Additionally, the existence of such previous notifications invested the lands with a certain public character, and attached a public purpose. The latter, 1959 notification therefore was made to yield to the specified use contemplated in the earlier notifications. The third category, namely exemption (d) in a sense constitute the exception to this pattern of excluding government/ notified lands. The same may be quoted again (d) The land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and the land attached to religious institutions and waqf property

This category was not seen as one entirely comprising government/ notified lands. It could and did cover private lands, which of course, was put to public or community use. In this category, too, there were two sub-categories: first, land under graveyard, tombs, shrines; second, land attached to religious institutions and wakf property.

40. It is necessary to notice the distinction between the first and second categories on the one hand, and the third category, ( i.e exemption (d) ) on the other. In the first two cases, those claiming exemption had to merely show that no private interest had passed in the evacuee lands, or had to merely establish the identity of the lands, vis-a-vis the previous notifications under the Act, to secure the benefit. In the case of exemption (d) however, mere identification of the property was not sufficien. A positive case had to be made out that the land was under a graveyard, tomb/ shrine, or was attached to religious institution and waqf property. This meant that the person/ institution, owning such private lands, had to contemporaneously satisfy the Land Acquisition officials, that his/ its land answered the description claimed and was eligible for exemption.

41. The facts of the present case however, present a picture where the claim of the petitioner No 1 about having approached the authorities with a representation in December 1959, seeking exemption on the ground of use of the petition lands by a religious institution, has been denied. The respondents deny ever receiving such a representation. At that time, the lands continued in the name of the second petitioner. The first petitioner society had come into existence in 1957; its executive committee was th body in which the property vested. The secretary, on behalf of the committee, was entitled to accept properties donated by the Patron ( i.e the second petitioner). Yet, the petition lands were made over to the first petitioner later. Undoubtedly, the ex racts of Khasra Girdawari placed on record do suggest that a part of the land was used for satsang. However, that solitary fact would not lead to an inference that the petition lands were attached to a religious institution. Another factor present in t is case is that the second petitioner claimed compensation on the basis of ownership, as late as in 1969. His claim for substantial compensation was based upon the valuable nature of the land. Even then, no attempt was made to state that the petition lands were exempted, and therefore no award could be made.

42. The circumstances noticed above compel us to conclude that it would be hazardous to return a finding that the petition lands were attached to a religious institution, on the date of the notification under Section 4. It was for the petitioners to asseret this fact, before the authorities. The claim, about the first petitioner (who was admittedly not the owner) making such a representation has been denied, in the pleadings and during the course of arguments. The respondents have categorically stated that such a representation does not exist in their records. Under these circumstances, any conclusion by us about the petition lands being attached to a religious institution, on 13.11.1959 would be elevating an allegation to a finding.

43. As noticed earlier, the Supreme Court, in several decisions, has repeatedly held that when a litigant approaches the court belatedly, much after the declaration under Section 6, or even the award, relief ought to be declined. This rule has been applied consistently. In the light of the discussion at paras 37 and 38, the argument about the petition lands being similar in nature to those where decisions were rendered by this Court ( Ref Ramesh Chand Chopra; Ram Chand and Matwal Chand's case etc) cannot be accepted. As held earlier, evacuee lands fall in a distinctly different category. Furthermore, we may notice that in two cases, namely, the Vishwas Nagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers Assn.case, and the Ramjass Foundation case, the claim of the landowners was similar to the present one, i.e that their properties fell within one or the other exemptions in the same notification, of 13.11.1959. In Ramjass Foundation, the Supreme Court, while dealing with a claim for quashing of the entire proceedings on the round that they were non-est, as the lands were attached to a wakf, (i.e closely identical with the present case, where application of exemption (d) has been invoked) held as follows:

It is an admitted fact that notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued as early as 1959 and all the notifications under Section 6 of the Act in relation to the land of the appellants in Sadhurakhurd were issued in 1968 and 1969. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings was mainly based on the ground that in the notification dated November 13, 1959 issued under Section 4 of the Act the lands of Wakf property were excluded and the lands of the appellants being also used for educational and charitable purposes the same were also liable to be excluded?

Later, the court repelled the challenge in the following terms:

We find no justification at all in explaining the delay on the ground that no award has been passed nor the appellants have been dispossessed so far. This cannot be an explanation for not challenging the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and in the present case the appellants had themselves sought stay from this Court as early as November 15, 1978 for not making and declaring the award and not to dispossess the appellants. Thus we find no justification at all for the delay in not challenging the notification issued under Section 4 on November 13, 1959 till 1973. Even notifications under Section 6 of the Act were issued in 1968 and 1969 but not challenged till 1973. As already mentioned above in Aflatoon case a Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that since even after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act published in 1966, the appellants had approached with writ petitions only in 1970 when the notices under Section 9 were issued to them the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay.

It would be therefore impossible for us to carve out an exception in the petitioners' favor, even if it is assumed that the petition lands were attached to a religious institution, on the date of the notification.

44. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the petitioners cannot succeed on account of inordinate delay and laches.

45. During the course of proceedings before the court, it was brought to our notice that the petitioners had made a without prejudice representation to the respondents for withdrawal of the petition lands from acquisition, in terms of Section 48 of the Act. A copy of their representation was placed on record. The respondents, however, declined the request, on the ground that the lands were required for providing facilities in the surrounding areas.

46. We therefore hold that:

(1) The materials placed on record in these proceedings show that the Radha Soami Satsang is a religious institution or religious denomination;

(2) The writ petition is highly belated, and hit by laches.

In view of the above findings, the petition fails, and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.