Gaon Sabha Samhalka vs R.N. Sahni And Ors.
2004 Latest Caselaw 711 Del

JUDGMENT

S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

1.This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the Judgment and order of a learned Single Judge dated 9th February 2000 in CWP No.5244 of 1998. The learned Single Judge had allowed the first respondent's writ petition. The Gaon Sabha, Samhalka, which was arrayed as respondent No. 4 in the petition (hereafter referred to as the ''Gaon Sabha'') has preferred this appeal.

2. The issue requiring determination in this appeal is the correct interpretation of entry 17 in the First Schedule to the Delhi Land Reforms Act 1954 [the ''Act'']. That provision prescribes periods of limitation for initiation of eviction proc endings.

3. The facts necessary for deciding the issue involved may be narrated. The predecessor-in-title of the first respondent had been conferred Bhumidari rights under the Act, in respect of land bearing Khasra No. 30/18/2(4-0) 19(4-16) and 23(7-4) aggregate ting 16 bighas or 3.3 acres, in the Revenue Estate village, Samhalka, Tehsil Mehrauli (hereafter ''the said lands''). The said predecessor-in-title had submitted a building plan for sanction on 23 September 1974. He was permitted to construct a building by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (''MCD'') through letters dated 01/07/1974 and 20/08/1974.

4. The Delhi Development Authority (''DDA'') by resolution dated 20 April 1976 decided to relax rules relating to farm houses enabling monkey farms.

5. The MCD by its Order of 6 June 1978 in line with the above relaxation by the DDA, permitted revision of the sanction plan of the petitioner's predecessor. He was issued a completion certificate on 19/09/1981. The sanction for construction was for a total covered area of 32890.36 Sq. feet with a ceiling height of 20 feet. Construction of the property was undertaken. This was duly reflected in Khasra Girdawari register maintained by the Revenue Officials. The copies of Khasra Girdawaries maintained by revenue officials for the period 1994-95 is a part of the record of the present proceedings. Apparently the suit lands and the construction were put to use as a monkey farm.

6. In 1983, the Central Government by its order banned export of monkeys. During the riots that took place in the wake of Smt. Indira Gandhi's assassination, in November 1984, the property on the said land was damaged.

7. The first respondent purchased the property sometime in 1985 and thereafter carried out constructions which, according to him, were in the nature of repairs, renovation etc. He also effected certain additional constructions. The first respondent received a notice dated 28/08/1986 from the Zonal Engineer (Building) MCD for inspection of the property. The inspection was carried out on 18/10/1986. The MCD did not notify any violation. Sometime thereafter the first Development Corporation (''ITDC'') and started using the said lands for the purpose of motel business. respondent entered into an agreement with the India Tourism

8. On 14/08/1992, the Halqa Patwari made a report to the SDM/Revenue Assistant, to the effect that the said lands were not being used for agricultural purposes. On the basis of this report, a conditional order was passed on 29/01/1993 against the first respondent under Section 81 of the Act. These proceedings were premised on the changed land-use of the said lands. It was stated that the said lands vested in the Gaon Sabha . Consequently it was proposed to evict the said respondent under Section 8 of the Act.

9. The Revenue Assistant passed a final order on 28/04/1995. The explanation offered by the first respondent, based upon the sanctions obtained by MCD and the ITDC were rejected on the reasoning that such sanctions did not automatically imply permission for conversion of the use of land and that permission had not been sought for such change of user. The first respondent preferred an appeal to the Additional Collector under Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act on 08/05/1995. In this appeal, two specific grounds were raised with regard to the proceedings under Section 81 being time barred. The Additional Collector, by his order dated 22/01/1996, allowed the appeal. In the course of his order the rival contentions as regards the issue of limitation were noted. The Additional Collector accepted the contention of the first respondent that the proceedings under Section 81 were time barred since the constructions were raised far back in point of time. He also rejected the plea that limitation h d to be reckoned only from the date of knowledge.

10. The Appellant herein preferred a revision to the Financial Commissioner. By order dated 28/09/1998, the Financial Commissioner set aside the order of the Additional Collector. The Financial Commissioner was of the view, erroneously, that the plea of limitation had not been raised before the Additional Collector.

11. In the above background, the first respondent approached this Court under Article 226 seeking appropriate writ of Mandamus Certiorari against the orders dated 08/09/1998 and 28/09/1998 passed by the Financial Commissioner. The order dated 28/09/1 998 is the final order passed in the revenue's revision application.

12. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, in the course of his judgment besides noticing certain subsequent developments that have been discussed hereafter, noted that the authorities concerned had not taken any action within the p period of limitation prescribed, having regard to specific entries in the revenue records. He, therefore, rejected the plea that the officials concerned were not aware of the construction of the building. The learned Single Judge held that the Financial commissioner fell into serious error in assuming that the first respondent had not raised the plea of limitation though the records spoke otherwise.

13. Mr. Shali appearing for the Gaon Sabha contends that the limitation in the present case commenced only from 14/08/1992 when the Halqa Patwari made a report. According to him, Entry 17 in the First Schedule to the Act has to be construed in such a manner as to further the purposes of the Act, particularly, the provisions in Sections 22, 23 and 24, which oblige use of land for the purposes of agriculture. According to Mr. Shali, if that objective is kept in mind, the period of limitation, namely, three years for the purposes of investment proceedings under Section 81 would commence only from the date of the authorities' knowledge about unlawful use of the land. The plea, therefore, is that the authorities came to know about the unlawful use of the and, namely, for purposes of motel upon the Halqa Patwari's report dated 14/08/1992; cognizance was taken on 29/01/1993 by the passing of a conditional order which eventually culminated in the final order of the Revenue Assistant on 28/04/1995.

14. Mr. Shali has further relied on certain orders passed under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957, particularly, on the order dated 23/03/1994 passed by the Lieutenant Governor. That order was in relation to premises/constructions on the said lands being sealed on account of certain excess construction.

15. Mr. N.S. Vashisht, appearing for the first respondent, (who had filed the writ petition) on the other hand, contends that the period of limitation in the present case is not from the date of knowledge but when the actual change of land use took place. He further contends that revenue records themselves speak of land use being non-agricultural as far back as in 1988-89. The Khasra Girdawari for the said land for the period 1988-89 clearly disclose that a swimming pool had been constructed besides certain other constructions (''Pucci Kothi'). Learned counsel for the first respondent has also placed reliance on certain notifications and circulars issued by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment, Government of India respectively which enable for grant of permission vis-a-vis establishment of Motels in rural zones and the standards to be adopted for the purpose. He also places reliance upon a letter dated 08/06/1997 to contend that the Ministry of Urban Affairs was of the view that the running of Motel by his client in collaboration with the ITDC was permitted.

16. In view of the fact that the entire discussion in the impugned order of the Financial Commissioner centered on the issue of limitation, we propose to examine only that issue. The other aspects raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, an melee, the unauthorized construction upon the land in question, on the one hand and the effect of orders passed by the Ministry of Urban Development and the DDA with regard to permission to set up Motels etc. on the other, are not being examined by us. he extension and enforcement of municipal laws is not the subject matter of the present controversy. Equally, the change of policy relied upon by the first respondent in support of his case occurred after initiation of the proceedings under Section 81 o the Delhi Land Reforms Act.

17. In determining the issue canvassed, it would be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, which are extracted below :-

81 ''EJECTMENT FOR USE OF LAND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT:

(1) A Bhumidhar or an Asami shall be liable to ejectment on the suit of the Gaon Sabha of the land-holder, as the case may be, for using land for any purpose other than a purpose connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry, which inch des pisci culture and poultry farming, and also to pay (damages) equivalent to the cost of works which may be required to render the land capable of use for the said purposes.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Revenue Assistant also may, on receiving information or on his own motion, eject the Bhumidhar or Asami, as the case may be, and also recover the damages referred to in sub-section (1), after following such procedure as may be prescribed].''

(2) Section 185 of the Act reads as under :

''185 COGNIZANCE OF SUITS, ETC. UNDER THIS ACT:''

(1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in column 7 of Schedule 1 shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in column 3 thereof.

(2) Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order passed under any of the proceedings mentioned in column 3 of the Schedule aforesaid.

(3) An appeal shall lie from the final order passed by a court mentioned in column 7 in the proceedings mentioned in column 3 to the court or authority mentioned in column 8 thereof.

(4) A second appeal shall lie from the final order passed in an appeal under sub-section (3) of the authority, if any, mentioned against it in column 9 of the Schedule aforesaid.''

18. Schedule 1 provides for the period of limitation. With reference to Section 81 the relevant provisions in Schedule 1 are as under :

S.N.

Section of the Act Description of suit proceedings application and other Period of Limitation Time from which period begins Proper Court fees Court of original jurisdiction 1st Appeal 2nd Appeal

.

.

(i) Suit for ejectment of Bhumidar or Asami and for damages under sub-Section (1).

(ii) Proceedings under sub-Section-(2).

Three Years From the date of unlawful use of the land As in the Court Fees Act, 1870

Revenue Assistant

Dy. Commissioner

----

19. In order to decide the issue of the correct interpretation of Entry 17, in the first Schedule to the Act, it has to be noticed that the relevant expression occurring in the 4th column is ''from the date of unlawful use of the land.'' The starting point of the period of limitation of three years is not dependent upon a subjective factor such as knowledge of any person or authority. The statutory intendment apparent from a reading of the first Schedule which prescribes various periods of limitation or different proceedings clearly point to the existence or occurrence of such objective events from which time begins to run for the purposes of reckoning limitation. The only exception is in the case of entry 15, the material portion of which reads as follows :

S.N.

Section of the Act Description of suit application and other proceedings Period of Limitation Time from which period begins Proper Court fees Court of original juristic-

tion 1st Appeal 2nd Appeal

.

.

(i) Application for cancellation of order of Gaon Sabhas relating to admission of a person to land.

.

(ii) Proceedings by Deputy Commissioner for such cancellation. Six months From the date of order of Gaon Sabha. When the Dy. Commissioner first knew of the irregular allotment.

Rs.1.25p .

.

.

.

Nil Dy. Commissioner .

.

.

-do-

Chief Commissioner .

.

.

-do-

.

----

.

.

---

.

20. The well-known canon of statutory interpretation embodied in the maxim 'Expression units est. exclusion altruism''- i.e. what is expressly mentioned in one place but not in another must be taken to be deliberately omitted has been resorted to frequently by the Supreme Court.1 That rule would squarely apply to the present case. The express allusion to knowledge in Entry 15 leads to the conclusion that knowledge has no role to play in respect of the other periods of limitation under the Act

21. It is, therefore, clear that where Parliament intended knowledge to be the basis upon which time is to commence for the purposes of reckoning limitation, the Statute has enacted it to be so. This excludes the ''knowledge'' based construction canvases d by Mr. Shali, in respect of Entry 17(ii)

22. So far as the argument of an interpretation based on the objects, or purpose of the enactment is concerned, it is settled law that where the words of a statute are plain, there can be no recourse to external aids.2 Hence the plain meaning of the ex pression ''use'' in Entry 17 has to be applied. Consequently, the limitation (for taking action) commenced in the present case at least from 1988, when the use of the lands had changed. The proceedings were started on 29/01/1993, admittedly beyond the period of three years.

23. The issue can be viewed from another perspective. The power to initiate proceedings under Section 81(2) for ejectment is regulated by express terms of the enactment. One such express term is the limitation placed upon the power, namely, the period within which it can be exercised. Such limitation is not merely akin to statute or a provision that prescribes a period of limitation it also trenches upon the very exercise of power. Having not used the power within the parameters prescribed by t e statute, it is not open to the authority, to wit, the Collector/ Additional Collector to take recourse to it beyond the conditions imposed by law.

24. It may be observed that the Supreme Court has held that while interpreting a provision in a statute prescribing a time limit for initiation of proceedings, considerations of equity and hardship are out of place 3

25. In view of the above discussion, inescapable conclusion is that the period of limitation prescribed by entry 17 in the first Schedule to the Delhi Land Reforms Act 1954 is the actual date of unlawful use of land and not the date of knowledge.

26. Coming to the issue of knowledge in the present case, it has to be noticed that the sanction for construction had admittedly been secured in 1974. Construction was carried out. The land was previously used for a monkey farm. Subsequently export o f monkeys was banned in 1983. The property suffered damage in the wake of riots in November 1984. The respondent purchased the land in 1985 and the constructions situated on it. He proceeded to make further renovations and constructions, which included a swimming pool in 1988-89. All these are documented in the records of the appellants themselves. Hence, the contention that the authorities were unaware of these constructions prior to Halqa Patwari's report dated 14/08/1992 cannot be accepted. The existence of these structures is reflected in the Khasra Girdawari of the relevant year, which is maintained by the authorities themselves. Therefore, the plea of Mr. Shali that the appellants came to know about the unlawful use of the land only on 14/08/1992 is also rejected.

27. We therefore find no infirmity in the judgment under appeal. The appeal therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed without any orders as to costs.