Mrs. Jyotika D/O. Late Shri Jayant ... vs Shri Anil Lal S/O. Shri Parshotam ...
2003 Latest Caselaw 550 Del

ORDER

Mahmood Ali Khan, J.

1. The plaintiff has filed a suit for partition of property bearing No. B-2/4, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi claiming her to be holding a share in it inherited from her father. She also filed application IA No. 4194/2002 under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 for grant of ad interim injunction order restraining the defendants from assigning, mortgaging on parting with possession by creating third party interest in the premises or acting upon the will dated 13th November, 1990 of Smt. Sushil Kumari. This Court while issuing notice of the application to the defendant by order dated 1st May, 2002 restrained the defendant No. 1 & 2 from assigning, mortgaging or creating third party interest in the said property. Upon service of the notice of the application and the ex-parte ad interim injunction order, the defendant No. 1 & 2 filed IA No. 7564/2002 under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC for vacating the exparte ad interim injunction order dated 1st May, 2002.

2. Relevant facts for appreciating the arguments of the parties on these applications on merits, briefly stated are that in the plaint the plaintiff alleged that she was daughter of Jayant Lal who died in 1973 and that her mother had re-married in 1979. Her father Jayant Lal Along with his father Parshotam Lal, defendant No. 2 and brother Anil Lal, defendant No. 1 formed Hindu Undivided family which owned House No. B-2/4, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. She sated that her father was working as Asstt. Engineer in Kirloskar from 1968 to 1970 and was getting a salary of Rs. 1200/- per month which he was giving to his parents, the defendant No. 2 and late Smt. Sushil Kumar. Defendant No. 2 was employed as Joint Secretary in the Government and he built the above said house with the money which included the money contributed by her father Jayant Lal. The name of his wife Smt. Sushil Kumari, was later on associated by him, although she was a house wife and had no independent income of her own. The plaintiff had been denied a share in the property by her grandfather and uncle who were defendant No. 2 & 1 respectively. The defendant No. 1 also claimed to have succeeded to a share in his property by virtue of a will allegedly executed by his mother Smt. Sushil Kumari and has applied for grant of letter of administration by filing a probate petition which is contested by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has claimed 1/3rd share in the suit property and prayed for grant of a decree of declaration of her 1/3rd share and also the partition of the said property by meats and bound and delivery of possession of her share in it. She also prayed for a decree for permanent injunction restraining defendants No. 1 & 2 from subletting, assigning or parting with possession of the property during the pendency of the suit. A prayer was also made for stay of the proceedings in probate case filed by the defendant No. 1 which is pending before Addl. District Judge, Delhi.

3. Defendant No. 2 in his written statement controverter the allegation of the plaintiff that her father Jayant Lal had contributed money towards the construction of the suit house. According to him he got enrolled himself as member of the Government Servant Cooperative Housing Society and was allotted a plot measuring 400 sq.yds. on perpetual sub-lease which was registered. He paid the price of Rs. 13,204/- in installments fixed by the society, between 1957 to 1968. The last installments of Rs. 164/- was paid in 1971. However, he got the allotted plot exchanged with a plot of Block-D in Vasant Vihar. Pursuant to a policy of the Government, his wife was also made joint sub-lessee in 1968 and perpetual sub-lease deed dated 09th November, 1971 was executed and registered jointly in his name and in the name of his wife Smt. Sushil Kumari. He got the building plan approved and thereafter raised the construction spending about Rs. 1,10,000/-. He raised the money from different sources and informed the Government accordingly on 26th December, 1973. He also obtained the completion certificate on 16.8.1973. He was the owner of the plot in his personal capacity and the suit property constructed thereon had never belonged to Hindu undivided family. He alleged that he had two sons, late Jayant Lal, father of the present plaintiff, and Anil Lal, defendant No. 1. Jayant Lal had been a student in a school/college and then in an Engineering College at Srinagar till 1968 during the period he (the defendant No. 2) was making payment of the price of the land to the society in installments. In 1969 Jayant Lal had joined Kirloskar Group at Pune as Apprentice and was getting only Rs. 175/- as stipend. The defendant No. 2 had arranged an accommodation for him at Pune and also provided financial assistance to him. Jayant Lal was not in a position to make any contribution to the construction of the suit property. In 1970 Jayant Lal joined Indian Oil Corporation as Sales Engineer at New Delhi and he was getting Rs. 400/- per month. At that time the defendant No. 2 was living in a government allotted accommodation and Jayant Lal used to live with him. When Jayant Lal wanted to buy a car, he provided financial help to him. In those days the income of Jayant Lal was hardly sufficient to make both ends meet and he was sustaining with his help. He also spent money on the marriage ceremony of Jayant Lal with defendant No. 3 in 1971. In 1973 Jayant Lal suffered from incurable paralytic infection and the defendant No. 2 met the expenditure on his medical treatment except to the limited extent the medical expenditure were re-imbursed by Indian Oil Corporation. However, Jayant Lal and defendant No. 3 continued to stay with him at his residence. Since he himself was due to retire in 1976 and was to get only a meager amount as pension, he canvassed the case of defendant No. 3 with the Indian Oil Corporation for granting a gas agency for the benefit of both defendant No. 3 and the plaintiff who was born in 1973 a little before the death of her father. The plaintiff and defendant No. 3 thereafter continued to live with him for about six years. In 1979, the defendant No. 3 left and got re-married. Thereafter, defendant No. 3 kept the plaintiff with her and stopped associating with defendant No. 2 and his family. There had been no communication with them. He also alleged that his wife Smt. Sushil Kumari died in January, 1998 leaving a registered will dated 13th November, 1990 bequeathing her share in the suit property in favor of defendant No. 1. The probate proceedings regarding that will are pending. The name of defendant No. 1 has been mutated in the record of the DDA in place place of Smt. Sushil Kumari. The leasehold rights in the suit property were converted to freehold and a Conveyance Deed dated 03rd April, 2000 was executed by the Government in his and in favor of defendant No. 1. Thereafter, by a registered Gift Deed dated 30th April, 2002 he gifted his share in the suit property to defendant No. 1. It is submitted that Jayant Lal had no share in the suit property; suit property did not belong to Hindu undivided family; Jayant Lal had not contributed in the construction of the suit property and; Jayant Lal had no share in it which could devolve on the petitioner or defendant No. 3 after his death. He, accordingly, prayed that the suit be dismissed.

4. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No. 1 more or less similar plea were raised as were raised on behalf of defendant No. 2.

5. The application filed by the petition for injunction order and the application which was filed by defendant for vacation of the ad interim injunction were also contested by the opposite parties on similar pleas.

6. The counsel for defendants No. 1 & 2 have referred to the various documents which has been placed on record to show that the land was allotted to defendant No. 1 by the society and the construction was raised by defendant No. 2 from his own sources of money including the house building advance taken by him from his office. He further submitted that the name of Smt. Sushil Kumari, being his wife, was associated in the property and the perpetual lease deed was executed by the Government in his name and the name of Smt. Sushil Kumari. It was also argued that the land was allotted and its price was paid by defendant No. 2 when late Jayant Lal, father of the plaintiff, was a student and he had no source of independent income and that he was being financially supported by his father. It is also submitted that as per the averments made in the plaint the father of the petitioner had joined Kirloskar and he was getting Rs.1200/- per month between 1968 to 1970 and he was employed with Indian Oil Corporation between 1970 and 1973 when he was getting Rs. 1400 per month as salary. But the facts are that he was getting stipend of only Rs. 175/- per month as apprentice in Kirloskar and was getting salary as sales engineer in Indian Oil Corporation @ Rs. 400 per month as would appear from the appointment letter of colleague of Jayant Lal who was also employed at the same time in the same organization at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month. It was also contended that apart from bald allegation that her father Jayant Lal had contributed towards the construction of the house, the plaintiff has not been able to produce a single document or bring on record any facts or circumstance which may suggest that he had contributed any money towards price of land or construction raised therein. On the contrary, it is argued, the overwhelming documentary evidence would show the defendant No. 2 was the member of the housing society and he was allotted land as a member and he also took house building advance and raised money from his sources which were duly informed to the Government as per service rules. It is, therefore, argued that the plaintiff has not been able to make out a prima facie case for the grant of ad interim injunction order in her favor, nor is the balance of convenience is in favor of the grant of injunction and the plaintiff would also not suffer loss or injury if the temporary injunction was refused to her. It also argued that there may be a legal presumption that a Hindu family forms a joint family but there is no presumption that property owned by individual co-parcener of the said joint family is also owned by that Hindu Undivided family. He referred to the judgment of this Court in Shri Nihar Singh and Ors. v. Smt. Chandari Devi and Ors. 2002 II AD (DELHI) 933, Shashi Kapoor v. Subhash Kapoor and Ors. AIR 1972 DELHI 84 and Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ram Chander Ravagowda Sankh 1969 (1) Supreme Court Cases 386.

7. The counsel for the plaintiff argued that at this stage it is admitted by defendant No. 1 & 2 that the father of the plaintiff, late Jayant Lal was employed and was getting a salary @ Rs. 400/- between 1970 and 1973 when he breathed his last and that during this period construction was also carried on by defendant No. 2. He pointed out to the share certificate of the housing society in which the names of both defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 1 have been mentioned. He also argued that the perpetual lease deed of the house was executed in favor of the defendant No. 2 and his wife Smt. Sushil Kumari had no independent income of her own to make a contribution towards the price of land or the construction of the house. According to him the will of Smt. Sushil Kumari showed that she had claimed the half share in the property, a probate petition on its basis had been filed the defendant No. 1 which is contested on behalf of the plaintiff. It is also submitted that defendant No. 1 has gifted the other half of the property in favor of defendant No. 2. It is contended that it is a partition suit in which the plaintiff being the daughter of Jayant Lal who was member of the Hindu undivided family, has alleged that the house was built by Hindu undivided family, therefore, she had a share in it and until this question and her rights are decided, it is necessary that the status quo in respect of the property is maintained. He, therefore, requested for dismissing the application of the defendants for vacating the ex parte ad interim injunction order dated 1st May, 2002. The counsel in support of his arguments has referred to Karam Singh and Ors. v. Nathu Singh, 1995 Raj.L.Reporter (Note)6; Sh. Kanwal Singh and Ors. v. Sh. Bishan Singh, 1992, Raj.L.Reporter 357; Ratanlal Sahdev v. Krishan Kumar, 1993 Raj.L.Reporter (Note)19; Sahb Dayal Chamanlal v. M.C.D. 1976 Raj.L.Reporter 550; Munni/Jaswant Kaur v. Bhonri Devi etc. 1974 Raj.L.Reporter 583; Ramji Mahinder Kumar v. Naresh Kumari, 1983 Raj.L. Reported 381 and Delhi Porters Labour Contract & C.C. Society v. Internation Airport Authority, 1984 Raj.L.Reporter 352.

8. There is indeed a legal presumption that Hindu father and sons form a joint Hindu family. But is equally well settled that there is no presumption that every property owned by the members of the Hindu undivided family is also a joint family property. On this proposition, counsel for the defendants has cited Shashi Kapoor v. Subhash Kapoor (supra), Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ram Chander Ravagowds Sankh (supra). The Supreme Court in the later judgment has held that there was no presumption that merely because Hindu family was joint, they had joint property also and further that the person who alleges the property to be coparcenary property must have to prove it. The Supreme Court further laid down that if it was shown that there was a nucleus of the joint family property then any acquisition by its aid by a member is joint property to be self-acquired has to prove it to be so. In the instant case, the defendant No. 2 was Joint Secretary in the Government. He was a member of a housing society. The land was allotted to him on perpetual sub lease. The perpetual sub lease deed of the land was executed in his favor. He got the name of his wife associated and the alternative plot was then executed in his name and in the name of his wife Smt. Sushil Kumari. The defendant No. 2 has also placed on record the statement of the expenditure incurred by him on the construction of the house which he had duly informed the Government as per service rule. It also shows that he had arranged the money from house building advance from his office and also from other sources. Even according to the allegation made in the plaint prior to 1968, Jayant Lal, father of the plaintiff was not earning. Though, the petitioner alleged that between 1968 and 1970, he was working with Kirloskar and was getting a salary of Rs. 1200/- and from 1970 to 1973 when he died he was employed with Indian Oil Corporation and was drawing salary of Rs. 1400 per month but she has not been able to produce any documentary evidence to that effect. Conversely the case of the defendant No. 2 is that Jayant Lal was an Apprentice working with Kirloskar at Pune in 1969 when he was getting a stipend of Rs. 175/- which was not even sufficient to meet his expenses, therefore, he was giving financial help to him and he also him gave money to buy a motor cycle. He further submitted that between 1970 and 1973 Jayant Lal was employed with Indian Oil Corporation at Delhi and he was getting Rs. 400/- per month. He also filed documentary evidence to show that a colleague of Jayant Lal was getting only Rs. 400/- per month as salary. Therefore, prima, it appears that Jayant Lal was not getting Rs. 1200/- per month as salary from Kirloskar or Rs. 1400/- from Indian Oil Corporation and further that his income was not even sufficient to meet his own expenses. Jayant Lal suffered from incurable paralytic infection and during this period he must be required to incur huge expenditure on his medical treatment. No evidence has been placed on record to show that entire expense were re-imbursed by his employer Indian Oil Corporation. The petitioner has not been able to obtain a certificate of the Indian Oil Corporation or even Kirloskar to show that income of her father between 1968 to 1970 was Rs. 1200/- per month and between 1970 to 1973 was Rs. 1400/- per month or that he was making contribution to the funds for raising construction of the house. Conversely the evidence which has been placed on record by the defendant prima facie showed that the construction of the land and the expenditure on the construction raised thereon were met by defendant No. 2.

9. The question now arises whether the ex parte interim injunction order, which was granted to the plaintiff at the initial stages, should be confirmed or should be vacated. In a partition suit when the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case that he is joint owner in the suit property the court in order to avoid complication and multiplicity of the proceedings and to protect the interest of the parties may direct the maintenance of status quo in respect of the title and possession of the suit property. But question here is whether the plaintiff has been able to make out a prima facie case for grant of interlocutory injunction order under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC. It has been held by the Court in Shri Nchal Singh and Ors. v. Smt. Chandari Devi and Ors. (supra) that:

"the contentions which should weigh with the court in deciding the application for grant of ad interim injunction are well settled. The are (i) whethere he plaintiff has made out a prima facie case meaning thereby that there is a bona fide contention between the parties or a serious question to be tried, (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favor of the plaintiff, that is to say whether it would cause greater inconvenience to the plaintiff if the ad interim injunction is not granted than the inconvenience to which the defendant will be subjected if it is granted, and, (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury if the prayer for grant of temporary injuction is refused. All these three considerations must be conjointly satisfied before the order of ad interim injunction is grant by the court."

10. The Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. and Ors. (1995) 5 Supreme Court Cases 545 has held as under:

"The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the court. While exercising the discretion the court applies the following tests - (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favor of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time whether the existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. Relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favor at the trial. The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights which he could not be adequately compensated."

11. It is clear from the law laid down by the Supreme Court that the grant of ad interim injunction is a discretionary relief and it should be granted where it is necessary to protect the legal right of a party until it is established at the trial when triple principles essential for grant of interlocutory injunction conjointly existed. It is also explicitly clear that mere allegation will not be enough to exercise discretion in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff to be entitled to interlocutory injunction order should produce facts, circumstances and available documentary evidence to prima facie establish that he may have rights in the subject matter of the suit which needed investigation and trial. Even a bonafide or serious contention which requires investigation and trial may in given facts would be sufficient to protect the interest of the plaintiff. But a bald claim of a right which is neither corroborated by facts and circumstances nor by documentary evidence would not be enough to be grant of ad interim injunction.

12. This Court relied upon this judgment while holding in Shri Nihal Singh and Ors. v. Smt. Chandari Devi and Ors. (supra), that there was no prima facie case for grant of ad interim injunction in the partition suit in the facts and circumstances treated and brought on record. In para 12 of the judgment this Court noticed that as per allegations of the palitiff Ram Phal, ancestor of the plaintiff from whom the plaintiff alleged to have inherited the right, title or interest in the suit land was not the owner of the entire khasra and that is was the case of the plaintiff that after the death of Ram Phal, his heirs had separated and had divided the land and they were in occupation of separate pieces of land. The plaintiff was silent as to when did the partition of the property took place, among which of the heirs the land was partitioned, which heir got which portion of the land and also why only a portion of the land was left undivided at that time. It was also noted that the adjoining land was alleged to be owned by the son of the plaintiff, but it was not explained as to how he got that land. On all these facts, this Court, apart from the bald allegation of the plaintiff did not find any fact and circumstance to show that Ram Phal was the owner of the suit land partition of which was sought. It was, therefore, held that it was not a case where the ad interim injunction could be granted to the plaintiff. In the present cause also there is bald allegation of the plaintiff in support of a claim that her father Jayant Lal was member of a joint Hindu family and he had made contributions towards the expenditure incurred on construction of the suit house or that suit house belonged to Hindu undivided family. No doubt, she had raised a contention, but it cannot be said to be a bona fide contention or a serious question which could be decided only after the parties allowed to produce evidence. In the partition suit when a disputed question of rights of the parties is raised which requires adjudication after evidence, it could be said that the balance of convenience is in favor of the grant of interim injunction order as it could cause a greater inconvenience to the plaintiff if the ad interim injunction was refused at the threshold and further since any alienation or parting with possession etc. of the suit property would lead to the multiplicity of the suit, it could also be said that the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury. But in the instant case the plaintiff case is based on her bald allegations which does not find corroboration from any facts and circumstance or documentary evidence. Conversely the case of the defendants 1 & 2 that defendants No. 1 was the sold owner and subsequently he got his wife associated and as such, both he and his wife became the joint owner of the suit property is corroborated by the documentary evidence. For all these reasons, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has been able to make out a prima facie case for grant of interim injunction or that the balance of convenience was in favor of the grant of ad interim injunction order in her favor or its non-grant would cause any greater inconvenience to her than to the defendant or that she would suffer irreparable damage as according to her share in the property is only Rs. 7 Lacs.

13. Before parting with, the case law relied upon by the plaintiff may also be discussed. In Karam Singh & Others (supra) the plaintiff's suit was for partition of the property to the allegation that he and the defendants were joint owners but one of the defendant had raised constructions to defeat his rights and his share be partitioned. He also applied for ad interim injunction. The defense was that the plaintiff had given up his right and he had also lost his rights, if any, by ouster, exclusion and adverse possession. On these facts it was observed that ad interim injunction should be granted to the plaintiff on terms. Here, there is no admission that Jayant Lal, father of the plaintiff was joint owner of the property or disputed property was Hindu undivided property.

14. In Kanwal Singh & Others (supra) one of the coparceners filed suit for his share in ancestral property. The court observed that there was a presumption that joint family continue to be joint so long as the status of the same has not been brought to an end by a definite and unequivocal expression of intention of the members constituting the same and that separate member or a member, who has been deprived of the usufruct of the joint family fund may not claim any amount from the joint family for his share in ancestral property. The court observed that there was a presumption that joint family continue to be joint so long as the status of the same has not been brought to an end by a definite and unequivocal expression of intention of the members constituting the same and that separate member or a member, who has been deprived of the usufruct of the joint family fund may not claim any amount from the joint family fund for his maintenance, he would still be entitled to get a share of his income. It was accordingly held that interim maintenance can be allowed to the plaintiff. The suit property is not an ancestral property in which the plaintiff claim a share. So, the facts are distinguishable.

15. In Rattanlal Sahdev (supra) the plaintiff was 25% owner of the suit property and the defendants owned the remaining shares and were in occupation of different portions of the suit property. Plaintiff filed suit for partition and prayed for ad interim injunction against the defendants restraining them from alienating the property in their possession. It was held that co-owners may be restrained from disposing of their portion if such disposal was likely to complicate the matter. Again, there is no admission that the father of the plaintiff was joint owner of the property against the defendants and as observed above also there is no prima facie evidence to hold it at this stage. Therefore, the principle of law laid down in the judgment does not advance the case of the plaintiff.

16. In Sahab Dayal Chamanlal (supra) the court observed that at the time of deciding interlocutory injunction application the court should deal with the limited question if the case requires investigation. The plaintiff as a lessee has raised certain structure which Along with some other constructions got destroyed by fire. The plaintiff repaired the structure. MCD sought to demolish it. The plaintiff appealed to the Additional District Judge against the notice of demolition. It was accepted and the case was remanded. The plaintiff was required to appear before the Zonal Engineer. Subsequently, demolition order was passed without providing hearing to the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereafter filed the civil suit that the demolition notice was without hearing. It was on these facts that it was held that when the appeal had been admitted the appellant was entitled to ad interim injunction. The facts of the present case are quite different and the law laid down do not come to the rescue of the plaintiff.

17. In Munni Jaswant Kaur (supra) Mohanlal took on lease plot of land for 15 years and raised construction there. After the expiry of the lease period the Lesser sued him for eviction. The plaintiff died and his legal representatives were brought on record. The report of service of the petitioner was refusal and it was deemed to be a sufficient service. Some of the LRs appeared and the suit was decreed. The petitioner mother then filed an application for setting aside ex-parte decree. The petitioner did not joint her and the application was dismissed. The petitioner then filed the suit for setting aside of the ex-parte decree and for the grant of ad interim injunction. The trial court held that there was no prima facie case and the appellate court held that the order was not appealable since it was passed under Section 151 CPC. The High Court held that on the stage of interlocutory application the plaintiff was not required to make our a complete legal right but has to satisfy the court that he has a strong prima facie case to raise and a mere existence of a doubt as to the plaintiff's right does not itself constitute a sufficient ground for refusing the injunction, although it is always a circumstance which calls for the attention of the Court. In the present case apart from the bald allegation of the plaintiff that her father had contributed towards raising of the construction of the house she did not corroborate it by fact or any documentary or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, there was no prima facie case or serious contention which requires investigation and trial of the suit. The judgment, therefore, does not help the case of the plaintiff.

18. In Ramjilal Mahinder Kumar (supra) a partnership firm had filed a suit for permanent injunction against certain persons alleging them to be the tenant in the shop on the allegation that the plaintiff was using a shop and the roof above for over 38 years and further that one of the defendant had approached them for increasing the rent which was declined and, therefore, the said defendant in collusion with the co-defendant threatened to take possession of the open roof by force and to raised unauthorized construction over the roof and prevent the plaintiff from using the tenanted portion without just and sufficient cause. On these facts it was held that the interim injunction restraining the defendant landlord from taking forcible possession of the shop and the roof and raise construction over it should have been granted since prima facie the plaintiff had raised bonafide dispute requiring investigation. In the instant case it was not an admission that the plaintiff or her father was joint owner of the suit property or had a share n the suit property and there is no serious and bonafide contention for investigation and trial on the basis of the facts stated in the application and the pleading which require this court to protect the right of the plaintiff by injuncting the defendant from selling or parting with possession. The case, therefore, was on distinguishable facts.

19. In Delhi Airport Porters Labour Contract & C.C. Society (supra) the defendant had tried to attempt to make suit infructuous by making cause of action disappear and on these facts it was held that the appellate court could grant interim mandatory injunction for restoration of status quo position. The facts of that case were different and, therefore, the principles of law laid down does not apply to the instant case.

20. For the reasons stated above, I allow the application of the defendants and dismiss the application of the plaintiff. Accordingly, an ex parte ad interim injunction order granted on 1st May, 2002 is vacated.

21. However, it is clarified that the observations made in this order are only on the basis of the prima facie view of the matter and nothing decided in this order would be constituted an expression of opinion of the Court on any of the questions involved on merit of the case which would be decided after recording the evidence.

22. Both the applications stand disposed of.

Suit No. 881/2002

23. List the matter before the Joint Registrar on 21st July 2003 for further proceedings.