Bhartia Industries Ltd. And Anr. vs Rajiv Saluja
2003 Latest Caselaw 687 Del

JUDGMENT

R. C. Jain, J.

1. The present appeal arises out of the order dated 7th May, 2002 passed by the learned Single Judge on IA No.255/2002 under Order XII Rule 6 CPC allowing the application and passing a decree for possession of the suit premises in favor of the plaintiff-respondent.

2. The relevant facts which may be noticed for the purpose of disposal of this appeal are that the plaintiff-respondent herein has filed a suit for possession, damages and mesne profits against the defendant-appellants with the averments and allegations that he is the landlord/owner of the property No.119/89, (New Number being 89-A, Sainik Farm, New Delhi-110062) consisting of a plot of land with a farmhouse constructed thereon. The said property was let out by the plaintiff to the defendants vide registered lease deed dated 1st September, 1990 for a period of five years at a monthly rent of Rs.35,000/-. The lease was renewed for a period of two years w.e.f. 1st September, 1995 to 31st August, 1997. The lease was further renewed for a period of two years w.e.f. 1st September, 1997 to 31st August, 1999 by virtue of an unregistered lease deed at the enhanced rent of Rs.45,000/- per month. The lease was renewed for the third time for a period of two years again by means of an unregistered lease deed but on further enhanced rent of Rs.85,000/- per month. Thereafter, the tenancy came to an end by efflux of time. However, on the request of the appellants-tenants, the respondent-landlord verbally agreed to the extention of lease for a period of six months to enable the appellants-tenants to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property. The appellants-tenants, however, failed to vacate the suit property and though the tenancy stood terminated by efflux of time on 29th February, 2000, by way of abundant caution, the respondent-landlord served a quit notice dated 8th June, 2000 on the appellant-tenant and his Chairman, appellant No.2 on 10th June, 2000 and later filed the suit.

3. The appellants-tenants contested the suit by filing a joint written statement thereby not disputing the facts with regard to the appellants-tenants having leased in the suit property by means of a registered lease deed dated 1st September, 1990 as also the lease having been extended from time to time and lastly uptil 28th February, 2000 and the last rent payable being Rs.85,000/- per month. It was, however, denied that the tenancy of the appellants-tenants stood terminated w.e.f. 29th February, 2000 by means of the alleged notice dated 8th June, 2000 service of which is also denied. The suit was also sought to be resisted on the ground that the plaintiff had deliberately suppressed certain material facts about the suit property forming part of the revenue estate of village Khanpur, Delhi which was the subject matter of land acquisition. It was pleaded that after the publication of notification under Section 4 & 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Land Acquisition Collector having rendered his award No.17/87-88, any right, title and interest of the plaintiff in the suit property stood extinguished and the plaintiff had no locus standi to file the present suit. In any case, it was pleaded that the plaintiff being a bhumidar of the land in question underneath the suit property within the meaning of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, the lease was not created in accordance with Section 36 of the said Act. It was denied that the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of possession or damages as claimed by them.

4. The application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC was moved by the plaintiff-respondent on the premises that there were unequivocal admissions of fact in regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant, termination of tenancy by efflux of time or in any case by means of a quit notice dated 8th June, 2000 which was duly served upon the defendants and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment and decree so far as the relief of possession of the suit property was concerned. The application was resisted by the defendants, inter alia, on the grounds that there were no clear, unconditional, unambiguous and unequivocal admissions made on behalf of the defendants which could entitle the plaintiff to a decree of possession. The contention raised by the defendants in their written statement involve serious disputed questions of facts and law which go to the very maintainability of the suit and which can only be answered after the parties have gone on trial. It was also pleaded that the appellants-tenants had been granted a license to use the premises and thereafter undertook works of permanent nature by incurring huge expenditure entitling them to certain rights in the suit premises.

5. By means of the impugned order, the learned Single Judge on a comparison of the averments and allegations made by the plaintiffs more particularly in paras 3, 5 & 8 of the plaint and that made by the defendants in paragraph 3, 4 to 6 & 8 of the written statement came to the finding that the said denials made by the defendants in the written statement are not specific and are evasive and, therefore, are no denials in the eyes of law and, therefore, the allegations and averments made in the plaint were deemed to be admitted. As regards the plea of non-termination of the tenancy and service of quit notice, the learned trial court held that though the tenancy of the defendants stood terminated by efflux of time even by way of abundant precaution a quit notice was issued and served on the defendants as the notice was duly received by defendant No.2 who was the Chairman of defendant No.1-company and for whose residence the premises was taken on lease by defendant No.1.

6. We have heard Mr. Rajiv Nayar, learned senior Advocate representing the appellants and Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, learned senior counsel representing the respondent-landlord and have given our thoughtful consideration to their respective submissions. Mr. Nayar has sought to assail the impugned order primarily on the following three grounds:-

(1) The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and try the present suit was barred by the provisions of Land Acquisition Act or in any case by Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, the subject matter of the suit property being agricultural land of which the plaintiff was a bhumidar.

2. There were no clear unequivocal and unconditional admissions within the meaning of Order XII Rule 6 CPC on behalf of the defendants entitling the plaintiff to a decree for possession; and

(3) The service of notice terminating the tenancy was not proved on record.

7. We propose to take up these grounds ad seratim. In support of the first ground, Mr. Nayar has submitted that the suit before the Civil Court was not maintainable inasmuch as the plaintiff was a bhumidar of the agricultural land forming part of the subject matter of the present suit within the meaning of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 which is a complete Code in relation to such a property and, therefore, the suit was barred under the provisions of Section 185 of the said Act; that such plea was raised in para No.2 of the written statement but it has not received the consideration of the learned Single Judge who failed to record any finding on this issue which goes to the very root of the case. As against this, Mr. Chandhiok, pointed out that this ground was not pressed by the counsel for the appellants-defendants during the course of hearing on the application as the learned Single Judge in para No.2 of the impugned judgment observed that there is no dispute as to the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. It is urged that in view of this, the ground will be deemed to have been given up by the defendants and if the defendants did not agree with this, they could at best approach the learned trial Judge for the review of the order and cannot be allowed to raise this question all over again in the appeal. In this connection, reliance is heavily placed on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Daman Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., wherein in para No.13, the Court observed as under:

" It is not unusual for parties and counsel to raise innumberable grounds in the petitions and memoranda of Appeal etc., but, later, confine themselves, in the course of argument to a few only of those grounds, obviously because the rest of the grounds are considered even by them to be untenable. No party or counsel is thereafter entitled to make a grievance that the grounds not urged were not considered. If indeed any ground which was argued was not considered it should be open to the party aggrieved to draw the attention of the court making the order to it by filing a proper application for review or clarification. The of the superior courts is not to be wasted in enquiring into the question whether a certain ground to which no reference is found in the judgment of the subordinate court was argued before the court or not?."

8. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Another, wherein in para No.4, the Court observed as under :

" .......Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. "judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation". We are bound to accept the statement of the judges recorded in the judgments, as to what transpired in Court. We cannot allow the statement of the judges to be contrdicted by statements at the Bar by affidavit and other evidence. If the judges say in their judgments that something was done, stated or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statement by affidavit or other evidence."

9. It is, thus, manifest that no such objection/plea either with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court being barred by the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act on the premises that the land underneath the suit property is land within the meaning of said Act or about the locus of the plaintiff-respondent to file the suit for possession, was pressed on behalf of the appellants-tenants and, therefore, question of consideration of such plea by the learned trial court did not arise. Such pleas and contentions raised in the written statement will be deemed to have been given up or not pressed while objecting to the grant of application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Assuming for the sake of arguments that such a plea being legal and might go to the very root of the case, suffice it would be to observe that such a plea is neither relevant nor is of any legal consequence inasmuch as on the face of the documents on record viz. the registered lease deed and the extention of lease deed will clearly establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Admittedly, the tenancy is created by means of registered lease deed dated 1st September, 1990 which was extended from time to time and the appellants had paid the agreed rent to the plaintiff-respondent throughout this period. In the case of Mercury Travels (India) Ltd. vs. Mahabir Prasad & Anr., , a Division Bench of this Court has clearly ruled that a relationship of landlord and tenant has to be inferred once it is shown that the defendant had been paying rent to the plaintiff who seek recovery of possession and mesne profits. The Court further held that relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties which is determinative factor for deciding the locus standi of the landlord to file the suit against the defendant and the defendant cannot be allowed to bank upon or take advantage of another litigation between the legal heirs of the original landlord.

10. Apart from the foregoing, the appellants are estopped from raising any challenge to the right of the respondent-landlord to seek ejectment by virtue of Section 116 of the Evidence Act which stipulates that a tenant is estopped from denying the title of the Lesser. In the case in hand, the appellant has admitted in its pleadings that the plaintiff-respondent had inducted it as a tenant in the suit premises, therefore, it does not lie in their mouth to urge that there exist no relationship of landlord and tenant and the respondent-plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit. It is settled legal proposition that in a suit for possessory relief the plaintiff is only required to prove that the defendant was inducted in the property by him and he is entitled to recover back the possession. This position is settled by a catena of judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court. Reference can be made to the cases of K.D. Dewan vs. Harbhajan S. Parihar, , Mercury Travels (India) Ltd. vs. Mahabir Prasad and Anr., and Prem Shanker Dave vs. Shikha Bai & Ors., 1993 (1) All India Rent C.J. 111. Even if for the sake of arguments, it is assumed that the defendant had pressed his plea with regard to the locus of the plaintiff-respondent to file the present suit on the alleged ground that the land underneath the suit property is agricultural land and the respondent was a bhumidar thereof, the same is not of any consequence because the dwelling house leased out to the appellants is not a subject matter of any land acquisition proceedings as the same was an event prior to the execution of the lease and, therefore, the appellants cannot be allowed to take any shelter under those proceedings. Besides the appellants have himself at page 2 of the registered lease deed dated 1st September, 1990 admitted the plaintiff-respondent as the absolute owner/landlord of the premises. The contention of the appellants that the property in question is a part of revenue estate of village Khanpur and is a part of the development area and, therefore, no valid lease could have been executed is also without any merits because the plaintiff-respondent has filed on record copy of the notification dated 28th May, 1966 wherein village Khanpur appearing at serial No.39 of the list has been declared to be urbanised. It is not disputed that the plaintiff-respondent has been paying house-tax at the urbanised rate to Municipal Corporation of Delhi in respect of property in question and as a necessary corollary, it has to be held that the suit property has ceased to be land within the meaning of Delhi Land Reforms Act. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff-respondent has the locus standi to file the present suit and none of the objections raised by the appellants challenging his locus is tenable.

11. The last contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that there has not been a valid termination of the lease. This is based on two fold submissions, firstly that a license will be deemed to have come into existence after the expiry of the term of the lease on 31st August, 1999 and acting upon the said license and consent granted by the plaintiff-respondent, the appellants have made various structural changes in the suit property by executing works of permanent character at a heavy expense as a result of which certain rights have devolved upon them. In the opinion of this Court, this contention too has no force because it is not disputed that the initial lease which was for five years was extended from time to time uptil 31st August, 1999. However, the appellants were allowed to continue in possession and granted a further extention for a fixed period of six months to enable them to deliver the vacant possession of the premises. Therefore, the lease stood terminated by efflux of time on 1st September, 1999 or latest on 29th February, 2000 and, therefore, strictly speaking no quit notice as envisaged by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary. However, since by way of abundant caution, the plaintiff issued a notice dated 8th June, 2000 calling upon the appellants to hand over the vacant possession, there remains absolutely no doubt that the lease of the appellants was duly terminated by serving such a notice.

12. Mr. Rajiv Nayar, learned Sr.Advocate has then vehemently urged that there was no service of the notice dated 8th June, 2000 on the appellant-defendant No.1. There is ample material on record which would show that the notice dated 8th June, 2000 was sent vide registered AD post to the appellants on three addresses, namely, M/s.Bhartia Industries Ltd., 1101, New Delhi House, 27, Barakhambha Road, New Delhi as also to Mr. O.P.Bhartia, Chairman, Bhartia Industries Ltd. on the same address as that of the company and also on the address of the suit premises viz. 89-A, Sainik Farm, New Delhi. Though the AD cards about the receipt of these notices were not received back but the plaintiff-respondent filed a certificate issued by the Post Master dated 10th January, 2002 certifying that the said notices/articles were duly delivered at the above addresses. There is no reason for not accepting this certificate of the postal authorities as conclusive proof about the delivery of the said notices. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, right in holding that the said notices were duly served upon the company as well as defendant No.2 who is not only the Chairman of defendant No.1-company but was the occupant of the premises.

13. Having considered all the submissions put forth on behalf of the appellants, we find no infirmity in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge granting a decree of possession of the suit premises under the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC. This appeal devoid of any merits is accordingly dismissed.