Smt. Abha Yadav And Ors. vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi ...
2003 Latest Caselaw 643 Del

JUDGMENT

R.C. Jain, J.

1. The plaintiffs have filed this suit for the recovery of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees fifteen lacs) as damages/compensation under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 on account of the untimely death of Pratap Singh Yadav who died on 30.1.1992 due to electrocution.

2. The suit has been filed with the averments that deceased Pratap Singh Yadav aged about 36 years was employed as a Junior Telecom Officer (J. T. O.) with MTNL-defendant No.4. As usual, he was on his official duty from 9.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. on 30.1.1992. At about 4.30 p.m. he along with two other persons went to the Link Telephone Exchange, Shakti Nagar Delhi and returned from there in a jeap to Keshav Puram Exchange. The driver parked the jeap on the main road in front of Keshav Puram Exchange Building and the deceased followed by the driver Ashok Kumar and one Thanjajdhiraj Vashishtha, forged ahead in an attempt to gain entry in the main gate of the Building of Exchange and in the process the deceased had to overtake a cess-pit of storm water, and came in touch with a stray wire installed to support the electric poll, having high potency current, as a result of which the deceased was electrocuted and died on the spot. FIR was lodged for an offence under Section 304(a) and enquiry was also held by defendant No.4 as also by the DESU authorities. It is alleged that death of the deceased was occasioned due to the negligence on the part of the defendant No.3 who is responsible for erection of electric posts, erection of electric grid, electric installations of over-head lines, fittings and fixtures to the electric installations and posts which was embedded in the earth including the stay wires as it was not expected that heavy electric current would be passing through the stay wire supporting the electric poll. The plaintiff at the time of his death was a confirmed J. T. O. in the pay scale of Rs. 2000-3500 and was drawing a gross salary of Rs. 3,850/- and he was due to get highest pay scale and in due course he could also get promotion in the scale of Rs. 4500-8300 and could have been in the service up to the age of 60 years and could have drawn accumulative pay and benefits to the extent of Rs.15,96,690/- in the remaining period of his service and would have lived for a period of 80 years and would have enjoyed retirement benefits of pension, gratuity, leave encashment etc. Plaintiff No.1 is the wife of the deceased while plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 are the three minor sons of the deceased and plaintiff No.5 is the unfortunate aged father of the deceased. Plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 were permitted to be sued through their mother and grand father during the pendency of the suit plaintiff No.2 and have attained majority and elected to pursue the suit on their own. Plaintiffs by serving statutory legal notice under Section 80 called upon the defendant to pay the compensation but there being no response from the side of the defendants, plaintiff have thus filed the present suit.

3. The suit has been contested by the defendants and a written statement has been filed on behalf of the defendant No.2-DESU which now stands substituted by North Delhi Power Ltd. raising preliminary objections that the suit of the plaintiff is absolutely misconceived and without any merits and is liable to be dismissed; the suit is barred by time and as also having being filed after lapse of time prescribed under Section 478 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act; the suit was bad for non-joinder of the necessary parties that is the MTNL as the digging at the site of accident was done by the MTNL. It is denied that the death of the deceased was occasioned due to any negligence on the part of the DESU in the maintenance of lines or polls and equipments. On the other hand it is explained that the leakage of current in the stay wire attached to the electric poll had occurred firstly on account of deep digging done by the MTNL near the site as a result of which the earth near the site wire had loosened and when the deceased in order to make a jump over the pit put his full weight and force of body on the stay, it tilted and egg insulator provided thereon was broken. The Accident Enquiry committee of the DESU inquired into the matter and reported that there was no fault of DESU leading to the accident involving the death of the deceased in any manner whatsoever and consequently the DESU cannot be held responsible in any manner for the death of the deceased. On merits, the factum of the deceased being an employee of the MTNL as a JTO and having died on the alleged day time and placed on account his electrocution has not been denied. It is specifically denied that there was any fault or negligence on the part of the DESU which resulted into accident. It is pleaded that as per the information received from their employees Shri Ranvir Sehgal and Shri J. K. Sharma, the deceased was crossing the water pit and in the process he put his entire weight on the stay wire and the stay wire and the pole along with LV. Mains violently vibrated because of the loosing of earth caused by the MTNL with the result the egg insulator gave away in many pieces and the stay came into contact with live mains resulting into the shock caused to the deceased. The shock got by the deceased was purely accidental because of the large scale digging by the MTNL authorities for laying the underground multiple pipes in trench at a depth of 5 to 6 feet. It is alleged that the MTNL did not take proper care and protection while digging nor the DESU was notified about the excavation of the land. It is denied that the plaintiffs are entitled to any compensation much less the compensation claimed by them from the answering defendants. The other defendants.

4. In the replication the plaintiffs have controverter the objections and pleas raised in the written statement of defendant No.2 and have mostly reiterated the averments and allegations made in the plaint.

On the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed as back as on 6.12.96:

1. Whether the suit is barred by time?

2.Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties?

3.Whether late Pratap singh died due to electrocution?

4.Whether the accident took place due to the negligence of the defendants?

5.Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages and if so, to what extent?

6.Relief.

5. In support of their respective cases, the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.2 have adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. The oral evidence of the plaintiff consists of five witnesses namely PW-1 Mr. Tungaj Dhawaj Vashistha, PW-2 Ashok Kumar Debas, two employees of the MTNL who were with the deceased at the time of fatal accident, PW-3 Smt. Abha Yadav (plaintiff No.1), PW-4 Dr. Mrs. Kamla Gupta, Chief Medical Officer, in regard to the post mortem examination of the body of the deceased and PW-5 constable Surender Singh of Police Station Keshav Puram. Defendants have produced DW-1 J. K. Sharma, Superintendent (Technical), Delhi Vidyut Board.

6. I have carefully perused the entire material brought on record and have heard Mr. P. R. Thakur, learned counsel representing the plaintiffs, Mr. Jayant Nath, Advocate, representing the MCD, and Mr. Ravi Sikri, learned counsel representing defendant No.4 MTNL and have given my thoughtful consideration to their respective submissions. My findings on the above issues are as under:

7. Issue No.1: The foremost objection put forth on behalf of the defendant-DESU is about the present suit being barred by time viz. having not been filed within a period of two years of the date of accident prescribed by article 82 of the Limitation Act 1963. There is no denial of the factual position that the present suit seeking compensation under Section 1(a) of the Fatal Accident Act 1955 by the heirs of the deceased Pratap Singh Yadav who died on 30.1.1992 has been filed on 30.11.1994 e.g. after two years and ten months. Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for the plaintiff, has however, urged that the suit so filed even after the expiry of two years as prescribed under Article 82 of the Limitation Act is still within time because of the legal disability with which the plaintiffs No.2 to 4 who are the sons of the deceased being minors at the time of accident, were suffering and, therefore, by virtue of the provisions of Section 1(a) of the Fatal Accident Act and Section 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, the suit should be deemed to be within times. Section 1(a) of the Fatal Accident Act 1855 provides as under:

" (1-A). Suit for compensation to the family of a person for loss occasioned to it by his death by actionable wrong.-Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony or other crime.

Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased;

and in every such action, the court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the parties respectively, for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought, and the amount so recovered, after deducting all costs and expenses, including the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned parties, or any of them, in such shares as the court by its judgment or decree shall direct."

Section 2 of the above Act provides as follows:

(2) Not more than one suit to be brought.-- Provided always that not more than one action or suit shall be brought for, and in respect of the same subject matter of the complaint.

Claim for loss........."

8. From the conjoint reading of the above provisions it is amply clear that nor more than one suit can be brought for claiming compensation in respect of death of a person occasioned by actionable wrong. Section 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act 1963 provided as follows:

"6. Legal disability--(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefore in the third column of the Schedule.

(2)        ..........
 

(3)        ..........
 

(4)        ..........
 

(5)        .........."  
 

Section 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides as follows:
   

"7.  Disability of one of several persons.--Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.
 

Explanation 1.--This section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in respect of any immovable property.
 

Explanation II --  For the purposes of this section, the manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence of the other members of the family only if he is in management of the joint family property."  
 

9. Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that as per Section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1855 only one suit could be filed and since out of the five plaintiffs, three were minors at the time of accident and on the date of the filing of the suit, the period of limitation stood automatically extended in their favor by virtue of Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1963 and this extended period of limitation Act 1963 also becomes available to plaintiff Nos. 1 and 5 by virtue of Section 7 of the Limitation Act 1963. There is considerable force in the argument because in the case in hand even the explanation II to section 7 cannot be invoked because neither the plaintiff No.1 nor the plaintiff No.5 were capable of giving a discharge on behalf of the minor plaintiffs. A similar question arose and came up to be considered by this Court in the case of Mr. Bishan Dass & Ors. Vs. Ramesh & Ors. 1971 A. C. J. 203 where the claim petition under Section 110(A) of Motor Vehicles Act filed by the two minor children of the deceased after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation of 60 days was not considered to be barred by time because their mother could not give a discharge on their behalf as she and the minors had separate cause of action and each of them was entitled to separate compensation by virtue of provision of Section 110(B) of the Motors Vehicles Act. In para 7 of the said judgment S. N. Shankar, J. had clearly laid down that where one of the several persons jointly entitled to make the application is under a disability and discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person under disability, then alone time will run against them all.

10. In the case of Smt. Usha Rani Banerjee & Ors. Vs. Premier Insurance Company Ltd, Madras & Ors. AIR 1983 Allahbad 27 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court considered the question on similar facts and held that heirs of a victim of accidental death are tenant-in-common and not joint tenants, interest of each one of them was distinct and separate, none of them is competent of give discharge in respect of the right of the other and where one of such persons is under a disability Section 7 would come into play and extend the period of limitation for the entire body of co-heirs who had a joint right to sue. The division bench after referring to Section 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act held that Section 7 is an exception to the general principle enunciated by Section 6 and held that if more than one person are jointly entitled to institute a suit and if one of them is disabled, time will not run against any of them until the disability ceases to exist. But if one of the persons entitled to institute the suit is competent to give discharge without the concurrence of the other, then time will run against both. In paragraph 9 of the said judgment it was held that in the case of fatal accidents, the interest of legal representatives and heirs is distinct. Each one of them is entitled to claim separate amount of damages. One person can give discharge in respect of his own right but he cannot give discharge in respect of the right of other claimant. In the present case and in the said case also there were two minor claimants which were incapable of giving their consent to their mother and she could not without their consent give discharge. A similar view was taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of The Amalgamated Coal Fields Ltd Vs. Mst. Chhotibai and Ors 1093 LAB I. C. 1410.

11. In view of the legal position emerging from a construction of Sections 1 and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act and Section 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act and the above referred decisions, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the present suit though filed after the statutory period of two years is still within limitation as the time got extended by legal fiction on account of the disability/minority of the three plaintiffs. The suit is therefore clearly within time and not barred by time. The issue is answered in negative and against the defendant.

12. Issue No.2 : This issue was framed owning to the objection of the defendant No.1 to begin with and after the impleadment of MTNL subsequently because defendant No.1 tried to shift the responsibility of the accident on the MTNL who had allegedly did same digging near the electric poll and stay wire in question. But since now both the parties are before the Court, in the opinion of the Court there is neither non-joinder nor mis-joinder of parties. This issue is accordingly answered in negative.

13. Issue No.3 : There is no denial of the factual position that late Pratap Singh Yadav had died on 30.1.92 at about 4:30 p.m. due to electrocution when he came in contact with the stay wire installed to support the electric poll. This has even otherwise been proved beyond doubt by means of cogent and reliable evidence brought on record in the shape of FIR No. 180/92. Ex.PW5/1, testimony of Mr. Tungaj Dhawaj Vashistha, PW-2 Ashok Kumar Debas, PW-3 Smt. Abha Yadav-plaintiff No.1, PW-4 Dr. Mrs. Kamla Gupta, Chief Medical Officer, Rajpur Road who proved the post mortem examination report of the body as PW 4/1A which gives out the cause of death of the deceased as cardio respiratory failure due to electrocution. Even the report of the Accident Enquiry Committee of the defendant acknowledges the fact that the deceased Pratap Singh Yadav had died due to electrocution having coming contact with the stay wire. This issue as such is answered in affirmative and in favor of the plaintiff.

14. Issue No.4 and 5 can be conveniently dealt with together. These issues are the crucial issues in this case because the fate of the case will depend on the answer to the question whether the accident took place due to the negligence of the defendants and if this is answered in affirmative the plaintiff would automatically be entitled to damages. The factual position that Pratap Singh Yadav had died due to electrocution when he caught hold or came in touch with the stay wire fixed at the spot in order to support the main electric poll is not in dispute. The defendant MCD/DVB has disputed any negligence on its part on the defense plea that due to excavation work carried by the MTNL there was a dug out trench as a result of which the earth surrounding the stay wire had loosened and when deceased Pratap Singh Yadav in order to jump over the said trench caught hold the stay wire and put his force/weight on the same, the poll and the stay wire tilted and egg insulator provided thereon was broken and the stay wire became electrified. Consequently it is pleaded that no negligence can be attributed on the part of the MCD and DESU because they were maintaining its electric lines, polls and equipment in accordance with the relevant rules. In this connection heavy reliance has been placed on the report of the Accident Enquiry Committee of the DESU which gave the above reasons for the accident.

15. On the other hand Mr. R. P Thakur learned counsel for the plaintiff has emphatically urged that the defendant-MCD had been negligent in not following the safely and protective norms in relation to its lines and equipment as prescribed by Indian Electricity Rules 1956. In this regard reference has been made to Rule 91 of the Indian Electricity Rules 1956 which reads as under:-

91." Safely and protective devices._ (1) Every overhead line, (not being suspended from a dead bearer wire and not being covered with insulating material and not being a trolley-wire) erected over any part of street or other public place or in any factory or mine or on any consumers" premises shall be protected with a device approved by the Inspector for rendering the line electrically harmless in case it breaks."

"(2) An Inspector may be notice in writing require the owner of any such overhead line wherever it may be erected to protect it in the manner specified in sub-rule (1)."

"(3) The owner of every high and extra-high voltage overhead line shall make adequate arrangements to the satisfaction of the Inspector to prevent unauthorised persons from ascending any of the supports of such overhead lines which can be easily climbed upon without the held of a ladder or special appliances. Rails, reinforced cement concrete poles and pre-stresses cement concrete poles without steps, tubular poles, wooden supports without steps, I-sections and channels shall be deemed as supports which cannot be easily climbed upon for the purpose of this rule."

16. In support of his contention that the defendant-MCD and DESU had been negligent and are liable for damages, plaintiff's counsel heavily relied upon several decisions of the various High Courts and the Apex Courts. The first case relied upon is this Court's decision in the case of Asa Ram & Anr. Vs. MCD & Ors. . In that case also compensation for death due to negligence of the MCD on account of electrocution was claimed and the Court on a consideration of the facts, circumstances and material brought on record had clearly held that the MCD had been negligent and, therefore, liable to pay compensation. In the case of M. P. Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumar & Ors. 2002 SCC (Cri) 315 the Supreme Court considered the question of strict liability of the electricity board in a case of electrocution of a citizen due to a snapped wire falling on the public road which was inundated with rainwater. The court ruled that in such circumstance, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness, State Electricity Board was liable to pay the damages and the exception "act of stranger" to the rule of strict liability was not attracted. The Court held:

" Even assuming that all safety measure had been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertaking. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in hits way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions.

One of the seven exceptions to the doctrine of strict liability is: "act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply. But that exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rat its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant Board."

Holding so, the Court ordered the Electricity Board to pay a compensation of Rs. 4.34 lacs to the claimants.

17. Keeping in view the above legal position, the ultimate question needs to be answered is as to whether the MCD and DESU are liable for the actionable negligence. In the opinion of this Court, once it is established beyond iota of doubt that the deceased Pratap Singh Yadav had died due to electrocution when he came in touch of the stay wire attached to the electric poll the onus to show that the electric line and poll and the stay wire were installed and maintained in accordance with the rules under the Electricity Act and were safe and that the death of Pratap Singh Yadav was not occasioned owning to any negligence on the part of the official of these authorities, lay heavily upon them. Though a defense plea was put forth on behalf of the MCD and DESU that the stay wire became live with the electric current due to the breaking of the egg insulator installed at the electric poll, which in turn had broken due to weight put on the stay wire, but even this defense was not established by means of any cogent and reliable evidence. The sole witness examined on behalf of the defendant MCD and DESU is DW-1 J. K. Sharma, Superintendent (technical) in the district Rohini Sector, North West DVB. This witness simply stated that he learned about the electrocution and consequently death of Pratap Singh Yadav on 31st January, 1992 at about 9.00 a.m. when he reached the office and he in turn informed the concerned Engineer. According to him the incident had not taken place in his presence and he visited the site only thereafter. He stated that the space from which the deceased tried to jump was not a passage meant for use of public but strangely this witness had not disclosed anything about him or his Engineer having noticed a broken insulator at the electric poll at the time they visited the site. In cross-examination the witness denied the suggestion that the wire attached to the poll should be covered.

18. Now coming to the Report of enquiry of the Accident Enquiry Committee dated 2.4.92 it may at once be noted that that no effort was made on the part of the defendant MCD and DESU to prove this Report. None of the Members of the Accident Enquiry Committee was examined. The Report otherwise appears to be a self-serving one because it squarely attributes the incident to the excavation work done by the MTNL authorities which in the opinion of the Committee led to the breaking of the egg insulator probably due to extra burden on the stay wire. Even this finding is not firm and positive enough to hold that the electrocution of the deceased could be directly co-related with the excavation work carried by the M.T.N.L. Authorities. Even if for the sake of argument, it is assumed that the earth surrounding the stay wire had caved in due to digging and rain even then it was the responsibility of the MCD and DESU authorities to have filled up the area so as to ensure safety and security of the stay wire and the electric poll against any hazard. So looking from any angle whatsoever, there is no escape from the conclusion that the stay wire attached to the electric poll was electrified and became live with current due to the negligence of the MCD/DESU in proper maintenance of their lines and equipment. In the opinion of this Court the MCD and DESU are squarely liable for the actionable negligence in regard to the death of Pratap Singh Yadav and no liability can be fastened on the MTNL.

19. The next is somewhat intricate question in regard to the assessment of damages/compensation which should be awarded. It is a fairly well settled position that in a fatal accident action, the accepted measure of damages awarded to the dependents is the pecuniary loss suffered by them as a result of the death. "How much has the widow and family lost by the father's death?" The answer to this lies in the of-quoted passage from the opinion of Lord Wright in Davies and Anr. v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., (1942) Appeal Cases 601 at 617 which says:-

"The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum of basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase. That sum, however, has to be taxed down by having due regard to uncertainties, for instance, that the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and other like matters of speculation and doubt."

20. It is also well recognised that except where there is express statutory direction to the contrary, the damages to be awarded to a dependent of a deceased person under the Fatal Accidents Act must take into account any pecuniary benefit accruing to that defendant in consequence of the death of the deceased. The actual pecuniary loss of each individual entitled to sue can only be ascertained by balancing, on the one hand, the loss to him of the future pecuniary benefit, and, on the other, any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to him by reason of the death. In the case of Gobald Moter Services Ltd. vs. R.M.K.Veluswami & Ors., , the Supreme Court stated that the general principle is that the actual pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a deponent by the death, must be ascertained. It is, thus, clear that the assessment of damages to compensate the dependent is beset with difficulties because from the nature of things, it has to take into account many imponderables, e.g., the life expectancy of the deceased and the dependents; the amount that the deceased would have earned during the remainder of his life; the amount that would have contributed to the dependents during that period; the chances that the deceased may not have lived or the dependents may not live up to the estimated remaining period of their life expectancy; the chances that the deceased might have got better employment or income or might have lost his employment or income altogether, are also relevant factors. The manner of arriving at the damages is to ascertain the net income of the deceased for the support of himself and his dependents and to deduct there from such part of his income as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself as regards both self maintenance and pleasure and to ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the dependents. It is almost impossible to make a perfect assessment because much of the calculation necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis and, therefore, it is the over-all picture through which the Court has to assess, as best as it can, the quantum of compensation.

21. Bearing in mind the legal position and the principle, we proceed to assess the compensation in the case in hand. It is not disputed that the deceased at the time of his death was 36 years of age and was employed as a Junior Telecom Officer at a gross salary of Rs.3,850/- per month and but for the untimely death, he would have continued in service uptill 2013 and would have been promoted to higher posts. Before the filing of suit, the plaintiffs had served a legal notice dated 5th February, 1994 on defendants 1 & 2 claiming a sum of Rs.15,96,690/- as compensation to the plaintiffs, the compensation having been assessed on a calculation of the salary on year to year basis starting from 1992 to 2013, the year uptil which the deceased would have been in the service had he not died prematurely. The assessment so made had not taken into account the enhanced salary which the deceased would have got on promotion. It also does not take into account any increase in salary owing to the revision/upgradation of pay-scales and allowances through the Pay Commissions. The plaintiff No.1 entered the witness box and claimed that she is not employed anywhere and has no earnings and her sons plaintiffs 2 to 4 were minors at the time of filing of the suit and plaintiff No.5, father of the deceased has to fall back only on the compensation which they might receive in the present suit. She has claimed a compensation of Rs.15 lacs which has not been controverter nor even a suggestion was put to her that the compensation claimed was excessive. Therefore, taking into account the above facts and circumstances of the case, no doubt is left in the mind of this Court that the deceased must have earned a salary of not less than Rs.20 lacs during the remainder period of his employment. The deceased was a middle level officer and having regard to the number of family members dependent upon him, this Court can safely assume that the deceased would not have spend more than 1/4th of the salary on himself. Therefore, looked from any angle, the assessment of the claim for damages at Rs.15 lacs seems to be quite just and reasonable and cannot be said to be excessive by any standard. In the opinion of this Court, it is a fit case where the plaintiffs can be awarded the full amount of compensation as claimed by them in the suit.

22. Now comes the last question about the apportionment of the amount of compensation so awarded amongst the five plaintiffs. This has to be answered in view of the provisions of Section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act. In view of the relationship of the plaintiffs with the deceased e.g. plaintiff No.1 is the widow of the deceased and plaintiffs 2 to 4 are the three sons and plaintiff No.5 is the father of the deceased, it seems to be appropriate that the amount of compensation so awarded should be apportioned in equal proportion amongst them meaning thereby that each of the five plaintiffs would be entitled to receive Rs.3 lacs out of the awarded compensation. However, so far as the amount of compensation payable to plaintiff No.4, who is still a minor, is concerned, the amount may be disbursed to his mother and natural guardian, plaintiff No.1 Smt.Abha Yadav. Although all other plaintiffs are major and they would be free to receive and utilise the amount of compensation in any manner they like but it is advisable for them if at least half of the amount of compensation received by them is invested in some term deposit etc. so as to take care of their future needs. The amount of compensation payable to plaintiff No.1 Smt.Abha Yadav in the capacity of mother and natural guardian of plaintiff No.4 Avinash Yadav shall be kept by her in a fixed deposit account in the name of Avinash yadav till he attains majority but she will be entitled to receive the periodical interest accruing thereon for the maintenance and education of plaintiff No.1. Though the petition was filed about eight years back still it is not proposed to award any interest on the amount of compensation because the compensation awarded is relatable to the salary which the deceased would have earned during the remaining period of his service uptill 2013. However award of future interest would be justified in the facts and circumstances of the case.

23. In the result plaintiffs' suit is hereby decreed for the recovery of Rs.15 lacs (Rupees fifteen lacs ) only with cost and future interest @ 9% per annum against defendant Nos. 1 and 2. The amount of compensation if paid shall be disbursed amongst the plaintiffs and received and utilised by them in the manner as observed in the preceding paragraph of this judgment. Let a decree sheet be drawn accordingly.