K.P. Singh vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.
2003 Latest Caselaw 24 Del

JUDGMENT

D.K. Jain, J.

1. An Order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (for short the Tribunal) on 4 August 1999, dismissing the petitioner's original application (OA No. 825/94), against the award of punishment of dismissal from service is under challenge in this writ petition.

2. In November 1980, the petitioner was appointed as an Auditor in the defense Accounts Department and was posted in the office of the Controller of defense Accounts (Funds), Meerut. He was transferred to New Delhi on 29 June 1992. Vide order dated 17 August 1992, he was placed under suspension pending inquiry and charge memo was issued to him on 26 June 1993 for his alleged acts of misbehavior, misconduct, indiscipline and disobedience, alleging that : (i) on 27 July 1992 he went to the Section in drunken state to produce the application for leave for his absence, enclosing the medical certificate and when one of the officers wanted to reconcile the discrepancy about his ailment shown in the medical certificate, he insulted her by throwing papers and shouting at her using intemperate language (ii) on 28 July 1992, in drunken state, he threatened to kidnap an officer and his family and also challenged the staff in the corridor attracting the attention of the staff and disrupting the normal functioning of the office; (iii) on 12 August 1992 he disobeyed the orders of the superior officer and tried to enter the nearby Accounts section and (iv) he was detained in judicial custody for more than 48 hours on 6 July 1992 in a case registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 and 307 IPC, in Meerut.

3. The petitioner was granted an opportunity to reply to these allegations, which he did on 28 June 1993 denying all the allegations. Not being satisfied with the reply and invoking the powers vested in him under Rule 19(ii) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (for short 'the Rules'), the Disciplinary Authority ordered dismissal of the petitioner from service. Petitioner's appeal against the said order was unsuccessful. Aggrieved, the petitioner carried the matter to the Tribunal but again without any success. Hence the present petition.

4. It is strenuously urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate that for resorting to the said Rule there was no material before the Disciplinary Authority to record his satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a regular inquiry. Learned counsel would urge that without reference to any overt act on the part of the petitioner which could create such a terror that the witnesses would not depose against him, a bald allegation that the witnesses were stricken with sudden terror was not sufficient to invoke the extraordinary power to dispense with the regular inquiry under Rule 14 and deprive the petitioner of his valuable right to defend himself. It is asserted that the action of the respondents is malafide and is aimed at getting rid of him, who was an elected General Secretary of the All India defense Accounts Departments Association (Calcutta Branch). Lastly, it was urged that the punishment awarded to the petitioner is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct of the petitioner, which aspect the Tribunal has failed to consider.

5. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner. Rule 19(ii) of the Rules reads as follows:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 14 to Rule 18 -

(i) ..........

(ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules, or

(iii).............

the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit."

6. The Rule provides that if the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry as per Rule 14, he can dispense with the inquiry and in the circumstances of the case, pass such order as he may deem fit. It is true that under the Rule the Disciplinary Authority is not expected to dispense with the regular inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or with ulterior motive or to merely avoid the holding of the inquiry but as observed by the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel in which case their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with the scope of clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, which is the main source of authority of a particular officer to dispense with the inquiry under service rules, like Rule 19(ii) in the present case, that whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause(b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man, taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It was further observed that "the reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the Disciplinary Authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening and is the best judge of the situation."

7. Having examined the impugned order in the light of the aforenoted broad principles, we feel that no interference is called for with the impugned order. As observed by the Tribunal, the Disciplinary Authority has found as a fact that the petitioner was detained in judicial custody on 6 July 1992, pending registration of case under Sections 147, 148, 307 and 302 IPC and, further, the material witnesses in the case was scared of giving evidence in view of the misbehavior and misconduct displayed by the petitioner which had generated a fear psychosis in the minds of the witnesses. The Tribunal has also noticed that the said fear psychosis of the staff had increased further as they were aware of the petitioner's various activities at Meerut and the threats he was holding out to the senior officers.

8. Bearing in mind all these facts, we find it difficult to hold that the satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority to the effect that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry against the petitioner as per the Rules is without any basis. As observed in Tulsi Ram Patel (supra), only the authority on the spot is the best judge of the situation. Keeping in view the conduct of the petitioner, we also find it difficult to interfere with the punishment awarded to the petitioner. Sympathy and commiseration cannot be allowed to outweigh considerations of public policy, concern for public interest and regard for public good.

9. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.