Sanjay Goyal vs Government Of Nct Of Delhi And Ors.
2003 Latest Caselaw 893 Del

JUDGMENT

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. This is a case which deals with the grant of L-52 licenses for retail sale of IMFL/Beer in Delhi. Earlier, a writ petition had been filed by the same party being CW 1295/2003. The same was disposed of by the order dated 20.05.2003 in the following manner:-

"In this petition, the only question is with regard to the allocation of district. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that in this petition, the respondent is willing to issue a show cause notice to the petitioner on this question itself and the petitioner would have full opportunity to reply to the show cause notice and also have an opportunity of being heard in the matter. In view of this, since it would involve detailed investigation into facts, the appropriate course would be for the respondent to issue a show cause notice and after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner come to a decision on the merits of the case in accordance with law. It is expected that this process would be completed within three weeks from today. In view of these directions, this writ petition is disposed of.

The liberty is granted to the petitioner to approach this court after the decision is taken."

2. Since liberty had been granted to the petitioner to approach this Court after the decision was taken, the petitioner has utilised that liberty to file the present writ petition challenging the order dated 01.07.2003 which has been passed by the Collector of Excise, Government of NCT of Delhi whereby the submissions made by the petitioner in rely to the show cause notice no. 3364 dated 28.05.2003 were considered and it was directed that the petitioner be de-listed from the list of successful applicants for the grant of L-52 licenses.

3. The issue involved here is that the petitioner wanted an L-52 license for retail sale of IMFL/beer from his premises at H-1/28-30, New Seelampur, Delhi-110053. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the petitioner had applied for 'East District' whereas, in fact, at the time of site inspection, it was revealed that the aforesaid premises is located in 'North-East District'. The Collector, Excise has passed the order after examining the factual position. It is recorded in the order that from a perusal of the application form submitted by the applicant, it was apparent that the name of district was mentioned as 'East' on the top of the application form. It is further mentioned therein that on the basis of this information provided by the applicant 'Code No. 01' was allotted to the application which pertains to the 'East District'. The whole question here turns on this finding of the fact as to whether the applicant had applied for 'East District' or 'North-East District'. It is the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that there was no column in the application form for providing the district for which he was applying and that in fact the word 'East' written on the top of the application form was not written by the petitioner. This is a disputed question of fact. This Court is loathe to go into disputed questions of fact and more so when the alternative remedy of a statutory appeal is provided under Section 14 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 which is applicable to Delhi. The Supreme Court in the recent case of Seth Chand Ratan v. Pandit Durga Prasad, reported in 2003 AIR SCW 3078 has clearly held that it has been settled by a long catena of decisions that when a right or liability is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before seeking the discretionary remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is no doubt a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and the Court in exceptional cases can issue a discretionary writ of certiorari where there is complete lack of jurisdiction for the officer or authority or Tribunal to take the action or there has been a contravention of fundamental rights or there has been a violation of rules of natural justice or where the Tribunal acted under a provision of law, which is ultra vires. None of these exceptional situations arise in the facts of the present case. Therefore, the petitioner has an alternative remedy which he should pursue in the first instance. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he would be filing an appeal within two weeks under the provisions of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914. It appears that the appeal may be beyond limitation. However, it is directed that limitation may not be taken as a ground for rejecting the appeal of the petitioner. In view of aforesaid discussion, it is directed that the appeal, if filed within two weeks, be disposed of as early as possible. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of.