Shri Mahesh Chand vs Sh. A.K. Chakravarty And Ors.
2003 Latest Caselaw 811 Del

JUDGMENT

S.K. Mahajan, J.

1. C.M. No.1056/2001 (condensation of delay) Since there was a delay in filing this appeal, the appellant has filed this application for condensation of delay in filing the same. It is stated in the application that the appellant was never served with the summons in the case by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and on coming to know of the award, he had filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the same. His application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was dismissed and an appeal against the order of dismissal of the application was also dismissed by this Court. It was after the dismissal of the appeal on 26.9.2001 that the present appeal was filed on 01.12.2001 challenging the main award. It is submitted that since the appellant was bonafide and in good faith taking recourse to the legal proceedings for setting aside the ex parte award, there was a delay in filing appeal against the award and consequently there was sufficient cause for condensation of delay in filing this appeal. It is also submitted that as the appellant was neither the driver nor the owner of the bus, he was neither aware about the proceedings in the Court nor could he be held liable to make payment under the award and that is also the reason why this appeal should be entertained against the impugned award.

2. Despite notice and number of opportunities, the respondents have not filed reply to the application.

3. It was stated in the claim application filed by respondents 1 and 2 before the Tribunal for grant of compensation that the vehicle was owned by the appellant and respondent no.3. Appellant has been described as the proprietor of respondent no.3. Admittedly, respondent no.3 is a private limited company. Admittedly there can be no proprietor of a private limited company but this is a question which has to be decided on merits and this application cannot be allowed only on the ground that the appellant had nothing to do with the offending bus involved in the accident. It is, however, not denied that the appellant on coming to know of the award had filed an application for setting aside the same on the ground that he was not served with the summons in the suit and that application was dismissed by the Tribunal. An appeal against the order was also dismissed by order dated 29.10.2001. In my view, since the appellant was bonafide and in good faith pursuing legal remedies available to him under law, there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal against the award till such time those proceedings had come to an end. I, therefore, find sufficient cause in not filing the appeal in time. I, accordingly, allow this application and condone the delay in filing the appeal. The application stands disposed of.

FAO No.583/2001 and CMs1057/2001 and 198/2002

ADMIT.

4. Since the point involved in the appeal is short, the same has been heard with the consent of the parties and disposed of by this order.

5. This appeal is filed by the appellant challenging the impugned award dated 20.4.1992, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal whereby the claim application of respondent no.1 was allowed and the appellant and respondents 3 and 7 were directed to pay a sum of Rs.1,49,882/- with proportionate costs and interest to respondent no.1. The liability of the insurance company, respondent No.7, was held to be limited to Rs.50,000/- and the appellant and respondent no.3 were, therefore, directed to pay remaining compensation of Rs.99,882/- to respondent No.1. The appellant has challenged this award on the ground that he was neither the owner nor the driver of the offending vehicle and there was thus no reason as to why he should be directed to pay compensation under the award.

6. Respondents 1 and 2 had filed an application claiming compensation for the injuries alleged to have been sustained by them in a road accident caused due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus allegedly owned by the appellant and respondent no.3 and insured with respondent no. 7. It was stated in the application that the appellant was the proprietor of respondent no.3. Respondent no.3 is admittedly a company incorporated under the Companies Act. There cannot be any dispute about the proposition that an individual cannot be a proprietor of a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act. An incorporated company is a distinct legal entity managed by its Board of Directors. All that was stated about the appellant in the claim petition was that the vehicle was owned by respondent no.3 company which is owned by the appellant and it was hired to the school/ respondents no. 5. The stand of the claimants before the Tribunal, therefore, was that the appellant is the owner of a private Limited company. This stand on the face of it appears to be not tenable. As already mentioned above, a person cannot be owner of a private limited company. In the award, the Tribunal has not discussed as to how the appellant become owner of a private limited company. He was not even shown to be a shareholder or director of the company. When the matter came up for hearing before this Court on 24.7.2002, it was fairly conceded by learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 that he did not claim that the appellant was the owner of the offending vehicle. That being the position, it is not understood as to how the appellant could be made liable to pay compensation to the claimants. It is either the driver or the owner or the insurer who can be held liable to pay compensation to the victim of the road accident. A person who has nothing to do with the offending vehicle cannot be held liable to pay compensation. As admittedly the appellant is not owner of the offending vehicle, in my opinion, the award insofar as it directs the appellant to pay compensation cannot be sustained. I, accordingly, allow this appeal to the extent that the appellant will not be liable to pay any part of compensation to the claimants. The appeal, accordingly, stands disposed of with no order as costs.