Sh. Devari Lal, Sh. Anil And Anr. ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.
2002 Latest Caselaw 953 Del

JUDGMENT

A.K. Sikri, J.

1. Common question of law is involved in all these petitions. That is the reason all these petitions were taken up for hearing together and we propose to dispose of the same by this common judgment.

2. Some of the writ petitions are filed by Union of India against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal as in these cases, the relief was granted by the learned Tribunal to the concerned workmen (for the sake of convenience, hereinafter referred to as the 'casual labourers' ). The direction given in all these cases is that these casual labourers should be brought on the Live Casual Labour Register ('LCLR' for short). Some other writ petitions are filed by the causal labourers. In those cases the learned Tribunal refused the relief prayed for by these casual labourers for bringing them on the LCLR.

3. It may be mentioned at this stage that most of these casual labourers had worked intermittently in early 80s. They had filed Original Applications in late 90s or even thereafter for re-engaging them and placing their names on the LCLR. Union of India (hereinafter referred to as the 'department') had contested the Original Applications on the ground that the casual labourers had approached the learned Tribunal much belatedly, i.e., after number of years ranging from 8-9 years to 16-18 years. The casual labourers tried to meet this argument by contending that the cause of action was continuing one inasmuch as Scheme for placing casual labourers on the LCLR was a continuing one. In those case where the relief has been granted to the casual labourers by the learned Tribunal and the department has filed the Origingal Application, the learned Tribunal agreed with the contention of the casual labourers holding that it was continuing cause of action. Contrary view as taken in other cases and the Original Applications were dismissed as highly belated and time barred.

4. Sensing that different Benches of the Tribunal were rendering conflicting decisions, the matter was referred to the Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Full Bench vide order dated 10th May, 2000, in a batch of Original Applications, took the view that cause of action was not continuous. Dealing with Circular dated 28th August, 1987 as per which the casual labourers get right to be placed on the LCLR, the Full Bench observed:

"Aforesaid circular, in our judgment, confers a right on casual labour to be placed on the live casual labour register. The said right arises the moment the casual labour is discharged. The said right is conferred on such casual labour who have been discharged after 1.1.1981. Hence, the moment a casual labour is discharged, a right to be placed on the register arises. To give an example, in respect of casual labour who have been discharged say, on

1.1.1982, the right to be placed on the register arises as on that date. The casual labour, no doubt has a right to be continued on the live casual labour register indefinitely. However, before that right of being continued on the register indefinitely can arise, the right to be placed on the rigister in the first instance, has to be asserted. The cause of action for asserting the said right arises on 1.1.1982 when the casual labour is discharged. This is amply clear from the aforesaid recital to be found in the circular. Circular no doubt casts an obligation on the part of the administration to maintain the registers continuously. That, however, does not mean that the same confers a continuing right on the part of the casual labour to be palced on the register in the first instance. If the right which ahs accrued in his favor on 1.1.1982 is denied to him, he has to take recourse to approach this Tribunal within the time prescribed by Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. He cannot wait for time immemorial and approach the Tribunal at leisure and, at his whims and fancies, may be years later, and assert his right of being placed on the register."

5. Full Bench also held that these casual labourers fall in two categories - one whose services had been discharged, and other who had either abandoned their employment or had not accepted the offer of employment when made. In respect of the first category, it held that right in their favor accrued the moment their services were discharged, and therefore, the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') prescribing the period of limitation would be applicable in such cases. In so far as the casual labourers of second category are concerned, the Full Bench held that the right contained in the Circular had not been bestowed upon them and on the contrary they had been deprived of the aforesaid benefit under the terms of this Circular itself.

Thereafter, the Full Bench after relying upon various judgments of the Apex Court, answered the question referred to it in the following terms:

"Provisions of the relevant Railway Board's circular dated 25.4.1986 followed by the circular dated 28th August, 1987 issued by General Manager, Northern Railway for placing the names of casual labour on the live casual labour register do not give rise to a continuous cause of action and hence the provisions of limitation contained in Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 would apply."

6. This Full Bench judgment is also under challenge in CWP No. 6513/2000 which is one of the petitions in this batch of writ petitions.

7. Before proceeding further, we may mention that on an earlier occasion, the Division Bench of this court in the case of Shish Pal Singh and Ors. v. UOI in CWP No. 5071/99 disposed of on 23rd August, 1999 had made observations to the effect that in the matter of maintenance of a LCLR, cause of action was a continuous one. In fact in many of these Original Applications allowed by the learned Tribunal against which the department has filed the writ petitions, the learned Tribunal has relied upon the aforesaid Division Bench

judgment in the case of Shish Pal Singh (supra). However, in another case, namely, Jagdish Prasad v. Union of India and Ors. in CWP No. 450/2001, the correctness of the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench in Shish Pal Singh (supra) was doubted and the matter was referred to the Full Bench of this court. The Full Bench thereafter considered this question and vide judgment dated 7th May, 2002 held that in a case of this nature, the cause of action would not be a continuous one and to this extent the decision in Shish Pal Singh (supra) was over-ruled. The Full Bench of this court, while holding the aforesaid view, relied upon two judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ratam Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors. .

8. It may also be mentioned that Jagdish Prasad (supra) was also a case of Railway administration and same Circular dated 28th August, 1987 came up for consideration in that case as well. It clearly emerges from the aforesaid discussion that interpreting the same Circular of the Railways relating to maintenance of LCLR and placing the names of the casual labourers on the said register. The Full Bench of the learned Tribunal as well as the Full Bench of this court have taken the view that it is not a continuous cause of

action and provisions of Section 21 of the Act would apply. In view thereof, same consequences could follow in the present batch of writ petitions as well.

9. However, learned counsel appearing for the casual labourers, in different cases, made fervent attempt to persuade us to take different view contending that some of he provisions contained in the aforesaid Circular and subsequent scheme of the Railways were not brought to the notice of the Full Bench. In the first instance, the learned counsel referred to the order dated 6th December, 2001 passed in CWP No. 6513/2000 and the following portion of that order was emphasised:

"By Court order dated 11.10.2001, Competent Authority of Railways was directed to subscribe an affidavit to indicate the manner and method of opening and maintaining LCLR and whether it contained particulars of all discharged/retrenched casual labour or whether such labour had to approach and apply for enlisting in this Register. Requisite affidavit was filed stating in para 5 that LCLR was being maintained in respective seniority units where varying particulars of retrenched casual labour were entered in order of their seniority. Though this suggests that all discharged/retrenched casual labour figured in this furnishing them a continuous cause of action to seek reengagement, but L/C for Railways still insisted that such labour had to ask for enlistment..."

10. Reference was also made to paras 7 and 9 of the Circular dated 28th August, 1987 as per which the department was to ensure that name of each casual

labour discharged any time after 1st January, 1981 on completion of work or for want of further productive work, was to be continued to be borne on the LCLR. It was submitted that to the similar effect was the later Scheme of the department.

11. We are afraid the aforesaid arguments do not persuade us to take a different vies. As far as order dated 6th December, 2001 is concerned, the same was an interim order passed in CWP No. 6513/2000 and expression of tentative view at that stage. Fact remains that after making the aforequoted observations, the department was directed to file an additional affidavit to clarify the position. Such an affidavit has been filed in all these writ petitions. In the additional affidavit filed in CWP No. 6513/2000, the department has explained:

"That detailed instructions were issued vide Northern Rly. Printed Serial No. 9349 which, inter alia, provide that whenever additional requirement of Casual Labour arises, the same is to be met by re-engaging the casual labour who had earlier worked on the seniority unit and had been retrenched due to completion of work. It was further provided that re-engagement of such casual labour had to be done on the basis of their seniority by following the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. i.e. 'LAST GO FIRST IN'.

That in order to ensure re-engagement of ex-casual labour on the principle of 'LAST GO FIRST IN' Live Casual Labour Registers are maintained in respective seniority units Wherein the particulars of the retrenched casual labour are entered in order of their seniority.

Amongst other details, the particulars listed below are to be entered into the Register to determine their seniority for re-engagement:-

(i) Name of the casual labour.

(ii) Father's name.

(iii) Date of Birth

(iv) Educational qualification.

(v) Personal mark of identification.

(vi) Date of engagement.

(vii) Age at the time of initial casual labour employment.

(viii) Nature of job in each occasion.

(ix) Date of retrenchment.

(x) Reason for retrenchment.

(xi) Signature of casual labour.

(xii) Signature of the supervisor (under whose supervision Live Casual Labour Register is maintained).

12. Therefore, now the matter having been clarified, the aforesaid tentative observations in order dated 6th December, 2001 would be of no help to the casual labourers.

13. In so far as paras 7 and 9 of the Circular dated 28th August, 1997 are concerned, what is stated in these paras is that even when the casual labourers who were discharged at any time after 1st January, 1981 on completion of work of for want of productive work, their name should continue to be borne on the LCLR and if the names of such casual labourers had been deleted due to earlier instructions those should be restored on the LCLR. From a provision of this nature, it cannot be said that id the name is not continued at the time of discharge of such casual labourers or the name of those are deleted earlier had not been restored, the cause of action would be continuous one. In fact as

per this Circular if on discharge the name of casual labourer was not continued on LCLR, cause of action would accrue on that date. Likewise, even if after this Circular dated 28th August, 1987 names of those casual labourers who were removed from the LCLR were not brought on record, cause of action, for bringing the names restored, would arise on the date of aforesaid Circular.

14. We do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the casual labourers that the Full Bench of the learned Tribunal was wrong in observing that cause of action arose at the time of their discharge. The learned counsel contended that the name was to be brought on the LCLR at the time of engagement and not at the time of discharge. Although we do not find any merit in such contention, if it is presumed to be so, it goes against the casual labourers as the cause of action would be further anterior in point of time as the engagement would be prior in point of time than the discharge and the resultant delay would be even more.

15. We, therefore, do not find any distinguishing circumstances in this case. We are also bound by the judgment of the Full Bench. We further hold that the impugned judgment of the Full Bench of the learned Tribunal, wherein same view has been taken as the Full Bench of this court, is correct in law. In fact the

said Full Bench judgment of the learned Tribunal has been referred to in the Full Bench judgment of this court dated 7th May, 2002 passed in CWP No. 450/2001.

16. The writ petitions of the department, except CWP No. 2817/2000 are accordingly allowed and the writ petitions filed by the casual labourers are dismissed.

CWP NO: 2817/2000

17. In so far as this writ petition is concerned, the learned counsel for the casual labourer/respondent pointed out that after the judgment of the learned Tribunal, the department had not only implemented the judgment by placing the name of the respondent on the LCLR but he was engaged as well. In this view of the matter, when the judgment of the learned Tribunal stands implemented and the benefit already extended to the respondent, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the learned Tribunal.

18. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

19. There shall be no order as to costs.