Dhanvinder Singh And Ors. vs State Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr.
2002 Latest Caselaw 744 Del

JUDGMENT

S. Mukerjee, J.

1. The petitioners 1 to 6 in the present case are accused numbers 7 to 12 in FIR No. 232/2001 registered under Sections 498A and 406 IPC by Police Station Chittaranjan Park. The case of the petitioners is that despite there being no direct blood or marriage relation between the petitioners and the complaint Smt. Chander Kanta, they have been dragged into the abovementioned FIR simply because petitioner No. 1 happened to have come to know the father-in-law of the complaint during business trips, and otherwise as family-friends. The telephone number of accused No. 7 had been given for local contact reference purposes at the stage of negotiation of the marriage, and the petitioners also, who had limited role to play in relation to the marriage and the ceremonies and certain other matters related therewith, only in the said capacity of family friends. It is contended that therefore they (petitioners) could not be roped in to the FIR No. 232/2001 relating to alleged offences under Section 498A and/ or 406 IPC.

2. Sh. Dinesh Mathur, leaned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has vehemently argued before us that the FIR deserves to be quashed in as much as no offence under other Section 406 or 498A IPC is made out against the petitioners on the basis of the FIR as it stands. He has also referred to a number of documents, affidavits and other averments in order to contend that the FIR and related proceedings are nothing else but a malafide exercise meant only for harassing the petitioners and that too after the complainant had separated from her husband in December 1999 and the divorce was granted in April 2001, and the decree of divorce made absolute in November 2001.

3. The further submission of Sh. Mathur with his usual eloquence was that the complaint had earlier to the lodging of FIR, taken out divorce proceedings and also filed a criminal case for harassment and misappropriation of her dowry articles including stridhan in London, and at that time no such allegations were made against the petitioners herein. The suggestion is that whatever complaint has now been set up by way of the present FIR, is only in the nature of a concocted case, by way of an after thought, and is also motivated, spiteful and vexatious.

4. Sh. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents duly countered each of the submissions put forward by Shri Mathur and also placed reliance upon the latest decisions of the Supreme Court laying down, in categorical terms as per his submission, that an FIR is to be quashed only very sparingly and with circumspection and that too only in the rarest of rare cases.

5. Having considered the matter in the perspective of the latest decisions of the Apex Court embodying clearest caution, in strongest terms, regarding the scope of the power of quashing of criminal proceedings, we fee that it would be appropriate to look at the matter from the purely legal aspect of examining the inherent powers as recognised in Section 482 of Cr.P.C. which are reserved for being used to give an effect to the provisions of the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of Code, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

6. For reasons, we will elaborate hereinbelow, we do not consider it appropriate to enter into the consideration of correctness of the rival versions or even an examination of the question whether on the material as existing in the complaint and other material collected during the investigation (which is not yet complete), the result will be a successful prosecution or not.

7. In our view, the present case is not a fit case for quashing the FIR, and we indicate our reasons for this view limiting our observations to the extent required for disposal of the present petition only, lest the same operate to the prejudice of either of the parties in a matter which is still under investigation:-

a) the complaint dated 16.7.2001 refers to all 13 accused by name with details and description about the role of each one of them with other particulars. The petitioners before us are accused numbers 7 to 12 in the said complaint. The said complaint runs into about 8 pages of single space typed sheets, in various paragraphs with sub paras etc, and the main paragraphs being total 12 in number. There are specific allegations in relation to each of the accused persons, at different places in the said complaint. The complainant has not only indicated the role of different accused persons in relation to each accusation which has been presented chronologicaly, but also which group of accused persons had what role(s) on each aspect has also been clearly spelt out. Just by way of illustration, we may mention that while para 1 refers to the role of accused No. 1, the second para refer to accused numbers 3,7 and 8. Similarly paras 9, 10 (i), (ii) etc. refer to the role of accused numbers 1,3 and 6 to 12.

8. There are a number of allegations against accused numbers 7 to 12 exclusively as in the case of para 10 (xviii). There are paragraphs which are only directed against accused number 7, or against accused numbers 7 and 8 only.

9. Without elaborating further, we may summarise it to say that the complaint as it stands, does make out a case for registering an FIR and for carrying out investigation thereon. As held by the Apex Court in the cases reported as Mahavir Prasad Gupta and Anr. v. NCT of Delhi and Ors. 2000 (8) SCC of 115) the High Court under Article 226 of under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability, or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. Neither the extraordinary writ jurisdiction nor inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC would confer the said jurisdiction upon us while dealing with matter where the investigations are still under progress, and where the complaint is specific and detailed.

10. We are unable to hold that in this case the complaint of FIR by itself, on the face of it, does not make out an offence. The present case also does not fall in any of the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal and other's cases on the point.

11. We have to consider the matter in the context of the present stage of proceedings since the FIR is still under investigation and we cannot also appreciate or weigh the materials on record for coming to the conclusion as to whether offences would be ultimately established against the petitioners or not. While we feel that the High Court does have the extraordinary and inherent jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and/or under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to interdict in criminal proceedings but that would be so only in the rarest of the rare cases. The power to quash F.I.R. has to be exercised with greatest care and circumspection. Moreover we take not that as per the decision of the Apex Court in Mahavir Prasad Gupta's case (supra), it is not for the High Court to pre-judge the case at this stage.

12. We are conscious that in a matter which has been argued at some length on two different dates by the Senior Counsel for the petitioners and respondents respectively, either party may feel that we have not considered their respective submissions in an elaborate manner, as they may have wanted of us but our constraint is that we have to ensure above all that neither party is put to prejudice by any observations made by us and hence we have restricted ourselves, in this judgment, to the consideration of only those aspects of jurisdictional nature, going to the root of the matter, which we felt were aspects which would bring a case within or take it out of the fold of the rarest of the rare cases warranting quashment of an FIR.

13. The above view which we have taken find support from a catena of judgment of the apex Court out of which we wish to make a reference to only a few for explaining our finding has arrived by us hereinabove. In the case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and Anr., , the Apex Court had occasion to deal with the scope of "stridhan and dowry articles. Over-ruling the judgment of the Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High court in Vinod Kumar's case it was held that the stridhan property of a married woman even if it be placed in custody of her husband or in-laws, still they would only be deemed to be trustees who are bound to return the same if and when demanded by her. Accordingly, the offence of breach of trust, could be alleged once the property is entrusted and the dominion for the property is given to the trustees. In this case the Apex Court approved the observations of Punjab High Court in Bhai Sher Jung Singh v. Virinder Kaur, where it was held that when a complainant makes an allegation in the complaint that either her husband or her parents-in-law had converted to their own use, the ornaments forming the part of her stridhan which she had entrusted to them, then the Court are to give legal effect to such allegation, and to assume that such ornaments had been made the subject matter of criminal breach of trust. The Apex Court also approved of the observations of Punjab and Haryana Court in Bhai Sher Jung's case (supra) to the effect that the complaint is under no obligation to plead the legal effect of the allegations made. All that is required is that the facts constituting a complaint should be specifically mentioned so that the Court may be able to perform its duty of punishing the accused under the appropriate provision of law, if such allegation is ultimately established. Such a complaint cannot be quashed without giving the wife an opportunity of proving that the ornaments had been given to her at the time of her marriage for her use only.

14. In the context of exercising powers under Section 480 Cr.P.C. (or Article 226 of the Constitution), the Apex Court observed that the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se, and where the allegations are clear, specific and unambiguous the complainant should be given the chance to prove her case, and the accused should be relegated to adopting whatever defenses were open, during the trial, and not by way of proceedings to quash the FIR/complaint.

15. In the State of Tamilnadu v. T. Perumal it was held following the Apex Court decision in Bhajan Lal's case that normal process of criminal trial cannot be cut-short, and the reliability or the genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint cannot be considered at the stage of a petition seeking quashment.

16. In the State of West Bengal v. Narayan K. Patoddia, , it was held that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are reserved to be used only to give effect to any orders under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, and therefore quashing should not be permitted where the ends of criminal justice are not subserved by doing so.

17. In Hardeo Singh v. State of Bihar and Anr., , it was held that where the "criminal purpose" in the matter cannot possibly be ruled out, then even if the allegation in a complaint may or may not be sufficient to bring home the charge, but that by itself would not authorise the court to call it a day. It was further held that criminal prosecution does not ipso facto necessarily mean harassment and except where there is travesty of justice or any undue prejudice, the prosecution is to be allowed to continue, and ultimately if the charge is not proved, the accused would be acquitted. For the purposes of proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Apex Court felt that once the record discloses some material for scrutiny against the accused persons, then it will not be appropriate for the High Court to interdict the criminal proceedings by quashing the FIR/complaint.

18. In the State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi and Ors., 2000 (8) SCC 239, it was held by the Apex Court that the invoking of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. was warranted only in exceptional circumstances calling for immediate interference of he High Court and that otherwise any attempt for quashing of charge before the entire prosecution evidence as come on record, should not be entertained.

19. In Mahavir Prasad's case (supra), it was held that the power of quashing criminal proceedings must be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. A brief look at the facts of the said case may be useful. The petitioner before the Supreme Court had sought quashing on the ground that even before the complaint by respondent had been filed the firm had addressed a notice demanding outstanding payments and that the respondents owed to the petitioner therein more than a crore of rupees. It was submitted that the petitioner firm had exercised lien over the goods till their dues were paid, and had claimed so in the legal notice and that the complaint had been filed falsely with the intention of misusing the process of law and subjecting the petitioner to undue harassment. It was the contention of the petitioner that the police has refused to register the FIR by acknowledging that the disputes and differences of the parties against each other, had to be resolved in a civil court.

20. The Apex Court while rejecting this plea observed inter alia that none of these aspects could be gathered from the complaint, implying thereby that only the complaint is to be considered. It was further held that the court would not be justified in embarking upon the reliability, or genuineness, or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, or as to whether allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not.

21. In the conspectus of the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court on the point, we hold that the present case does not in any manner fall in the category of the rarest of rare cases warranting interdicting of the criminal proceedings at this stage. As detailed by us above in this judgment, there are specific, clear and unambiguous averments made in relation to each of the petitioners. At this stage we are constrained to consider only the allegations as contained in the complaint and the supporting documents, and not the defense set up by the petitioner. There is also no good ground for us to quash the FIR/complaint from the stand-point of the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. being reserved for being used to prevent the abuse of the process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

22. Accordingly, the present petition do not warrant any interference either under Article 226 or Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is hereby dismissed.

23. The parties are left to bear their own costs.