Sarup Singh And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi)
2002 Latest Caselaw 203 Del

JUDGMENT

S.B. Sinha, C.J.

1. An order dated 3rd September, 2001 passed by a learned Singly Judge of this Court in CWP 5364/2001 has been questioned in this Letters Patent Appeal, whereby and whereunder notice has been issued to the respondent to show cause as to why the petition be nt admitted limited to the extent as to why the petitioner is entitled to the allotment of alternative plot of land and as to why no reference under Section 18 has been made to the Court of the District Judge for enhancement of compensation.

2. Appellant was owner-Bhumidar of certain land in revenue estate of village Maidan Garhi, Delhi. The said land was acquired in relation to which award No. 23/86-87 was passed. The appellant has also received payment of compensation in terms of the said award.

3. The notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in respect of 13 villages. Admittedly, one Balak Ram Gupta filed a writ petition questioning the said notification in relation to one of the villages and the same was quashed by the Court. Contention of the appellant is that as the judgment of this Court in the said writ petition was a judgment in rem, and thus the learned Single Judge ought to have issued rule nisi in respect of all the prayers of the appellant.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the decision of this Court in Balak Ram Gupta has been upheld by the Apex Court, as the SLP filed by the respondents there against has been dismissed. the learned counsel submitted that the decision of the Apex Court, having regard to the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution of India is binding on all. Reliance in this regard has been placed on State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. , and A-One Granites v. State of U.P. 2001(3) SCC 537.

5. Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that in the instant case, the appellant has received compensation and sought for reference in terms of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as also allotment of alternate plot and in the said situation, this Court should not exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel would contend that the question of withdrawing the notification was in terms of exercise of its power under Section 48 would not arise having regard to the position as already taken. Strong reliance has been placed on Secretary Jaipur Development Authority Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and Ors. , . Learned counsel would submit that having regard to the subsequent decision of this Court also the Apex Court in Ajit Singh and Ors. v. Union of India , the LPA should not be entertained.

6. Acquisition proceedings were started on 25.11.1980, when the notification under Section 4 was issued. A declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was issued on 7.6.1985. An award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector in July, 1987. The appellant filed an application for reference as regards quantum of compensation in terms of Section 26 of the Said Act immediately thereafter. The decision of this Court in Balak Ram Gupta v. UOI AIR 1987 DELHI 239 Was rendered on 18.11.1988. Following the said judgment various writ petitions filed by others were allowed in March, 1989. The Apex Court upheld the judgment in Balak Ram Gupta on 20.9.1991. The appellant filed a writ petition on 2.8.2001. Learned Single Judge having regard to the fact, as noticed hereinbefore, issued a limited notice to show cause to the respondent.

7. the learned Single Judge in his impugned order has noticed that the Apex Court has held that judgment of this Court in Balak Ram's case would be a judgment in personam and only those persons who had applied would be eligible to get the benefit.

8. In the instant case the following facts are not in dispute. The award was made and the appellant has received payment. He has filed an application for reference to the civil court praying for enhancement. The said application is still pending. the appellant has received the payment in July, 1987. He has also filed an application for allotment of alternate plot. Despite the fact that the notification was issued in 1980, the award was made in 1987. He has chosen to file an application in 2001. In the said situation, is he entitled to obtain a relief from this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226? Answer to the said question, in the considered opinion of this Court, must be rendered in the negative. A writ petitioner, it is trite, is not entitled to invoke extraordinary and equitable discretion of this Court if he does not approach this Court with clean hands and/or had been sleeping over his rights for a long time. In A. Hamsaveni v. State of Tamil Nadu , law is stated state in the following terms :

"4. Facts are self-demonstrative. No reliance can be placed on the averment that they did not approach earlier as they were not affected. Even if ti be so they are to thank themselves. Sleeping over the rights, if there were any, with eyes open does not cure laches. In nay case, when the Commission publicized and it became known to every helper to the State that the Commission had been constituted for the specific purpose of identifying and regularizing service of helpers then what prevented the petitioners form approaching the Commission if they too were helpers as claimed by them, as intervention was permitted by the Commission of even those who were not parties in the writ petition or special leave petition. We agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that in view of the observations made by Khalid Commission that the proceedings were held openly and it was known to one and all in the State that the Commission was constituted for purpose of deciding the criteria for appointment of helpers in the service of the Board and their service conditions and the norms on which those who were working should be regularized it was incumbent on the petitioners to have approached the Commission by way of individual applications even if they were not sponsored by the union. The claim of the petitioners that since the Commission was concerned only with those petitioners who had approached the Commission in the report itself has mentioned that even others who had intervened and whose claim was found to be justified were permitted to intervene and were imp leaded and the orders were passed in their favor as well."

9. The Apex Court yet again in Municipal Council Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, categorically held:

"The High court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the same. It is now a well settled principal of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, delay defects equity has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favors a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise. The High Court as a matter of fact lost sight of the fact that since the year 1952, the land was specifically reserved for public purposes of school playground and roads in the development plan and by reason therefore, the notification to acquire the land has, therefore, been issued under the provisions of the Act as stated above."

In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh, , Apex Court took notice of the decision in Balak Ram and held :

"30. The crucial question therefore is whether in a situation where each of the seventy odd writ petitioners of 1985 covered specific areas and the brief order dated 14-10-1988 allowed the writ petitions, the said order could be treated as one affecting the entire notification under Section 6 and even cases where objections were not filed under Section 5A as in the case before us Question also arises whether the final order dated 18-11-1988 containing reasons as reported in B.R. Gupta v. UOI, could have covered the entire area in the 12 villages about 50,000 bighas even with regard to the other claimants whose writ petitions were not before the Division Bench and even other cases where no objections were filed in Section 5-A inquiry?

In our view, if the court allows a writ petition and reasons were to follow later, the first order allowing the writ petition and issuing the writ absolute is the operative order. If reasons therefore are supplied later, as a matter of convenience, the latter order containing reasons cannot go beyond the four corners of the rule absolute already issued."

11. The Apex Court held that reservation made in Balak Ram cannot be accepted stating :

"51. It is true that Section 6 uses the words "particular land" but in our view while referring to its satisfaction in regard to the need to acquire the entire land, the Government need not refer to every piece of particular land. It is sufficient if the authority which conducts the Section 5A inquiry has considered the objections raised in relation to nay particular land. Even where the said authority accepts the objections, that is not binding on the Government which can take a different view for good reasons. Where the Government agrees with the report under Section 5A, the declaration under Section 6 need not advert to the reasons or facts concerning each piece of land. Hence the wide observations made in Balak Ram Gupta case cannot be accepted."

12. It also referred to Abhey Ram's case in the following terms :

"In Abhey Ram as well as in the judgment in the civil appeals, it has been clearly stated that those claimants who have not filed objections to the Section 4 notification cannot be permitted to contend before the court that Section 5-A inquiry is vitiated so far as they are concerned. Nor can they be permitted to seek quashing of Section 6 declaration on that ground. We shall elaborate this aspect further."

13. The Apex Court recorded the findings of the Division Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 18.11.1998 which is in the following terms:

"Similar orders are passed in relation to all the eleven villages as if there was a prescribed proforma. Section 6(1) requires that the appropriate Government, in this case Administrator/Lt Governor of Delhi should consider the report under Section 5-A. After consideration he has to satisfy himself that particular land is needed for the public purpose. The consideration of the report including the objections of the objectors must be based on fact disclosed in the order."

14. And held that two different concepts were mixed up thereby. The law was thus stated in the following terms

"56.....Satisfaction regarding public purpose, it was said must be expressed in respect of each "Particular land". This view, as already stated, is not correct. If the entire land is needed for a public purpose, it is not necessary for the Government (or here the Lt Governor) to say in the Section 6 declaration that each piece of land is required for the public purpose. The Division Bench then mixed up this question with individual objections in each writ petition. Obviously, these individual objections of types (ii) and (iii) mentioned above can only be personal to each writ petitioner or peculiar in respect of each of the pieces of land owned. In that event, the rejection of the objections by the Land Acquisition Officer and the "satisfaction" of the Government/Lt. Governor can relate only to each of these pieces of land and not the whole. Therefore, there is no question of the Division Bench holding in its order dated 18-11-1998 that the satisfaction of the Lt Governor in respect of the entire land is vitiated. As already stated the satisfaction regarding public purpose was never in issue."

15. Be it further recorded that it was further held that the said observations of the Division Bench are counter to the earlier decision of this Court in Ganga Bishnu Swaika and Anr. v. Calcutta pinjrapole Society and Ors., .

16. It was further observed.

"58. We are unable to agree that in the cases not before the Division Bench and in particular in cases where no objections are filed, the satisfaction under Section 6 is vitiated because in some other cases, the objections which were filed were not properly disposed of. As to rejection of personal grounds of each writ petitioner, - other than the 73 writ petitions- there was no occasion for the Lt Governor to apply his mind if objections were not indeed filed. The only question then could have been about the public purpose."

17. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge correct in issuing notice on limited question.

18. Submission of the counsel to the effect that the order of the Apex Court dismissing the SLP would be a binding precedent in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution is wholly misplaced. By dismissing a SLP in liming, the Apex Court does not lay down a law.

19. Balak Ram Gupta as notice hereinbefore has been fully explained in the decision of the Apex Court in Sohan Ram where it has been held to be applicable in the facts of this case. In Abbhey Ram (supra), the legal position has been considered in depth by the Apex Court. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh (supra) the Court has reviewed its earlier decisions and came to the conclusion that persons like the petitioners who were not parties in the earlier writ petitions are not entitled to any relief.

20. In A-One granites v. State of UP (supra) on which the learned counsel for the petitioner himself placed reliance, the Apex Court has held that a decision not express, not accompanied by reasons and not proceeding on a conscious consideration of an issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared and to have a binding effect. In the State of U.P. and Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (supra) the same principle was stated.

21. For the reasons aforementioned we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.