Ex. Constable Vinod Kumar vs Union Of India (Uoi) Through The ...
2002 Latest Caselaw 1398 Del

JUDGMENT

Anil Dev Sing, J.

1. By this writ petition, the petitioner challenges the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 995/2002 dated April 15, 2002. By that order the Tribunal declined to quash the order dismissing the petitioner from service. The facts giving rise to the writ petition are as follows:-

2. The petitioner was enrolled as a Constable in the Delhi Police on October 21, 1986. On December 12, 1995 an enquiry was initiated against the petitioner on the ground of indulging in corrupt activities. The allegations against the petitioner are that while posted in 'E' Block, Security Lines, he received an illegal gratification of Rs. 20,000/- in the year 1993 and Rs. 5,000/- in the year 1994 for securing an appointment for one Shri Surinder Singh in the M.C.D. as a teacher. Again in the year 1994 he received a sum of Rs. 20,000/- as illegal gratification from one Khacheru Sharma for getting his son appointed as Constable in the Delhi Police. In the light of the allegations, the Enquiry Officer framed charges against the petitioner. After recording the evidence the Enquiry Officer held the charges to be proved against the petitioner. Thereafter, on May 20, 1999, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order dismissing the petitioner from service. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of his dismissal to the department Appellate Authority. The appeal, however was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on October 28, 1999. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner filed an original application being O.A. No. 2630/99 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, seeking quashing of the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and the order of the appellate authority. The Tribunal upheld the order of dismissal as also the order passed by the appellate authority. According, the O.A. was dismissed on July 12, 2001.

We may not that an FIR being FIR No. 99/96 under Section 420 I.P.C., PS Tilak Marg, was also registered against the petitioner with reference to the allegations of receipt of illegal gratification by the petitioner. After investigation a charge sheet was filed against him. The trial led to the ultimate acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case on October 21, 2001. Thereafter, on November 12, 2001 the petitioner filed a representation to the appellate authority by which relief was sought on the basis of the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate authority declined to entertain the representation. Thereupon, the petitioner filed another original application being O.A. No. 2002/2002. The O.A. was disposed of by the Tribunal with the direction to the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner.

Pursuant to the order of the Tribunal the representation was entertained by the Additional Commissioner of Police but the same was rejected by him on merits on March 27, 2002. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner again filed an original application being O.A. No. 995/2002 before the Central Administrative Tribunal which too was dismissed by the Tribunal on April 15, 2002. It is this order of the Central Administrative Tribunal which has been impugned before us in this writ petition.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appellate authority failed to consider that the petitioner had been acquitted of the charge which was based on the same allegations which were subject matter of the department enquiry. According to him, the dismissal order ought to have been reviewed and recalled by the respondents, and the petitioner ought to have been reinstated in service.

5. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is not disputed that on March 20, 1996 the petitioner was acquitted not on the ground that there was no evidence against him but on the basis of a compromise effected between the complainant and the petitioner. In view of the compromise, the trial court compounded the offence. The appellate authority while disposing of the appeal of the petitioner considered the factum of acquittal of the petitioner but declined to set aside the punishment as the petitioner was acquitted only on the basis of the compromise.

The appellate authority by a detailed order rejected the appeal of the petitioner. While rejecting the appeal, the appellate authority took note of the fact that the petitioner was awarded a punishment of dismissal from service for his corrupt activities and, according to him, his further retention in the disciplined force was hazardous for the entire force. The appellate authority also expressed the view that if a policeman who is charged with the responsibility of upholding the rule of law himself indulges in acts of lawlessness then faith of the common man in the government machinery is bound to get affected and at the same time it has highly deleterious impact on the organisation.

6. The view taken by the appellate authority and the disciplinary authority cannot be found fault with. The learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly not challenged the findings of fact arrived at by the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as the writ court cannot interfere unless it is shown that there was no evidence at all to support the same. The mere fact that the petitioner was acquitted of the charge does not ipso facto entitle the petitioner to seek reversal of the punishment imposed on him in the departmental proceeding. The standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding is different from that in a criminal trial. while the charge in a disciplinary proceeding is to be proved by preponderance of probability, charge in a criminal trial is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission that the departmental proceedings stood vitiated by the acquittal of the petitioner, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr., . In that case at the trial it was found that the raid and recovery at the residence of the delinquent employee were not proved. The whole case of the prosecution was, therefore, thrown out on that ground and he was acquitted by the trial court. The Supreme Court in that case determined the question of impact of the acquittal of the delinquent on the findings recorded against him in ex parte departmental proceedings. In the peculiar circumstance of the case, it was held by the Supreme Court that since the accused was acquitted with a finding that the raid and recovery at his residence was not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded against him at an ex parte departmental proceedings to stand.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sulekh Chand and Salek Chand v. Commissioner of Police and Ors. (1994) 28 Administrative Tribunals Cases 711 (SC). In that case the Supreme Court held that once the acquittal was on merits the necessary consequence would be that the delinquent is entitled to reinstatement as if there is no blot on his service and the need for the department enquiry is obviated.

9. The aforesaid decisions cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner as the acquittal of the petitioner in the instant case was not on merits but was grounded on a compromise between the parties.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Rule 12 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 does not permit the respondents to punish the petitioner in respect of very offence of which he has been acquitted. According to him, there is a clear violation of the provisions of Rule 12 of the Rules.

11. Rule 12 reads as follows:-

"12. Action following judicial acquittal.- When a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal cae, whether actually led or not unless -

(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds, or

(b) in the opinion of the court, or non the Deputy Commissioner of Police the prosecution witnesses have been won over; or

(c) the court has held in its judgment that an offence was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned; or

(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses facts unconnected with the charge before the court which justify departmental proceedings on a different charge; or

(e) additional evidence for departmental proceedings is available.

12. As is evident from a reading of Rule 12, it has no application to the instant case. The Rule applies to a case where a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court and is subsequently punished departmentally on the same charge or a different charge on the same evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not. In other instant case, the petitioner was proceeded departmentally and his services were terminated by way of punishment before he was acquitted by the trial court, not on merits, but on the basis of a compromise and compounding of the offence.

13. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.