Shyam Lal vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr.
2002 Latest Caselaw 596 Del

JUDGMENT

S.B. Sinha, C.J.

1. This writ petition has been filed questioning a judgment and order dated 02.02.1990 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. No. 90 of 1987. The petitioner herein filed the said application purported to be on the ground that he was prevented from performing his duties and he had not been paid his wages. He further prayed that he should not be discharged from service without following the procedure laid down under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as 'the Constitution').

2. The petitioner was initially appointed as Safaiwala as a casual labourer in the Carriage and Wagon Branch, New Delhi on 08.04.1985. He worked as a casual labourer only for 137 days up to 31.07.1986. According to him, he had worked as casual labourer for a total number of 280 days. In support of which plea, he has annexed a purported chart containing the names of 12 persons wherein the petitioner's name is at serial No. 10. However, admittedly on 01.01.1987, the respondents discharged all those persons whose names appeared in the said chart and the said action on the part of the respondents was the subject matter of the original application before the learned Tribunal.

3. By reason of the impugned order, the learned Tribunal held that as the petitioner can file a representation, the same may be considered on its own merits. The said original application was disposed of directing:-

"... The applicants will, however, be at liberty to file a fresh application in accordance with law, if so advised. We also direct that the respondents shall consider any representations that may be made by the applicants as regards their claim for wages for the past period expeditiously. The applicants may file fresh application, if they are aggrieved by the decision taken by the respondents on their representations. The application is disposed of on the above lines."

4. It does not appear form the writ petition that pursuant to and in furtherance thereof any representation was filed by the petitioner herein, although the said original application was disposes of by the learned Tribunal on 02.02.1990 and this writ petition has been filed on 22.02.2002.

5. Mr. Malik B.D. Thareja and Mr. K.K. Puri, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would contend that the petitioner was not aware of the proceedings before the learned Tribunal and had lost contact with his counsel and in that view of the matter, this Court should entertain this writ petition despite delay. In support the said contention, reliance has been placed on Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Katiji and Ors. ; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. ; and State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Anr. .

6. The petitioner herein has failed to show that the had a right to be absorbed in the Railway service. Only because he has allegedly completed a period of 240 days, the same by itself would not entitle him of regularization of his service.

7. In Madhyamik Siksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra and Ors. , it was held thus:-

"4. We are unable to uphold the order of the High Court. There were no sanctioned posts in existence to which they could be said to have been appointed. The assignment was an ad hoc one, which anticipatedly spent itself out. It is difficult to envisage for them, the status of workmen on the analogy of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, importing the incidents of completion of 240 days work. The legal consequences that flow from work for that duration under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are entirely different form what, by way of implication, is attributed to the present situation by way of analogy. The completion of 240 days' work does not, under that law import the right to regularization. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the service. It is not appropriate to import and apply that analogy, in an extended or enlarged form here."

8. Apart form the said fact, a writ petition cannot be entertained after a period of 12 years, the submissions, which have been made in support of the application for condensation of delay, in our opinion, cannot be believed.

9. If the petitioner was interested in getting his services regularized, he should have been in constant touch with his counsel who had appeared before the Tribunal. If he failed to do so, he should thank himself for the same.

10. The decision cited by the learned counsel in support of the contention that the writ petition should not be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone may now be considered.

11. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag's case (supra), was a case where the appeal by the State was barred by 4 days, wherein the Apex Court held:-

"4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are petted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay."

12. In Chandra Mani's case (Supra), the Apex Court held that ceratin amount of latitude within reasonable limits is permissible in condoning the delay, particularly when the State is the appellant having regard to the impersonal bureaucratic set-up involving red-tapism.

13. In Kameshwar Prasad Singh's case (Supra), the Apex Court condoned the delay of 679 days in filing Special Leave Petition upon having satisfied itself that sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner, as he had been pursuing other remedies.

14. The aforesaid decisions cannot be said to have any application in the instant case.

15. "Delay defeats equity" is a well-known concept. A person, who approaches a Court of equity must approach that Court within a reasonable period.

16. In any event, the post in which the petitioner sought for regularization of his services, it is unlikely to be still vacant despite expiry of the period of 12 years.

17. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. it was held:-

"5. The representation does not give any detail. It is not mentioned if the scheme was given due publicity or not. No explanation is given as to why the petitioner did not approach till 1990. Nor it is stated if any of the casual labourer of the project were reemployed or not. It is vague and was lacking in material particulars.

6. Two questions arise, one, if the petitioners are entitled as a matter of law for re-employment and other if they have lost their right, if nay, due to delay. Right of casual labourer employed in projects, to be re-employment in railways has been recognized both by the Railways and this Court. But unfortunately the petitioners did not take any step to enforce their claim before the Railways except sending a vague representation nor did they even care to produce any material to satisfy this Court that they were covered in the scheme framed by the Railways. It was urged by the learned Counsel for petitioners that they may be permitted to produce their identity cards etc., before opposite parties who amy accept or reject the same after verification. We are afraid it would be too dangerous to permit this exercise. A writ is issued by this Court in favor of a person who has some right. And not for sake of roving enquiry leaving scope for manoeuvring. Delay itself deprives a person of is remedy available in law. In absence of any fresh cause of action or any legislation a person who has lost his remedy by lapse of time loses his right as well. From the date of retrenchment if it is assumed to be correct a period of more than 15 years has expired and in case we accept the prayer of petitioner we would be depriving a host of others who in the meantime have become eligible and are entitled to claim to be employed. We would have been persuaded to take a sympathetic view but in absence of any positive material to establish that these petitioners were in fact appointed and working as alleged by them it would not be proper exercise of discretion to direct opposite parties to verify the correctness of the statement made by the petitioners that they were employed between 1964 to 1969 and retrenched between 1975 to 1979."

18. Yet again in Narayan Singh Solanki v. Union of India and Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 321, the Apex Court held:-

"...We are not inclined to go into the merits of the matter as we are of the view that the appellant having resigned form the service and accepted his provident fund in the year 1963 and thereafter remained silent for nearly 28 years, and therefore, demand for change in option in the year 1992 did not deserve to be entertained. In fact the appellant was guilty of laches and, therefore, not entitled to change his option for pension. On this short question, we dismiss this appeal. There shall be no order as to costs."

19. Furthermore, in Patel Motibhai Naranbhai and Anr. v. Dinubhai Motibhai Patel and Ors. , it was held:-

"10. Faced with the situation that an application for filing the award in court under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act has become barred by limitation, Jayantikumar Ishwarbhai Patel induced the Arbitrator to make an application for filing of the award and also for making the award the rule of the court. In other words, Jayantikumar Ishwarbhai Patel, a party to the dispute, with the help of the Arbitrator, did indirectly what he could not have done directly. We are of the view that law cannot be allowed to be circumvented in this fashion. The court should have declined to entertain the application moved by the Arbitrator nearly six years after making of the award. Without six application of the Arbitrator, the application made by Jayantikumar Ishwarbhai Patel under Section 14(2) could not survive. The court should not come to the aid of a party where there has been unwarrantable delay in seeking the statutory remedy. Any remedy must be sought with reasonable promptitude having regard to the circumstances."

20. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any reason to interfere with the said order. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.