Chander Mohan vs State (Delhi Admn.)
2001 Latest Caselaw 265 Del

JUDGMENT

K. Ramamoorthy, J.

1. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge finding that the appellant was guilty of committing the murder of his wife Veena. Veena was married to the appellant on 26.5.1983. At the time of marriage it would appear that the appellant did not have the capacity to make money and what he was getting by lending books was very meagre. Seeing the plight of

the couple PW 1, the father of Veena, and his son Vijay Kumar PW 3 had started business of making 'Tawa & Karahi' at Gautam Vihar and the factory was established taking the appellant as a partner. In all fairness PW 1 having invested Rs. 15,000/- gave the appellant 1/3rd share. As the ill-luck would have it, the business did not prosper. The shutters had to be put down within a year from its commencement. That was the genesis of the misunderstanding between the appellant and the in-laws. PW 1 and PW 3 called upon the appellant to make goods his 1/3rd share of loss and the appellant could not comply with the demand. On that score, the appellant started harassing his wife Veena and the harassment reached to the point where the appellant had decided to finish her off. The appellant was charge-sheeted and tried for the offence of murder. The appellant would deny the indictment against him. Therefore, he had to be put on trial by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. The prosecution examined PW 1 to PW 14 and the appellant examined in defense Mr. Yash Pal as DW 1.

2. We have perused the evidence of PWs and evidence of DW 1. We heard at length Mr. Jatinder Sethi, the learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. H.J.S. Ahluwalia, the learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State.

3. Mr. Jatinder Sethi, the learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the story projected by the prosecution is absolutely false and not supported by the evidence of PW1, PW3 and PW 4. The learned Counsel submitted the presence of PW. 3 and PW 4 at the spot is doubtful and the investigation conducted was unfair, biased and tainted. The learned Counsel submitted that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had taken the view that the accused had not referred to relevant facts with reference to his defense in statement recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C. The learned Counsel submitted that the evidence of DW 1 Yash Pal has to be believed and if it is done the case of the prosecution would fall to the ground.

4. PW 1 Ram Sarup, the father of Veena, had spoken to the facts in detail. He had said that the appellant denied the partnership in the factory. He threatened PW 1 that if he persisted in his demand he would throw Veena out. In narrating the facts the PW 1 had said :

"My daughter Veena was married to the accused on 26.5.1983. At the time of marriage, accused was giving novels on rent and earning that way. In order to give him monetary support, I got the factory installed for making 'Tawa and Karahi etc.' at Gautam Vihar and made accused my partner. Accused had 1/3rd share. The other two were of my son and myself. Vijay Kumar is my son. The factory was run for a year. I asked accused to settle the accounts. I was already under plaster on my leg fractured in accident. I wanted some money for expenses. He refused to give anything and told us that we were only servants and had already paid our wages. He denied our partnership in the factory. He further threatened that if we persisted in demanding the accounts for money, he would throw my daughter out. This was conveyed to me by my sister Urmila though whom I had demanded some money from the account. On 19.10.1986 accused Along with his father and other persons came to the factory where I had given the Dharna to

demand my money and the funds. Accused Chander Mohan told me that we had nobody in the factory except the servants and that all the property of the accused and asked me to get out. He also told me that Veena and he were not pulling on well and might not do so in the future also. Accused was keeping Veena alright but were not giving her proper expenses. A day before the occurrence, accused came to me at place of work at Usmanpur at about 4.30 p.m. and told me that he had slapped Veena and her also somewhat strangled her throat and that Veena was raising hue and cry and asked me to call Veena and pacify. I sent my son with the accused. They returned with Veena to my place of work. No quarrel took place there. I pacified both, I asked my daughter not to intervene in the quarrel between me and the accused. They left. On the next morning at about 10 a.m. I came to know about the death of Veena. I went to the house of the accused and found Veena lying dead there. Police also came there, police took into possession deadbody. I signed the inquest report, Ex. PW 1/A. I gave the statement also Ex. PW 1/B."

5. In the cross-examination it was suggested that Gautam Vihar factory was not successful and that led to the quarrel between the appellant and PW 1 was not correct. Nothing else has been elicited to show that PW 1 is not speaking the truth.

6. PW 2 Dr. L.T. Ramani was the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination. The doctor had categorically said :

"Injuries were ante-mortem and were caused during the process of strangulation. Injuries over the neck were sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature. Death was due to asphyxia, resulting from strangulation."

7. Therefore, the post-mortem examination would clearly show that Veena died on account of strangulation.

8. The brother of Veena and son of PW 1 Vijay Kumar was examined as PW 3. In the chief-examination he would say that the appellant refused to settle the accounts and the appellant threatened that if PW 1 and PW 3 persisted with demands Veena will be thrown out. He had stated that his uncle Kishan Chand and the brother of PW 1 lodged a report with reference to this at P.S. Seelampur. He would state that on 7.12.1986 he visited a person close to the house of the appellant who attempted to reconcile between the parties. At that time, the appellant met him and started crying and asked him to take away the goods in the factory. According to the witness, he took the appellant to the factory at Usmanpur and thereafter he left him. He would further state that the appellant came to his factory at Usmanpur next day and again started threatening. The appellant had also told him that he had beaten Veena and asked PW 3 to take her to their house. Thereafter, according to the witness he went along with the appellant to his house. He brought both the appellant and Veena to the factory at Usmanpur. PW 1 was present there at the factory at Usmanpur. PW 1 tried to pacify the appellant and gave advice to Veena to put up with the situation and try to adjust with the appellant. PW 3 would further state that considering the events he doubted

the bona fides of the appellant went to the house appellant's house at 8 p.m. and stayed there over night. There Veena and the appellant were sleeping while PW 3 was sleeping just a few feet away. At about 5 a.m. he saw the couple quarreling. PW 3 attempted to pacify the appellant but the appellant pushed him out." Thereupon PW 3 rushed to inform Om Parkash (Foofa sister's husband of PW 1), Om Parkash (PW 4) and PW 3 came back and when they opened the door they saw the appellant sitting on the chest of Veena and strangulating her. PW 4 and PW 3 tried to remove the accused but they could not save Veena. She had died because of the strangulation. The appellant cross-examined the witness PW 3 at length on matters which are not germane to the issue involved. The appellant had not denied his presence at the place of occurrence.

9. Om Parkash, the maternal uncle of PW 3, was examined as PW 4. He had also spoken to the facts and would corroborate PW 3's evidence. PW 5 is Kishan Chand, brother of PW 1 who lodged the report. PW 6 is Ravi Dutt Sharma, Purohit who performed the marriage on 26.5.1983.

10. PW 7, PW 8 and PW 9 are police personnel.

11. PW 10 Dhir Singh is the clerk in SDN Hospital who had proved the handwriting of Dr. N.K. Sharma who had signed the MLC Ex. PW 10/A as he had left the service of the hospital and was not available for being examined.

12. PW 11 H.C. Khem Chand was examined as he was asked to take photographs at the spot.

13. PW 13 H.C. Harish Chand was examined to show about the special report delivered to the Senior Police Officers and Area Metropolitan Magistrate on 9.12.1986.

14. PW 14 Inspector Raj Kumar, Addl. SHO, R.K. Puram was working in P.S. Seelampur on 9.12.1986. It is not necessary to develop at length the evidence of PW 14.

15. DW 1 Yash Pal is the uncle of the appellant. He had been examined to show that he was living with the appellant in December, 1986. He was living with appellant in Gautam Vihar. The appellant, according to him, came to the spot after easing himself around 6.15 in the morning and he woke him up. The appellant asked him to see his wife who was lying dead at that time. Thereafter, he and the appellant went to the police station. They found two policemen sitting at Shahdara Police Station. According to DW 1 those two policemen asked them to run away. Following that advice, they came back. The appellant remained at home and DW 1 went out to inform the relatives. The witness had gone to inform the parents of the girl. He came between 10 and 11 a.m. and at that time the police had come to the spot. He would state that he was residing with the appellant for the last two years. According to him, he had not seen the appellant and his wife quarreling at all. The evidence of DW 1 even in his examination is quite unreliable. What he speaks is absolutely false and he had been examined just to support the case of the appellant.

16. Mr. Jetinder Sethi, the learned Counsel for the appellant, inspite of these facts would submit that the presence of PW 3 and PW 4 at the spot was doubtful. He would submit that PW 3 had stated in the cross-examination that he had strained relations with the appellant and he had not visited on auspicious occasions like 'Bhai Duj' and 'Rakhi' and when that is so, the evidence of PW 3 that the appellant visited the factory at Usmanpur on 8.12.1986 could not be true.

17. We are not able to accept this submission. May be, there were misunderstandings in view of the conduct of the appellant but when the sister was in trouble the brother PW 3 naturally had to come to her and that is what happened in this case. Therefore, from the fact that PW 3 had not visited the appellant on festival occasions assuming it to be true, the case of the prosecution cannot be said to be untrue.

18. The learned Counsel submitted that PW 1 did not say that PW 3 had ever gone to the house of Veena on the night of 8.12.1986 and the prosecution cannot try to say that PW 1 was not aware of PW 3 going to the house of his sister. While considering the overall facts what is not stated or what is stated by the witnesses would not very much affect their evidence on the core facts required for the purpose of establishing the guilt of the accused.

19. The learned Counsel submitted that PW 3 had vastly improved his statement in Court on material points which he had not stated in his statement before the police and the prosecution had zoomed the facts in trying to establish a false case. The learned Counsel relied upon the judgments reported in Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur v. State of Karnataka, 1993 (2) Chandigarh Criminal Cases 72; Rishi Pal and Ors. v. State, 1994 (1) Chandigarh Criminal Cases 59 and Harbans Lal v. State of Punjab, 1996 (1) Supreme Today 766. In Bhimappa case, 1993 (2) CCC 72 (supra) the High Court set aside the order of acquittal by the second Addl. Sessions Judge, Belgaum and that was interfered with by the Apex Court. The case of the prosecution there was that there was bad blood between the appellant and the deceased and at the time when the deceased had finished with his mid day meal he was attacked by the appellant and that was witnessed by his wife. The Apex Court highlighting the assumption by the Trial Court said that the Trial Court disbelieved the presence of PW 2 and PW 3, eye-witnesses and also disbelieved the evidence of PW 1 Srimati, the wife of the deceased and the High Court on appeal differed from the view taken by the Trial Court and the Apex Court observed that the view of the High Court cannot at all be sustained. The Apex Court posited that it cannot be said that the reasons recorded by the Trial Court are far fetched. With reference to the evidence of PW 1, the wife of the deceased, the Apex Court observed.

"If we take the statement of PW 1 for its face value the deceased died within a couple of minutes of his coming out of the courtyard after finishing his mid day meal. It is clear from the post-mortem report as well as the statement of the doctor PW 6 that the deceased could not have consumed his lunch at the time as stated by PW 1. In other words the incident must have been of a period much before the time as alleged by the prosecution. This was the main reason which persuaded the Trial Court to disbelieve the prosecution version in toto. Besides, we also notice that as to the disclosure statement which lead to the recovery of the axe (MO 9) the only witness examined is Ramu Mellappa, PW 13. He did not depose about witnessing to

the disclosure statement which led to the recovery of axe. The only evidence regarding the disclosure is "come with me" and thereafter the accused proceeded towards Harugeri and stopped near the stream situate at a distance of about 2 Kms. away and the accused took out the axe from inside the Nallah (stream). In the absence of any disclosure statement the recovery of axe itself becomes meaningless. The Trial Court had rejected the evidence in relation to extra judicial confession as unreliable."

20. The Apex Court observed that the behavior of PW 1, wife of the deceased was not natural. The Apex Court further observed that the statement of PW 1 instead of corroborating the medical evidence was inconsistent as to the time of the death of the deceased and once the substantum of the case did not have any substance the view taken by the Trial Court have to be upheld. We have not been able to see how the ratio laid down by the Apex Court could be pressed into service by the appellant.

21. In Rishi Pal's case 1994 (1) CCC 509 (supra) a Division Bench of this Court following the Bhimappa's case on facts held the prosecution had not established its case. Mahinder Narain, J. in his separate judgment referring to the facts observed :

"On a consideration of all the factors mentioned hereabove, I am of the view that the entirety of the case hinges upon the testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses, who are all near relations (sons of Chhotey Lal deceased). Their behavior clues not appear to be the behavior of normal persons. They have, to my mind, been tutored to tell an untruthful tale by the which the accused are sought to be implicated in the murder of Chhotey Lal. I disbelieve the testimony of these witnesses, and once the testimony of these witnesses is disbelieved, there seems to be nothing left in the case of the prosecution against the accused, of think the Court below was in the error in accepting the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses, who are all interested persons, and the Trial Court was further in error in not Realizing the impact of the nature of fatal injuries on the deceased Chhotey Lal. The injuries which were spindle shaped injuries, had deeply penetrated into body. The had been inflicted by a double edged weapon, EX PI which is a single edged weapon, could not have caused these injuries. There are discrepancy in the prosecution story regarding the recovery of that weapon. All of which goes to show that the accused have not committed the crime, alleged to have been committed by the prosecution."

22. The learned Judge allowed the appeal acquitting the accused persons. Jaspal Singh, J. concurring with the view taken by Mahinder Narain, J. while assessing the evidence of the eye-witnesses said :

"The entire conduct of the alleged eye-witnesses is not normal. They had the means and ability to come forward to protect their father. They rather, remained silent spectators. They did not rush to his help even when he was beaten and stabbed at the Dhaba. They did nothing except remaining mute spectators. Even while he was being stabbed repeatedly at a place where he ultimately fell and lost his life, they did not pick him up. Rather they did not even go near to him. They did not cry. They did not shout. They sought no

help. They had been their father being stabbed and yet did not even think of contacting any medical doctor. They did not even think of reporting the matter to the police. There was residential colony nearby. There was a taxi stand not far away. And, above all, it was a thoroughfare. Thus help could be made available at their elbow. They did not even make an effort. They neither murmurred nor stirred.

The circumstances as narrated by me above, if taken in their totality, cast grave doubts on the veracity of the prosecution version. I, therefore, as already noticed above, agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother and would acquit the appellants by giving them the benefit of doubt."

23. This case also, in our view, does not help the appellant in any manner.

24. In Harbans Lal's case 1996 (1) Supreme Today 766 the appellant along with his two sons were put up for trial in connection with the murder of Punni Devi, wife of the appellant on the intervening night of 16/17.10.1981. The Trial Court convicted all the three accused. The High Court gave benefit of doubt to two other accused, the sons of the appellant, and maintained the conviction of the appellant. That was carried in appeal to the Apex Court. The High Court expressed the view that even if the evidence of Kartar Singh, PW 11 is ignored the fact was that the deceased was found dead in the house of the appellant and, therefore, the appellant must have burnt her to death. After analysing the evidence on record, the Apex Court held that while the High Court accepted the statements of the two sons of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code giving them benefit of doubt while the same yardstick was not applied while assessing the evidence as against the appellant. The statement by the appellant was on account of his strained relations with his wife he used to sleep at shop and not in the house and he learnt about the death of his wile at about 10-11 a.m. on 17.10.1981 and informed her relations. The Apex Court further observed that the High Court did not consider the evidence of 10 defense witnesses besides the Court witness and that had resulted in miscarriage of justice. In this view, the Apex Court gave the benefit of doubt to the appellant also. We are not able to see anything relevant to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.

25. The learned Counsel submitted that PW 3 Vijay Kumar had not made any attempt to take the sister to the hospital, along with PW 4 and they had assumed that Veena had died. According to the learned Counsel, the inference from this should be that PW 3 and PW 4 were not present at the spot. The learned Counsel relied upon judgment reported in 1993(2) Chandigarh Criminal Cases 72 (supra).

26. The learned Counsel further submitted that in the rough site plan and the scale site plan no mention is made about the position of PW 3 in the house of the appellant and no reference is made to any separate bedding besides the double bed and PW 3 had not raised any hue and cry when he saw his sister and brother-in-law appellant quarrelling in the early morning. Therefore, the learned Counsel proceeded to submit the evidence of PW 3 cannot be accepted and there is no question of his statement being corroborated by PW 4 Om Parkash. The learned Counsel referred to the

judgment of the Supreme Court in Muluwa S/o Binda and Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, and the learned Counsel invited our attention to paragraph 18 wherein the Supreme Court had said :

"It is elementary that the evidence of an infirm witness does not become reliable merely because it has been corroborated by a number of witnesses of the same brand ; for, evidence is to be weighed nor counted. Since the evidence of PWs 5 and 6 suffered from the same infirmities as that of Smt. Jugatia, it cannot be said that the trial Judge had no basis, whatsoever, for stigmatising it as unreliable."

27. The submission of the learned Counsel Mr. Jatinder Sethi was that the presence of PW 3 had not been established. We have considered the evidence of PW 3 and the evidence of police officials. It was PW 3 who lodged the FIR and PW 14 Inspector Raj Kumar, Additional SHO had clearly stated that on the complaint of Vijay Kumar PW 3 he recorded the statement of Vijay Kumar which is marked as Ex. PW 14/A. It is further in evidence of PW 14 that he made endorsement on it and sent the Rukka through Constable Rajbir Singh (PW 12) for registration of the case. Therefore, we are quite unable to accept the argument of Mr. Jatinder Sethi that the presence of PW 3 has not been proved.

28. The learned Counsel commented on the evidence of Dr. L.T. Ramani PW 2 and tried to dig holes in the case of the prosecution and no reference was made to either from rod or cotton Nala in the hands of the appellant.

29. We have seen the post mortem report and we have carefully read the evidence of PW2. We are not able to subscribe to the submission of the learned Counsel Mr. Jatinder Sethi.

30. The learned Counsel submitted that the investigation was unfair, very much biased and tainted. The learned Counsel attempted to say there had been interpolation in the time of Rukka and dead body remained in the house till 2-2.30 p.m. and there is no explanation from the prosecution and the inquest papers were received at 9 a.m. on 10.12.1986 and, therefore, the learned Counsel submitted that the case of the prosecution cannot be accepted. The learned Counsel brought to our notice the judgment of this Court reported in Lala Ram and Anr. and Thakur Singh v. State, and Raj Kumar and Anr. and Udhay Singh v. State, 1991 (2) Chandigarh Criminal Cases 497 and the learned Counsel read paragraphs. 24 and 25.

31. In Lala Raj's case, a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the correctness of conviction recorded by the learned trial Judge. In this case, a few days prior to the occurrence there was a quarrel between the deceased and the accused persons and that was the main reason for the accused persons committing the offence was the case of the prosecution. The submission before this Court was that the First Information Report was not recorded at the earliest available opportunity. The said report was not dispatched to the higher authorities on time and the time schedule mentioned by the prosecution which was stated to have been followed was proved to the wrong which gave rise to a doubt about the correctness of the prosecution version. The Division Bench also noticed wrong procedure followed by the police in destroying the cases property even before the disposal of the appeal. The Division Bench decided the case on facts and we are not able to see any ratio laid down by the Division Bench which could be made applicable to the facts in t he instance case.

32. In Raj Kumar's case, 1991 (2) CCC 497 a Division Bench of this Court, was invited to consider the correctness of the conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Judge. What happened was that in the village known as Chirag Delhi the deceased and the accused were living and there were difference of opinion between the parties which gave rise to the commission of the offence. The Trial Court returned the verdict against the accused and that was challenged before this Court. The main point projected on behalf of the appellant-accused was there was delay in lodging the First Information Report. The Division Bench observed :

"The Courts in India with a view to ensure a fair trial, have time and again laid emphasis on the desirability of prompt lodging of First Information Report as, with delay creeps in the danger of introduction of coloured versions, twisting of facts, manufacturing of stories and introduction of false witnesses. The danger being inherent, the Courts have been insisting upon some additional safeguards too. One of those safeguards is drawn from Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which enjoins that once the first information is recorded, the substance thereof "shall be entered" in the Daily Diary. The Police Rules framed under inspiration of this provision make in more explicit. It is unfortunate that the safeguard, so salutary, has been given a complete go by even in a case like the present one where stakes are so enormous. We say so as in the Daily Dairy Report (Ex. PW 11/B & 11/C) neither we find the names of the accused nor any description of the weapon of offence and significantly even the names of Kalu Ram, Murari Lal and Basant Ram as witnesses to the occurrence find no mention therein".

33. The Division Bench also referred to the report being sent to the Magistrate under Section 157 of Criminal Procedure Code. Here also, the Division Bench observed that procedure had not been followed in that case. The Division Bench observed as under:

"The Courts have insisted upon yet another safeguard. It is with regard to sending of the First Information Report to the concerned. Metropolitan Magistrate, Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins the sending of the same "forthwith". The duty is absolute. It is mandatory. However, what do we find in the present case ? The report allegedly sent has not been proved. The Metropolitan Magistrate concerned has also not been examined. The best evidence to prove that the report had actually been received by the Magistrate has thus been kept back. Of course, Constable Nawal Kishore, (PW 22) has been examined to show that the report was received by the Magistrate. However, in the absence of that original report, in the absence of proof of any endorsement of the Magistrate and in the absence of the Magistrate himself to prove its receipt, we are disinclined to believe the Constable. However, even if it be assumed that the report was

sent and served, as per the Constable, it was served at 7.30 p.m. The Magistrate lived hardly six kilometers from the police station. Why then this inordinate delay? Interestingly even the constable does not lag being in minting an explanation. He says his motor-cycle broke down on the way and it took him four hours to get it repaired. We refuse to believe him. No mechanic has been produced. No bill or voucher is on the record. No such entry was got made in the Daily Diary on his return to the police station. A statutory safeguard cannot be allowed to be defeated in such a manner. We refuse to be a party to it."

34. The Division Bench, with great respect, rightly observed:

"Wise men rightly warn not to assess the worth of witnesses in isolation, for, such an approach blurs the vision, dulls the perception and imprisons the perspective. After having examined the evidence in its totality what do we find? We find dark clouds of doubt howering all around. The benefit obviously goes to the appellants. The appeals are accepted."

35. Here also, we do not find any ratio discernible which could be applicable to the facts of the instant case in favor of the appellant.

36. The learned Counsel submitted that Ex. PW 3/A cannot be treated as a FIR as the statement of PW 3 was recorded after the police came to the house of the appellant. Ex. PW 3/A can be only treated as statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. and that being so it is hit by Section 162, Cr.P.C. and, therefore, it cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of PW 3. The learned Counsel relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Punati Ramulu and Ors., , and the learned Counsel brought to our notice paragraph 5 of the judgment. The Supreme Court laid down that if the investigation was found to be tainted it cannot be relied upon and the testimony of interested witnesses cannot be relied upon in the absence of strong corroborative evidence of clinching nature. The learned Counsel relied upon the observations in paragraph 5 of the judgment wherein the Supreme Court considering the evidence on record upheld the order of acquittal recorded by the High Court. That cannot be pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the appellant to say that in the instant case we should reject the evidence of PWs 1 to 4.

37. The learned Counsel submitted that the evidence of DW 1 would disprove the case of the prosecution and the learned Additional Sessions Judge erred in rejecting the evidence of DW 1. The learned Counsel pressed into service the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 72. In this case the Supreme Court laid down therein that if the plea of private defense was not taken by the accused while the statement was being recorded under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1860 if basis is laid in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and by defense witnesses Court can consider such a plea and the burden of establishing that plea was on the accused. That cannot be used by the appellant-accused in the instance case.

38. The learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. Jatinder Sethi submitted that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had placed implicit reliance on the evidence of the

alleged eye-witnesses and that is not permissible in law as laid down in the Supreme Court in Hallu and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, . The Apex Court had held :

"It is generally not easy to find witnesses on whose testimony implicit reliance can be placed. It is always advisable to test the evidence of witnesses on the anvil of objective circumstances in the case."

39. We have considered the evidence of PW 1 to PW 4 and other circumstances projected by the prosecution and on a consideration of the entire evidence, we are of the view that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had come to the correct conclusion. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed.