Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs O.P. Dwivedi And Anr.
1997 Latest Caselaw 846 Del

JUDGMENT

M.S.A. Siddiqui, J.

(1) The challenge in this writ petition is the order dated 22.10.1995, who while accepting the appeal has remanded the case to the Assessing Authority for refixing the ratable value of the property bearing No. 65/1, New Rohtak Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.

(2) The respondent No. 2 alongwith her husband purchased a plot of land under the registered sale deed dated 17.31.1976 for a consideration of Rs. l,15,000.00 .The construction on the plot was commenced in the same year and was completed in September, 1978 at the cost of Rs. 3 lacs. On 1.9.1978 basement and ground floor of the said premises were let out to the State Bank of India on a monthly rent of Rs. 8,000.00 . The petitioner then issued a notice, under Section 126 of the Dmc Act to'the respondent No. 2 proposing enhancement of the ratable value to Rs. l,12,130.00 with effect from 1.9.1978. The respondent No. 2 filed objections and after considering the said objections the Assessing Authority determined the ratable value at Rs. 86,400.00 for the portion of the building let-out to the State Bank of India and for residential portion at Rs. 25,730.00 . In an appeal filed by the respondent No. 2, the assessment order was set aside and the case was remanded to the Assessing Authority for redeeming the ratable value of the premises in question.

(3) Two questions arise for decision. Firstly, whether the notice u/Section 126 was bad as it was vague and did not state reasons, or grounds for proposed enhancement of the ratable value, and, secondly whether the order of assessment is bad as retable value of the property in question was not determined in accordance with the principles laid down in Dr. Balbir Singh v. Mcd, . In his judgment, the learned Acj has observed that the notice issued u/ Section 126 of the Dmc Act is totally devoid of any particulars or grounds upon which the assessment was sought to be enhanced. According to the learned Adj, a notice u/Section 126 must contain relevant particulars and grounds sufficient to put the person concerned on notice of the proposed enhancement of ratable value of the property and its basis. Absence of such particulars and grounds in such a notice vitiates the notice itself. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the aforesaid view of the learned Adj runs counter to the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Government Servants Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. Union of India, , wherein a notice of the nature as was issued in this case was upheld as valid. The Division Bench observed : "The reasons for amendment in the assessment list are quite sufficient and they put lhe petitioners on notice as to why ratable value is sought to be increased. Petitioners also very well knew this and as a matter of fact if we refer to their reply in the form of objections to notice under Section 126 of the Dmc Act, they know what is required of them. Their grievance that notices are vague has no basis."

(4) The aforesaid observations have been quoted with approval by another Division Bench of this Court in Prem Prasad Juneja v. M.C.I)., . It is pertinent to point out that Section 124 of the Dmc Act mandates preparation of an assessment list of all lands arid buildings in Delhi in such form. and manner and containing such particulars with respect to each land and building as may be prescribed by bye-laws. Sub-section (1) of Section 126 of the Dmc Act empowers the Commissioner to amend the said assessment list at any time. Sub-section (2) of Section 126 mandates an amendment in the .assessment list not to be made unless preceded by a notice of not less than one month. Section 126(2) does not specify as to what should be the contents of a notice. For the purposes of giving an opportunity to all owner/occupier to file his objections, all that he has to be informed is what the Commissioner has proposed for amending the assessment list. One of the items, which is entered in the amendment list of assessment, is the ratable value of the property. The Commissioner is under no obligation to inform as to how the ratable value, which is proposed to be enhanced, has been arrived at. The principles for fixation of ratable value are well known. In my opinion, 126(2) of the Dmc Act does not require the giving of any particulars in addition to what is stated therein. In this view of the matter, I am fortified by the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Assistant G.M., Central Bank of India v. Commissioner Municipal Corporation, .

(5) It is also significant to point out that the assessment order (Annexure P2) clearly shows that no objection was raised before the Assessing Authority against the proposed ratable value of the property. The only dispute which was raised before the Assessing Authority was with regard to the date of its enforcement. Thus, it is obvious that after receiving the notice u /Section 126 of the Dmc Act, the respondent No. 2 knew what was required of her. In this view of the matter, it cannot be held that absence of particulars and grounds for the proposed enhancement of the ratable value of the property in question vitiated the notice under Section 126 issued to the respondent No. 2. In my opinion, the learned Adj has committed a patent illegality in setting aside the assessment order (Annexure P2) on the ground of invalidity of the notice u/Section 126, DMC Act issued to the respondent No. 2.

(6) Learned AD) has also set aside the assessment order on the ground that ratable value of the property in question was not determined in accordance with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Dr. Balbir Singh's Case (supra). Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not disputed the proposition of law that if two portions of a property are being used for different purposes, then, in terms of the Section 114 of the Dmc Act, the separate portions are to be treated as separate properties and to be taxed accordingly. In the instant case, one portion comprised of ground floor and basement were let out to the State Bank of India and the remaining portion of the building in question was in occupation of the respondent No. 2. Consequently, the learned Adj has rightly held that both the portions are to be taxed in accordance with the principles laid down in Dr. Balbir Singh's case (supra). A perusal of the assessment order (Annexure P2) shows that having analysed the facts and the material available on the record, the Assessing Authority formed an opinion that the assessee had defaulted in supplying complete information and documents, and therefore, it was not possible to determine date of completion of the building or even the date of first letting out. In Dr. Balbir Singh's case (supra) their Lordships have disapproved such an attitude of the Assessing Authority and have held : "It is indeed strange that the Assessing Authorities should have declined to assess the ratable value of 494 properties in South Delhi on the basis of standard rent determinable on the principles laid down in Sub-section (1)(A)(2)(b) or (1)(B)(2)(b) of Section 6 merely on the ground that in the opinion of the Assessing Authorities "the assesses failed to produce the documentary evidence as regards the aggregate amount of reasonable cost of construction and the market price of land comprised in the premises on the date of commencement of the construction". If the assessees failed to produce the documentary evidence to establish the reasonable cost of construction of the premises or the market price of the land comprised in the premises the Assessing Authorities could arrive at their own estimate of these two constituent items in the application of the principles set out in Sub-section (I)(A)(2)(b) or (I)(B)(2)(b) of Section 6. But on this account, the Assessing Authorities could not justify resort to Sub-section (4) of Section 9. It is only where for any reasons it is not possible to determine the standard rent of any premises on the principles set forth in Section 6 that the standard rent may be fixed under Subsection (4) of Section 9 and merely because the owner does not produce satisfactory evidence showing what was the reasonable cost of construction of the premises or the market price of the land at the date of commencement of the construction, it cannot be said that it is not possible to determine the standard rent on the principles set out in Sub-section(l)(A)(2)(b)or(l)(B)(2)(b) of Section 6. Take for example a case where the owner produces evidence which is found to be incorrect or which does not appeal to be satisfactory can the Assessing Authorities in such a case resort to Sub-section (4) of Section 9 slating that it is not possible to determine the standard rent on the principles set out in Sub-section (l)(A)(2)(b) or (l)(B)(2)(b) of Section 6. The Assessing Authorities would obviously have to estimate for themselves on the basis of such material as may be gathered by them, the reasonable cost of construction and the market price of the land and arrive at their own determination of the standard rent. This is an exercise with which the Assessing Authorities are quite familiar and it is not something unusual for them or beyond their competence and capability. It may be noted that even while fixing standard rent under Sub-section (4) of Section 9, the Assessing Authorities have to reply on such material as may be available with them and determine the standard rent on the basis of such material by a process of estimation."

(7) It is pertinent to point out that the Assessing Authority should not have fell helpless and should have exercised the power conferred on it by the various provisions of the Dmc Act and compelled the respondent No. 2 to divulge the required information. The Assessing Authority ought to have engaged it own valuer, if it was necessitated. In my opinion the learned Adj has rightly remanded the case to the Assessing Authority for refixing the ratable value of the property in question in accordance with the principles laid down in Dr. Batbir Singh's case (supra). For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.