R.C. Juneja vs Prem Dass Bajaj
1997 Latest Caselaw 1046 Del

JUDGMENT

N.G. Nandi, J.

(1) In this petition under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the petitioner (original respondenttenant) has been challenging the order dated 6.5.1995 refusing leave to contest under Sections 25-B(4) & (5) of the Act in the proceedings under Section 14-C of theAct.

(2) It is not disputed that the petition under Section 14-C of the Act came to be filed on 12.12.1996. The petitioner retired from the service of the Central Government with effect from 31.8.1997.

(3) It is submitted by Mr. Sethi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, that the first and second floors having four rooms and two rooms respectively, with a separate water and electric connection is available with the respondent/ (originalpetitioner-landlord) and that the demand for eviction under Section 14-C of the Act is mala fide inasmuch as the respondent has not been completing the flooring and the water and electric fittings and that it is an artificial scarcity/ need created for the purpose of evicting the petitioner from the demised premises inasmuch as thedoors, flooring and sanitary fittings are not provided malafide and that there is no necessity for residence much less bona fide, as contemplated under Section 14-C of the Act; that since first and second floors is available, Section 14-C of the Act cannot be invoked as the demand for additional accommodation is not contemplated under Section 14-C of the Act; that the first and second floors cannot be said not habitable and, therefore, not available for residence to the respondent; that the contentions raised in the leave to contest suggest triable issues which require scrutiny of evidence.

(4) As against this, it is submitted by Mr. Dhir, learned Counsel for respondent,that the periodic increase in the rent cannot debar a claim of the landlord on the ground of bonafide requirement, be it under Section 14(l)(e) or under Section 14-C of the Act; that the first and second floor premises cannot be said to be available for residence as the same are not habitable and even if first and second floor are considered available, even then first and second floor being not sufficient, looking to the number of family members namely petitioner, his wife, two married sons with their families, children; that the parameters of Section 14(l)(e) of the Act cannot be extended to Section 14-C of the Act; that the petitioner has already retired from Central Government employment w.e.f. 31/08/1987 and that he has to handover the possession of the Government accommodation on or before 31.12.1997.

(5) Section 14-C does not postulate non-availability of other premises to the landlord for the purpose of invoking Section 14-C of the Act nor does it provide thata landlord cannot claim additional premises by invoking Section 14-C, if he does not have premises sufficient available for his residence. In the case of Anand Swnroop Vohra v. Bhim Sen Bahri & Another, , the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case under Section 14-C(1) of the Act filed by the landlord - a retired Central Government employee on the ground of requirement of demised premises namely the ground floor for his own residence because of insufficiency of accommodation on the first floor of the house where his brother was residing, held petition under Section 14-C(1) of the Act maintainable. This would provide an answer to the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for petitioner on this score.

(6) It is not disputed that the first and second floors in the property wherein the demised premises is on the ground floor were constructed during the years 1990-1992. It is also not disputed that there are no doors, sanitary fittings and the laying of the tiles on the floor. The premises which are not complete in every respect cannot be said to be habitable and available to the landlord for the purpose of residence taking the admitted facts as they are, as pointed out above.

(7) Simply because the present petitioner has been granted leave to contest in the proceedings under Section 14(1 )(e) of the Act, the same would not mean that the petitioner would be ipso facto entitled to leave to contest in the proceedings under Section 14-C of the Act inasmuch as the bona fide requirement for residence by the landlord for himself and his family members, as contemplated under Section14(1 )(e) of the Act, cannot be extended/stretched to Section 14-C of the Act and that the requirement for residence has to be within the parameters of Section 14-C of theAct. It is not the say of the petitioner that the present respondent is not bona fide in as much as the respondent, after getting possession of the demised premises,wants the same to be converted into commercial complex or sold. The fact is that the respondent has retired from the Central Government employment with effect from 31/08/1997 and as per page 154 of the paper book, he has been served with a notice to vacate the Government accommodation, which was given to him while in service on or before 31.12.1997.

(8) All what Section 14-C(2) of the Act contemplates is whether the landlord is in the employment of the Central Government or Delhi Administration and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him are required by him for his own residence after his retirement. Hemay, at any time within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.

(9) In the instant case, the petition under Section 14-C of the Act has been filed within one year preceding the date of his retirement on 31.8.1997. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, as pointed out above, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order so as to call for any interference therein. THE petition being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed.

(10) Ordered accordingly.