Rahul Int. Mkting P. Ltd vs Jai Gopal
1995 Latest Caselaw 895 Del

JUDGMENT

Arun Kumar , J.

(1) Originally petitioner took premises for 2 years u/S. 21 of Drc Act. On expiry of period landlord applied for possession against petitioner no. 2 who was residing in premises. Objection was that no. 2 was not tenant. Landlord then wanted to apply against Petitioner no. 1 but he was non-suited on the ground of limitation of 6 months. Landlord then filed instant petition u/S. 14(i)(e) of Drc Act against both petitioners No. 2 was M.D. of no. 1. Landlord was living in a tenanted premises at Daryaganj and his landlord had sued him for eviction. Tenant denied ownership of landlord contending that premises was let for residential-cum-commercial purposes and that premises was not bonafide required by landlord. Arc decreed landlord's claim and tenant filed CR.l After detailing above. Judgment is.

(2) First let me deal with the question of ownership. According to the landlord the President of India had granted a perpetual lease in his favor with respect to the plot on which the suit property is constructed. The perpetual lease deed is dated 5th July 1974. The original lease deed is Ex. A-l. This leaves no doubt about the fact that the respondent herein, i.e. Jai Gopal Guglani was the owner of the property. I am using the word 'was' because during the pendency of the present proceedings Jai Gopal Guglani died and his legal repetitive have been brought on record vide an order passed by this court.

(3) Apart from the fact that the document Ex. A-1 is sufficient to clinch the issue of ownership of the property in favor of the respondents, the plea of the tenants in this behalf is also such that the tenants are nut entitled to raise any controversy on this point. They have only pleaded that Jai Gopal, the petitioner in the eviction petition was not the owner of the property in suit They have nowhere suggested that who else was the owner of the property, if not Jai Gopal Guglani. Further this fact was not disputed that rent was paid to him. It is also to be noted that the legal position about proof of ownership in petitions u/S. 14(l)(e) of the Act is now clear. The landlord is not required to prove ownership in the sense one is required to do so in a contest based on title to property. Therefore tenants in such cases normally do not claim title to the property. Therefore, it is not a contest based on title to property. The tenants have been encouraged to deny ownership only in view of this statutory provision which uses the word 'owner'. By denying ownership the tenants try to ensure that at least the case goes on for trial. It is basically this reason for which the plea of denial of ownership is raised by the tenants in case u/S. 14(1)(e) of the Act.

(4) A further fact noted in this case is that premises was taken on rent initially u/S. 21 of the Act. To application for permission u/S. 21 both the sides, i.e. the landlord as well as the tenant are parties. Both the parties approach the Controller for permission. Statements of both the parties are recorded by the Controller generally before grant of permission. Therefore, in a case of the present type there is no scope for the petitioners/tenants to say that the respondent is not the owner of the property. The Additional Rent Controller was perfectly justified in giving this finding in favor of the respondents/landlords.

(5) This brings me to the point regarding letting purpose. The learned counsel for the petitioners/tenants submits that right from the inception of the tenancy the tenants are having their offices in the premises in suit. The rent has been most of the time paid by one of the companies of Rahul Nevile. From this it is sought to be urged that the fact that the companies were having their offices in the premises in suit was well within the knowledge of the landlord and he never objected to this, Further it has been urged that onus of proving that the premises is let for residential purpose alone was on the landlord which he failed to discharge On the question of onus it is no doubt true that the initial onus is on the landlord. But the onus keeps on shifting and it cannot be said that the tenant is totally absolved from showing that the i remises was let for residential-cum-commercial purposes. Particularly it has to be kept in mind that it is the tenant who raises the plea that the premises was let for residential-cum-commercial purpose,

(6) Apart from oral statements of the parties in support of their respective stands it is found the material facts to be seen in this behalf are :- (1) that the perpetual lease granted by the Lesser, i.e. the President of India in favor of the landlord restricts the use of the property to residential use only ; (2) admittedly Rahul Nevile has been residing in the premises along- with bids family ; (3) the property is located in a residential area ; (4) the property was let u/S. 21 of the Act as per permission granted by the Controller u/S. 21 Permission is granted only in case of letting for residential purpose. Before grant of permission the tenant accepts that he is renting the premises for residential purpose only. As already noted permission was granted by the Controller on the basis of application made by both the parties and statements made before the Controller by both the parties. Therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to now contend that the premises was let for residential-cum-commercial purpose.

(7) The learned counsel for the petitioners tried to take advantage of the fact that the rent receipts are in favor of the companies of Rahul Nevile. It is also submitted that rent was being paid by either of the companies of Rahul Nevile. Payment of rent alone is not sufficient to hold that the person who pays rent is tenant of the property. Mere payment of rent is not sufficient for basing a finding of relationship of landlord and tenant or letting purpose. Issue of rent receipts in favor of the companies, firstly does not by itself make the companies the tenant. Secondly even if a company is a tenant, this mere fact will not lead to the conclusion that the premises is let for residential-cum-commercial purpose. A company may take the premises on rent for residence of its officers. In that event a company may be a tenant. The letting purpose automatically cannot become a residential-cum- commercial. Therefore, even the other argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the payment of rent by the companies or issuance of rent receipts in their favor shows that the offices of the companies were located in the premises does not hold water.

(8) The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that even in the eviction petition the address of the companies of Rahul Nevile is given as that of the premises in suit. To my mind this does not make any difference and this cannot lead to a finding that the premises was let for residential-cum-commercial purpose. The statute, i.e. 14(l)(e) has an explanation which runs:

"EXPLANATION.-for the purposes of the clause, "premises let for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes,"

The Explanation leaves no scope for the argument being advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners in this behalf. In view of all these facts I am fully in agreement with the finding of the A.R.C. on the question of letting purpose, i.e. the premises were let for residential purposes

(9) This brings me to the question of bona fide requirement of the respondent landlord regarding the suit premises. The case set up by the landlord is mainly on the ground that he and his family were residing in a tenanted premises and that they were facing eviction qua the said premises and, therefore, they wanted to reside in the property in suit which is their only residential property in the city. Thus it is not a case of additional accommodation being required by a landlord who is already living in his own property. A landlord can have a legitimate desire to live in his own property. Secondly an added factor in the present case and which is stronger in favor of the landlord is that the landlord says that he is threatened with eviction from the tenanted property in which he and his family are residing. In the eviction petition itself the landlord has given the cause title of the eviction proceedings as well as the name of the court. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the plea regarding facing eviction petition was vague since no particulars of eviction case have been given by the landlord. In the eviction petition the landlord has given particulars of the case. Then in his own statement he mentioned two cases with their cause title as well as name of the respective courts in which they were pending. The tenants had cross-examined the landlord and if they were not satisfied with the particulars of the eviction cases already furnished by the landlord in his examination- in-chief, they could have sought further information from the landlord;

(10) Learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that after the death of Jai Gopal Guglani, there is only his widow and one son who are in Delhi. The other sons and daughters are all settled in U.S.A. From this the learned counsel tried to urge that the landlord's requirement were not such that they would be requiring the entire property in suit. This argument overlooks the fact that even if some of the children are settled in U.S.A. or have become U.S. citizens as contended by the counsel for the petitioners, they still will be visiting their mother who undisputedly resides in Delhi. Fortunately in our society we still maintain family bonds which compel the children to visit their parents and stay with their parents as long as possible though they may be settled abroad. On such visit of the children of the widow of Jai Gopal Guglani accommodation would be required for their residence. I am in perfect agreement with the findings of the A.R.C. on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord regarding the property in suit.

(11) Lastly I may mention that the learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the ground No. 11 in the grounds of revision in this Court ought to be considered and in view of the said ground it should be held that the A.R.C. had no jurisdiction to pass the eviction order in the present case. Ground No. 11 is : "11. That the learned A.R.C. has erred in law in holding that although the rent of the premises exceeds Rs. 35001- p.m. he docs not cease to have jurisdiction inspite of the introduction of amendment in section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, The learned A.R.C. should have held that on the day when the judgment was pronounced he has no jurisdiction under the Act as amended because the same was ousted by the introduction of the amendment in Act. Even if the operation of section 3(c) is held to be prospective, immediately after the introduction of the amendment the jurisdiction was taken away and the case was taken out of the purview of the Act"

(12) The point sought to be raised is covered by a Division Bench judgment of this court in Nirmaljit Arora vs. Bharat Steel Tubes . Apart from the fact that I was a party to that judgment, sitting as a single Bench I cannot take a different view. The learned counsel tried to urge that a judgment of Supreme Court in H. Shivarao vs. Ciliu Pereira was not cited before the Division Bench which handed down the judgment in Nirmaljit Arora's case. This reason also does not persuade me to reopen the issue. Therefore, I do not find any merit in ground No. 11 as quoted above.

(13) The result of the above discussion is that this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 5000.00.