Jai Narain Verma vs Delhi Development Authority
1995 Latest Caselaw 415 Del

JUDGMENT

Y.K. Sabharwal, J.

(1) The petitioner is an employee of Delhi Development Authority (In short. the 'DDA'). At the relevant time, the petitioner was a lower division clerk. A charge sheet dated 7th April 1973 was served on the petitioner The statement of imputation pertain to incidents of 1969 and 1970. The allegations against the petitioner, in terms of the statement of imputation on the basis of which article of charge has been framed, are these : "Allegation Shri Jai Narain was functioning as Rent Collector, J. J. Scheme, Najafgarh Road, Dda in the year 1969-70. The duty of Shri Jai Narain was only to collect rent or lease money from the allottees. The plot were allotted by the Executive Officer of the J. J. Scheme and the said Shri Jai Narain was not authorised to give possession of plots under the above scheme without competent authority. The said Shri Jai Narain collected money and issued the following receipts :

1.Receipt No. 390/38968 dated 29-7-70 for Rs. 152 in favor of Shri Badri s/o Khaoheroo plot SB] 381 and gave possession of the plot of Shri Basant Lal.

2.Receipt No. 263126286 dated 10-12-69 in favor of Shri Sohan Lal, Plot No. E 1138 and gave possession to him.

3.Receipt No. 342.!34137 dated 1-4-70 for Rs. 50 in favor of Shri Duli Chand, plot No. H/ 150 and gave possession to him.

4.Receipt No. 390138956 dated 22-7-70 for Rs. 104 in favor of Shri Balwant Singh Tenement No. 838 and gave possession to him. The said Shri Jai Narain realised the above amount and issued receipts unauthorisedly for ulterior motive. He thus, contravened Rule 3 of the C.C.S. (Conduct) Rules, 1964.."

The petitioner submitted his reply dated 21st July 1976. The petitioner, inter-alia, took the stand that so far as charge No. 1 is concerned, Sh. S. C. Dixit, the then Officer on Special Duty (JJ) passed certain orders on an application which was received by him through the transit/dispatch register of J. J. which has not been made available to him and that the orders of Shri Dixit should be in the records with CBI. or Dda, which record has not been made available to the petitioner. The stand is that receipt was issued under the orders of Sh. Dixit. Regarding charge No. 2, the petitioner stated that he issued the receipt on having seen the previous receipt issued by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, since the Corporation was dealing with the J. J. Scheme prior to its transfer to Dda and had issued receipt Nos. 982056, 982057 dated 3rd May, 1967 and 150052 dated 13th January 1968 in the name of Digh Ram. He further, took the stand that receipt No. 263126286 dated 10th December, 1969 has been issued by him in the name of Digh Ram and not Sohan Lal. Regarding receipt No. 342! 34137 dated 1st April, 1970 in favor of Duli Chand., petitioner ^ has stated that Duli Chand is the actual allottee of plot vide. allotment letter No. 2147iN dated 3rd November, 1965 arid there is no case as such of issuance of receipt unauthorisedly or for ulterior motive. Receipt No. 390138956 dated 22nd July. 1970 was stated to have been issued under the written orders of Sh. Ram Dhir Singh Dahiya, the then Rent Supervisor under whom petitioner was stated to be working and written orders of Sh. Dahiya were stated to be available in original with CBI. The delay in filing reply to charge sheet is stated to have occurred on account of non supply of documents by the Dda to the petitioner.

(2) Since the enquiry did not make any head way, the petitioner filed this petition in February 1994, inter alia, seeking quashing of the charge-sheet and consequent departmental proceedings on the main "round of undue and inordinate delay in conclusion of the departmental proceedings.

(3) It also seems dear from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Dda that there has been undue and. inordinate delay in the conclusion of the departmental enquiry for no fault of the petitioner. No satisfactory explanation is coming forth on record for this delay. The incident pertains to the year 1969-70. Charges were served on the petitioner about 22 years ago. Except for change of enquiry officers and presenting officers nothing tangible has happened in the proceedings of the enquiry. As many as 8 enquiry officers a.nd 6 presenting officers have been changed. According to the Dda it was. on account of administrative reasons. For the present purposes we will accept that explanation. But, the fact remains that in all these years even the documents have not been supplied to the petitioner. The counter affidavit of Dda show that only 5 out of 14 documents have been supplied to' the petitioner. Regarding the supply of the remaining documents, the plea of the Dda is that end envious for collecting the same are going on. What endeavors have been made in lust about 20 years have not been stated in the counter affidavit. The recording of evidence has not commenced. Further, it seems that the allegations against the petitioner were connected with the allegations against one Randhir Singh, Rent Collector, who was convicted by orders of Special Judge. The appeal of Randhir Singh was dismissed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition is stated to be pending in the Supreme Court. in case the original documents had been filed in Court in case against Randhir Singh, it was expected of Dda to take appropriate steps to obtain certified copies of documents from the Court and supply the same to the petitioner. The Dda did not adopt that course with the result that the disciplinary proceedings, without any progress, are pending for about 22 years ago. The question is can the charge sheet and the disciplinary proceedings, under these circumstances, be quashed.

(4) No direct judgment has been cited before us where the charge sheet and the disciplinary proceedings may have been quashed on the ground of inordinate and undue delay in conclusion of the proceedings. Reliance has, however, been placed, on behalf of the petitioner, on the latest decision of Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and others vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, 'for .the proposition that the disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities and if the delay is too long and remains unexplained, the Court can interfere and quash the charges. In the cited decision, the Apex Court while referring to the Constitution Bench decision in the case of A.R. Antulay vs. R. S. Nayak and another, fl992m S.C.C. 225].( 2) has opined that though Antulay's case pertained to criminal prosecution, the principles enunciated therein are broadly applicable to a plea of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. Reference has also been made to paragraph 86 of the judgment in Antulay's case, for the propositions emerging from the several decisions considered therein and observations that "ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors balancing test or balancing process and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case".

(5) We are cautious of (wo facts, namely (i) the Supreme Court in Chaman Lat Goyals case by applying the balancing process came to the conclusion that quashing of charge by the High Court was not warranted, in the facts and circumstances of the case. and (ii) the opinion that the Court can quash A the charges if the delay is too long and unexplained was expressed in the context of delay in serving the charges. We may, however, notice that one of the factors which heavily weighed for not quashing the charge was that in the meantime the enquiry had proceeded and was in final phase. There is also no doubt that case of Chaman Lal Goyal and other cases 'on the subject mainly deal with delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings and not delay in conclusion of the said proceedings. In our opinion, however, the said principle is equally applicable in a clear case like the present one where no progress has been made in the disciplinary proceedings for last .so many years as noticed herein before and there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay. The petitioner is stated to have already put in about 26 years of service and will be superannuated in about 718 years. Apart from service of charge sheet in respect of the incidents the year 1969-70, no progress has been made in the disciplinary proceedings. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, keeping in view the nature of the charge and reply submitted by the petitioner as noticed hereinbefore. the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings for nearly two decades, by itself is a sort of punishment or at least an agony or mental tension to the petitioner. The Dda has not denied in the counter affidavit that in the meantime the juniors of the petitioner have been promoted. The sword of Democles cannot be allowed to hang over the head of the petitioner any longer. Enough is enough. The disciplinary proceedings must be completed in a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time would depend on facts of each case. The test of balancing process can also be applied even in cases of undue long and unexplained delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings. Applying the said test here, for the facts and circumstances noticed earlier, the charge sheet deserves to be quashed.

(6) In view of the aforesaid. we allow the petition and quash the charge sheet dated 7th April, 1979 and consequent department proceedings pending against the petitioner. Petitioner would be entitled to consequential benefits arising out of the quashing of the charge sheet. In the circumstances of the case. parties are left to bear their own costs.