Tejbir Kaur vs Davender Singh
1995 Latest Caselaw 106 Del

JUDGMENT

Devinder Gupta, J.

(1) Tenant has felt aggrieved against an order passed on 27.1.1992 by Shri L.D. Malik, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi allowing the petition preferred by respondent under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and ordering petitioner's eviction from the premises in question.

(2) Respondent Devinder Singh sought the petitioner's eviction from the suit premises known as 26-A, Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar Iv, New Delhi comprising ground floor, first floor and second floor, as shown in the plan attached to the petition for eviction.

(3) Petition was filed on 24.7.1994 in which it was averred that an application under Section 21 of the Act was moved by the respondent seeking permission to create limited tenancy in favor of the petitioner. Both he and the petitioner appeared before the additional Rent Controller along with a property dealer. After statements were recorded an impression was gathered by him that the learned court had granted the application for creating limited tenancy but later on it transpired that the requisite permission had in fact not been granted. Thus, according to the respondent, premises were let out to the petitioner on 18.9.1980 for residential purpose which now were required by him for his own bonafide requirements and for requirement of the other members of his family consisting of himself, his wife, two sons and a daughter and two male servants. The residential accommodation in his occupation was only an annexe comprising one drawing cum dining room in the ground floor with a kitchen and a bed room along with covered verandah on the first floor. The accommodation was too small. Since children were growing, servants were having only one servant quarter, he being a man of status, namely, son of late Maharaja Mahipal Singh, an ex ruler of Sarala State, number of guests do keep on visiting him from the State of Sarala, who used to stay during night also. Thus, he was in urgent need of accommodation for which there was no other alternate suitable accommodation available to him except the accommodation in question.

(4) After the petitioner was granted leave to defend, reply on merits was filed on 5.12.1984 which was later on got amended. The amended reply was filed on 28.7.1988. Two preliminary objections were taken - one of which was that the petition for eviction was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code') because of the respondent having earlier preferred a petition for eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, in which ground of bonafide use and occupation was not taken. Since ground was not taken earlier, the present petition was merely an after thought and gross abuse of process of law. Petition otherwise was frivolous. The second objection was that petition for eviction was not maintainable since it amounted to seeking partial eviction from tenanted premises. He had illegally and tortiously been deprived of a servant quarter on 14.12.1982. On merits it was not disputed that an application was moved by respondent for grant of permission for letting out the premises under Section 21 of the Act and ultimately permission was declined to the respondent. Petitioner denied the respondent's ownership to the premises by alleging that the property was owned by late Maharaja Mahipal Singh, respondent's father, but during his life time had entered into an agreement to sell with one Alo Devi. On failure to perform his contract by Maharaja Mahipal Singh, a suit for specific performance of an agreement was preferred by Alo Devi, which was pending in original jurisdiction of this court. Petitioner denied the extent of accommodation available with the respondent and also denied that the same was not suitable according to his status. It was alleged that the respondent was already in occupation of a spacious accommodation which was more than suitable for his requirement. Recently the respondent had let out one room in the first floor to some students from Zambia Embassy. There were two garages available with the respondent. Instead of using the same for his car he had let out both the garages to Batra Property Dealer. Thus, it was alleged that the respondent was not in need of any accommodation. Filing of petition for eviction was alleged to be a counter blast to the petitioner's application preferred for fixation of standard rent. According to the petitioner, the act in seeking eviction was malafide since the respondent wanted to convert the entire building in residential flats for which the respondent had issued an advertisement.

(5) The Controller through the impugned order upheld the respondent's version and negatived the petitioner's stand after recording a finding of fact that the premises are required bonafide by the respondent for his requirement since he was not possessed of sufficient accommodation. He was also held to be the owner of the premises and entitled to seek petitioner's eviction. Petition was held not barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. It is this order which is under challenge in this revision. Along with the revision an application under 41 Rule 27 (CM 1771/92) was also preferred by which the petitioner seeks liberty to lead additional evidence to produce on record copies of orders passed in civil suit preferred by Alo Devi against Maharaja Mahipal Singh and also a prove a fact that the respondent owns another property in Delhi, namely, 37, Jor Bagh, New Delhi.

(6) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have been taken through the entire record, including the reply and rejoinder filed to Cm 1771/92.

(7) The main submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petition for eviction is bad for non-joinder of Alo Devi or in any case respondent is not competent to seek petitioner's eviction since part of the premises, as per the decision in civil suit preferred by Smt. Alo Devi against Maharaja Mahipal Singh, in which respondent was also a party, are now owned by Alo Devi. Second submission made is that the petitioner deserves to be granted leave to produce on record additional evidence in order to show that respondent owned other property due to which he is not entitled to seek petitioner's eviction. This fact was not known to the petitioner earlier. Third submission is that the findings recorded as regards bonafide use and occupation are contrary to the evidence on record and are bad in law and are liable to be reversed.

(8) Learned counsel for the respondent has tried to meet the arguments by referring to evidence and other documents on record and contending that there is no material justifying interference with the findings of fact. Petitioner is not entitled to challenge the respondent's ownership to the premises in question since it was the respondent who had let out the premises to the petitioner. Obtaining of a decree by Alo Devi does not affect the petitioner's right to seek eviction of a tenant, who had been inducted by him. On the question of additional evidence it has been contended that the petitioner is not entitled as of right to lead additional evidence. The respondent is not the owner of any other property other than the suit premises. Filing of application is a device to prolong the litigation. The said property in Jor Bagh for which evidence is sought to be led is not owned by the respondent but is owned by the respondent's sister-in- law.

(9) In so far as the application for additional evidence by which the petitioner wants to lead additional evidence as regards documents from the file of civil suit are concerned is also vehemently opposed. During the course of arguments learned counsel for the respondent stated that he has no objection in case the documents as regards civil litigation are also taken into consideration and read as a piece of evidence in the case.

(10) It is not in dispute that a civil suit No.665/81 was preferred by Alo Devi seeking specific performance of an agreement dated 2.1.1978 for sale of property No.28, Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. Ia 6612/89 was moved in the suit on 4.3.1989 on the basis of which suit has partly been decreed. Suit was filed against Maharaja Mahipal Singh, respondent's father. On his death, respondent and his brother Devendra Singh were brought on record as parties. Alo Devi also expired. Her legal representatives were brought on record. Respondent's brother Nripendra Singh entered into a compromise as regards his share in the property by accepting a sum of Rs.7 lacs as consideration for transfer of his interest in the property. Now for all intents and purposes, by virtue of a compromise decree passed as regards Nripendra Singh, the three legal representatives of Alo Devi, Namely, Smt. Pushpa Devi, Sanjeev Singh and Noordesh Singh are the owners along with respondent Devendra Singh in property No.28, Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, Thus the heirs of Alo Devi have stepped into the shoes of Nripendra Singh. This fact is also not in dispute that premises in question, which are in occupation of petitioner were in fact let out to the petitioner by respondent Devendra Singh alone, for which before letting out, an application under Section 21 of the Act was moved by the respondent in which the petitioner also made a statement admitting the respondent to be the owner of the premises in question. Petitioner also does not dispute the fact that the respondent had let out the premises to her. In view of these facts, even if Nripendra Singh was a co-owner in the entire property No.28, Ring Road, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, of which premises in question is a part, there is no question of taking note of the objection of the petitioner at this stage of the proceedings that the petition is bad for non-joinder of parties since petitioner is estopped to challenge the respondent's title to the premises or to claim that the other co-owner or transferee from a co-owner would be a necessary party to the eviction petition. It is a petition for eviction preferred by a person, whose ownership was not disputed at the time of letting the premises. His status is of a person who lets out premises as a landlord is not disputed by the petitioner. The fact that during the pendency respondent's brother Nripendra Singh has conceded the claim of Alo Devi's heirs will not be a relevant factor to be taken note of since petition was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Even Nripendra Singh was not a necessary party, such an objection had not been taken in the reply to the eviction petition.

(11) As regards the other evidence sought to be adduced on record, there is no cogent reason assigned in the application as to why such an evidence could not be adduced at an earlier stage of the proceedings. There is also no other ground as to why the application be allowed at this stage on a question that the landlord owns some other property. This fact is not admitted by the respondent that he is the owner and in case the petitioner considers himself to be the owner, the respondent is prepared to transferred ownership rights, or his title and interest in petitioner's favor. Irrespective of this, this fact alone will not be relevant, since what the respondent in the petition for eviction has prayed is that he owns some accommodation in the building in question and requires additional accommodation therein. Otherwise also there is no material on record even to suggest that the respondent is the owner of property No.37, Jor Bagh. Mere issuing a notice by Mcd regarding collection of house tax does not raise an inference of ownership.

(12) On the question of bonafide requirements. As regards respondent's status, there is no evidence in rebuttal adduced by the petitioner to the evidence adduced by the respondent that he belongs to a royal family being son of late Maharaja Mahipal Singh, an ex Ruler of Princely Sarala State. In that capacity he is accustomed to live in a spacious accommodation. His family consists ofhimself, his wife and three children whose ages at the time when respondent's statement was recorded were 11 years, 10 years and 8 years respectively. In addition there were two servants in the family. Statement was recorded in the year 1985 and naturally Controller was justified in assuming their ages at the time of decision to be 17, 16 and 14 years respectively. The Additional Rent Controller opined that keeping in view the status at least 4 bed rooms are required by the respondent. The report of local commissioner as regards the extent of accommodation available to the respondent which was obtained with the consent of the parties was taken into consideration and it was noticed that the respondent was in possession of a drawing cum dining room on ground floor besides a verandah and one living room and a store and kitchen on first floor, which accommodation in the facts and circumstances was held to be highly inadequate for respondent's requirement.

(13) While consideration a petition preferred under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act seeking eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide personal requirement, the essential idea to be kept in mind would be that the need of landlord is genuine and honest, conceived in good faith and naturally in order to test these requirements the relevant factor required to be taken into consideration would be the status of the person concerned, the environment in which he was born and brought up and his life style to which he is used. A person belonging to a royal family with royal background naturally is accustomed to live in spacious accommodation and would require servants also. For a family of five persons in which three children are of growing age, who presently are of 21 years, 20 years and 18 years respectively and of the respondent's status, accommodation which is available cannot be considered by any stretch of imagination to be adequate. There are two servants also. The Additional Rent Controller rightly found the accommodation to be highly inadequate for which the respondent has rightly been held to be entitled to additional accommodation. In this view of the matter, no interference is called for in the findings recorded by the Additional Rent Controller. Revision is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed as such leaving the parties to bear their own costs.