C.B. Aggarwal vs P. Krishna Kapoor
1994 Latest Caselaw 764 Del

JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

(1) The present suit has been instituted by the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. l,10,000.00 with costs and future interest. The case of the plaintiff is that he is the Principal of Government Senior School, and, at the time of institution of the suit, was working in Government Co-educational Senior Secondary School, Issapur, Delhi. The plaintiff, along with one Ishwar Dass Mahajan, had taken on rent the premises bearing No. F-122, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi, at a monthly rent of Rs. 350.00 exclusive of electric and water chargers vide lease deed dated 27th May, 1964 from the defendant.' The lease deed dated 27th May, 1964 provided the terms and conditions which were to govern the relationship of the landlord and the tenant. Clause (f) of the lease deed reads as under :- "NOT to use the said premises or any part thereof for any purpose other than for residence or for school but in case of opening any school, not to take any third person or other person(s) as partner(s) and not to introduce them in the said premises without the prior consent of the Lesser."

The case of the defendant is that the premises were rented out for a composite purpose of residence-cum-commercial. The defendant served a notice dated 8th April 1969 upon the plaintiff and Shri Ishwar Dass Mahajan to which they had sent reply dated 23rd April 1969. Shri Ishwar Dass Mahajan had written to the landlord that he had ceased to occupy the premises with effect from 20th February 1969, and, consequently, the plaintiff had become sole tenant of the premises under the defendant. Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff replied the notice issued by the defendant satisfactorily and staling that the defendant in this suit had no cause of action to take legal proceedings, the defendant instituted a petition on 17th March 1970 under Sections 14(1)(e), 14(1)(b), 14(1)(c), 14(1)(j), 14(1)(d), 14(1)(h) and 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as .the 'Act'). The case of the defendant is that institution of this petition was with ulterior motive and was without sufficient grounds. The defendant knew and was aware of the existence of the lease deed dt. 27th May 1964 and that the premises had been let out for a composite purpose. It was contended that, as such the petition under Sections 14(1)(e), 14(1)(b), 14(1)(c), 14(1)(j), 14(1) (d), 14(1)(h) and 14(1)(a) of Act was not maintainable. This petition was dragged out by the defendant for a considerable period with collateral purpose of harassing the plaintiff till it was finally dismissed on 23rd April 1974. The appeal preferred by the defendant against the said order of dismissal on 16th July 1974 was also dismissed by the learned Additional Rent Control Tribunal on 7th January 1978.

(2) The plaintiff has stated in the plaint that the grounds made out by the defendant in the petition were not available to the defendant under law and were totally based upon concocted facts which never existed. The plaintiff has stated in detail in the plaint as to how the grounds were not available to the defendant herein for instituting a petition under Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The plaintiff further states that the defendant filed a petition under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act on 10th December 1975. This petition and even the previous petition were the product of her nefarious and evil designs to harass the plaintiff into a time-consuming and money-consuming litigations. The plaintiff, as a result of this frivolous litigation, had to waste time and money, besides undergoing torture and simultaneously he was losing respect and reputation in the estimation of his friends, colleagues, relations, employers and the various officers of the Directorate of Education because of this litigation. It is stated in the plaint that the defendant had always been motivated to cause 44 obstacles and tremendous difficulties to the plaintiff particularly from April 1969 and she did not present the monthly cheques to her bankers every month and deliberately accumulated them so as to somehow or the other manoeuvre to create three consecutive monthly defaults in the payment of rent by the plaintiff and institute petition for default under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

(3) The plaintiff, for these reasons, had claimed damages of Rs. 3,10,000.00 from the defendant but restricted his right to claim damages to the extent of Rs. 1,10,000.00 only. Out of this sum, an amount of Rs. l,00,000.00 has been claimed by the plaintiff on account of damages suffered by him because of false, frivolous, vexatious and unwarranted litigation launched by the defendant, and on account of the tortures, agony, humiliation, harassment suffered because of the false and frivolous litigation for the institution of which the defendant had no bona fide reasons. This amount also includes the amount claimed by the plaintiff because of the loss in reputation in society, amongst nefarious and evil designs to harass the plaintiff into a time-consuming and money-consuming litigations. The plaintiff, as a result of this frivolous litigation, had to waste time and money, besides undergoing torture and simultaneously he was losing respect and reputation in the estimation of his friends, colleagues, relations, employers and the various officers of the Directorate of Education because of this litigation. It is stated in the plaint that the defendant had always been motivated to cause obstacles and tremendous difficulties to the plaintiff particularly from April 1969 and she did not present the monthly cheques to her bankers every month and deliberately accumulated them so as to somehow or the other manoeuvre to create three consecutive monthly defaults in the payment of rent by the plaintiff and institute petition for default under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

(4) The plaintiff, for these reasons, had claimed damages of Rs. 3,10,000.00 from the defendant but restricted his right to claim damages to the extent of Rs.1,10,000.00 only. Out of this sum, an amount of Rs.1,00,000.00 has been claimed by the plaintiff on account of damages suffered by him because of false, frivolous, vexatious and unwarranted litigation launched by the defendant, and on account of the tortures, agony, humiliation, harassment suffered because of the false and frivolous litigation for the institution of which the defendant had no bona fide reasons. This amount also includes the amount claimed by the plaintiff because of the loss in reputation in society, amongst colleagues, friends, relations and the employer and officers and employees of Delhi Administration. The remainder of Rs. 10,000.00 was claimed towards the litigation expenses, i.e., conveyance, typing, stamps, counsels' fees, postages for registration etc.

(5) The claim of the plaintiff has been strongly refuted and denied by the defendant. The defendant in the written statement has taken a preliminary objection that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action as such and is liable to be rejected under Order Vii Rule Ii of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is denied in the written statement that the proceedings were initiated by the defendant before the Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal obstinately or deliberately or consciously or with any ulterior motive. The defendant has stated in the written statement that the petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act was filed because substantial damage had been caused to the property in questi. The defen also claims to have a reasonable ground for filing the petition on the ground of subletting because the school being run in the premises in question by the defendant was 'Modern Public Greenery', but this name was changed and a board was put of 'Vivek Model School' run by Vivek Education Society at the same premises. It is denied that the defendant persisted in any deliberate falsehood or produced false or unreliable evidence as alleged in the plaint. It is stated that the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent was conclusively established before the Additional Rent Controller and the plaintiff was a regular defaulter in regard to the payment of rent. Explanation has been given in the written statement that the petitions were instituted for bona fide reasons and on bona fide belief. The defendant has stated that Clause l(f) of the lease deed has to be read with and subject to Clause l(g) . The latter clause reads as under:- '(g) not to do anything against the law of the land or the rules and bye-laws of the local body.

(6) Replication was filed by the plaintiff to the said written statement controverting the facts as stated in the written statement and reaffirming the facts as stated in the plaint by the plaintiff.

(7) On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed on 29th March 1985: '1. Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule Ii of the Code of Civil Procedure as not disclosing any cause of action ? 2. Whether the defendant obstinately, deliberately and consciously and with ulterior motive instituted petition for ejectment against the plaintiff with full knowledge that she ha.d no cause of action as alleged in para 3 to 9 of the plaint ? If so, what is the effect thereof ? 3. Whether the usual mode of payment of rent by plaintiff to defendant was by cheque/bank draft? OPP. 4. Whether the defendant deliberately accumulated cheques given by the plaintiff towards payment of rent to maneuver to create three consecutive monthly defaults and maneuvered dishonoring of four cheques in league with bank officials as alleged in para 10 of the plaint? If so, to what effect. 5. Whether the defendant deliberately and maliciously instituted the second petition for ejectment of the plaintiff knowing it to be false? If so, to what effect ? ' 6. Whether the defendant refused without any justification to accept payment of rent legally tendered as alleged in para 12 and 13 of the plaint? If so, what is the effect? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any amount by way of damages ? 8. Relief.'

(8) Counsel for the parties had made a request before the Court and upon their joint request, the Court had struck off issues NO.. 3 vide order dt. 30th September 1991.

(9) During the pendency of the suit, the defendant had given a statement before the Court that the defendant would not alienate the property without obtaining the orders of the Court. This statement was recorded by the Court in its order dt. 23rd July 1984. However, by an order dated 24th March 1987, 'the defendant was permitted to sell this property subject to the condition that she would deposit a sum of Rs. 1,00,000.00 in the United Commercial Bank, High Court premises. New Delhi, in the name of the Registrar of this Court as a fixed deposit. This amount was deposited by the defendant.

(10) Finding on Issues Nos. 2 and 7 would have a direct bearing on other issues as well. Consequently, I propose to first deal with issues Nos. 2 and 7 and together. Issues Nos. 2 and 7

(11) The undisputed facts are that the defendant herein had filed first petition under Sections 14(1)(e), 14(1)(b), 14(1)(c), 14(1)(j), 14(1)(d), 14(1)(h) 47 and 14(1)(a) of the Act on 17th March 1970. This petition was disposed of by the learned Additional Rent Controller vide his judgment dt. 23rd April 1974. In this judgment the learned Additional Rent Controller rejected the petition of the petitioner on all grounds, but held that the plaintiff herein had taken benefit of Section 15(2) of the Act. Appeal against this order was preferred by the defendant which was also dismissed vide order of the learned Rent Control Tribunal dt. 7th January 1978. The judgment of the learned Additional Rent Controller was upheld by the learned Tribunal in its entirety.

(12) Thereafter, a second petition under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act was instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff in the present suit on 11th December 1975- The judgment on this petition was pronounced by the learned Additional Rent Controller on 15th September 1979 whereby the petition was dismissed. The learned Additional Rent Controller held that plaintiff herein was tendering the rent by cheques but the same was not encashed. The appeal against this order was also dismissed by the learned Rent Controller vide the judgment dt. 30th April 1982. All these judgments though in favor of the plaintiff, i.e., the tenant before the learned Rent Control Tribunal, no costs were awarded by the concerned Additional Rent Controller and the Tribunal. Counsel for the plaintiff has laid great emphasis on the observations made by the learned Additional Rent Controller in his judgment dt. 30th April 1982 wherein it has been observed that "The chances of thus the notice having been forged cannot be ruled out. "FURTHER,in the judgment dt. 15th September 1979, the learned Additional Rent Controller also observed "this also showed that the respondent has been regularly paying the rent but the petitioner had not been presenting the cheques for encashment and that the respondent did not commit any default".

(13) The learned 'Additional, Rent Controller and the Tribunal having made such observations had dismissed the petition and the appeal respectively without any order .as to costs.

(14) Learned counsel for the plaintiff has also argued that admittedly a lease deed was executed between the parties and in the said lease deed dt. 27th May 1964 the purpose of letting was composite and Clause l(f) gave the authority to the plaintiff to use the premises both for residential and commercial purpose. Therefore, the purpose of letting being composite, a petition under Section 14(1)(e), 14(1)(h) etc. did not lie, and the defendant had instituted the petitions maliciously and only with the intention to harass the plaintiff. In the plaint, as mentioned above, allegations have been made that the whole intention of the defendant was to harass the plaintiff with the collateral -purpose to throw out the plaintiff from the premises under his tenancy. On the basis of the allegations made in the plaint, damages to the extent of Rs. 1,00,000.00 have been claimed by the plaintiff in the present suit.

(15) Learned Counsel for the defendant, on the other hand, submits that all petitions were instituted under bona fide belief and on reasonable basis. Counsel submitted that Clause l(f) of the lease deed dt. 27th May 1964 has to be read in conjunction with Clause l(f) of the said lease deed. Clause l(g) of the lease deed read as under : 'Not to do anything against the law of the land or the rules and bye-laws of the local body.

(16) This objection has been taken in the written statement as well, and it was stated that running of a school was contrary to the permitted user of land, contrary to bye-laws and regulations of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. It was also submitted that the ground of subletting was also bona fide for the reasons stated in the written statement. In the first petition which was instituted under various provisions of the Act as indicated above, the findings of the Court on the ground of section 14(1)(a) of the Act were in the favor and the court had given the benefit of Section 15(2) of the Act. Further it was argued that the mere fact that he had not succeeded before the learned Additional Rent Controller and the Tribunal, does not necessarily constitutes a ground or a cause actionable in torts. It was also submitted that no damages can be awarded in case of ordinary civil legal proceedings, even if the petitioner/plaintiff in those proceeding fails.

(17) I have heard the parties at length and have also perused the judgments which have been referred to by the respective parties.

(18) Before coming to the merits of the present case, it will be appropriate at this stage to discuss the law on the subject of malicious prosecution and other forms of abuse of legal process. Certainly, in given facts and circumstances, and upon fulfilllment of the conditions settled by various pronouncements, malicious prosecution as well as any other abuse of legal process which injuries the reputation of the party is actionable in torts. The party thus suffering can bring a suit for damages in a court of competent jurisdiction. The settled view appears to be that an ordinary civil action even if decided against a party would not normally give right to an action for a suit for damages on that ground.

(19) The Privy Council in the case of Mohamed Amin Vs. Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee and others, Air (34) 1947 P.C. 108, held that- The reason why an action does not lie for falsely and maliciously prosecuting an ordinary civil action is that such a case does not necessarily and naturally involve damage to the party sued. A civil action which is false will be dismissed at the hearing. The defendant's reputation will be cleared of any imputations made against him, and he will be indemnified against his expenses by the award of costs against his opponent. The law does not award damages for mental anxiety, or for extra costs incurred beyond those imposed on the unsuccessful party. But criminal charge involving scandal to reputation or the possible loss of life or liberty to the party charged does necessarily and naturally involve damage and in such a case damage to reputation will be presumed.'

(20) In the written statement, the defendant had described facts which, according to her, constitute a bona fide belief in instituting the legal proceedings under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. For the institution of petition on the ground of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, the explanation given is that the commercial purpose was contrary to law, and, as such, entitled her to go before the Additional Rent Controller because the said clause would be contrary to law and thereby a ground to institute the petition for evicting the tenant. The ground of subletting has also been justified in the written statement. In this manner, the defendant, in the written statement, has given detailed reasons in the pleadings and in evidence for institution and continuation of those proceedings.

(21) The plaintiff's plea that there was no reasonable ground whatsoever for the defendant to go to the court of Additional Rent Controller does not seem to be well founded. This court is not sitting in appeal, and, in fact, has no jurisdiction to go into the reasoning given by the learned Additional Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal in their respective judgments. This court can neither reappreciate the judgments, nor can substitute its view for the view given by the learned Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunals. This court is only concerned with whether the present suit for damages is maintainable as framed, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to any damages.

(22) At this stage, it will be relevant to refer to the judgment of Lord. Denning Mr. Scarman and Bridge Ljj, in the case of Goldsmith Vs.Sperrings Ltd., (1977) 2 All Er 566, wherein it has held as under: 50 '(i) What the defendants had to show in order to establish abuse of legal process was that, in starting and continuing his actions, the plaintiff had an ulterior purpose in that he was seeking a collateral advantage for himself beyond what the law offered as a remedy for his grievances and that, but for his ulterior purpose, he would not have started proceedings at all. Accordingly the defendants had to prove that the plaintiff's purpose was to stifle the future publication by Private Eye by depriving it of its commercial outlets.'

(23) It is true that in a civilized society, legal process is the machinery for keeping order and doing justice. It can be used properly or it can be abused. It is used properly when it is invoked for the vindication of men's rights or the enforcement of just claims. It is abused when it is diverted from its true course to as to serve extortion or oppression; or to exert pressure so as to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a tort, a wrong known to the law. Thus initiation of proceedings must be abused and has to be for 'a collateral purpose for which the law does not intent to provide a relief for such institution. The tort of abuse of the process of the court would lie against a plaintiff where it could be shown that he had set proceedings on foot to effect an object or purpose which was not within the scope of the process. The tort of abuse of the process was distinct from malicious prosecution, and unlike malicious prosecution, did not depend on the plaintiffs proceedings being completed before an action could be brought.

(24) In the case of Speed Seal Products Ltd. Vs. Paddington and another, (1986) I All Er 91, it was held that the object or purpose which was not within the scope of the process is a basic ingredient for maintaining such a suit.

(25) In the present case, the proposition of law cannot be disputed that the learned Additional Rent Controller is the only forum, which can order the eviction of the tenant from the premises, and where the parties are governed by the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Both parties admit the relationship of landlord and tenant, and that the provisions of the Act were applicable. The dispute is to the availability of ground and denial of relief. The question for determination is whether the mere fact that the case has been instituted on these grounds or even with malicious intent would enable a party to bring a suit for damages, more especially, when the petition and the appeal of the landlord are dismissed. In the instant case, counsel for the plaintiff has fairly conceded at the bar that the plaint does not contain specific allegations of collateral purpose of institution of the petition without reasonable cause and other special ingredients required in law for the purpose of institution of the suit. Even no specific particulars of damages have been given in the plaint.

(26) The landlord did not choose the process for any ulterior 'purpose to cause mental agony, expenditure, harassment and unavoidable consequences of litigation. The defendant has not used, nor, in fact, is it the case as stated in the plaint, that the defendant used these proceedings for such a collateral or other purpose for which the learned Additional Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to give a relief to the landlord for eviction of the premises. In the present case, it is not only that the basic ingredients of abuse of the process are lacking in the plaint, but also there is no evidence. The plaintiff had examined one witness besides himself. The said witness has not stated any thing in regard to the matter in issue in the present suit. He could not produce the records because they were not available. Even if he had produced the records, this Court could not have given findings whether there was any fault on the part of the tenant and whether the benefit under Section 15(2) of the Act was rightly or wrongly given to the present plaintiff by the learned additional Rent Controller.

(27) Irrespective of the pleadings by the parties and quantum of evidence led in this court, can never be a ground for giving jurisdiction to this Court, to re-examine or re- appreciate evidence led before the Additional Rent Controller and the judgments pronounced thereupon, in these proceedings. It is an actionable wrong to institute certain kind of legal proceedings against another person maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. Liability attaches to him who maliciously and without reasonable cause petitions to have another person adjudicated a bankrupt or a company to have wound up as insolvent. Taking a wider view, the Courts in England even extended this action for unfounded and malicious proceedings before a Court Martial. Aside from liability for malicious civil proceedings the law also recognises a related tort called 'abuse of process'. This lies where a legal process, not itself without foundation, is used for an improper, collateral purpose (Salmond and Houston on the Law of torts, 18th Edn).

(28) On the basis of the various pronouncements of courts in India and in England. It can safely be concluded that civil actions which are normally covered under 'abuse of process' are relating to attachment or property, damage of a person, malicious bankruptcy, winding up proceedings and such other processes of the Courts which are abused by a party. Only those cases can be considered by the courts which satisfy the following ingredients:- 1.The proceedings must have been instituted or continued by ' the defendant; 2. He must have acted without reasonable and probable cause; 3. He must have acted maliciously; 4. The proceedings must have been unsuccessful- that is to say, must have terminated in favor of the plaintiff now suing; 5. The legal process was not only without foundation but is used for an improper and collateral purpose. Such orders were not used for a purpose, for which the court intended to pass the order or the order passed by a court in a case has been used with ulterior motives to cause damage to the reputation, person or property of the affected party.

(29) The probable cause is not the same thing as sufficient cause and has to be judged from the standard of reasonable and ordinary prudent men. The plaintiff is obliged to give positive evidence of not only the lack of proper probable and reasonable cause but also as to the requirements of other conditions, before any relief is granted to him against the defendant. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued that the defendant had no right to institute the proceedings and the initiation and continuation of proceedings was without probable cause and was malicious. I have already held that even these two ingredients are not proved in the present case. Even if these be assumed and have been proved, the remaining three ingredients have neither been pleaded nor proved. As such, the plaintiff could hardly bring the present suit for damages against the defendant, and the net result is that the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages.

(30) Another factor which must be taken into consideration by this court is that under Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, specific power is given to the Controller for awarding costs. Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act reads as follows: 'In all proceedings before him, the Controller shall consider the question of costs and award such costs to or against any party as the Controller considers reasonable.' The plain language of the above provision indicates that the legislature in its wisdom has worded sub-section (3) to give it a wider meaning and greater power. This, to my mind, certainly includes the power to award costs as well as compensatory costs. Both these costs are established in law, and, in fact, one finds them codified under section 35 and 35A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus an Additional Rent Controller while exercising powers under Section 37(3) of the Act can certainly take into consideration the falsity of the claim by a party, the harassment unnecessarily caused to the other party and award such costs as it may deem fit keeping in view the entirely of the facts and circumstances of a given case.

(31) As mentioned by me earlier, in respect of the specific observations made by the learned Additional Rent Controller as well as by the Tribunal, no costs, much less compensatory costs, were awarded by the court in favor of the plaintiff. Under the above provisions, the Controller has to consider the question of costs and award such costs to or against any party as the Controller may consider reasonable.

(32) Learned counsel for the plaintiff has heavily relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in the case of Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Hansaben Baldevdas Shivlal and others, , wherein the court held as under: "Abuse (in contradiction to proper use) of legal process is the crucial element of tort". Such as oppression, it makes the defendant liable for damages. It is thus improper purpose which is the gravamen of liability and when that is proved, no question of further proof of malice and absence of reasonable and probable cause arises; and that is not a necessary element to be proved in such cases. It must be borne in mind that such improper purpose is not an act of Court, nor does the Court give any judicial sanction to such improper purpose while granting the interim injunction. The Court grants the interim injunction for proper purpose of protecting the interest of the party seeking injunction. However, if such party were to abuse such injunction (which has been granted to protect its interest) for other improper and collateral purpose of oppression or harming the other party, that would be clearly abuse of process of Court. By voluntary acts of the party who obtains the interim injunction blame cannot be laid at the door of the Court and the argument cannot be sustained that such improper purpose was sanctioned by the judicial order. It must be emphasized that the gravamen of this tort is the abuse or improper purpose in obtaining the legal process and not the legal process itself. If it was a case of mere legal process resulting in damage .to a party, the question of absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice would be relevant and necessary. However, when it is shown that it was not a case of mere legal process causing damage but the improper purpose and abuse of such legal process by a party that has caused damage, no further 54 proof of any other element is required. It was further held as under: 'that the appellant's wrongful refusal without any justification to supply the films had caused and damage to the respondent and, therefore, the case against the appellant was complete and the appellant was liable to the respondent without proof of malice.'

(33) There is no reason for taking any contrary view than what has been expressed by the Gujarat High Court. The facts of that case are totally different and the basic and fundamental distinction between the present case and the Filmistan Distributor's is that in that case an injunction order was obtained and that injunction order was misused which resulted in the closure of the cinema hall. The reasoning given is that the order was used by the party concerned for a purpose for which it was never granted or even intended to be granted; as such, the purpose was collateral, malicious and definitely caused considerable injury and damages to the plaintiff, and in that suit as the cinema hall remained closed for a considerable period.

(34) Counsel for the plaintiff also relied on a decision of Patna High Court in the case of Bachcha Pandey and another Vs. Mt. Deo Sunder Devi and others, Air 1986 Patna 248, wherein the property was attached under Sections 145 and 148 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the person was deprived of his property. The suit was held to be maintainable because the person suffered injury to property and such injury could not be left remedyless. This case is of no help to the plaintiff in the present case. It is certainly proper that in a given case the Court would award exemplary damages or exemplary costs. Such damages are consolatory rather than penal resting upon the principle that, where there is malice, the mental pain caused to the plaintiff must be taken note of.

(35) Some other cases have been- referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the parties but they have no bearing on the present case, inasmuch as they relate to the criminal prosecution or attachment of property under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code.

(36) In view of the above discussion, issues Nos.2 and 7 are decided against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff is not entitled to any amount for damages from the defendant. Issues Nos. 4 to 6

(37) No evidence has been led by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has failed to discharge the onus put on him under these issues. As already noted, Pw I has not really proved the case of the plaintiff under these issues.

(38) The plaintiff was given the benefit of Section 15(2) of the Act by the judgment of the learned Additional Rent Controller. As such the findings on these issues by this Court would hardly be of any consequence. The judgment of the learned Additional Rent Controller has already become final and binding between the parties. The learned Additional Rent Controller and the Tribunal have discussed the case of the parties and made observations, as noticed by me above, that the possibility of the notice being forged could not be ruled out. In spite of this finding, the learned Additional Rent Controller and the Tribunal had decided not to award any costs. Having failed to get any relief in this regard, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to reagitate these issues before this Court because this Court has no jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence adduced before the learned Additional Rent Controller by the parties in those proceedings, and cannot now substitute its judgment in place of the judgment of those Courts. It cannot be disputed that the learned Additional Rent Controller could not pass a decree on the grounds taken by the present defendant before the Controller. However, the said petition was dismissed without costs.

(39) The defendant has put forward the stand that the proceedings taken by her were for reasonable and probable cause and were bona fide. The mere fact that the defendant had failed in the proceedings ipso facto would not constitute a ground for an actionable tort for damages on the ground of abuse of legal process or abuse of process. The plaintiff has a heavy onus to discharge in such suits. Institution of such suits certainly can amount to multiplicity of frivolous litigation and therefore the courts must scrutinise such cases more closely and put the plaintiff to discharge the onus of issues strictly and in accordance with law.

(40) The plaintiff has produced no definite evidence and has made statements which are general in nature. The definite evidence with regard to the withholding of the cheques with the intention and to manoeuvre to create three consecutive monthly defaults has not been proved. The plaintiff has not even led specific evidence. Even the statement of the plaintiff does not specify the basis of the claim. Therefore, I decide issues No. 4 to 6 against the plaintiff. Issue No.1

(41) The defendant in the written statement has not stated as to how the plaint is liable to be rejected. The plain certainly discloses a cause of action as alleged by the plaintiff which has to be adjudicated by the court of 56 competent jurisdiction. The provisions of Order Vii Rule Ii of the Code of Civil Procedure have very limited application and must be confined to the clauses stated in Rule Ii of Order VII. The legislature having made the provisions exhaustive, cannot be given a wider meaning than what is intended. The present plaint does not suffer from any of the legal infirmities or grounds as stipulated under the said provisions. There is a clear distinction in law in a plaint being rejected under Order 7 Rule Ii of the Code and holding on merits that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief because of certain reason.

(42) Therefore, in the present case, I decide this issue in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant holding that the plaint is not liable to be rejected under this provision. Issues No. 8

(43) On the basis of the findings on various issues, this issue is decided against the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.

(44) Though no specific issue has been framed on limitation, but it is a settled principle of law that the court itself can raise the question of limitation in the case. The present suit, as discussed above, is based upon the decision delivered by the learned Additional Rent Controller on the first petition filed by the defendant herein as well as the second petition. The first petition was instituted on 17th March 1970 which was decided by the learned Additional Rent Controller on 23rd April 1974 and the appeal against the same was dismissed vide order dt. 7th January 1978. The claim of the plaintiff which arises from the cause in regard to mental agony and harassment as alleged by the plaintiff is, therefore, for the period April 1970 to March 1978. The suit in this regard could have been instituted within a period of three years, and, as such, the suit would be covered under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. The plaint was filed including this claim on 28th April 1983. As such, this claim of the plaintiff would in any case be barred by time. The claim arising out of the second petition could be entertained, but, as I have already held, the claim is not maintainable. In view of the above discussion, and my finding on Issue Nos.2 and 7, the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.