Universal Cylinder Ltd. vs Gurcharan Singh Rishi Raj
1993 Latest Caselaw 686 Del

JUDGMENT

Jaspal Singh, J.

(1) The facts need not. detain me for long. Major (Retired) Gurcharan Singh Rishi Raj filed a petition under Section 14B of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act) for an order of eviction against his tenant M/s. Universal Cylinder Ltd. which is the petitioner before me. It may be noticed that Section 14B of the Act confers upon certain members of the Armed Forces etc. right to recover immediate possession of premises. During the pendency of the eviction proceedings Major (Retd.) Gurcharan Singh Rishi Raj moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to incorporate yet another ground of eviction enumerated in Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Under the said clause an owner-landlord can seek eviction provided the premises had been let out for residential purpose and the same are required bonafide by him for his own residence and for the residence of his family members dependent upon him. Of course, under the said clause it is also to be proved to the satisfaction of the Controller that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.

NEEDLESS to say the application was contested by the tenant.

(2) The learned Rent Controller by his impugned order allowed the application holding that compelling the landlord to file afresh petition under Section 14(l)(e) would only result in multiplicity of litigation causing delay and that in any case the tenant could be compensated by way of costs. Aggrieved by the said order the tenant company has preferred this civil revision.

(3) The learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to a judgment of this Court in Madan Lal Lamba v. Tirlok Singh Sehgal, 1991(43) Dlt 623 and has contended on its basis that since it had come in the evidence of the landlord that he had with him an independent dwelling unit, therefore, fearing that his petition under Section 14B might be dismissed, he moved the application for amendment .seeking to incorporate yet another ground of eviction. I may hasten to add that in the judgment referred to above which was under Section 14C(2) of the Act relating to a retired Central Government employee, it was held that where the landlord is in possession of an independent dwelling unit the petition would be liable to be dismissed irrespective of the fact as to whether the premises in his possession are sufficient or not.

(4) Whether the landlord in the case before me was prompted to move the application seeking to incorporate an additional ground of eviction by the judgment of this court in Madan Lal Lamba's case or not is, to my mind, of little relevance. The question is as to whether in a pending petition under Section 14B of the Act the landlord can ask for incorporation of another ground of eviction or not. And, it is this question which needs to be answered.

(5) The scheme of Section 14B and Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act would go to show that Section 14B does not cover all the grounds open to a landlord for evicting the tenant, but is confined only to the ground specified in that very section. This being the position. Section 14B falls in a separate class or category from Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14. Section 14B thus cannot debar the landlord from seeking eviction under a clause or provision which falls in a separate category. In any case since the petition under Section 14B is quite at an initial stage, I see no reason as to why the landlord should be deprived of taking yet another ground of eviction, if available to him. It would avoid multiplicity. It would avoid delay. It would avoid unnecessary expenses. Above all, it would avoid inconvenience, not only to the landlord but to the tenant as well.

(6) It is contended by Mr. Sabharwal that earlier too an eviction petition had been filed by the landlord under Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act but the same was dismissed as withdrawn. It may be so. If it provides any defense to the tenant he would be at liberty to raise it. In fact, he can raise all the pleas in defense which may be available to him consequent upon the introduction of a new ground of eviction. I entirely agree with the learned Rent Controller that by allowing the application no such prejudice would be caused to the tenant which cannot be compensated by way of costs. He thus rightly allowed the application with costs. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed. However, no order is made as to costs.