Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Parmod Nath And Ors.
1991 Latest Caselaw 126 Del

JUDGMENT

R.L. Gupta, J.

(1) This regular second appeal has been filed by the appellant along with tills application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

(2) I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on this application to see whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned or not. I am of the view that this appeal is hopelessly barred by time and there is no sufficient ground disclosed in the application to condone the delay. The second appeal has been filed against the judgment of the first appellate court passed on 15.2.90. The file of this case is alleged to have remained with the counsel of the appellant up to 29.9.9U and it was only on that date that the file of this case was sent by the counsel. From the above circumstance, can it be said that the lapse was only on the part of the counsel ? The answer is no. Some duty was cast upon the officials of the Corporation also to procure the file from the counsel. Apparently the file of the case was sent by the counsel after more than 7 months of the decision of the first appeal. If this delay is condoned, I am afraid, then there will be no case in which the delay will have not to be condoned by the courts. It could very well happen in some cases that the file is sent by the counsel to the department not only after 7 months but after a number of years. Is then the whole period to be excluded for computing the period of limitation ? I am of the view that this cannot be the intention of the legislature because in fact if such delays are condoned, it will completely eroda the very purpose of fixing the period of limitation of filing appeals.

(3) The matter does not rest here. It is then alleged in the application that after complying with all the legal formalities of going through the various departments, the file was put up before the Legal Advisor on 23.10.90 and he opined that the appellant had a strong case in spite of the fact that the limitation for filing the appeal had expired. At least it can be inferred from this allegation that the Legal Advisor to the appellant was aware that by the time the file was put up before him, the limitation had expired. In that situation, it was the duty of the Legal Advisor to place the file even personally before the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor (Tax) (AMP) immediately. But unfortunately no such precaution was taken and file was leisurely put up before the Amp only on 14.11.90, i.e. after expiry of a period of more than 21 days. Then in para 3 of the application, it is stated that the case was finally cleared by the Law Officer on 26.10.88. Learned counsel for the appellant says at the bar that this date actually should be taken as 26.11.90 and it has been wrongly typed as 26.10.88. Similarly she submits that the file has been wrongly stated to have been sent to her office for filing the appeal on 22.11.90 and actually it was delivered in her chamber on 29.11.90. Let us presume what she says is correct. It is really surprising to note that it is then stated in the application that since the time the brief was delivered to the counsel by the department, the appeal has been pursued diligently and, therefore, within time. I do not agree with this submission. Even if the brief was received by the learned counsel on 29.11.90, she did not take urgent steps in filing this appeal which (as actually filed only on 11.12.90 i.e. after almost 12 days of the receipt of the brief in her chamber. Each and every day's delay has to be explained while computing the period of limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant cited before me the case of 0. Ramegowda, Major and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and urged that in case of delay caused by the counsel of the appellant in sending the file from his office to the department, the delay should be condoned. I have carefully gone through this authority. In that case the Land Acquisition Officer specifically averred on behalf of the State Govt. that the delay in filing the appeals occured due to the fraud played by and unusual conduct of the concerned Govt. Pleaders who were in office for a particular period. On that account it took quite some time for the Govt. to realise that the Law officers failed the trust reposed in them by the Govt. and that the Govt. would lose more than a crore of rupees on account of said fraud. No such allegation has been made in the present application for condoning the delay. Therefore, the aforesaid authority is not applicable to the facts of the present case. On the other hand, it is observed in this very authority. "The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant, must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it."

(4) Learned counsel for the appellant has neither pleaded in this application nor pointed out at the bar if in the present case the delay in filing the appeal occured due to the fraud played by or any unusual conduct of the concerned counsel or officers of the appellant. Therefore, I am of the view that the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court are not attracted in this appeal. Since no plausible reason has been made out for condoning the delay in filing this appeal, the application as well as the appeal are hereby dismissed in Imline.