S.K. Singh vs Governor, Union Territory Of ...
1986 Latest Caselaw 89 Del

JUDGMENT

J.D. Jain, J.

(1) The facts giving rise to the above mentioned writ petitions which involve common questions of law and fact in brief are that the Air Force Central School, Delhi Cantt. (hereinafter referred to as 'the School'), petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 1160/80 and respondent No. 3 in Civil Writ Petition No. 540/80 is a society duty registered under the Societies Registration Act. It is a recognised private (unaided) school and is governed and regulated by the provisions of the Delhi School 'Education Act, 1973 (for short 'the Act'). Gr. Capt. C. K. Dhawan was the Chairman of its Managing Committee at the relevant time. Wine Commander S. K. Singh, petitioner in C.W.P. No. 540180 (hereinafter referred to as 'the petitioner') was formerly an officer in the Indian Air Force. He retired from service in June 1978. Thereafter, he was employed as a Bursar in the School by its Managing Committee vide letter of appointment dated 11th April 1978. annexure 'B' to C.W. P. No. 540/80. The said letter, inter alia, stipulated that he would be on probation for one year which probation may be extended for another year. It further stated that terms and conditions of his service would be governed by the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules made there under as in force from time to time. However, it clarified that . "Till such time a proper confirmation letter is issued to you, you will be deemed to be on probation and your probationary period will be considered to have automatically been extended. During the probationary period, your services can be terminated without notice without assigning any reason. On expiry of the period of probation, or the extended period of probation as the case may be, you will be considered for confirmation with effect from the of expiry of the said period."

(2) The contention of the petitioner is that even though his performance was very good, the management of the School suddenly issued to him letter dated 14th July 1979 (annexure 'D') staling that his services were terminated with effect from 16th August 1979 because his work during the probationary period had been found unsatisfactory. It further stated that the same be treated as one month notice. Since the purported notice of termination of his service was patently illegal because he stood automatically confirmed in service on the expiry of the period of one year which was the initial person of probation and during which no action had been taken by the Managing Committee to terminate his service or extend his probation, he made a representation against the same vide his letter dated 2nd August 1979 (annexure 'E'). Thereupon, the Managing Committee issued letter dated 18th August 1979 (annexure 'F') informing him that his period of probation was extended for three months with effect from 15th August 1979. Still later he received further intimation from the managing Committee vide letter dated 5th December 1979 (Annexure 'G') stating that the Chairman of the Managing Committee had extended his probationary period from 15th November 1979 to 31st December 1979, Eventually he received letter dated 31st December 1979 (Annexure 'H') from the Chairman of the Managing Committee informing him that his service as Bursar was Further extended until 31st January 1980. However, he also informed him that the same be treated as one month notice of termination of his service. The petitioner lodged a protest and sent a representation dated 17th January 1980 (copy annexure 'l') to the Chairman of the Managing Committee, inter ana, saying mat the termination of his service was absolutely illegal in as much as he stood automatically confirmed on successful completion of probationary period of one year during which no action for terminating his service or extending his probation was at all taken by the Managing Committee. The petitioner also represented to the Director of Education, Delhi Administration, against termination of his service vide letter dated 30th June 1980 (copy annexure 'J') staling that his service had been terminated in complete violation of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. However, his representation fell on deaf ears despite the Principal of the School informing him vide letter dated 1st February 1980 that in case his representation was decided favorably by the Director of Education he would be re-instated in the School as per routine procedure and the fact that the Director did write to the Chairman of the Managing Committee vide letter dated 3rd April 1980 (Annexure "K') that he had taken a serious view of the illegal action taken by him (i.e. Chairman) for termination of the service of the petitioner in complete violation of Rule 120 framed under Section 8(2) of the Act. The Director even directed the Chairman to cancel the illegal orders issued to the petitioner under intimation to him (i.e. the Director). Thus, the case of the petitioner in nutshell is that he having successfully completed his probationary period of one year he stood automatically confirmed and as such termination of the service subsequently under Rule 105 of the Delhi School Education Rules (for short 'the Rules') is unlawful and void. (3) The petition is contested vehemently by respondents 3 & 4, namely, the Managing Committee and the Principal of respectively of the School. However, there was no appearance on behalf of respondents 1 & 2, viz. Lt. Governor and the Director of Education, Delhi Administration. (4) The stand of the respondents 3 & 4 succinctly is that the School is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and is neither a statutory body nor an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is merely a recognised private school and the relationship between the parties was that of master and servant. Thus it is urged that the contract of personal services cannot be specifically enforced and the respondent is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is further averred that Section 8(3) of the Act provides an alternative remedy by entitling an aggrieved employee to file an appeal before the Delhi School Tribunal. However, the petitioner not having availed of the said remedy is not entitled to the discretionary relief by way of writ petition under Article 226. On merits the respondents 3 & 4 have vehemently refuted the contention of the petitioner that he stood automatically confirmed on the expiry of the; initial period of probation viz. one year and asserted that the total probationary period being two years the services of the petitioner were rightly terminated within the stipulated period of probation. It is further averred that even before the expiry of the initial period of probation i.e. one year an order was made by the Chairman of the Managing Committee on 12th May 1979 extending the period of probation of the petitioner for three months. The said order was sent to the Principal of the School and was confirmed vide subsequent communication dated 1st June 1979 (copies annexures R3 & R5). As regards the direction given by the Director of Education, Delhi Administration, vide communication dated 3rd April 1980, the specific stand of the respondents is that he was not competent and had no jurisdiction to issue any such direction because his prior consent was not at all necessary for terminating the service of a probationer teacher of a private recognised school which did not receive any grant-in-aid from the Government. (5) In C.W.P. No. 1160180 the said order dated 3rd April 1980 of the Director of Education as also his subsequent order dated 20th August 1980 is sought to be impugned on precisely the same ground. (6) The law regarding the termination of service of a probationer is well settled by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. It is that where the service rules fix a certain period of probation and the said period can be extended at the option of the employer, the petitioner on being allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the said period without any order of confirmation would be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only in the absence of any communication to the contrary in the original order of appointment. In such a case the express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post and from the mere fact. that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specified period of probation, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed. However, if the probationer completes his maximum period of probation without there being an order terminating his service and he continues to hold the post on. which he is appointed he shall be deemed to have been confirmed automatically by necessary implication. The reason for this proposition is that where on the completion of the specific period of probation the employee is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation, the only possible view to take in the absence of anything to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules is that the initial period of probation has been extended by necessary implication. However, if the probationer is allowed to continue in service even on the expiry of the period beyond which the probationery period cannot be extended he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication and he will be deemed to have been confirmed against the post. (See Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, (1), G. S. Ramaswamy v. The Inspector General of Police, Mysore State, Bangalore, , (2) State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali Khan, State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, Air 1968 Sc 1240(4) and Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat, .(5) In the last mentioned authority the Supreme Court observed that : "There was no right in the appellant to be confirmed merely because he had completed the period of probation of two years and had passed the requisite tests and completed the prescribed training. The function of confirmation implies the exercise of Judgment by the confirming authority on the overall suitability of the employee for permanent absorption in service."

(7) In that case the initial period of probation was two years but it could be extended by one year under the service rules. The service of the appellant therein was terminated after the expiry of two years but within three years, without there being any order of extension of probationary period. A distinction was, therefore, sought to be drawn between a probationer whose G services are terminated on the expiry of the period of two years and a probationer who has completed the normal span of two years and whose services are terminated sometime later after he has put in a further period of service. This contention was repelled by their Lordships who said : "We are unable to see any distinction It is perfectly possible that during the initial period of probation 598 the confirming authority may be unable to reach a delinite conclusion on whether the cai.'d'date should be confirmed or his services should be terminated. Such candidate may be allowed to continue beyond the initial period of two years in order to allow the confirming authority to arrive at a definite opinion. It seems to us difficult to hold that a candidate enjoys any greater right to confirmation if he is allowed to continue beyond the initial period of probation."

(8) These observations in my view squarely apply to the facts of the instant case. Rule 105 which finds place in CnaFtci: VTIl of the Rules relating to recruitment and terms anci conditions of service of employees of the private schools other than unaided minority schools reads as under :    "105.Piobation (1).-Every employee shall, on initial appointinent, be on probation for a p'eriod of one year which may be extended by the appointing c by another year and the services of an employee may be terminated without notice (luring the period of probation if the work and conduct of the employee, during the said period, is not. in the opinion of the appointing authority, satisfactory : Provided that no termination from the service of an employee on probation shall be mad^ by an aided school except with the previous approval of the Director."  

(9) The language of this rule is quite explicit and clear. On its plain language it provides that the initial appointment of a school teacher will be on probation for a period of one year but the same may be extended by the appointing authority by another year. Thus, it was open to the Managing Committee wlio was the appointing authority in this case the" to confirm the petitioner on the exr)irv of the initial period of probation or to extend the period of probation by another year. The mere fact that no order for extension of probation w^s made by the ap- pointing authority v.'ould be of no consequence. As said by the Supreme Court in Dhaniibhai Ramiibhai (supra) that :    "The power to extend the period of probation mv.st not be confused wi'th the manner in 'A^lich the extension "have been effected. The one re1atl- t" n-ower. the other to mere procedure. Merely because procedural rules have not been framed does not imply a negation of the power. Jn the absence of such rules, It is sufficient that the power is exercised fairly and reasonably, having regard to the context in which the power has been granted."  

(10) The instant case stands on a better footing, in that, as seen above, it was specifically mentioned by respondent No. 3 in the letter of appointment that :    'TILLsuch time a proper confirmation letter is issued to you, you will be deemed to be on probation and your probationary period will be considered to have automatically been extended."   

(11) This clarification was obviously made by the appointing authority in conformity with provisions of Rule 105 with a view to apprise the petitioner of the correct legal position. No doubt, the respondents have raised the plea that the period of probation was extended vide order dated 12th May, 1979 i.e. before the expiry of the initial period of probation but I need not go into this question in view of the well settled legal position enunciated above. Hence, I find no merit in this contention of the petitioner.  

(12) The impugned order, however, suffers from end is vitiated by a serious legal infumity as it was not made by the authority competent to do so. Rule 105 clearly contemplates termination of the services of an employee during the period of his probation if the work and conduct of the employee is not, in the opinion of the appointing authority, satisfactory. Thus, termination could be effected only by the appointing authority. Rule 98' which too occurs in Chapter Viii states in terms that the appointment of every employee of a school which would naturally mean a private recognised school shall be made by its Managing Committee. Thus, the service of the petitioner could be terminated only by the Managing Committee of the School and none else. It is well settled that when the language of a statutory provision is plain and unambiguous the Court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequence, for in that case the works of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. In other words, when the language is itself explicit the consequences are for the legislature and not for the courts to consider. Jeewanlal Ltd. and others v. Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act & Others, ]. (6) Undoubtedly the provisions contained in the Act are in the nature of social welfare legislation, their object being (i) to maintain a uniform level and standard of teaching and education in all the recognized schools whether aided or not; and (ii) protect the teaching staff from blackmail or exploitation at the hands of the management or office bearers of the managing committees of the schools. Thus, this particular provision i.e. Rule 105, is intended to ensure security of tenure and protect the teachers of a school from the whims and caprice of the chairman or any other office bearer of the managing committee. Of course, I do not mean to say that the managing committee of a school can never act capriciously and whimsically but there are greater chances of a managing committee acting reasonably and fairly as compared to an individual office bearer like the chairman or secretary. Anyhow, there can be no shadow of doubt that these Rules being statutory in nature it was obligatory upon the Managing Committee of the School to form its own opinion about the work and conduct of the petitioner and take action by way of termination of his service if the same was found to be unsatisfactory. Surely the Managing Committee could not delegate this power to its Chairman or anyone else. A perusal of letters dated 18th August 1979 (Annexure 'F') 5th December 1979 (annexure 'G') and 31st December 1979 (annexure 'H') would show that the same were issued either by the Chairman himself or by the Principal of the School under his authority. They do not purport to have been issued under the authority of the Managing Committee. Indeed, this fact has been candidly admitted by Shri C. K. Dhawan. Chairman of the Managing Committee, in the counter to the writ petition filed on behalf of respondents 3 & 4. Not only has he arrogated himself to the position to the appointing authority in his capacity as Chairman of the Managing Committee but has also claimed to have passed orders extending the probationary period of the petitioner from time to time and eventually making the impugned order dated 31st December 1979. Of course, his stand is that the action taken by him was duly confirmed and ratified by the Managing Committee vide its unanimous decision taken in the meeting held on 12th May, 1980. Obviously the ratification of the action taken by the Chairman on his own which was void ab initio and for that matter non-est has no meaning in the eye of law. It could have hardly the effect of curing the illegality from which the impugned order suffered. I am fortified in the view I have taken by the decision of a learned Judge of this Court in N.C. Gupta v. The Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & others, 1979(2) Slr 98(7). Ovserved the learned Judge (V. D. Misra, J.) that :    "Admitted delay the appointment of the petitioner was by the Managing Committee (respondent No. 3). The probation for a period of one year was fixed by the Managing Committee. The termination in terms of Rule 105 can only be by the Managing Committee. The extension of the probationary period, if any, had to be, in these circumstances, by the Managing Committee itself."  

(13) Hence, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the impugned order of termination of services of the petitioner is absolutely illegal and void.  

(14) The crucial question which would fail for determination then is whether this Court in exercise of its prerogative writ jurisdiction under Article 226 would be competent to set aside/quash the impugned order. The answer to this question would naturally turn on the decision whether the petitioner is an employee of a private institution and their mutual rights and obligations arc governed by the terms of the contract or whether he enjoys an office or status of public employment. The law is well settled that when there has been purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration that the contract of service still subsists would rarely be made and would not be made in the absence of special circumstances; because of the principle that the courts do not ordinarily grant specific performance of contract of service. This is so even in cases where the authority appointing an employee was acting in exercise of statutory authority. The relationship between the person appointed and the employer would in such cases be contractual i.e. as between a master and a servant and the termination of that relationship would not entitle the servant to a declaration that his employment had not been validly determined. (See Francis v. Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur. 0962) 3 All Er 633(8), Barbar v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board. (1958) I All Er 322(9), Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, and Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. However, there are three well recognised exceptions to this general rule under the law of master and servant where such a declaration would be issued, namely, (i) cases of public servants falling under Article 311(2) of the Constitution ; (ii) cases falling under the Industrial Law ; and (i'ii) the cases where acts of statutory bodies are in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. (See Indian Airlines Corporation (supra) and Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others v. Lakshmi Narain and others, ) (II) :

(15) Evidently the case on hand does not fall under categories (i) & (ii) above. It is said to be a case where a statutory body has acted in breach violation of the maidaory provision of slatihory rules. The qestion would, therefore, arise whether a " rit to cerliorari or mandamus would lie against respondents .' ^ 4. In other words, whether the respondent-School can be -..:id to bL a slalutory body or an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In Executive Committee of Vaisli Degree College, Sham'i (supra) the Supeme Court observed that : "BCLORC^ii institution can be a statutory body it must be i.i'eatFu by or under the statute and owe its existence to a slatlitt:. This must be the primary thing which has got to be established. Here a distinction must be made between an institution which is not created by or under a statute but is governed by certain statutory provisions for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution. There have been a minister of institutions which though not created by vi- under any statute have adopted certain statutory provision, but that by itself is not sufficient to clothe the institution with a statutory character. The c in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a c existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body."

(16) Applying his criterion called "structural test", a Division Bench of this Ccurt ha" held in L. R. Sharma v. Delhi Administration & others, (1982) I Slr 526(12), that the Managing Committee of a private recognised school (Shri Mahavir Jain Higher Secondary School) could not be termed a statutory body Prakash Narain, CJ. speaking for the Court observed : "......WHEREthere is an existing managing committee prior to the promulgation of the Rules the existing managing committee has to constitute itself as postulated by Rule 59-. It is not absolutely a new body (as distinguished from th3 existing managing committee) coming into existence. Tt amounts" to the existing managing committee bringing itself in conformity with the scheme of management it has made it esier within 90 days of the approval of the draft scheme submitted by it. Therefore, respondent No. 3 cannot be regarded as being constituted by the Act or the Rules or even being constituted under the Act or the Rules. Its composition is only changed, if at all, to be in conformity with the scheme formulated by it and approved by the appropriate authority in .accordance with the provisions of Rule 59. ...... .Therefore, when the" existing managing committee conformed by reconstituting itself to the approved scheme of management it was following not only the provisions of the Act and the Rules but also the regulations of the Society by which it was bound. This conforming cannot be construed as being constituted by or under the Act and the Rules."

(17) Prior to the aforesaid judgment, a learned Single Judge of this Court held in C.W.P. No. 741174, I.D. Dhawan v. Lt. Governnor, decided on 30th September, 1978 (13), that the managing committee of the school was not a statutory authority. In that case there was not even an earlier managing committee and one had been constituted in accordance with the requirements of Section 5 of the Act read with Rule 59 of the Rules. This view was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 77178, Smt. I.D.Dhawan v. Lt. Governor & Others, decided on 31st March, 1980(14), as being based on the correct approach. Their Lordships observed as under :    "With regard to the Managing Committee of the School, no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable. This is now the. settled law. The Managing Committee of the School by itself is not a legal entity. It is a body created by the bye- laws of the society to which the School belongs. The Society is registered under the Societies Registration Act and so, not amendoble to Writ jurisdiction."  

(18) These observations aptly apply to the facts of the case on hand. Hence, I have least hesitation in holding that the respondent Managing Committee is not a statutory body.   

(19) The Division Bench also applied what it called "functional test" in addition to the "structural test" to find out whether the managing committee of a school is an agency or instrumentality of the Government for carrying on a particular business. Their Lordships noticed the teats for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be instrumentality or agency of Government termed as merely inigative indicia as laid down in Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravarid & others etc., . The various indicative indicia had been culled out from an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in R, Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, and summarised by the Constitution Bench in Ajay Hasia (supra). Applying the said tests the Division Bench came :o the conclusion that the managing committee of the school in the said case could not be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government and, therefore, an authority/State within the meaning of that expression in Article 12. Eventually therefore, their Lordships held that the managing committee of the school therein could neither be called a 'statutory authority' structurally nor could it be regarded an instrumentality or an agency of the Government so as to entitle the petitioner to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence, the writ petition was held to be not maintainable. In view of this authoritative pronouncement which, if I may say so with respect, is binding on me, I hold that the respondent-Managing Committee is neither a statutory body nor an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Hence, the mere fact that the order of termination of petitioner's service has been made in breach or violation of the statutory provision contained in Rule 105 (supra) would not warrant invocation of writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the impugned order of termination of service much less declaring that the petitioner continued to be in service despite the impugned order of termination of his service.

(20) In this view of the matter, therefore. Civil Writ Petition No. 540180 has to be dismissed as not maintainable against respondents 3 & 4. Needless to say that no relief is sought in this petition against respondents 1 & 2.

(21) This brings me to C.W.P. No. 1160180. The sole question which now survives for decision in this petition is whether the Director of Education-respondent No 2 was competent and had the authority to issue direction/order dated 3rd April 1980 (annexure "K" supra) and for that matter his subsequent letter dated 20th August 1980 (annexure "R2" in C.W.P. No. 11601 80). The answer to this question, in my view, is clearly available in Rule 105 which has been reproduced above. The said rule explicitly provides for termination of service of a probationer employee of a private recognised school by the Managing Committee thereof. It does not talk of previous approval of the Director. It is only in the proviso that previous approval of the Director has been made a condition precedent to the termination of the service of an employee on probation of an aided school. Admittedly the respondent-School is not an aided school. So, the proviso will have no application to the case on hand It is a well established rule to interpretation of a proviso that it is normally meant to be an exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. Hidayatullah, J.-. (as his Lordship then was) aptly and succinctly indicated the parameters of a proviso thus : "as a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as staling a general rule."

(22) So, the function of the proviso in the instant case, is to create a special category with regard to private recognised aided schools as distinct from private recognised schools (unaided). The reason for this is not far to seek, namely, that in the case of an aided school enormous grants-in-aid as given by the Government which may sometimes be to the tune of 95 per cent of the total current expenditure of the school. Hence, the legislature in its wisdom thought that a further safeguard to the teachers of aided private recognised schools be provided by attaching the additional condition of previous approval of the Director of Education.

(23) Reliance, however, is placed by the learned counsel fur the petitioner en sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act which enjoins that subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf no employee of a recognised school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director i.e. Director of Education. No doubt, this sub-section deals with the dismissal. removal and reduction in rank of employees of a recognized private school but it opens with the words "Subject to any rule" which clearly imply that the Rules may carve out an exception so as to exempt any category of private recognised schools or any class of employees of private recognised schools from the rigour of sub-section (2). This is precisely what has been done by the rule making authority by enacting Rule 105 which retains the rigour of Section 8(2) in respect of an aided school but not in respect of private recognised school which docs not receive grant-in-aid from the Government. This conclusion is further countenanced by a perusal of Rule 120 which specifically deals with the procedure for imposing major penalties. As in the case of proviso to Rule 105, sub-rule (2) of Rule 120 explicitly ordains that no order with regard to the imposition of major penalty shall be made by the disciplinary authority except after the receipt of the approval of the Director. Thus, on a mere juxtaposition of Rules 105 and 120, it is manifest that while prior approval of the Director is a sine qua non in the cases of major penalties like dismissal, removal from service etc. of an employee of a private recognised school it is not so In the case of a probationer employee of a private recognised school unless it receives grant-in-aid. Hence, the contention of the potilicner that the Director of Education was not competent in the instant case to issue any direction of the nature contained in his order dated 3rd April 1980, has considerable force.

(24) The subsequent letter dated 20th August 1980 of the Director of Education (annexure "R2" in Cwp No. 1160/80) is rather innocuous, in that the Director therein simply declined to make any comment or pass any order on the representation made by the Managing Committee of the School, on the ground that the case of the petitioner was subjudice. Indeed, it does not amount to any order within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 8 or Rule 105.

(25) As a result Civil Writ Petition No. 540/80 is dismissed as being not maintainable against respondents 3 & 4. The only relief sought against respondents 1 & 2 is that an order/direction be issued to them to ensure that respondents 3 & 4 comply duly and promptly with the various provisions of the Act and the Rules made there under. In the view of the matter I have taken above, the question of such an order/direction being issued to respondents 1 & 2 does not arise because they do not come in the picture at all in the case of termination of service of a probationer employee of a private recognised school as provided in Rule 105. As a necessary corollary, Civil Writ Petition No. 1160/80 is allowed and the impugned letter dated 3rd April 1980 of respondent No. 2 to the Managing Committee, respondent No. 3, is quashed as being unlawful and unwarranted by the provisions of the Act and the Rules made there under.

(26) Keeping in view all the circumstances of the case, however, no order is made as to costs.