Union Of India vs Ajit Singh And Ors.
1986 Latest Caselaw 303 Del

JUDGMENT

N.N. Goswamy, J.

(1) This judgment will also dispose of R.F.As. Nos. 379, 423, 350, 351 and 352 of 1971 as all these appeals arise out of a consolidated judgment dated 27/3/1971 whereby the learned Additional District Judge held that lessee was entitled to 75% of the compensation and the Lesser was entitled to 25%. It was further held that the lessee will be entitled to the entire compensation awarded in respect of shifting of stone crusher and cost of kotha. However, in these appeals, there is no challenge to the grant of compensation in respect of stone crusher or kotha. The arguments were confined to the apportionment of compensation for the land only. The Union of India has filed three appeals being R.F. As. Nos. 378, 379 and 423 of 1971 while the lessee Ajit Singh has filed the other appeals being R.F. A. Nos. 350, 351 and 352 of 1971. Both sides have claimed that they are entitled to the entire compensation.

(2) The land which is the subject matter of three awards being awards Nos. 1968, 1969 and 1970 belonged to the Government and has been leased out in favor of Chet Singh & Sons. Ajit Singh and Tilak Raj Sethi sons of Faqir Chand and Union of India were considered to be interested parties. However, Tilak Raj Sethi withdrew from the contest on 5/1/1970. The contest remained only between Ajit Singh on the one hand and the Government of India on the other.

(3) The lease deed executed by the Government of India is Ex. L. 1. A copy of the same has also been produced by Ajit Singh and is Ex. A4. The relevant stipulation regarding the nature of the lease and the period of lease is to the effect that the lease deed was executed in the general form of lease of waste land in Punjab and it also carried a promise of occupancy right. Clause I of Part I of the lease deed is to the effect that the lease shall be for a term of 99 years renewable after every 30 years. The lease deed is. dated 25/1/1950. However, it commenced on 22/8/1949 and was to end on August 21, 2048.

(4) The learned Additional District Judge on consideration of the entire terms and conditions of the lease deed came to the conclusion that the lease was for setting up of film industry which meant that the land had been leased for building purpose and as such impliedly it was a lease in perpetuity. The learned Additional District Judge also agreed that the lease could be compared to the rights of occupancy and as such the Lesser was entitled to a very small share in compensation. Consequently the conclusion was that the lessee will be entitled to 75% of the compensation and the Lesser will be get only 25% of the same.

(5) The learned counsel for the Union of India strenuously argued that the lease though was for 99 years but it was renewable after 30 years which implied that the Union of India had the authority to terminate the lease after 30 years. This contention has only to be rejected in view of the .inter party judgment Ex. A. 1. It appears from the said judgment that the Union of India had terminated the lease on the ground that Ajit Singh had not paid rent in accordance with lease deed and that he had started quarrying of stones and had installed stone crusher. The Government wanted to take possession. Ajit Singh, therefore, brought a suit for declaration to the effect that lease 26/1/1950 subsisted and that the notice dated 23/7/1967 of the Collector terminating lease was illegal, ultra vires and prayed for the issue of permanent injunction restraining the Union of India from taking possession of the land in question. The suit was dismissed by the Sub-ordinate Judge but in appeal the learned Additional District Judge vide his judgment 8/3/1966 reversed the judgment and decreed the suit. It was held that the lease was for 99 years and it was with the permission of the Collector that Ajit Singh was carrying quarrying of stones and that there was no default in respect of payment of rent. From the judgment it could be inferred that the lease could only be terminated on account of default on the part of the lessee. Admittedly no such default has even been alleged. In the circomstances, it has to be held that the lease was for a period of 99 years, and was in the nature of perpetual lease which could not be terminated by the Union of India except in the circumstances mentioned above. This judgment, according to the learned Additional District Judge, operated as res judicata. Reliance was placed for this proposition on various judgments of their lordships of the Supreme Court and no exception could be taken to the settled law by the learned counsel for the appellant Union of India. The next contention of Mr. Mehra learned counsel for the Union of India was that where a grant of land is made by the Government in favor of a person on the specific condition that in the went of Government requiring the land for any reason whatsoever the grantee should surrender the land to the Government without claiming any compensation. This contention is against the settled law and it will be enough to refer to A.I.R. 1965 Mysore 222 wherein it was held that where the Government when enforcing the conditions of grant by calling upon the grantee to surrender possession, starts proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and obtains possession of the land under the statutory provisions, it is not open to the Land Acquisition Officer to deny to the claimant any compensation by relying upon the conditions ..of the grant although compensation was claimable under the provisions of the Act by the claimant. Once the proceedings are commenced under the Land Acquisition Act every subject enjoined by that Act must be taken and every relevant statutory provision contained in that Act must be obeyed. The Mysore judgment was confirmed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Air 1966 Supreme Court 1045. It is no where the case of the Union of India that they have ever asked the grantee to surrender possession of any portion of the land under the lease deed till the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act commenced. Therefore, the judgment of their lordships of the Supreme Court fully covers this contention of Mr. Mehra against him.

(6) Mr. Vohra, the learned counsel, for the Lesser claimant sought to argue that in a lease deed of the type in question, at best, the landlord was entitled to capitalised value of the land on the basis of 20 years rent which in the present case meant Rs. 80.00 per bigha because the rent per annum per bigha was Rs. 4.00 . This was only a half-hearted argument and was not seriously pressed by Mr. Vohra.

(7) We have given our careful consideration to the terms of the lease deed which admitted was carrying a promise of occupancy rights and was granted for film industry and building purposes and we are of the opinion that the learned Additional District Judge was justified in apportioning 75% of the compensation in favor of the lessee and 25% in favor of the Lesser. It is well-settled that where the land lease in perpetuity on a fixed rent is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and the question as to the proportion in which compensation should be divided between the . Lesser and the lessee the court ought to proceed on the principle of ascertaining what was the value of the interest of the Lesser on the one hand with which he has parted and that of the lessee on the other and to apportion the compensation accordingly. In the present case as has been held the lease was for a period of 99 years and was carrying the promise of occupancy rights, the landlord-lesser had no better title than to get the rent agreed upon. In the circumstances, the Lesser was certainly not entitled to more than 25% of the compensation.

(8) For the reasons recorded above, we arc of the opinion that all these appeals have no merit and the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge has necessarily to be upheld. Consequently the appeals are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.