[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Om Prakash Bhatt vs Sharad Tudu (Dead) on 9 March, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:11197
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SA No. 13 of 2025
Digitally
signed by
AMARDEEP
Om Prakash Bhatt S/o Shri Bans Gopal Bhatt Aged About 62
Years R/-27/vv, Vaishnavi Vihar, Phase-1, Uslapur, P.O.- Sakri,
AMARDEEP CHOUBEY
CHOUBEY Date:
2026.03.10
17:19:06
+0530
P.S.- Sakri, Tahsil- Bilaspur, Distt.- Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh)
... Appellant
versus
1 - Sharad Tudu (Dead) Hence Through His Legal
Representatives
1.1 - (A) Kavita Tudu W/o Sharad Tudu Aged About 56 Years R/o
Jyotipur, P.O.- Pendra Road P.S.- Pendra Road, Now Distt.-
Gourela Pendra Marvahi (Chhattisgarh)
1.2 - (B) Nupur Tudu Alias Sana Tudu D/o Sharad Tudu Aged
About 22 Years R/o Jyotipur, P.O.- Pendra Road P.S.- Pendra
Road, Now Distt.- Gourela Pendra Marvahi (Chhattisgarh)
2 - Ramchand Agwani (Dead) Hence Through His Legal
Representatives-
2.1 - (A) Smt. Agwani W/o Lt. Ram Chand Agwani Aged About 60
Years Resident Of Jyotipur Squire, P.O.- Pendra Road, P.S.-
Pendra Road, Distt.- G.P.M. (Chhattisgarh)
2.2 - (B) Amar Agwani S/o Ramchand Agwani Aged About 40
Years Resident Of Jyotipur Squire, P.O.- Pendra Road, P.S.-
Pendra Road, Distt.- G.P.M. (Chhattisgarh)
2.3 - (C) Kishan Agwani S/o Ramchand Agwani Aged About 40
Years Resident Of Jyotipur Squire, P.O.- Pendra Road, P.S.-
Pendra Road, Distt.- G.P.M. (Chhattisgarh)
2.4 - (D) Rohit Agwani S/o Ramchand Agwani Aged About 25
Years Resident Of Jyotipur Squire, P.O.- Pendra Road, P.S.-
Pendra Road, Distt.- G.P.M. (Chhattisgarh)
3 - Suchandra Tiwari S/o Santosh Tiwari Aged About 38 Years
Village- Dhanouli, Tahsil- Pendra Road, P.O.- Pendra Road, P.S.-
2
Pendra Road, Distt.- G.P.M. (Chhattisgarh)
4 - Herikelip Tudu S/o Samual Tudu Aged About 72 Years R/o
Tikarsani (Jyotipur), Tahsil- Pendra Road, P.O.- Pendra Road,
P.S.- Pendra Road, Distt.- G.P.M. (C.G.)
--- Respondents
For Appellant : Mr. Pravesh Bhatt, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Judgment on Board
09.03.2026
1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the
appellant/plaintiff challenging the impugned judgment and decree
dated 13/08/2024 passed by the learned Additional District
Judge, Pendra Road, C.G. in First Appeal No.04A/2019
(Omprakash Bhatt Vs. Sharad Tudu & Ors) arising out of the
judgment and decree dated 24/10/2018 passed by the learned
Civil Judge Class-I, Pendra Road, C.G. Civil Suit No.34A/2014
(Omprakash Bhatt Vs. Sharad Tudu & Ors . For the sake of
convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status
before the learned trial Court.
2. The plaintiffs preferred a suit seeking for permanent and
mandatory injunction, pleading inter alia that the plaintiff is the
owner of land bearing Khasra No. 44, area 0.15 acre, Abadi land,
situated at Village Tikarsani, Pendra Road, P.H. No. 23, R.N.M.
Gaurela, Tehsil Pendra Road, District Bilaspur. The plaintiff had
purchased the said Abadi land on 18.01.1973 from one late
Ahmad Hussain for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/-. Earlier, the
house of the defendants was situated to the north. The
dimensions of the plaintiff's land are 150 ft. towards east, 150 ft.
towards west, 50 ft. towards south, and 19 ft. towards north. It is
towards the northern side of the plaintiff's land the defendants are
attempting to take possession. In front of the house, towards the
west direction, there is a P.W.D. road, and towards the south
direction, there is a lane leading to a pond. There is a courtyard
on the northern side of the plaintiff's house. Behind the plaintiff's
house and after the plaintiff's land lies the land of the defendants
bearing Khasra No. 45/1, which is recorded in the names of the
defendants and their relatives. The defendants' land is situated
behind the plaintiff's land and faces it, while the main road lies to
the west of the plaintiff's land. Because of this, the defendants, by
creating disputes or by issuing threats, are eager to connect a
direct passage from their house to the main road, and they have
repeatedly attempted to do so. The defendants are trying to
illegally occupy a portion of the plaintiff's land bearing Khasra No.
44, area 0.15 acre, particularly the portion adjoining the main
road measuring approximately 50 × 22 ft. The plaintiff further
pleaded that the defendants had filed an application before the
Court of the Tehsildar, Pendra Road under Section 250 of the
Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, wherein they alleged that their
land bearing Khasra No. 45/1, area 0.15 acre, which according to
them is in their right and possession, was being subjected to
illegal construction by the plaintiff with sticks and rods, and that
the plaintiff had dispossessed them from the said land.
3. The defendant No.1 in his written statement, denied all the plaint
averments. He submitted that that Khasra No. 44, area 15 dismil,
is an Abadi land and the same is in the name of Government.
The plaintiff is neither the owner nor the person in possession of
the said land. The plaintiff claims to have purchased the land
from Ahmed Hussain, however, said Ahmed Hussain had no
authority to sell land belonging to the Government. The sale deed
which the plaintiff claims to possess is a forged document, and
therefore the plaintiff does not acquire any legal title or rights on
the basis of such a forged document. The defendant further
stated that the alleged seller mentioned by the plaintiff, late
Ahmed Hussain, was not the owner of the said land, and
therefore he could not transfer ownership rights to any other
person. Thus, the plaintiff is neither the title holder nor the person
in possession of the said land. The plaintiff claims to have
purchased the land from Ahmed Hussain, but Ahmed Hussain
had no right to sell government-owned land. The alleged sale
deed relied upon by the plaintiff is forged, and no legal title can
arise from such a forged document. It is further stated that since
the alleged seller late Ahmed Hussain had no ownership rights
over the land, he could not transfer ownership to anyone else.
Hence, the plaintiff is not the owner nor in lawful possession of
the said land.
4. Defendants No. 02 and 03 also filed their written statement and
stated that Khasra No. 44 is in the name of the Government, over
which about 3 dismil area has a house constructed on it. The
plaintiff was attempting to sell this land in Village Gaurela to
Ishwarchand Bansal, and in this regard Ishwarchand Bansal,
Jyotsnanath, and the plaintiff were negotiating among
themselves. The defendants further stated that the plaintiff has
no land at the site, and Khasra No. 44 belongs to the
Government, over which the plaintiff has no right whatsoever.
5. The learned Trial Court, after framing the issues and upon due
consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by
both parties, as well as the material available on record, dismissed
the suit filed by the plaintiff. The Court observed that according to
the boundary demarcation report dated 26.05.08 (Exhibit P-05), it
was found that the boundary of Khasra No. 44, measuring 70x20
(1400), was occupied by Ramchand and Trilokchandra. It also
observed that as per the orders of this Court passed in WP (227)
307/2018, a new site inspection report was called for and
according to the said site inspection report dated 03.05.2018 it
can be seen that the government land situated in Village
Tikarsani and belonging to Khasra No. 44, with an area of 0.15
dismil. The report further reveals that the said land is adjacent to
the main road, and encroachment was found from east to west,
where houses, courtyards, and shops were constructed.
According to the demarcation, Herikelif Tutu (son of Samuel
Tudu), residing in Village Tikarsani, has encroached on 1.40x6m
of land by constructing a shop and house. Suchand Tiwari, son of
Santosh Tiwari, residing in Village Dhanoili, has constructed a
house on 7.20x6m of land, encroaching upon it. Ramchand
Agwani, son of Trilokchand Agwani, has constructed a house and
shop on 10.40x4.90m of land, encroaching upon it.
Rameshchandra Goyal, son of Ishwarlal Goyal, Shailesh Goyal,
son of Rameshchand Goyal, and Kamla Goyal, wife of
Rameshchandra Goyal, have constructed a house and shop on
21.40x14m of land, encroaching upon it. Lakhan Singh, son of
Bisahu Ram Rathore, has begun construction work by digging a
pit for a house on 5x6.40m of land. Thus, according to the site
inspection report, encroachments on the land of Khasra No. 44
were found by defendant No. 02 Ramchandra, defendant No. 03
Suchand Tiwari, defendant No. 04 Herikelip Tudu, and other
individuals. However, according to the land record of Khasra P-II
for the year 2007-08 (Exhibit P-12), the land is considered Abadi
Land. Therefore, the possession by the aforementioned
defendants cannot be considered legal. Documents, Khasra No.
44 is confirmed as Abadi Land. However, the plaintiff has not
made the Government a party in the suit. Neither revenue
records produced nor pleadings made, by which, the title or
ownership of the alleged seller of land has been proved, whereas
the land in dispute is shown in the record as a government land.
6. Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff filed the Civil
Appeal before the learned Appellate Court who by order
impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the
judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this
appeal by the appellant/plaintiff.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the
learned Trial Court failed to carefully examine the documentary
evidence as well as the oral evidence adduced in the matter. He
submits that the findings of the learned trial Court that the plaintiff
has failed to prove the defendant's interference with possession
appears to be perverse, as it is contrary to the evidence available
on record. He further submits that some of the documents which
are in favour of the plaintiff have not been brought on record by
his counsel in the civil suit and even no proper pleading made in
the civil suit. Hence, he may be permitted to produce the same in
the instant appeal.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material
available on record.
9. In the present case, as per the boundary demarcation report
dated 26.05.2008 (Exhibit P-05), the boundary of Khasra No. 44
measuring 70×20 (1400) was found to be under the possession
of Ramchand and Trilokchandra. Further, in compliance with the
order passed by this Court in W.P. (227) No. 307/2018, a fresh
site inspection was conducted and the report dated 03.05.2018
was prepared. The said report reveals that the land bearing
Khasra No. 44, measuring 0.15 dismil, situated in Village
Tikarsani, is government land adjacent to the main road, and
several persons have made constructions and encroachments
over the said land. The report specifically records that Herikelip
Tudu, Suchand Tiwari, Ramchand Agwani, Rameshchandra
Goyal along with Shailesh Goyal and Kamla Goyal, and Lakhan
Singh have constructed houses, shops, or initiated construction
activities on different portions of the said land. Thus, as per the
site inspection report, possession over portions of the said land
has been found with defendant No. 02 Ramchand, defendant No.
03 Suchandra Tiwari, defendant No. 04 Herikelip Tudu, and other
individuals. Neither revenue records produced nor pleadings
made before the learned trial Court, by which, the title or
ownership of the alleged seller of land has been proved, whereas
the land in dispute is shown in the record as a government land.
10. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely
limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves
a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded
by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings
are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to
settled principles of law.
11. As far as the submission of learned counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff with regard to production of certain documents
in this appeal is concerned, such permission cannot be granted
as a matter of course, nor can additional evidence be introduced
at the whim or convenience of a litigating party. In fact, the
general principle is that the appellate Court should not travel
outside the record of the trial Court as well as the First Appellate
Court and cannot take any evidence in an appeal under Section
100 of the CPC. It is noteworthy to mention here that once trial
had concluded and the decree was under challenged in an
appeal, the appellants cannot be permitted to fill the gaps in their
case by seeking to adduce further material to fortify the claim that
was fundamentally flawed.
12. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate
Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of
evidence available on record, that the appellant/plaintiff failed to
establish its case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The
appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or
misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.
13. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal
essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to
concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any
substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
14. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of
fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not
ordinarily interfere with the said finding.
15. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal
and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the
settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent
finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is
entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded
de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material
documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision
of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting
judicially could reasonably have reached.
16. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for
the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be
regarded as satisfying the test of being 'substantial question of
law' within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions,
in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed
to raise any substantial question of law which is required under
Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not
involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under
Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant
herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial
Court as well as by the learned First appellate Court are just and
proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.
17. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby
dismissed. SD/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Gowri/
Amardeep
