[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Chandrakant Pandey on 26 February, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
Digitally
signed by
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
2026.02.26
16:52:39
+0530
1
2026:CGHC:9924-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 156 of 2026
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary General Administration
Department, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur,
District Raipur Chhattisgarh
2 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Finance Department,
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
... Appellants
versus
1 - Chandrakant Pandey S/o Shri Kamal Prasad Pandey Aged About 34
Years Presently Posted As Assistant Grade I In The Department of
Culture, Nava Raipur, R/o Sector 29 Bunglow No. 32, MIG Room No.
101, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar Nava Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh
2 - Mirza Muskan Baig Presently Posted As Assistant Grade I, In The
Animal Husbandry Department Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
3 - Lokeshwar Kumar Sahu Presently Posted As Assistant Grade I, In
The General Administration Department (Accounts), Atal Nagar, Nava
Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
4 - Lalit Kumar Paul Presently Posted As Assistant Grade I In The
Department of Public Health Engineering, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur
District Raipur Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Praveen Das, Additional Advocate General
For REspondents : Mr. Yashkaran Singh, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
26.02.2026
1. Heard Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General for
the appellants/State on I.A. No.01, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 210 days in preferring the present writ appeal.
2. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the
State/appellants submits that the delay of 210 days in filing the present
writ appeal is neither deliberate nor attributable to any inaction on the
part of the appellants, but has occurred on account of procedural
formalities inherent in governmental functioning. It is submitted that
immediately after passing of the order dated 09.05.2025 in W.P.(S) No.
8453/2022, the matter required administrative examination at various
levels, and thereafter, owing to the filing of Contempt Case (C) No.
1208/2025, the Department was bonafidely pursuing compliance
proceedings before taking a conscious decision regarding assailing the
order under appeal. It is further submitted that upon seeking opinion
from the Office of the learned Advocate General, and after receipt of the
considered legal opinion on 05.01.2026 recommending filing of a writ
appeal, the competent authority promptly processed the matter and
accorded requisite sanction on 07.01.2026. Thereafter, the Officer In-
Charge was immediately appointed and necessary steps were
undertaken for collection of records and drafting of the appeal. Thus,
there has been no intentional lapse or negligence, and the delay is
sufficiently explained by a day-to-day account of events.
3. Learned Additional Advocate General also submits that the State
represents a large administrative machinery where decision-making
involves procedural approvals and inter-departmental correspondence,
which inevitably consume some time. It is contended that a liberal
approach ought to be adopted while considering an application for
condonation of delay filed by the State, particularly when substantial
questions of law are involved in the appeal. It is, therefore, prayed that
this Court may graciously be pleased to condone the delay of 210 days
in filing the present writ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents/writ petitioners opposes the application for condonation of
delay and submits that the delay of 210 days is inordinate and remains
wholly unexplained inasmuch as the appellants have failed to show any
sufficient cause preventing them from filing the appeal within the
prescribed period of limitation under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh
High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006. It is submitted that
mere administrative movement of files and internal correspondence
between departments cannot constitute a valid ground for condonation
of such prolonged delay. The respondent contends that the explanation
furnished is mechanical and stereotyped, and does not disclose any
bona fide or unavoidable circumstance. Hence, the application for
condonation of delay deserves to be rejected.
5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e.
the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal
from an order of acquittal.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC
563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this
Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why
the delay is to be condoned mechanically
merely because the Government or a wing
of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in
a matter of condonation of delay when there
was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction
or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to
be adopted to advance substantial justice, we
are of the view that in the facts and
circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery
and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in
view of the modern technologies being used
and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the
file was kept pending for several months/years
due to considerable degree of procedural red-
tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with
diligence and commitment. Condonation of
delay is an exception and should not be used
as an anticipated benefit for government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no
proper explanation offered by the Department
for the delay except mentioning of various
dates, according to us, the Department has
miserably failed to give any acceptable and
cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a
huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable
to be dismissed on the ground of delay."
7. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while
considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation,
the petitioner has to explain the Court as to
what was the "sufficient cause" which means
an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi,
2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this
Court that even though limitation may harshly
affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied
with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A
reference was also made to the decision of this
Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC
Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this
Court in regard to the condonation of delay.
In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on
time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to
the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit
any mistake in dismissing the delay
condonation application of the present
appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances
of each case and that, the expression
'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally
interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala,
J) was a member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay
should not be excused as a matter of
generosity and rendering substantial justice is
not to cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made
it very clear that we are not going to look into
the merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been
made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross delay
of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the lapse of
the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the parties
started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till
date the respondent has not been able to
reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the delay of
12 years and 158 days and once again ask
the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of
the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own period
of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost
his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the case,
he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred
as against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the
main matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is
only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy
and principles of equity. We should not keep
the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the
head of the respondent for indefinite period of
time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached
to the conclusion that the High Court
committed no error much less any error of
law in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it
has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to
the opposite party. The appellants have failed
to prove that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for
condoning the delay is not satisfied in this
case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the opinion
that the High Court correctly refused to
condone the delay and dismissed the appeal
by observing that such inordinate delay was not
explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was
shown for the same, and no plausible reason
was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are
inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time,
huge revenue loss will be caused to the
Government exchequer. The present case is
one such case, wherein, enormous delay of
1788 days occasioned in preferring the
second appeal due to the lapses on the part
of the officials functioning under the State,
though valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the State to
streamline the machinery touching the legal
issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the
responsibility on the officer(s) concerned,
and penalize the officer(s), who is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses,
etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused
to the Government. Such direction will have
to be followed by all the States
scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the
delay is sought to be explained right from the
time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end
of the same. For example if the period of
limitation is 90 days then the party seeking
condonation has to explain why it was unable
to institute the proceedings within that period of
limitation. What events occurred after the 91st
day till the last is of no consequence. The court
is required to consider what came in the way of
the party that it was unable to file it between
the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a
party is entitled to wait until the last day of
limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows
the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient
cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because of
some event or circumstance arising before the
limitation expired it was not possible to file the
appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can
constitute such sufficient cause. There may be
events or circumstances subsequent to the
expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has
been allowed to expire without the appeal
being filed must be traced to a cause arising
within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh
Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat,
AIR 1981 SC 733)."
8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar
Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government departments are
under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule,
and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all
litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a
select few.
9. Upon considering the matter in its entirety and in light of the
chronology placed on record, we find that though a day-to-day
explanation has been furnished by the appellants, the same essentially
reflects internal administrative correspondence, movement of files
between departments, and procedural formalities culminating in the
grant of sanction on 07.01.2026. The impugned order was passed on
09.05.2025, yet no tangible steps for filing the writ appeal were taken
within the statutory period prescribed under Section 2(1) of the
Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006. The
pendency of Contempt Case (C) No. 1208/2025 or the subsequent
seeking of opinion from the Office of the Advocate General cannot, by
themselves, constitute sufficient cause for condoning such prolonged
delay. The explanation offered does not disclose any unavoidable or
exceptional circumstance which prevented the appellants from
approaching this Court within limitation. Thus, the appellants have failed
to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting condonation of the delay of
210 days.
10. Consequently, we are not persuaded to exercise our discretionary
jurisdiction to condone the inordinate delay. The reasons assigned are
administrative in nature and do not inspire confidence so as to justify
deviation from the settled principles governing limitation. Mere
procedural movement of files and departmental approvals cannot be
accepted as a valid ground for condonation of such substantial delay.
11. In view of the aforesaid, the application seeking condonation of
delay is rejected. As a consequence thereof, the writ appeal stands
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, without entering into
the merits of the case.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu
