Ram Prasad Nayak vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2026 Latest Caselaw 63 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Ram Prasad Nayak vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 26 February, 2026

                                                         1




                                                                              2026:CGHC:9919
                                                                                      NAFR
SOURABH
BHILWAR
Digitally signed by             HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SOURABH BHILWAR
Date: 2026.02.26
18:00:16 +0530


                                            Order reserved on 23-02-2026

                                          Order delivered on 26-02-2026

                                               REVP No. 191 of 2025


                      Ram Prasad Nayak S/o Bhagbali Nayak Aged About 70 Years R/o
                      Shanti Vihar Colony, Dangniya Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh
                                                                                 ... Petitioner


                                                      versus


                      1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Energy,
                      Mantralya Atal Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh District Raipur Chhattisgarh


                      2 - Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited Through
                      Managing Director (CSPDCL), Dangniya Raipur, District - Raipur
                      Chhattisgarh


                      3 - Superintendent Engineer Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution
                      Company (Civil - Distribution) Cercal C-6, Gudiyari Raipur, District
                      Raipur Chhattisgarh
                                                                            ... Respondent(s)

(Cause title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Ms. Surya Kawalkar Dangi, Advocate For Respondent/ State : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate For Respondents No. 2 & 3 : Dr. Veena Nair, Advocate

(HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE BIBHU DATTA GURU) C A V Order

1. By the present review petition, the review petitioner/ writ petitioner

is seeking review of order dated 15/04/2025 passed by this Court

in WPS No.1473/2021 by which the writ petition, filed by the

petitioner questioning the order dated 05/02/2021 passed by the

respondent/ CSPDCL whereby the petitioner was declined to

grant back-wages, was dismissed with an observation that Rule

54-B of the Fundamental Rules (for brevity, 'the FR') would not be

applicable to his case.

2. The case of the petitioner, as projected in the writ petition, is that

the petitioner was initially appointed in the Electricity Board in the

year 1977. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of

Supervisor (Civil) in the year 1995. According, to the petitioner

one Manshukh Lal made a complaint to the Anti Corruption

Bureau, Raipur against the Additional Superintendent Engineer

and the petitioner in respect of illegal demand of bribe and in the

said proceeding, the FIR was registered for the offence

punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988. On account of registration of FIR, the

petitioner has been placed under suspension by order dated

12.10.2007. Since the trial could not be concluded within a period

of 3 years the suspension period has been revoked by order

dated 04.09.2010. In the meantime, after completion of trial, the

petitioner has been convicted by the Court of Special Judge

(Prevention of Corruption Act) Raipur, C.G. Owing to conviction

imposed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioner has been

terminated from the services by order dated 01.04.2013. The said

conviction has been challenged by the petitioner before this Court

in CRA No. 1153/2012, which has been allowed by this Court vide

judgment dated 08.05.2020 and the petitioner has been acquitted

from the charges. In the meanwhile, the petitioner retried from

service on 31-8-2018 on attaining the age of superannuation.

Thus, after acquittal, the petitioner made several representations

before the authorities seeking back-wages, which has been

rejected and petitioner was declined to grant back-wages.

Thereafter the petitioner filed the writ petition challenging the

impugned order dated 05/02/2021 and the same was dismissed

by this Court by the order under review. Against the said order, the

petitioner preferred writ appeal No. 418/2025 which has been

dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court as withdrawn vide

order dated 30/06/2025 reserving liberty in favour of the writ

petitioner to take recourse to law before the learned Single Judge.

Hence the present review petition.

3. (i) Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that earlier

counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has relied upon the

provisions of Rule 54-B of the FR whereas in the facts of the

present case, Rule 54 would be applicable and on the basis of the

said provision, the petitioner is entitled for back-wages during the

period when he was out of service. She would submit that in the

instant case, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the

matter of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore vs. Superintendent

Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat)

and Another reported in (1996) 11 SCC 603 would not be

applicable.

(ii) Learned counsel further submits that the order under review

dated 15.04.2025 suffers from an apparent error on the face of

record inasmuch as the case of the petitioner is squarely

governed by Rule 54 of the FR and not by Rule 54-B, which

pertains only to cases of suspension. She vehemently contends

that the petitioner, having been dismissed solely on account of

conviction and subsequently acquitted on merits by this Court in

Criminal Appeal No. 1153/2012, stands fully exonerated, and

therefore, in terms of Rule 54, the competent authority was

mandatorily required to treat the period from dismissal till

retirement as spent on duty and to grant full pay and allowances.

(iii) According to the learned counsel, the petitioner raised a

specific ground in the review petition that Rule 54 of the FR

makes a clear distinction between honourable acquittal and

acquittal on technical grounds or benefit of doubt, and in cases of

complete exoneration, full back-wages follow as a matter of right.

She would submit that even otherwise, complete denial of pay for

the interregnum period is impermissible under Rule 54, which in

no case permits payment of less than subsistence allowance, and

that the order dated 05.02.2021 was passed without affording any

opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Accordingly, learned

counsel urged that non-consideration of the mandatory mandate

of Rule 54 constitutes a manifest error warranting review. In

support of her contention, she would place reliance upon the

decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Jaipur

Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Others vs. Nathu Ram

reported in (2010) 1 SCC 428 and the decisions rendered by this

Court in the matters of Shankar Lal Soni (died) through LR's

vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others reported in 2021 SCC

OnLine Chh 2722; Rajendra Sharma vs. State of Chhattisgarh

and Others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Chh 2812; and

Santosh Kumar Patnayak vs. State of Chhattisgarh and

Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 1296.

4. (A) Countering the aforesaid submissions of the petitioner,

learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the

present review petition is misconceived and does not disclose any

error apparent on the face of record warranting interference in

review jurisdiction. Learned counsel submits that this Court, while

passing the order dated 15.04.2025 in WPS No. 1473/2021, has

rightly declined the relief of back-wages. Learned counsel would

submit that though Rule 54-B of the FR is not applicable to the

case of the petitioner, as the said provision pertains to cases of

suspension, however, Rule 54 of the FR is equally inapplicable to

the petitioner's case. She contends that the petitioner was

dismissed from service on account of his conviction by the

competent criminal court and not as a consequence of any

departmental proceedings, and mere acquittal in appeal would not

automatically entitle him to claim back-wages as a matter of right.

(B) Placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in

Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), it is submitted that grant

of back-wages is not a natural or automatic consequence of

acquittal. She thus argued that the petitioner is seeking re-

appreciation of the matter on merits under the guise of review,

which is impermissible in law, and therefore, the review petition

deserves to be dismissed. She would place reliance upon the

decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Corp.

Mithilesh Kumar alias Mithilesh Singh vs. Union of India and

Others reported in (2020) 12 SCC 423 and would contend that

merely because there has been an acquittal does not

automatically entitle the petitioner to get the consequential

benefits.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record with utmost circumspection.

6. The order under review was passed by this Court in detail by

assigning sufficient and cogent reasons that too after hearing all

the parties at length. By considering the entire aspects of the

matter in its true perspective and by relying upon several

decisions rendered by the Supreme Court including the decision

rendered in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), this Court

dismissed the writ petition observing thus at para 12 and 13 :-

"12........... it is quite vivid that the petitioner was

convicted by the jurisdictional criminal court for offences

under Sections 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pursuant to which

his services were terminated. However, in the criminal

appeal this court acquitted the petitioner from the

charges. But in the meanwhile, the petitioner retired from

service on 31.08.2018, on attaining the age of

superannuation. However, he has been denied back-

wages, as the respondent CSPDCL was unable to take

the services of the petitioner due to his facing criminal

charges and as such, in light of the principles of law laid

down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in

Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh's

case (supra), Baldev Singh (supra) and Mohammed

Abdul Rahim's case (supra), subsequent acquittal of the

petitioner though obliterates his conviction, does not

operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal

consequences of the conviction and thus, he would not

be entitled for back-wages. Concludingly, it is held that

Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would not be

applicable to the petitioner herein in the present case.

Consequently, Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules

would not be applicable and thus, he would not be

entitled for back-wages.

13. In that view of the matter, I do not find any merit in

this writ petition, it deserves to be and is accordingly

dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s)."

7. From the aforesaid facts, it is an admitted fact that the writ

petitioner could not have remained employed with the respondent

authorities during the said period on account of his involvement in

a criminal case and as such it is difficult to visualize as to how he

would be entitled to pay and allowances during the said period.

His subsequent acquittal albeit obliterates his conviction, does not

operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences. The

entitlement of the petitioner to back-wages has to be judged on

the aforesaid basis.

8. It is the trite law that employee dismissed from service on

conviction and reinstated on acquittal in appeal, he is not entitled

to back-wages for the period of absence.

9. Even if, Rule 54 of the FR would apply to the present case then

also the petitioner is not entitled for any relief as in the said

provision there is no mention of criminal case. For the sake of

convenience, Rule 54 is quoted below :-

"F.R. 54. Pay and allowances on re-instatement. (1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired, is reinstated as a result of appeal or review or would have been so re-instated [but for his retirement on superannuation, while under suspension or not, the authority competent to order re- instatement shall consider and make a specific order-

(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be; and

(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.

(2) Where the authority competent to order re-instatement is of the opinion that the Government servant who had been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired has been fully exonerated, the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (6), be paid full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be:

Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation [within 60 days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him] and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (7), be paid for the period of such delay, only such [amount not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine.

(3) In a case falling under sub-rule (2), the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes.

(4) In cases other than those covered by sub-rule (2), including cases where the order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service is set aside by the Appellate or Reviewing Authority solely on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution and no further enquiry is proposed to be held, the Government servant shall,

subject to the provisions of sub-rules (6) and (7), be paid such [amount (not being the whole)] of the pay and allowance to which he would have been entitled had he not be dismissed, removed or compulsory retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period [which in no case shall exceed sixty days from the date on which the notice has been served] as may be specified in the notice:

[Provided that any payment under this sub-rule to a Government servant, other than a Government servant who is governed by the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936), shall be restricted to a period of three years immediately preceding the date on which orders for re-instatement of such Government servant are passed by the Appellate Authority or Reviewing Authority, or immediately preceding the date of retirement on superannuation of such Government servant, as the case may be.]

(5) In a case falling under sub-rule (4), the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose:

Provided that if the Government servant so desires, such authority may direct that the period of absence from duty including the period of suspension preceding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, shall be converted into leave of any kind due and

admissible to the Government servant.

Note- The order of the competent authority under the preceding proviso shall be absolute and no higher sanction shall be necessary to the grant of-

(a) extra-ordinary leave in excess of three months in the case of temporary Government servant, and

(b) leave of any kind in excess of five years in the case of permanent or quasi permanent Government servant.

(6) The payment of allowances under sub-rule (2) or sub-

rule (4), shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible.

(7) The [amount] determined under the proviso to sub-rule (2) or under sub-rule (4), shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under rule 53.

(8) Any payment made under this rule to a Government servant on his re-instatement, shall be subject to adjustment of the amount, if any, earned by him through an employment during the period between the date of removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and the date of reinstatement. Where the emoluments admissible under this rule are equal to or less than the emoluments earned during the employment elsewhere, nothing shall be paid to the Government servant."

10. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others

vs. Jaipal Singh reported in (2004) 1 SCC 121, held thus at

para 4 :-

"4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the

materials on record, including the judgment and orders

brought to our notice, we are of the view that it is well

accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at

the threshold without detailed reasons therefor does not

constitute any declaration of law by this Court or

constitute a binding precedent. Per contra. the decision

relied upon by the appellant is one on merits and for

reasons specifically recorded therefor it operates as a

binding precedent as well. On going through the same, we

are in respectful agreement with the view taken in

Ranchhodji. If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in

acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest of or

by the department itself, perhaps different considerations

may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee

or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if

after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal

on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any

manner be found fault with for having kept him out of

service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an

offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service.

Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied

upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in

consonance with reasonableness as well. Though

exception taken to that part of the order directing

reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent

has to be reinstated in service, for the reason that the

earlier discharge was on account of those criminal

proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well

within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent

for the period he was not in service. The appellants

cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they

could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High

Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing

back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant

aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of

the High Court insofar as it directed payment of back

wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside."

11. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the matter

of State Bank of India and Another vs. Mohammed Abdul

Rahim reported in (2013) 11 SCC 67.

12. The petitioner is seeking the relief of back-wages after his

acquittal by the High Court in a criminal appeal by relying upon

the provisions of Rule 54 of the FR, whereas the said provision

would not be applicable to the case at hand because the

petitioner's termination was not on account of disciplinary action,

and the claim is not consequent upon exoneration in a

departmental appeal. The petitioner was out of employment and

was terminated during the period of conviction in a criminal case.

Now he is claiming back-wages owing to his acquittal in the

criminal appeal.

13. It is noteworthy to mention here that it was his own conduct of

involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his

not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his

acquittal, he may be entitled to reinstatement for the reason that

his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by

operation of the proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the

situation. However, the question of back-wages would have arisen

only if the respondents had taken action by way of disciplinary

proceedings and the said action was found to be unsustainable in

law, and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging his duties.

The conduct of the petitioner becomes relevant for consideration

of his entitlement to back-wages. In the present case, since the

petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later

acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering service on

account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these

circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back-

wages.

14. In the present case, the principal contention of the review

petitioner is that this Court failed to apply Rule 54 and instead

proceeded on an erroneous premise regarding Rule 54-B.

However, a careful reading of the order dated 15.04.2025 would

demonstrate that the entitlement of the petitioner to back-wages

was considered on merits and declined.

15. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was dismissed from service

on account of his conviction by the competent criminal Court and

not pursuant to any departmental proceedings. His subsequent

acquittal in Criminal Appeal No. 1153/2012 does not automatically

entitle him to back-wages. In Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore

(supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held that acquittal in a

criminal case does not ipso facto confer a right to claim back-

wages for the period during which the employee remained out of

service on account of conviction. The principle laid down therein is

that where the employer had acted on the basis of a subsisting

conviction, the action cannot be termed illegal merely because the

conviction was later set aside.

16. By placing reliance upon the decisions rendered in the matter of

Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) and Jaipal Singh (supra),

the Supreme Court reiterated the same view in Corp. Mithilesh

Kumar alias Mithilesh Singh (supra).

17. The reliance placed by the petitioner upon Jaipur Vidyut Vitran

Nigam Ltd. (supra) is distinguishable on facts. In the said case,

the Supreme Court examined circumstances where reinstatement

followed and the issue arose in a different statutory backdrop. In

the present case, the petitioner had already superannuated and is

claiming back-wages for the interregnum period. The question is

not of reinstatement but of financial consequences for a period

during which he did not render service owing to his conviction by

a competent Court.

18. In the matters of Shankar Lal Soni (supra) and Rajendra

Sharma (supra), the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in

Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has not been considered.

Though in the matter of Santosh Kumar Patnayak (supra) in the

submission of learned State counsel the decision of Ranchhodji

Chaturji Thakore was referred, however, there is no finding about

the applicability of the said decision.

19. Be that as it may, it is well settled that the jurisdiction of review is

extremely limited. In case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati

reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320, the Supreme Court has

categorically held that review is maintainable only when there is

an error apparent on the face of record, and that re-appreciation

of arguments or rehearing on merits is impermissible. Similarly, in

the case of State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta reported

in (2008) 8 SCC 612, it has been reiterated that a review

proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the

case and is confined to correction of patent errors.

20. Further, even assuming that an alternative view is possible

regarding applicability of Rule 54, the same would at best amount

to a debatable point of law and not an error apparent on the face

of record. As held in Kamlesh Verma (supra), a review cannot be

entertained merely because another view is possible.

21. Very recently, the Supreme Court passed the order dated

08/09/2025 in the matter of Malleeswari vs. K. Suguna &

Another reported in AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2490 :: AIR Online

2025 SC 827 has laid down the principles in respect of dealing of

review petition at para 15 which reads thus :-...

"15. It is axiomatic that the right of appeal cannot be

assumed unless expressly conferred by the statute or

the rules having the force of a statute. The review

jurisdiction cannot be assumed unless it is conferred by

law on the authority or the Court. Section 114 and Order

47, Rule 1 of CPC deal with the power of review of the

courts. The power of review is different from appellate

power and is subject to the following limitations to

maintain the finality of judicial decisions:

15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an

appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and

ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate

powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct

all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.

15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule

1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision

to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must

be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be

allowed to be an appeal in disguise.

15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the

correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view.

Such powers can be exercised within the limits

specified in the statute governing the exercise of power.

15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its

own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It

constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a

judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be

altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a

miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable

errors."

22. Applying the aforesaid well settled principles of law and in view of

the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered opinion that

no error apparent on the face of the record has been

demonstrated in the order dated 15.04.2025 passed in WPS No.

1473/2021. The present review petition, in substance, seeks re-

argument and re-appreciation of the matter on merits, which is

impermissible within the limited scope of review jurisdiction. The

principles governing grant of back-wages consequent upon

acquittal were duly examined while deciding the writ petition, and

no ground warranting exercise of review powers is made out.

23. Accordingly, the review petition is liable to be and is hereby

dismissed.

Sd/-

(BIBHU DATTA GURU) JUDGE

$. Bhilwar/ Gowri