[Cites 18, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Devendra Kumar Sahu vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Ors on 6 April, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:3144
NAFR
Digitally signed by
INDRAJEET INDRAJEET SAHU HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SAHU Date: 2026.04.06
17:54:09 +0530
WPS No. 3143 of 2014
1 - Devendra Kumar Sahu S/o Shri Ganesh Ram Sahu Aged About 35 Years
R/o Hathanipara, Bhatapara, PS Bhatapara, Distt Balodabazar-Bhatapara,
Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Urban Administration And
Development Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, Dist Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Joint Secretary Urban Administration and Development Mahanadi
Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, Dist Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Bhatapara, District
Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.
4 - Satish Singh Chauhan S/o Shri J.B.S.Chauhan Aged About 33 Years R/o
C-28, Sector-1, Shankar Nagar, PS Shankar Nagar, Raipur, District : Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner : Shri Ishan Saluja on behalf of Shri Mateen
Siddique, Advocate.
For State : Ms. Isha Jajodiya, Panel Lawyer.
For Respondent No.3 : Ms. Natasha Khan on behalf of Shri Y.S.
Thakur, Advocate.
For Respondent No.4 : Ms. Priyanka Rai on behalf of Shri Abhishek
Thakur, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
Judgment reserved on 19.01.2026
Judgment delivered on 06.04.2026
1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been
filed by the petitioner against the order dated 23.03.2013, Annexure
P/1, which is the appointment order of respondent No.4 on the post of
Revenue Sub Inspector (Unreserved) at Municipal Council, Bhatapara,
and also for quashing his joining letter dated 01.08.2013 and prayed
for following reliefs in the present writ petition:
"10.1) The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the
impugned recommendation order dated 23.03.2013 of
appointment of the respondent No.4 namely Satish Singh
Chauhan, on the post of Revenue Sub-Inspector (Annexure P-1);
10.2) The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the
joining order dated 01.08.2013 of the respondent No.4 namely
Satish Singh Chauhan on the post of Revenue Sub-Inspector
(Annexure-P/2);
10.3) The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the
respondent to consider the candidature of the petitioner for the
post of Revenue Sub- Inspector,
10.4) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and
proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest
of justice."
2. Brief facts of the case are that, an advertisement for appointment on
the post of Revenue Sub Inspector (one post for unreserved category)
was published on 16.11.2012 by the Municipal Council Bhatapara,
District Baloda Bazar Bhatapara. The other posts were also advertised
by the said advertisement, however, in the present writ petition the post
of Revenue Sub Inspector is the subject matter, therefore, only the post
of Revenue Sub Inspector is being dealt with. The requisite
qualification for the post of Revenue Sub Inspector was Graduation
from any recognized University and having passed Post Graduate
Diploma in Computer Application (PGDCA). The last date for
submission of application was 06.12.2012. It was also condition in the
advertisement that employees working as daily-wager/work-charged
employees and temporary employees would be given preference on
the basis of their length of service and they are required to submit the
relevant certificate along with application form. Although a corrigendum
was also issued and last date of submission of application form was
extended up to 10.12.2012, but the said corrigendum was with respect
to other posts of the advertisement.
3. The petitioner considering himself to be qualified for the said post of
Revenue Sub Inspector, applied for the same and submitted his
application form on 04.12.2012 alongwith all requisite documents
under the advertisement. After last date of submission of application
form, when the list of eligible and ineligible candidates were published
by the Municipal Council, Bhatapara, the name of petitioner does not
find place either in the list of eligible or ineligible candidates.
Subsequently, the petitioner came to know about the appointment
order dated 23.03.2013 in which it was mentioned that after
recommendation of District Selection Committee on its meeting dated
15.03.2013, interview was conducted. Since the petitioner was also
one of the aspirant and his name also did not find place in the list of
eligible/ineligible candidates, he made efforts to get the details of his
application form then he came to know that his application form was
suppressed by the respondent authorities showing it to be misplaced.
When he filed an application on 03.10.2013 under Right to Information
Act, 2005, for disclosure of information, the copy of the application form
of the petitioner was supplied to him which proved that petitioner had
duly submitted his application form within time along with all relevant
documents, yet his name has not been find place in the list of
candidates. The petitioner was most suitable candidates and eligible
for appointment on the said post, but his candidature was deprived by
the authorities concerned by suppressing his application form. The
petitioner also came to know that the selection of respondent No.4 was
in a discriminatory manner as father of respondent No.4 namely J.B.S.
Chauhan was the Chief Municipal Officer (in short, CMO) at the same
office i.e. Municipal Council Bhatapara at the time when the
advertisement was issued, however, before issuance of impugned
recommendation order, he was transferred from Bhatapara and there
was every chance of tainted selection respondent No.4 influenced to
the members of selection committee. He also came to know that the
respondent No.4 has submitted his experience certificate allegedly
obtained from Municipal Council Kumhari where his father was posted
and he himself issued the said experience certificate of his
son/respondent No.4 without having any actual experience of work.
Thus, considering arbitrariness in the recruitment process, he filed the
present writ petition claiming the aforesaid reliefs.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that from
the documents supplied to him under Right to Information Act, it is
clearly established that the petitioner had duly submitted his application
form for the post of Revenue Sub Inspector (Unreserved category)
within time and his application form was very much available with the
respondents, yet his application was not considered at the time of
preparation of list of eligible or ineligible candidates. By suppressing
his application form, the petitioner was deprived to participate in the
selection process only to keep him away from the selection process
and to select the respondent No.4 who was an influential person. There
was no reason for the respondents in not considering the application
form of the petitioner in selection process. He would also submit that in
the return, the respondent Municipal Council pleaded that the
application form of the petitioner was misplaced at the time of
preparation of the list of eligible and ineligible candidates, but supplying
copy of same to the petitioner at later stage under the Right to
Information Act itself shows that the said application of petitioner was
very much available with them. He also submits that experience
certificate of respondent No.4 for working with the Municipal Council,
Kumhari, itself is a suspicious document as the same has been issued
by his father who was posted as CMO at Municipal Council Kumhari.
The respondent No.4 has not worked there at Kumhari, but under the
arbitrary exercise of powers his father has issued the experience
certificate. Further, at the time of publication of advertisement for the
post of Revenue Sub Inspector at Municipal Council Bhatapara, the
father of respondent No.4 was posted as CMO Bhatapara and there
was every chance of being influenced to the members of the selection
committee by him. The petitioner was deprived of fair selection process
and prima facie the selection of respondent No.4 appears to be tainted.
Therefore, the impugned order of appointment of respondent No.4 may
be quashed and the respondent authorities may be directed to conduct
a fair selection process for the post of Revenue Sub Inspector
(Unreserved Category).
5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3-Municipal Council
Bhatapara, apart from their return, would submit that at the time when
the list of eligible and ineligible candidates were published, the
petitioner have not raised any objection that his application form has
not been considered. She would further submit that due to clerical
mistake the application of the petitioner could not be considered as the
same went missing at that time. The entire selection process was
conducted in a fair and transparent manner and there is no
arbitrariness in the same.
6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 would also opposes
the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner and submit that
the respondent No.4 had submitted his application form supported by
requisite documents. He was having requisite qualification including
experience of work done at Municipal Council, Kumhari. After having
successful in the interview, he was selected on the post of Revenue
Sub Inspector after recommendation of the selection committee and
PIC meeting dated 25.07.2013. The allegation of tainted selection
process is misconceived as all the procedure have transparently
followed by the authorities. There was no influence from the father of
respondent No.4 and under his official capacity, based on the record,
he issued the experience certificate in favour of respondent No.4. After
due and fair selection process, the name of respondent No.4 was
recommended and he has been appointed, in which there is no
arbitrariness or illegality. He worked there for more than 10 years and
at this stage his appointment cannot be cancelled for no fault of him
and the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed.
7. Learned counsel for the State/respondents No.1&2 would submit that
the State is a formal party in the present writ petition.
8. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material
annexed with the petition.
9. The grievance of the petitioner is that, after publication of
advertisement dated 16.11.2012 for the post of Revenue Sub
Inspector, he filed his application form, but his form has not been
considered at the time of preparation of list of eligible and ineligible
candidates. When the list of eligible and ineligible candidates were
published and the name of petitioner does not find place then he came
to know about the appointment order dated 23.03.2013 in which it was
mentioned that after recommendation of District Selection Committee
on its meeting dated 15.03.2013, interview was conducted. When
despite his efforts he could not get proper information, he made an
application under Right to Information Act to the authorities for
disclosing information about his application form for the applied post of
Revenue Sub Inspector and then the respondent No.3 supplied the
copy of his application form under Right to Information Act on
07.10.2013 (Annexure P/5). From perusal of document Annexure P/5 it
transpires that petitioner had submitted his application form on
04.12.2012 and his application form was very much available with the
respondent No.3/Municipal Council, Bhatapara.
10. The return filed by the respondent No.3 is relevant here to be quoted,
the averment made in paragraph 18 reads as under:
"18. As regards the contents of these paras of the petition, it is
respectfully submitted that the petitioner's application did not
consider due to clerical mistake, which is bonafide and
unintentional. It is further respectfully submitted that the petitioner
did not raise any objection when his name was not mentioned in
eligible and non-eligible candidates."
11. When the respondent No.3 duly received the application form of the
candidates in the selection process initiated by it, they are under
obligation to maintain the records of application forms of each
candidates as each candidates were under the legitimate expectation
of their appointment. The respondent No.3 cannot simply say that due
to clerical mistake the application form of the petitioner could not be
taken into consideration at the time when the list of eligible and
ineligible candidates were prepared, particularly when the allegation
was raised against the respondent No.4 that his father was posted as
CMO at the time of publication of advertisement for appointment on the
post of Revenue Sub Inspector and in the midst of process he was
transferred. Further, in view of the allegation that experience certificate
submitted by the respondent No.4 along with his application form was
issued by his father himself at the time when he was posted as CMO
Municipal Council, Kumhari and the said experience certificate was
also with respect to work done at Kumhari, which prima facie appears
to be arbitrary exercise of his powers.
12. Whether or not the petitioner is being selected or any other candidate
will be selected, but the candidature of a candidate cannot be dropped
in the manner as has been dropped in the present case. Depriving
right of a single candidate from his candidature would affect the entire
process particularly when there are substantive allegation of influence
and arbitrary selection of respondent No.4 is alleged in the case, which
has much force, supported by the documents annexed with the
petition.
13. The issuance of experience certificate in favour of respondent No.4 by
his father is not denied by respondent No.4. He pleaded in his return
that he worked there in the Revenue Department through placement
from September 2006 to July, 2009. However, there is no answer to the
effect that the said experience certificate was issued to respondent
No.4 by his father who was then posted as CMO at Municipal Council
Kumhari.
14. From consideration of overall facts and circumstances of the case as
well as documents produced by the parties and their pleadings, this
court is of the opinion that the petitioner was arbitrarily deprived from
participating selection process by suppressing his application form only
to give appointment on the post of Revenue Sub Inspector
(Unreserved Category) to respondent No.4 whose father was CMO
posted at Municipal Council, Bhatapara at the time of publication of
advertisement and the experience certificate was issued by his father
when he was posted as CMO at Municipal Council Kumhari for the
period September 2006 to July, 2009 and all these exercise of
selection process appears to be arbitrary exercise of powers by the
authorities concerned and against the fair and transparent selection
process.
15. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law
Officers' Assn., (1994) 2 SCC 204 while dealing with the back-door
entries in public appointment observed as under: -
"19. ...The appointments may, therefore, be made on considerations
other than merit and there exists no provision to prevent such
appointments. The method of appointment is indeed not calculated to
ensure that the meritorious alone will always be appointed or that the
appointments made will not be on considerations other than merit. In
the absence of guidelines, the appointments may be made purely on
personal or political considerations, and be arbitrary. This being so
those who come to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can
hardly complain if the termination of their appointment is equally
arbitrary. Those who come by the back door have to go by the same
door. This is more so when the order of appointment itself stipulates
that the appointment is terminable at any time without assigning any
reason. Such appointments are made, accepted and understood by
both sides to be purely professional engagements till they last. The
fact that they are made by public bodies cannot vest them with
additional sanctity. Every appointment made to a public office,
howsoever made, is not necessarily vested with public sanctity. There
is, therefore, no public interest involved in saving all appointments
irrespective of their mode. From the inception some engagements and
contracts may be the product of the operation of the spoils system.
There need be no legal anxiety to save them."
(emphasis supplied)
16. In State of Bihar Vs.Upendra Narayan Singh & Others, 2009(5)SCC
65, it was observed by Hon. Supreme Court in paragraphs 45,50,54
and 67 as under:
"45.Thousands of cases have been filed in the Courts by aggrieved
persons with the complaints that appointment to Class III and Class IV
posts have been made without issuing any advertisement or sending
requisition to the employment exchange as per the requirement of the
1959 Act and those who have links with the party in power or political
leaders or who could pull strings in the power corridors get the cake of
employment. Cases have also been filed with the complaints that
recruitment to the higher strata of civil services made by the Public
Service Commissions have been affected by the virus of spoil system
in different dimensions and selections have been made for
considerations other than merit.
50.In State of U.P. and others v. U.P. State Law Officers Association
and others [(1994) 2 SCC 204], this Court examined the correctness of
an order passed by Allahabad High Court quashing the termination of
the services of 26 law officers and appointment of new law officers.
After noticing the provisions of Legal Remembrancer's Manual which
regulate appointment of Government counsel in the State of U.P. and
the manner in which the respondents were appointed, this Court
reversed the order of the High Court and observed:
"It would be evident from Chapter V of the said Manual that to
appoint the Chief Standing Counsel, the Standing Counsel and
the Government Advocate, Additional Government Advocate,
Deputy Government Advocate and Assistant Government
Advocate, the State Government is under no obligation to consult
even its Advocate-General much less the Chief Justice or any of
the judges of the High Court or to take into consideration, the
views of any committee that "may" be constituted for the purpose.
The State Government has a discretion. It may or may not
ascertain the views of any of them while making the said
appointments. Even where it chooses to consult them, their views
are not binding on it. The appointments may, therefore, be made
on considerations other than merit and there exists no provision
to prevent such appointments. The method of appointment is
indeed not calculated to ensure that the meritorious alone will
always be appointed or that the appointments made will not be
on considerations other than merit. In the absence of guidelines,
the appointments may be made purely on personal or political
considerations, and be arbitrary. This being so those who come
to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain
if the termination of their appointment is equally arbitrary. Those
who come by the back door have to go by the same door. This is
more so when the order of appointment itself stipulates that the
appointment is terminable at any time without assigning any
reason. Such appointments are made, accepted and understood
by both sides to be purely professional engagements till they last.
The fact that they are made by public bodies cannot vest them
with additional sanctity. Every appointment made to a public
office, howsoever made, is not necessarily vested with public
sanctity. There is, therefore, no public interest involved in saving
all appointments irrespective of their mode. From the inception
some engagements and contracts may be the product of the
operation of the spoils system. There need be no legal anxiety to
save them."
54. The Constitution Bench then considered whether in exercise of
power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court could
entertain claim for regularization and/or continuance in service made
by those appointed without following the procedure prescribed in the
rules or who are beneficiaries of illegal employment market and held:
"43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public
employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the
rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly
be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article
14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the
requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution.
Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this
Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that
unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after
a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would
not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual
appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the
contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages
or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is
discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to
be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It
has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary
employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond
the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be
absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the
strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not
made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the
relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular
recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period
of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who
by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right.
The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution,
should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption,
regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment
itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional
scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under
cover of an order of the court, which we have described as
"litigious employment" in the earlier part of the judgment, he
would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made
permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court
may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if
ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it
may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that
ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim
direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular
procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of
paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must
be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the
economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its
instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate
the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.
49. It is contended that the State action in not regularising the
employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law.
The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as
envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have
indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees
had worked for some length of time but this has also been
brought about by the pendency of proceedings in tribunals and
courts initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover,
accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State
would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of
public employment and that would be a negation of the
constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of India. It is
therefore not possible to accept the argument that there must be
a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily
wages. When the court is approached for relief by way of a writ,
the court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it
had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the
very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the
employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made
permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms
of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.
51. The argument that the right to life protected by Article 21 of
the Constitution would include the right to employment cannot
also be accepted at this juncture. The law is dynamic and our
Constitution is a living document. May be at some future point of
time, the right to employment can also be brought in under the
concept of right to life or even included as a fundamental right.
The new statute is perhaps a beginning. As things now stand, the
acceptance of such a plea at the instance of the employees
before us would lead to the consequence of depriving a large
number of other aspirants of an opportunity to compete for the
post or employment. Their right to employment, if it is a part of
right to life, would stand denuded by the preferring of those who
have got in casually or those who have come through the
backdoor. The obligation cast on the State under Article 39(a) of
the Constitution is to ensure that all citizens equally have the right
to adequate means of livelihood. It will be more consistent with
that policy if the courts recognise that an appointment to a post in
government service or in the service of its instrumentalities, can
only be by way of a proper selection in the manner recognised by
the relevant legislation in the context of the relevant provisions of
the Constitution. In the name of individualising justice, it is also
not possible to shut our eyes to the constitutional scheme and the
right of the numerous as against the few who are before the court.
The directive principles of State policy have also to be reconciled
with the rights available to the citizen under Part III of the
Constitution and the obligation of the State to one and all and not
to a particular group of citizens. We, therefore, overrule the
argument based on Article 21 of the Constitution."
67. By now it is settled that the guarantee of equality before law
enshrined in Article 14 is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced
by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality or irregularity
has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of
individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum,
others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior Court for
repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing
wrong order - Chandigarh Administration and another v. Jagjit Singh
and another [(1995) 1 SCC 745], Secretary, Jaipur Development
Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and others [(1997) 1 SCC 35],
Union of India [Railway Board] and others v. J.V. Subhaiah and others
[(1996) 2 SCC 258], Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal
Committee [(1996) 2 SCC 459], State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann
[(1997) 1 SCC 35], Faridabad CT Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services
and others [(1997) 7 SCC 752], Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory,
Chandigarh and another [(1999) 7 SCC 89] and State of Bihar and
others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another [(2000) 9 SCC 94],
Union of India and another v. International Trading Co. and another
[(2003) 5 SCC 437] and Directorate of Film Festivals and others v.
Gaurav Ashwin Jain and others [(2007) 4 SCC 737]"
17. The non-consideration of the petitioner's candidature due to an alleged
"clerical mistake" cannot be sustained in law, as it vitiates the entire
selection process, particularly when the authorities were under an
obligation to maintain proper records.
18. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & others Vs. State of U.P. & Others,
1991(1)SCC 212, in paragraph 36 to 39, the Hon. Supreme Court has
held as under:
"36.The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily
visualized than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an
impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the
facts and in the circum- stances of a given case. An obvious test to
apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging
from the impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasona-
bleness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no
impediment in following that procedure, perform- ance of the act
otherwise and in a manner which does not disclose any discernible
principle which is reasonable, may itself attract the vice of
arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it
follows that an act unin- formed by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law
contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or
caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time
being. It is trite that be you ever so high, the laws are above you'. This
is what men in power must remember, always.
37. Almost a quarter century back, this Court in S.G. Jais- inghani v.
Union of India and Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 703, at p. 7 18-19, indicated the
test of arbitrariness and the pit- falls to be avoided in all State actions
to prevent that vice, in a passage as under:
"In this context it is important to emphasize that the absence of
arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which
our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed
by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive
authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The
rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be
made by the application of known principles and rules and, in
general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen
should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any princi-
ple or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is
the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of
law. (See Dicey--"Law of the Constitution"-Tenth Edn.,
Introduction cx). "Law has reached its finest moments", stated
Douglas, J. in United States v. Wunderlick, (*), "when it has freed
man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler ... Where
discretion is absolute, man has always suffered". It is in this
sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of
caprice. Discre- tion, as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms
in the case of John Wilker (*), "means sound discretion guided by
law. It must be governed by rule, not humour: it must not be
arbitrary, vague and fanciful."
38. After Jaisinghani's case (supra), long strides have been taken in
several well-known decisions of this Court expand- ing the scope of
judicial review in such matters. It has been emphasized time and again
that arbitrariness is anathe- ma to State action in every sphere and
wherever the vice percolates, this Court would not be impeded by
technicali- ties to trace it and strike it down. This is the surest way to
ensure the majesty of rule of law guaranteed by the Constitution of
India. It is, therefore, obvious that irre- spective of the nature of
appointment of the Government Counsel in the districts in the State of
U.P. and the secu- rity of tenure being even minimal as claimed by the
State, the impugned circular, in order to survive, must withstand the
attack of arbitrariness and be supported as an informed decision which
is reasonable.
39. No doubt, it is for the person alleging arbitrariness who has to
prove it. This can be done by showing in the first instance that the
impugned State action is uninformed by reason inasmuch as there is
no discernible principle on which it is based or it is Contrary to the
prescribed mode of exercise of the power or is unreasonable. If this is
shown, then the burden is shifted to the State to repel the attack by
disclosing the material and reasons which led to the action being taken
in order to show that it was an informed decision Which was
reasonable. If after a prima facie case of arbitrarineSs is made out, the
State is unable to show that the decision is an informed action which is
reasonable, the State action must perish as arbitrary."
19. In light of the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the recruitment
process for the post of Revenue Sub Inspector was vitiated by
arbitrariness, lack of transparency, and procedural irregularities. The
unjustified exclusion of the petitioner, despite the timely submission of
a complete application, coupled with the suspicious circumstances
surrounding the selection of respondent No.4, particularly the issuance
of an experience certificate by his father and the possibility of undue
influence, undermines the fairness of the entire selection process. The
respondents failed in their duty to ensure equal opportunity and to
properly consider all eligible candidates. Consequently, the impugned
appointment of respondent No.4 by the appointment order dated 23-
03-2013 (with respect to the appointment of Respondent No. 4, Satish
Singh Chauhan) is quashed.
20. As a consequence of quashment of appointment of respondent No.4,
the respondent No.3-CMO, Municipal Council, Bhatapara, is directed to
conduct a fresh selection process considering candidature of the
petitioner and to pass a fresh order of appointment after conducting fair
and transparent selection process.
21. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is allowed.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
inder
